2nd levels of analysis:
- declining power of 2 empires: austro-hungarian, ottoman
- expansionist domestic politics in Germany

The funnel of time:
Intermediate causes:
- rising nationalism
- balkan wars of 1912 pushed the Turks out, but caused further Balkan conflict
- Serbian nationalism
- Balkan Wars

1st level of Analysis:
- week rulers compared to those in XIX century
- Franz Joseph old and manipulable (by the foreign minister)
- Tsar Nicholas II - obsessed with dom. pol., poor supp from bureaucrats
- Kaiser Wilhelm II - weak blusterer with an inferiority complex
The funnel of Time:
- deep causes: the uneven versailles treaty
Intermediate causes:
- class conflict
- ideological politics
- divided diplomacy (not a breakdown though)
Precipitating causes:
- personal ambition/overconfidence of Hitler
- Aryanism: Hitler ignored the potential of the Slavs and underestimated the strength/ resolve of the US ("it's full of jews")

When doing case study work, ask the what would happen if ... question. For ex., what if there was more diplomatic relations and cooperation?

WWII => Cold War (It's crucial to understand the technological advancement: for ex. nuclear weapons, biological weapons etc.)
The three major thinkers of IR


Edward Hallett “Ted” Carr was an English historian, diplomat, journalist and international relations theorist. He can be considered to be realist in international relations, with his invention of realist-utopian dialectic. He would reject the utopian prospects of the League of Nations and of a world government, and recommend a preparation for the ensuing war that was to come as the result of the unsettled business of the WWI. As a historian, he’s best known for his monumental book called the History of Soviet Russia, which he was working on pretty much all of his life, and which the Guardian referred to as ‘one of the most important works by a British historian this [i.e. the twentieth] century.' His other publications include The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 and Conditions of Peace (1942). After the WWII, Carr saw his role as the theorist who would work out the basis of a new international order. Hence his book The New Society in 1951. Disenchanted with the prospects of cold-war, he increasingly turned towards historiography, where he questioned the prevalent empiricist methods used at the time, and laid his radical foundations for a new kind of historiography in his book called What is History in 1961. When he died in 1982 The Times wrote, 'With the unimpassioned skill of a surgeon, he laid bare the anatomy of the recent past (laboratory of history) ... beyond doubt he left a strong mark on future historians and social thinkers.'

E.H. Carr is best known for his book The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939, 1946), which combines a trenchant critique of Western diplomacy between the two world wars with an influential framework of analysis. Carr’s work is intended to establish the core of which international theory has been discussed in the twentieth century, namely, as an ongoing debate between ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’ or ‘utopians’. Carr did not begin this debate, nor did he stake out his own position clearly within it. What he did do was to demonstrate how two contrasting conceptions of historical progress manifested themselves in international thought and practice. Furthermore, the facility with which he combined philosophical reflection, historical analysis and commentary on current affairs ensured that this book remains one of the classics in the field. ... Chief among these were the beliefs in both the natural harmony of interests (derived from nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics) and collective security. In particular, the latter treated war as a consequence of ‘aggression’ across borders.

Hans J. Morgenthau: Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904 – 1980) was one of the leading twentieth-century figures in the study of international politics. Widely considered the Father of Classical Realism, although Hobbes laid the groundwork for this theory of IR. With his book called Politics Among Nations, he made landmark contributions to international relations theory and the study of international law. In this book, he outlines the six principles of political realism:
But in contrast to the US, the Soviet Union didn’t demobilise, Stalin didn’t hold up Yalta, didn’t give free elections in Poland; the expansionist foreign policy of the USSR was further confirmed: the takeover of Chechoslovakia in 1948, Berlin Blockade 1948-1949 etc., Vietnamese Communist attack in the 1950s

This is the traditionalist account.

Post-war era was never truly ‘bipolar’ - the SU was never a real match to the US, it was weaker in almost every respect than the US. See revisionist account:

**THE REVISIONIST ACCOUNT – US AGGRESSION / EXPANSIONISM**

- Post-war era was never truly ‘bipolar’ – the SU was weaker in almost every respect than the US
- The government was much more concerned with domestic reconstruction than with foreign expansionism
- Stalin tried to / permitted
  - Restrain the Chinese Communists from taking power in 1918
  - Restrain the Greek communists in their uprisings
  - The formation of non-Communist governments in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Iran and Finland

For instance: 10 million people died, the economy was in ashes, the three major cities (Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad) were raised to the ground etc., therefore most of its resources was turned towards the reconstruction of economy, infrastructure ... USSR was therefore a lot more inward-looking.

Even 1st image a lot more nuanced:
Stalin tried to restrain the Chinese communists from taking power in 1949, consent to a non-communist government in 1949. => Be careful with reading of the history, the evil of the Stalin is not that straightforward.
As a student of WP we ask why the actions of human beings cause:
- hunger, war, poverty etc.
- how human beings seek to prevent these things from happening
=> through cooperative efforts.
Key actors (politicians, businessmen, professors, financiers etc.) working together through institutions that create rules and norms (for ex. slavery) intended to regulate and guide future behavior.
Note that while Great Powers must balance (according to Waltz), other logics might guide the foreign policy of other less powerful states.

Evidence?

- During WW2 the US allied itself with the USSR against Germany despite being implacably opposed to Communism.
- Post-WW2, with Germany / Japan no longer a threat, the US once again balanced against the USSR.
- In the Post-Cold War era, with the USSR no longer a threat, the US is beginning to balance against an emerging Great Power
  - First Japan, again, late 80s, early 90s, then the emerging power China

Conclusion: no-one was to blame for the Cold War: it was the structural system itself, it was inevitable. Individual actions are not significant. Only structure counts. Thus through an appreciation of the distribution of power throughout the system we can understand the behaviour of great powers and the likelihood of systemic/total war.
ability to predict the future. Lastly, realism is still relevant – it seems to be the most applicable concept to the conflicts we have between and within states at present time. …

Realism is defined, in general, as placing an emphasis on the acceptance of facts and analysis of their causes and consequences (E. H. Carr 1939), and in politics, as the view that political relations are driven by competitive self-interest. To analyse the contribution of realism to world politics and explain why it is dominant, we must develop an understanding of the philosophical heritage of realism, and its development. Realist thought can be traced back many centuries; for example, in Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 BC) it says, “… the real reason for the war … was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” (Book I, 21-3). This expresses Morgenthau’s second principle, which I will come on to later. Machiavelli’s *The Prince* also expresses realist-like opinions; “… it seems to me better to concentrate on what really happens rather than on theories and speculations…. A ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary,” (N. Machiavelli 1532). While Machiavelli does express what we would define as realist views, as does Thucydides, it would be wrong to suggest that they both subscribe to the realist tradition. Thucydides account of the war for example conveys common sense, and perhaps is more of an empirical account than an attempt at theorising world politics. A more crucial contribution came from Thomas Hobbes, who, with his pessimistic prognosis of the state of nature, described what became the source of the philosophy of classical realism (the view that states act just as self-interested human beings do, on a larger scale). Self-interested individuals without arbitration provoke “continual fear and danger of violent death” (Hobbes 1651: 13). Classical realism is based upon this crucial parallel, and uses it as an explanation for inter-state conflict. Since international relations theory developed relatively late, it is often unsettled, disputed, and difficult to define. Before The Great War (WW1), IR theory concerned the nuances of Great Power rivalry (the history of conflicts and efforts of diplomacy to mediate them) – it concerned empirical investigations researched under fields such as History or Law rather than its own theories of a useful or predictive capacity. WW1 was inexplicable in a way under previous frameworks of analysis, and so IR scholars became entirely concerned with preventing further war. Inter-war Wilsonian Idealism and the liberal faith in democracy failed to appreciate that other states (namely the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan) were not happy with the current system. Executing an idealist foreign policy at that time was wrong: not all states were satisfied to a degree that would prevent the outbreak of further war. Realists have accused liberal idealists of naïveté – their ‘natural harmony of interests’ (Adam Smithian thing) did nothing to prevent war. Come the 1940s, realism’s explanation on the failure of peace was an empirical focus on the creation/subsequent collapse of the League of Nations, the rise of fascism in Europe and Japan in the 1930s and also the ‘fallacy’ of pacifism. However, no theory is without
flaw, and the irrational aggression of the Nazis cannot have been accounted for with any type of rational theory – even realism would not have predicted the dimensions of the dictatorships that had been brewing. Attacks on the idealists’ position were characterised by E. H. Carr, whose *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* has become an original manifesto for classical realism. He contrasts the harmony of interests with the grim reality that between political agents there lies a conflict of interests (E. H. Carr 1939). **Idealism is centred on the notion that we seek common ground and are willing to cooperate with one another, however in truth societies and states are characterised by their individual interests, and pursue power to defend or promote these interests:** “Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers” (E. H. Carr 1939: 76) which leads us to his conclusion that order is based on power, not morality. Realism provided IR with grounds for understanding the chaotic series of events that lead to The Second World War (WW2), in a way that idealism could not. As such, realism quickly replaced idealism as the approach to IR, and continued to be dominant in the years to come.

**After WW2 and up until the 1970s,** classical realism continued to dominate. In Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948), it is asserted that international politics, (like all politics) is fundamentally a struggle for power, accentuated by fear of others gaining it in relative terms [H. G. Morgenthau 1978]), is synonymous with realism and so is often portrayed as its fundamental view. Critics use this to convey theoretical narrow-mindedness, and it is often where the most substantial critiques of realism stem from. However Morgenthau’s third principle is that realism does not give 'interest defined as power' as fixed, but recognizes foreign policy decisions are determined by their political context. In use together, his principles provide a far from dogmatic approach to world politics.

The second of his Six Principles of Political Realism, (political interests are based on the desire for power, accentuated by fear of others gaining it in relative terms [H. G. Morgenthau 1978]), is synonymous with realism and so is often portrayed as its fundamental view. Critics use this to convey theoretical narrow-mindedness, and it is often where the most substantial critiques of realism stem from. However Morgenthau’s third principle is that realism does not give 'interest defined as power' as fixed, but recognizes foreign policy decisions are determined by their political context. In use together, his principles provide a far from dogmatic approach to world politics.

The main criticism of classical realism comes from its assumption that the state itself is the key actor and proponent of IR politics. ‘Neo’ or structural realism responds to this by classifying political agents into three categories: human nature, nation-states and the international system (K. Waltz 1959), with the view that it is the anarchic international system that causes conflict, rather than the nature of the states themselves. States act rationally, to pursue their interests of power and security, but the lack of globally enforceable rules creates conflict in international politics. The Cold War was

Other essays on power are also available on ppe essay drive.

Foucault on power:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMxm-aXAwc4
Maginot line => French thought the next war would be the same, notwithstanding De Gaulle’s warnings.

Hierarchy! Politics first, military second (Check the state of Maginot line) => they wait for command from politicians

The French strategy for WW2 was based on their reading of what happened in WW1 – i.e. outdated. Defensive War. Dig in and wait. Assume the war will be a war of attrition.

Decision-making in political hands – soldiers sit and wait for politicians / the chain of command to tell them what to do.

In 1934 he wrote Vers l’Armée de Métier (Toward a Professional Army), which advocated a professional army based on mobile armored divisions. Such an army would both compensate for the poor French demography, and be an efficient tool to enforce international law, particularly the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade Germany from rearming. He proposed mechanization of the infantry, with stress on the wholesale use of tanks. Ironically the German panzer units, so effectively employed in the invasion of France in 1940, utilized similar theories, while the French dispersed and wasted their armor. The book sold only 700 copies in France, where Pétain Marshall advocated an infantry-based, defensive army, but 7,000 copies in Germany, where it was studied by Adolf Hitler.

German strategic thinking evolved. Facing ‘enemies’ on both sides, a more flexible strategy was demanded. Offensive War. Strike fast through airforce, encircle by tanks and demoralise / destroy the enemy.

**Decision-making in military hands** – no time to get clearance from either the military High Command or from political leaders.
Extended deterrence: prevention of attacks on allies

Would the US really get involved in a nuclear war to save Japan or Taiwan, or Europe...?

US was the sole nuclear power until 1949.

The true significance of nuclear weapons wasn't appreciated until early 1950s
- the dangers of radiation were suppressed by the US gov. for as long as possible.

War - Secrecy – The decline of democracy: key issues in the Cold War, especially the second one.
Mary Kaldor leads the academic community in heralding a definition for **new wars** specifically. According to Kaldor in her book *New and Old Wars*, new wars:

1. are fought by varying combinations of state and non-state networks
2. use identity politics to fight in name of a label as opposed to ideology
3. attempt to achieve political, rather than physical, control of the population through fear and terror
4. are no longer financed through the state but through other predatory means that seek the continuation of violence.

Kaldor’s definition of 'new wars' is made within the context of a wider 'new wars thesis' debate between academics on how to properly define or brand the apparent revolution in warfare in the post-Cold War world. Kaldor purports that new war characteristics must be analyzed within the context of **globalization**. Kaldor does admit that 'new wars' are not necessarily new, in that they have no precedent in history; however, she insists on keeping the term because there is a definite need for new policy responses. Old international strategies have failed to address the characteristics of new wars successfully and instead continue to treat as old conventional warfare. The term is an antonym of **conventional warfare** whereupon conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics are no longer used between two or more states in open confrontation.

Other authors have also attempted to characterize the shift in warfare, but they have chosen to use another descriptor. Recognizing the blur between state and non-state actors and dual conflation of interstate and intrastate conflict, **Frank Hoffman characterizes modern wars as ”hybrid wars”**. John Mueller in *Remnants of War* describes modern warfare as “criminal” and perpetuated by small bands of greedy and predatory thugs. **Martin Shaw chose the term ”degenerate war” to describe how warfare is now directed toward the mass destruction of populations.**

Often, the term "new war" is compared to or defined as **"low intensity conflict"**, a term invented by the US Army which broadly encompasses all modern warfare that don't quite meet the threshold or level of violence found in conventional wars.

Globalisation produces:
Shift in strategy: goal of the war is the complete destr. of enemy (both ideology, both nuclear). Size and population doesn't matter anymore: technology over military force

Objections:
- security dilemma (eveyone is levelled again, same weapons, power)
- when are nuclear weapons "legitimate"?
=> credibility and timing

Nuclear weapon is not always the right strategy (you lose resources in the destroyed country)

In CW nuclear weapons worked: bipolarity, ideological war, enemy must be destroyed, today it's not working maybe.

Terrorism cannot be explained by that.

3) network centric warfare vs geopolitics

Traditionally: states and relations in peace, in war

NCW: rise of transnational terrorist organisations, cyber-war
Danger comes from within the state, not from another state
Change of battlefield (blur between civilians and terrorists).

NCW: is suplement but not a substitute though
- technology (knowledge is power)
=> espionage
- financing [resources?]
- civilians (no control)
- supranational organisations

Old wars: statecraft
=> conflict => policy => go to fight

New wars: integrity, ethnic background, rather than pure ideology and material gains => Ethnic-centric warfare.
Core Assumptions

• **3. individuals are basically good, and have incentives and impulses towards trade, bargaining, negotiation etc.**
  
  — And will cooperate to achieve mutual gains
  
  • Absolute gains — what matters is that everyone gains from cooperation and trade
    
    — China’s economic growth is good because the US is still growing too
  
  • Relative gains — what matters is that my state gains more than any other state
    
    — China’s economic growth is bad because its economy is growing faster than is the US economy

To understand political power right, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions.
• Realism: domestic politics is a black box. State interests are fixed, it's all determined by the international level.

• Liberalism: opens that black box and focuses on the domestic politics (for ex. how domestic political atmosphere formed the EU, rather than something from the top down. Pressure groups promoting export. Change comes from the bottom up! Also case study: 1792-1815

• Liberalist account is a lot more pluralist view on power

Realism vs Liberalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>International System</th>
<th>Key unit</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>How can we create order, hierarchy?</td>
<td>BOP – Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>How can we foster cooperation and interdependence?</td>
<td>International institutions, democratisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Realism vs Liberalism: descriptive vs normative (though that’s not very true)

• Liberal theory of IR is too complex to provide a systemic analysis (while realism is too simple)

• Compare competing theories - when you write your essay compare and contrast, be aware of the limit of your approach.

• Liberalism argues against a natural state of anarchy - states can use international institutions to regulate themselves.

• Constant human progress, modernization.
  => Fukuyama's optimism
  Spread of supranationalism (for ex. European Commission, whereas the European Council is just inter-governmental)

Democratic Peace: As states become more democratic, and hence peaceful, we should promote that?

• Karl Deutsch: nation state is not unimportant, but they would be integrated in pluralist security community, where there would be a balance of power (not an international body, but an arena for mediating conflict). States are not separable from the international system. The stability of such systems cannot be explained without looking at the constituent states.

• The need for institutions - at a state and global level - to protect core liberal democratic values

• Pluralist view of power: the state is just one such group, and is dominated by whichever group or ideology is currently dominant within the state.

• Progressivism, defense of liberal rights, democratisation
**Liberal internationalism 3.0** requires a movement away from a sovereignty-based order towards one where global institutions become the new rulers of the world. While these institutions would be less tied to American power, they would still be driven by liberal values. **The problem is 2.0 is in crisis, but 3.0 is hopelessly unrealistic.**

*If 2.0 fails, we fall back to inter-war-like 1.0 that failed to live up to its promises. If 2.0 is reinvigorated, then global institutions will adapt to the challenge of new emerging powers without losing their distinctively liberal character.*

Huge inequalities between West and the rest: liberal scholars are more preoccupied with the question of preserving the current order rather than reconstituting it according to more just distributive principles.

Liberal international order remain favorable to the most powerful states in the system.

**Conclusion**

- liberal democracy remains an incomplete project
- where do we go now? Some like Ikenberry (2009) say more liberalism.
- But Enlightenment discredited already. Contrary to the hopes of Kant, Hume, Mill, and Paine, the application of reason and science to politics has not brought communities together.
- The universalizing mission of liberal values such as democracy, capitalism, and secularism undermines the traditions and practices of non-Western cultures (Gray 1995)
- some people blame liberalism for generating hierarchies of wealth and power; for ex. in the area of international security almost every organization or treaty is built on inequalities that might be defensible if those institutions were effective.
- some say: not enough liberalism: we should go back to core values and beliefs and reform our international institutions

**Books:**

- Ikenberry (2009) Liberal internationalism 3.0
Immediately after the Second World War international institutions were created to facilitate cooperation in the world economy.

**Bretton Woods**: de-politicisation through functionalism: the US takes the local politics away, by creating international institutions.

The onset of the cold war postponed the operation of these institutions, as the USA stepped in directly to manage the reconstruction of Europe and the international monetary system based on the dollar.
Why Global Society?

- 1990s trends like globalisation, ethnic conflict and identity politics
- Academic focus on gender, religion, culture, democracy etc
- Security redefined
- State as solution became state as problem
- Increased focus on ethics

What is Global Society?

- Loss of ontological separation between national and international
- Focus on IO’s and transnational companies
- Embracing of alternative epistemologies and methodologies

- Threat: original view of the state as unit of protection questioned; states are perceived more as a source of insecurity. (In 20th century more people were killed by their governments than in international wars)
Donald Trump: “We don’t know if they are ISIS, we don’t know if it’s a Trojan horse.”

Cameron: We can’t have more immigration because we can’t cover it financially. Our schools, our hospitals, our public services. The pressures are too great. => That’s bulls—. We could afford it, but he won’t because he is on the political pedestal, he’s using the issue for politics.

Office for Budget Responsibility on Osborne’s claims:
- Immigration is beneficial for the economy

3) Demography

To understand migration you have to understand demography!

Population change = (+) births (-) deaths (+) in-migration (-) out-migration
Europe shrinks. African growth will dominate the next 80 years (4x growth until 2100); Asia's growth will turn back. 5 billion to 4.5.
It's not just a European stuff; in 2015 as yet 215 people died on the US-Mexican border. 2000km Boarder, fire command!

High-Income Countries (HICs)

- 2000-2015 net migration of 4.1 million annually
- 2015-2050:
  - Births / Deaths will add 20 million to the population of the HICs
  - Migration will add 91 million to the population of the HICs
    - or 82% of population growth

=> 82% of population growth will be the result of migration.

Projected Flows: 2015-2050 (more than 100,000 annually)

**Top Net Receivers**
- USA
- Canada
- UK
- Australia
- Germany
- Russian Federation
- Italy

**Top Net Senders**
- India
- Bangladesh
- China
- Pakistan
- Mexico
Drivers of migration

1) globalisation [fragmentation of economic production]: production and trade; highly fragmented production system (production is dissipated amongst countries => causes economic dislocation => people move => creates mobile pool of labor => stronger links between developed and developing countries => underpinned by technological innovation, that is cheap transport and communication

2) conflict and persecution (60 million people)
86% of these people are being hosted in the developing world
=> It affects the poor countries more.

The most fundamental questions
Do porous borders undermine national security? Yes.

People are an indispensable component of state sovereignty – but they can also undermine sovereign institutions

- Allow people to ‘escape’ – eastern Europe
- Allow dissenting communities to grow – Palestinian refugees; Rwandan Patriotic Front in Uganda
- Foster organised criminal networks – ‘people’ smugglers

- Response: strengthen border controls; increase surveillance; develop ‘de-radicalisation’ strategies; discourage migration (Cameron, Trump); coordinate with neighbors (EU debate)
Does migration undermine national identity?

How can we measure whether its good or bad? We can measure the economic impact, but that's not all.

An internal clash of civilisations?

Are our countries monocultures or multicultures?

**Civic nationalism vs ethnic nationalism**

[Previously in ethnic - German, Japanese etc. - , now civic - if you gain citizenship, you are a fully fledged member of the community]. Japan still wants a very homogenous society, it is one of the least multicultural countries of all. Even if you speak Japanese, they don’t really accept you. But they have demographic decline => If they don’t do something miracle, they will lose their economic power soon (even 3% change can have massive impact).

Elsewhere: For ex. 20 per cent of the US army force is non-american. But Jewish lobby in the US is immensely powerful: more muslims than jews yet jews have an enormously inproportionate power: does that enhance or erode national security? Maybe they should support the Arabs, especially because of the oil.

Also, we have diaspora populations and links to the old country that hampers integration.

The ultimate question: Is sovereignty undermined or enhanced?

What we have learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What have we learned?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• That large-scale migration is not new</td>
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<tr>
<td>• That current levels of migration are at an all-time high, driven by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Climate Change (talk more about this next week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• That migration is not going to stop and therefore won’t go away as a political issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• That migration, constructed as a ‘crisis’, can be useful in all sorts of ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- But also, of course, can be a terrible burden on states with low capacity / few resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• That migration can have positive effects – economically, politically, socially and culturally</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Migration won’t go way as a political issue. Migration can have positive effects: economically, politically, socially and culturally, but that’s not the whole story.
• **Globalisation** has caused huge waves of migration around the world.
• Many forms are welcomed by the government
• Especially **tourism** - world’s largest export earner and significant source of employment.
• Number 1 in industry in many countries such as Spain and the Maldives
• Another form of movement that is rapidly increasing is **students enrolled in institutions of higher education outside their origin** (Freeman and Thorn 2006)
• International business travel, overseas employment and certain types of immigration are all encouraged by governments

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• **PUSH AND PULL FACTORS** explain economically motivated migration
• **PUSH**: lack of employment opportunities, low wages, political instability and poverty
• **PULL**: employment opportunities exist, earn higher salaries

• 53,900 attained legal residency in UK (1991) but by 2006, increased to 143,205

• BUT - undocumented border crossers are usually not included in these statistics and met with great opposition from Western industrialised countries such as the USA and UK.

• This explains why many have introduced restrictive immigration policies especially regarding unskilled workers
Potential case studies:

- Pollution
  - Air, water, land
- Biodiversity
  - Animal and plant species – lions and herders sharing land....
- The food chain
  - Production methods (fertilizers; antibiotics)
  - Mono-cropping - rice, wheat, corn & potatoes are responsible for more than 60% of human energy intake; Cavendish bananas & the Fusarium wilt
  - Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
Knowing Nature – challenging the liberal orthodoxy

• 1. David Harvey’s critique of Malthusian ‘limits-to-growth’ (i.e. over-population and the ‘scarce natural resources’ argument)
  – ‘western’ scientific knowledge being used to disguise a political agenda aimed at population control in poor countries
  – The ‘real problem’ was not the amount of resources in the world, but their uneven distribution amongst the global population

• 2. ‘Natural’ disasters: tend to impact most heavily on the disadvantaged in society; responses dominated by ‘techno-fixes’ (walls, containment-chambers, machines, chemicals etc.) – rather than by measures addressing social inequality (New Orleans / Tohoku Earthquake etc.)

Engaging Nature – exploring the relationship between humans & nature

• The physical characteristics of nature are not fixed; they are contingent upon social practices
  – Literature on ‘First one’
    • Amaury de Gannaz’ droughts ‘trigger’ famines, but they don’t cause them. Famines very often occur in situations of food surplus. Lack of ‘entitlements’ (wealth) prevents famine victims buying the food they need in their own communities
  – Literature on ‘Third World Political Ecology’
    • Legacies of colonialism: uprooting of traditional use of resources in favour of cash crops etc. Dependence on colonial / world ‘markets’ and exposure to price risk
  – ‘Environmental Injustice’ in the developed world
    • Toxic risk borne disproportionately by the poor, by racial minorities. Proximity to polluting industries / waste disposal sites etc. – because these communities can’t afford to fight their legal battles – recycling of electronic devices
Why is cooperation so difficult?

• Collective goods vs national interests
  • What benefits all in general may not benefit each individually
  • Clean air may be a collective good, but the temptation is always to ‘free ride’ – to let some other state pay the costs of clean up etc.
  • Costs to developed states are higher – and they’re the ones controlling the negotiations – participatory justice...?
  – All of which leads to a very low ‘floor’ of protection

• Developed vs developing states
  – Outsourcing of production means that developing countries produce emissions on goods consumed in developed countries
  – ‘burden-sharing’: developing countries point to the historical legacy to claim that developed countries should pay more of the costs – corrective & distributive justice...?
  • Thus developing countries should not have to ‘pay’; or they should pay a significantly smaller proportion of the costs
  • BUT: developed countries argue that they cannot be held accountable for the mistakes / policies of earlier generations – and call for a ‘clean sheet’
  • Developed countries have already reaped the benefits of ‘cheap pollution’ – whereas developing countries are being denied these benefits without having either the money or the expertise to develop ‘clean technology’
Thus...

- Exporting ‘revolution’ becomes a key component of Communist strategy
  - Through the creation of the ‘Communist International’ (Comintern: 1919-1943)
    - Drawing in China, Vietnam etc
  - Through supporting anti-colonial liberation movements
    - In Africa and Asia etc.
  - Through Occupation
    - Eastern Europe....
- A very close link between theory & practice; but what happens after Communism collapses?
New Gramscians

Robert Cox (i)
Took Gramsci’s ideas into a critique of orthodox IR theory.

- Developed Gramsci’s ideas into a critique of orthodox IR theory (Realism & Liberalism)
- ‘Critical Theory’ vs ‘Problem Solving Theory’
  ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’
- Tri-partite analytical framework:
  material power, institutions, ideas
- Deployed at 3 inter-related levels:
  social forces, states, world orders
- Key focus on US hegemony post-1945 and the construction of a (neo) Liberal world order
- Hegemony creates a world order through a mixture of coercion (of competitors) and co-opt (of allies)
  Consent is usually to the fore – but coercion is used when necessary
  When coercion becomes the norm hegemony has been lost – and only dominance remains...

Hegemonic block underpinned by American power, then this hegemonic block begins to break down in the 1970s (for ex. The decline of Bretton Woods), US power is not as strong any more, but then Washington Consensus and neo-liberalism. But the appeal (institutional, ideational) has been lost, and the US is more apparently acting self-interestedly.

Stephen Gill (ii)

- Disciplinary neo-liberalism

Mark Rupert (iii)

- Producing hegemony through consent
What really distinguishes?

Marxism vs Realism vs Liberalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>International System</th>
<th>Key Agent/level of analysis</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>How can we create order, hierarchy?</td>
<td>Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>States, individuals</td>
<td>How can we foster cooperation, interdependence and peace?</td>
<td>Institutions, Norms, Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Exploitation, inequality</td>
<td>Revolution</td>
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</table>

- Marxism: concentrates on inequality. Anarchy: global structure: North and South; realists and liberalist would say anarchy.

The Marxist contribution is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Marxism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Holistic (whereas the other two are reductionist): politics and economics together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahistorical</td>
<td>Ahistorical</td>
<td>Historical [materialism]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpret the world (Structural analysis of neo-realism)</td>
<td>Interpret the world (for ex. Doyle’s Democratic Peace Theory)</td>
<td>Change the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Power (preserving the status quo)</td>
<td>Status quo thinking: harmony of interests</td>
<td>Revolutionary Thinking</td>
</tr>
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</table>
his approach and Cox’s and in part because Horkheimer, like Cox and as I would like to do, provides an explicit defence of the enterprise of critical theory.

While the scale of Horkheimer’s critique, engaged as he was with theory per se, is much grander than the stage Cox builds when he focuses on IR theory in the 1981 article, their accounts of “traditional” and “problem-solving” theory are remarkably similar. Cox notes how the power of problem-solving theory stems from its methodological “fixing” of the social and institutional parameters surrounding the variables it examines. For Horkheimer, this method, rooted in Descartes and predominant not only in social sciences but in science generally in his time, stems from the ability of the scholar to abstract him or herself from these social and institutional parameters in the production of theories and analyses. In other words, just as in any production process where a division of labour separates the subjective functions of planning, designing, interpreting, and analysing from the executive functions, traditional theory renders the world under study as objective and passive and the scientist an active, analysing subject.

In their conceptualisations of critical theory, however, Cox and Horkheimer differ slightly but in an important way. While both are concerned to defend theory as an approach to a dynamic and interconnected totality, Cox does not foreground the status of the theorist, while for Horkheimer the critical theorist must engage with theory as a productive process. Cox does take neorealism to task for neglecting the production process in the constitution of national interest (Cox 1981: 134-135) but Horkheimer goes further: it is not a matter of adding another parameter or variable to the theoretical enterprise; it is a matter of understanding the theoretical enterprise itself in relation to and as a part of a general production process and division of labour. When Cox wrote in 1981, the prevailing epistemology in IR and the epistemological commitment of problem-solving or traditional theory was realist: the world exists independently of our thoughts about it and the task of theory is to make thought adequate to reality. What Horkheimer shows is that there is no neat division between thought and reality that can justify the privileged position of the theorist in the social division of labour: our thoughts are part of reality, as real as the city you live in or the job you work at and they must be analysed as part of the general social division of labour and of social reproduction.
Lecture 11: The Globalization of World Politics

- Globalisation? is it interlinked with capitalism? Are Marxist perspectives the most plausible ones? Not necessarily.
• recap of last lecture: Marxism is a crucial player, now more than ever; normative body of work to promote change; reshaping of Marxist literature and apply it to IR

Framing our analysis

International Political Economy: IPE

• Competing concepts and framework of analysis: IPE from 1970s and Globalization (after 1980s)
• Mainstream IR was insufficient to account for global crisis, the economic decline of the USSR as a result => need for International Political Economy (IPE)

They break with tradition, and treat economics as central to understanding international relations; it starts to blur the domestic and the international; it also takes account of domestic sphere (openness, reflexivity etc.). But it’s very liberal approach (again economics reductionism)
Sceptics: globalization is a myth: the world is much less interdependent than it was in the nineteenth century, and remains dominated by states, geopolitics, and Western Capitalism (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Rosenberg 2000).

- increasing regionalization and internationalization
- concentrated within OECD states
- South much less integrated into the global system
- Western capitalism and US hegemony
- responses to the financial crisis demonstrates the centrality of national power

Problem with the sceptics:

- Contemporary phase of glob. has prove more robust in response to the 2008 financial crisis than sceptics recognize.
- Economic reductionism
- Globalization is a multidimensional process: patterns of economic globalization and cultural glob. are neither identical nor simply reducible to one another

(iii) The bah humbug approach: something has changed

(iv) The transformationalists:

- Not everything has changed. But technology has changed something, even if we don’t know what it is exactly is.
- Network societies: they don’t replace the state but they circumvent: not only global, but regional, local.
The challenge posed by the economic geography of regionalism to the financial and geopolitical power of the west

Corporate power = private power => antithetical to the public power of democracy

Evidence? insider dealing (WEF), manipulation of interest rates; bank rolling of political parties and election campaigns etc.; legislation at the WTO - TRIPS, investment measures; TRIMS and GATS: they were all formed by corporal organizations in America; Regional agreements; TPP and TTIP both restrict state power over global corporations

Globalization disrupts the traditional story of development.

Combined yet uneven development

- Globalisation has disrupted the ‘traditional’ logic / trajectory of modernisation
  - Agriculture – mixed factory (Fordist) – services (post-Fordist)
  - More & more frequently production is organised as global commodity chains
  - With large numbers of workers trapped in low wage, low benefits, and unsafe jobs

- Hierarchically linking developments in the core of the glob. econ. with peripheral economies
- Globalization is combined yet uneven

The US, the last hegemon? (shifting back to traditional stuff)
- enormous gap between US military power and the state of the US economy: they manifest some characteristics of a third-world state: high unemployment, underemployment, low paying service sector jobs etc.

Big shift in policy: The US has withdrawn from multilateral institutions: they still turn up but they don’t engage because they don’t expect to win: from unipolar movement to defensive entrenchment.
• PPP - purchasing power parity: 12 per cent of people live on one dollar a day, 80% live on less than 10 dollars a day (2005: since it has come down but it's still huge)

• Extreme poverty (less than or one dollar) is going down slowly – but still affects almost one billion people: especially Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa and South Asia.

• Is something wrong with practical policy? This is after 30 years of developmental policy.

• Though some say it’s heading in the right direction: not because of IMF, OECD countries or World Bank whatever, but domestic policy: China is largely responsible for the decline in extreme poverty between 1981 and 2011: 753 million Chinese people moved above the threshold. But what is the difference between extremely poor and very poor?

‘Extreme’ poverty is going down slowly – but still affects 900 million people

• 2012
  – 12.7% of the world’s population lived at or below US$1.90 per day
    • 896 million people
  – 35% of the world’s population lived below $3.10 per day
    • 2.1 billion people
  – What’s the practical difference between being ‘very’ poor and ‘extremely’ poor?
Marxist critique of development in one slide

A Marxist Critique...

- The language of ‘development’ is misleading
  - ‘human development’ and ‘poverty alleviation’ mask the realities of capitalist expansion
- Capitalism is not yet fully developed
  - ‘Proletarianisation’ has not been fully realised in large areas of the world
  - i.e the ‘world market’ envisaged by Marx is not yet a reality
- Development policies should therefore be seen as attempts not to alleviate poverty but to complete the world market
  - Hence the language of competitiveness used by states, firms, the WEF, IOs, and Universities
  - And efforts to widen and deepen market discipline

Has privatisation gone too far? Less aid comes in than money leaves the country.

What have we learned?

- ‘Development’ is one of those ‘essentially contested concepts
  - No one can agree precisely what it means, although there is a dominant view as peddled by various states and IOs
- Accepting this liberal account (where economic growth is the key measure) has implications – both for policy and analysis.
- One of these is that people can be easily ‘categorised’ (as poor). Thus these people can be subject to surveillance, regulation and control.
- The orthodox view on development accords strongly with Liberal International Theory. However, strong critiques are available (not just from Marxism) and you should familiarise yourselves with some of these.
Deep causes: The global food system
The web of relationships that span the production, processing, trade and marketing of the food we eat. (Clapp, p.2)

Triangle: 1) production (land use, land rantage, water use, chemicals etc.); 2) exchange: how it is traded among continents, what policies drive this; ownership of transnational corporations, horizontal and vertical integration: lot of corporations do everything: produce food, produce the machines, chemicals, possess the market etc. INCREDIBLY RICH area of research 3) Consumption: cultural aspects.

You have to explore each in order to develop a comprehensive critique.

Forming critique: equality, security, sustainability. Does the system produce security, is it sustainable, is it compatible with equality? Can we maintain an efficient system that produce food for all the people? We have an enormous efficient system already, so this not seems to be the problem.
• In the meantime for ex. UK ‘food security’ only possible through trade / colonial exploitation. Food as a national security issue.

The modern food system began post WWII, as a consequence of American power, hegemony

US is not only a major industrial or even post-industrial power, but also one of the greatest producers of agriculture (together with Canada and Australia, followed by the EU). The US push to erode imperial preferences, now European power: it’s a market driven but state supported thing.

• Green Revolution through technology transfer in the 1960s: new techniques, pesticides etc.
• By the 1970s, TNCs (Transnational Political Corporations) had begun to develop global networks of their own: horizontally they spread over the world, vertically they take over every aspect of the food chain - from field to plate)
• TNCs also have enormous political power: through markets, lobby etc.
• Top food importing countries in 2011: China, US, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Russia, Spain, Canada etc.
• Why does the US produce and export that much? It shouldn’t? Nor Germany should be an agricultural power at all. Again, major export country.
• There are other big players, but more than 40 developing countries are dependent on the trade of a single crop (e.g. bananas, rice - y etc.) Thus they are incredibly vulnerable to shifts in the weather, natural disaster, unfree price instability (rapid fall in demand; financial speculation).

Most important characteristics:
• State-led industrial agriculture and international market expansion (they finance particular kinds of food producers whose commodities are good for export) => (The World Trade Organization: EU also entered by fear of developing countries: structural impediments?)
• uneven agricultural trade liberalisation (for ex. Uruguay, Doha Rounds)
  => intellectual property wrapped up in food; marketization of everything then sold back to indigenous people
• The rise of TNCs (using trade legislations for their own ends and integrating vertically)
• The financialisation of food and agriculture (speculation on foods)
2008: Food Crisis overnight
Resistance: re-localisation efforts: food sovereignty in India, Peasant Movements (Transnational La Via Campesina); Fair Trade Movement (Linking developing world to get a fair price for their product); the rise of Green movements (sustainable ecology).

All seek to ‘re-connect’ consumers with producers in more sympathetic relationships that acknowledge (and celebrate) interdependence.

Key characteristics

• State-led industrial agriculture and international market expansion
• Uneven agricultural trade liberalisation
  – Uruguay and Doha Rounds
• The rise of TNCs
• The financialisation of food and agriculture
HOW WE HAVE REACHED THE CURRENT FOOD SITUATION

4 Points

1) State-led expansion of industrial agriculture and international market expansion
   - 1930s – 1980s
   - Rich countries laid the groundwork for the intensification of international agricultural trade

2) Even agricultural trade liberalisation
   - Reduction of farm subsidies in rich countries in return for opening or markets in developing countries
   - However, in developing countries this was a disadvantage
Wendt: There is no true SoN. International anarchy is neither eternally conflictual nor potentially cooperative. Conflict and security are not inevitable: *they are the state themselves that determine the structure or nature of int. anarchy.*

- Conflict or cooperation will be **produced** depending on how two states respond to one another.
- The self-help system can be **transformed** through the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic entities into collective identities.

**States driven by (social) identity and interests** => No prior, given security dilemma prior to social interaction: **SITUATED ACTIVITY (identities are produced in and through situated activity – interaction with other states):** situations change: 40 years ago it was imaginable that Germany and France will go to war, now it’s impossible.

Identities produce collective meanings like social threats -

‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than 5 North Korea nuclear weapons’ - Wendt
legal norms, sovereignty, and human rights. Yosef Lapid (1989) writes that reflectivism has allowed many IR theorists to gain confidence in their scientific credentials by allowing for a great deal of manoeuvrability within the range of what work could be considered scientific. This benefitted the discipline by allowing a great deal of new research to be undertaken that would not have previously been considered legitimate. It is also worth pointing out that some scholars, such as Monteiro and Ruby (2009), consider there to be a difference between anti-positivism and post-positivism based on whether the theory rejects all or just some of the assumptions of positivism respectively. For the purposes of this essay, both viewpoints will be considered as reflectivist because they both critique, on some level, the positivist assumptions.

Critique of the First Assumption:

The first assumption of the positivists carries with it a belief that since the same methodologies apply to both the natural and social worlds, there must be something analogous between natural and social facts, and they can both be utilized as independent variables in said methodologies. This is debated amongst IR scholars with a great deal of dissent coming from those scholars who see social facts as constructed, unlike natural facts, and therefore cannot be studied with the same methodologies. Constructivism utilizes an epistemology that is based on the belief that knowledge is made up of facts which are socially constructed. As mentioned by William A. Gordon (2006), Karl Popper suggested that the social environment is created by humans and is therefore alterable by their decisions and actions. John Searle (1996) further stipulates this with regards to constructivism by writing that constructivism contains the central notion that there is a fundamental difference between brute facts and social facts, with the former representing those which are true independent of any human action, and the latter referring to those which exist because of socially established conventions. Michael Barnett (2005, p.259) refines this by reiterating that social facts are dependent on agreement and uses examples such as money and sovereignty to demonstrate this claim. Alexander Wendt (1992) further argues that those same social facts can be transformed by a wide variety of factors and therefore should be considered a dependent variable which means, in other words, they do not exist in a natural state independent of their context. The constructivists’ critique of this assumption is the observation that the social world cannot be measured with the same methodologies as the natural world because social knowledge is made up of changing, ever-modifying facts and therefore bears no resemblance to knowledge of the natural world as well as the idea that social facts cannot be used as independent variables in the positivist methodologies since they are dependent on their context.

Critique of the Second Assumption:

The second assumption of positivism clings tightly to the belief that facts are separate from values and therefore will remain neutral between theories. Both critical and normative theory oppose this claim because they perceive that knowledge has value to someone or something and therefore cannot be seen as being neutral. Robert Cox is one of the staunch critics of this assumption and demonstrates it in his famous article ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in which he said that ‘Theory is always for someone, and for some purpose’ (1981, p.128). This suggests that social knowledge reflects the time or context in which it was created and therefore knowledge, and the facts the form it, cannot be objective and must contain some aspect of the values of
Intersectionality

Intersectionality: brought in from sociology
We don't have a single identity, we bear multiple identities.
Race, religion, class, gender, ethnicity, ability etc.

Identity Politics...

• Is about the cultural construction of
  – Inclusion, Exclusion & Hierarchies
    • Being in some ‘groups’ automatically excludes you from belonging to another group in the same ‘category’
      – White / Black
      – Rich / Poor
      – Catholic / Protestant
      – English / Foreign
      – Developed / Developing
      – Friend / Enemy
    • Results in Contestation / Struggle / Violence...
      – Boundary politics
        » Transgender politics
        » Politics of migration

Identity: basic definitions

• “A relatively stable and enduring sense of selfhood”
• Identity is
  – Personal: unique to the individual
  – Social: shared with a group
  – Human: shared with all people

• “The understanding of the self in relationship to an “other”.”
  – Identity is always ‘social’
  – Identity shapes interests & actions
  – Identity is subject to change
Today: we only talk about nationality and religion.

Identity politics has always been around: suffragettes; racial equality; religious intolerance etc., but most of these were subsumed (at least for IR scholars) beneath the Cold War struggle.

Why is identity politics more visible now?

Globalization: Promotes/enforces uniformity of experience across the globe: national and cultural differences disappear with massive technological homogeneization.

Identity politics: concerned with the Search for meaning in a meaningless world: an anti-globalisation movement.

Post-Modernity:
- Secularity: is an ideology that leaves a hole in peoples' lives. Modern life seems empty, devoid of meaning (for ex. Leo Strauss). Thus, the search for something that transcends the mundane: and thus the flourishing of counter-cultures, religious fundamentalism, alternative religions etc. Extremist secular ideologies caused enormous suffering in the 20th Century: Communism and Fascism. Hence, a return to religion (for ex. Neo-conservatives)

So, identity politics is everywhere all the time - but how can (and why should we talk about it as an issue in world politics? Two concerns: nationalism, religious fundamentalism or war on terror are the most relevant ones.
Identity comes from many places, two most powerful being religion and nationalism.

**Perspectives on religion**

**Geertz**
symbolic power of religion and its ability to influence how people understand their place in the world.

**Marxist view**
Louis Althusser religion functions as a form of false consciousness.

**Rise of secularism**
forms part of our understanding in modern society.

**Islamic view**
Religion and politics cannot be separated
Emergence of Islamism ideology. Way to be modern without being Western.

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**How do religious beliefs affect Politics?**

- Western conception of religion as being a separate, private sphere from political activity (secularism).
- Talal Asad (1993): Other cultural traditions do not share such a strong distinction between religion and e.g. politics, culture, and economics.
- Religion in global politics most prominent in Islamic world: examples of groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Tupac Amaru.
- Rise of Islamists as WW2 as a way to establish new institutions and technology without becoming westernised.

**Secularism**

- Christian tradition: "Render unto God what is God’s and unto Caesar what is Caesar’s."
- Islamic tradition had no such format theological division, but empires which reflect such a mentality existed.
- Enlightenment closely tethered to Secularism—shift away from relying on religious belief for knowledge, rise of belief in knowledge through rationality.
- Emergence of sovereign states (Peace of Westphalia) associated with secularism. Legitimacy of sovereign to be free from church interference.
Abridged Timeline for the 2008 Crisis

• **November 2008**
  - 10\textsuperscript{th}: China announces a $586bn stimulus package — the largest in the country’s history
  - 10\textsuperscript{th}: The US Treasury increases the AIG bailout fund to $150bn
  - 28\textsuperscript{th}: The World Bank launches a Debt Management Facility to help developing countries prevent debt problems in the future
  - IMF busy in Eastern Europe negotiating standby agreements with vulnerable economies

Abridged Timeline for the 2008 Crisis

• **December 2008**
  - The Fed lowers interest rates to near zero — a move copied the world over
  - January 2009
  - 9\textsuperscript{th}: Irish government bails out Anglo-Irish bank
  - Standard and Poor’s cuts the credit rating of debt issued by Greece, and puts Portugal, Spain and Ireland on its ‘watch list’.
  - 20\textsuperscript{th}: Barack Obama sworn in as US President
  - 20\textsuperscript{th}: IMF predicts global growth rate of 0.5% - the lowest rate since WW2
China is struggling to find a new growth model and its currency devaluation is transferring problems to the rest of the world, Soros said in Colombo. A return to positive interest rates is a challenge for the developing world, he said, adding that the current environment has similarities to 2008."

Etc.

**Financial Globalisation: a history**

- Growth of telecommunications networks
- Growth and spread of TNCs
  - Market integration
- Development of new financial instruments: derivatives (futures, options & swaps)
- August 1971
  - US ends the convertibility of US Dollars into gold
    - To avoid a looming crisis of confidence
    - To boost the competitiveness of US firms
    - To combat ‘speculative’ attacks on the US dollar by private investors
  - Since the mid-60s it had been printing more & more dollars to pay for its foreign & domestic policies
- Oil shock of 1973
  - Petro-dollars’ largely recycled through private banks
Winners and Losers

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juNFgIL8LdU

Financial Crisis

► Financial crisis happened because banks were able to create too much new money, too quickly.

► They used it to push up housing prices and speculate on financial markets.

► Irresponsible lending leads to defaults and crisis. Once in crisis, the system only makes it worse.

► Defaults make banks stop lending, and therefore no new lending means that the money supply shrinks along with the real economy.
Consequences

- North America and Europe were wounded the most by the financial downturn.

- First time since WW2 that there had been a decrease in the volume of world trade.

- Falling house prices, sharp increases in house repossession and the credit crunch that had a catastrophic impact on the volume of credit available for mortgages, business loans.

No actions have been taken to try to prevent similar crises from taking place in the future.
Gramsci’s Work

• In line with Critical Theorists
  – Critical of positivism and economism
• Gramsci’s Historical Materialism
  – Departed from classical / orthodox Marxism’s focus on the forces of production (i.e. the economic ‘base’)
  – Focused instead on the relations of production (i.e. the political superstructure)
    • the realm of the arts, of culture, religion and myth

Gramsci: social and cultural critique in his early life, for ex. how certain art forms are embedded in capitalism; then concern with the rise of fascism.

Western Marxism: focus on superstructure; Eastern: Economic Base. But not separate; for ex. they critique the superstructure in order to challenge the base.

Hegemony:
Power is as much about ‘persuasion’ as it is about ‘coercion’
Power is about manufacturing ‘consent’

Integral State:
The state = political society + civil society, or ‘hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’

War of Movement:
Struggle conducted on a range of fronts, involving wide-ranging social organisation and cultural influence

Historic Bloc:
Mutually reinforcing relationship between the base (socio-economic relations) and the superstructure (political & cultural practices)
Transformations affecting the community

There is no universal truth, but

A cosmopolitan world

The opening up of possibilities for a more cosmopolitan world: a multilayered government. The move towards cosmopolitanism won't be made in a single bound. They see this already emerging: three overlapping international society.

Three overlapping forms of international society:

1) A pluralist society of states bound together by principle of co-existence (cf. the English School),
2) Solidarist society of states that agree on substantive moral purposes (cf. Wilsonian Liberalism)
3) Post-Westphalian framework where states give up some of their sov. powers so as to institutionalise shared political and moral norms.

Stress on dialogue as a means of achieving this (influenced by Habermas).

Post-structuralism

A big varied field of scholarship. There is no post-structural theory of IR, it's a critical orientation, a set of techniques etc.
Book on the major figures of all critical theory.

It's a reaction to/symptom of: the Vietnamese war, anti-colonial struggles, student uprisings in France, Third World calls for economic justice.

**Key features**

*Post-positivism*

Post-positivism: an attack on the ontological and epistemological foundations of positivism: rooted in the account of science associated with the Enlightenment, and with mainstream theories of IR for our purposes.

3 key positivist assumptions:

1) **Epistemic realism**: the view that there is a world external to and independent of the observer - the separation of subject and object
2) **A universal language of science** that is value-neutral, rendering the world describable in objective terms
3) **A correspondence theory of truth**
   That the observer can capture the facts of the world in statements that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not
Anti-foundationalism

• P-S begins from the notion that there is no single, essential ‘truth’
  – If ‘truth’ is illusory, the search for it is a waste of effort
• This is ‘anti-foundationalism’
  – There is no ‘truth’ in which we can ground our arguments concerning world politics
    • Contra Realist claims that the sovereign state & anarchy constitute the defining features of world politics / IR
    • Contra Marxist claims that class and class struggle under capitalism are defining features etc...
    • Contra ethical claims grounded in appeals to ‘universal’ human rights etc...
**Children**

By 2050 there will be around 10 billion people, more than 20 per cent will be under 18. 1 in 3 children in the world do not have a legal identity, hence cannot access a lot of things, like banks.

Rich vs poor, city vs rural

Food deprivation, lack of opportunity for e.g. in education, they are also exposed to the brunt of climate change, environmental degradation => children will pay the price.

Technology:
Increasingly everywhere but expensive: online education excludes the poor.
Social Media: exposes children to both economic marketing and sexual abuse.

Fragility/Social unrest:
Children are increasingly exposed to exploitation, rape etc.

**Women**

Seminar on Children and Women

Waltz: Man, State, War

“Mankind”: already gender-biased; anthropomorphize the state

Realist:
High politics (military, defense, state survival)
Low politics (economy, domestic politics in general)

Gender citation gap

Keynes: Beauty contest
Bet on the winner: a bad approach is to follow your taste, a good is to realize who others vote for.
Performative action - reinforcing assumptions - objectification - unnecessary categories.

What would a gender critique say about that?

Objectification of women like stock, commodification. Dehumanizing.

Objects of view to vote for.

Small variety: beauty standard.

“Rational expectations: male quality.”

The question itself is performative: it reinforces the problem. We should get rid of the categories =>
Social constructivism (ideational change)

Discourse we are brought up with: power that lies within the discourse (Foucault Regimes of Truth).