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Primitivo Mijares' Testimony in US Congress

"After our last footnote updating this paper, Marcos' top confidential press man, Primitivo Mijares, Chairman of the Media Advisory Council and twice President of the National Press Club with Marcos' support, testified in the U.S. (House) Subcommittee on International Organizations which held hearings on violations of human rights in South Korea and the Philippines. Mr. Marcos attempted to bribe Mijares with \$100,000 not to testify but the latter spumed the bribe. Marcos denied the attempted bribery but from a scrutiny of Mijares' testimony, the statement of denial and the circumstances described, the probability favors Mijares. Mr. Marcos denied mainly the reported bribery but not the contents of the testimony of his erstwhile confidential press man. Considering that Mijares was an "insider" in the Philippines, Mijares' testimony carries much weight.


Diosdado Macapagal Statement

"If Mijares were not credible, he would not have merited refutation by Mr. Marcos himself as well as a formal exculpatory inquiry into the Mijares charges by the senior Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs " — *DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, former President of the Philippines, in his latest book, Democracy in the Philippines.*

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

Tibo was both a star witness and active participant in the greatest single upheaval to hit the Philippines. The full story is, of course, in this book.

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Original Cover of the 1976 Edition

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

utilizing them as links to heretofore unrevealed facets of the various ruses that Marcos employed to establish his dictatorship.

Now, I have kept faith with the Filipino people. I have kept my rendezvous with history. I have, with this work, discharged my obligation to myself, my profession of journalism, my family and my country.

I had one other compelling reason for coming out with this work at the great risks of being uprooted from my beloved country, of forced separation from my wife and children and losing their affection, and of losing everything I have in my name in the Philippines — or losing life itself. It is that I wanted to make a public expiation for the little influence that I had exercised on the late Don Eugenio Lopez into handpicking a certain Ferdinand E. Marcos as his candidate for the presidency of the Philippines in the elections of 1965. Would the Filipinos be suffering from a conjugal dictatorship now, if I had not originally planted in Lopez's consciousness in 1962 that Marcos was the "unbeatable candidate" for 1965?

To the remaining democracies all over the world, this book is offered as a case study on how a democratically-elected President could operate within the legal system and yet succeed in subverting that democracy in order to perpetuate himself and his wife as conjugal dictators.

I entertain no illusions that my work would dislodge Ferdinand and Imelda from their conceitedly entrenched position. However, history teaches us that dictators "live a while", either on account of their own corrupt weight or sheer physical exhaustion. I am hopeful that this work would somehow set off, or contribute to the ignition, of a chain reaction that would compel Marcos to relinquish his vise-like dictatorial grip on his own countrymen.

When the Filipino is then set free, and could participate in cheerful cry over the restoration of freedom and democracy in the Philippines, that cry shall be the fitting finish to this, my humble work

April 27, 1976

Acknowledgment

I would need an additional chapter in a futile attempt to acknowledge all the help I received in producing this volume. However, I would be extremely remiss if I did not acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the librarians at the Southeast Asia Center, University of California at Berkeley, and the thousands of Filipinos in the United States and back home in the Philippines whose enthusiasm for, and dedication to, freedom and democracy guided my unsteady hands in an unerring course to finish this work.

— *The Author*

Chapter I

A Summer Night in Washington, D.C.

The capital of the United States of America had always incited in me the inner feelings of love of country, a feeling which I seem to overlook while I am actually in my own terra firma on Philippine soil; it is as if one is given a sudden urge of imbibing, and seeking to belong to a vital footnote to, history. Except for this latest trip of mine which I was pondering this sultry summer night on June 16, 1975, every time I visited Washington, D.C. which, to me, stands out not only as the capital of the United States but also of the democratic western world as well as the J.S. allies in Asia, I always felt that I was invested with a sense of mission for my country, even though my trips to this capital of the world had always been undertaken by me in my capacity as a simple newspaperman. So it was the way I felt in June, 1958, when, as a young reporter for the now defunct Manila Chronicle, I first set foot on Washington, D.C. My first trip to Washington, D.C. was in connection with my coverage of the state visit of then President Carlos P. Garcia.

The thought alone of going to Washington, D.C., that square mass of land carved out of the territories of the states of Maryland and Virginia, becomes awe-inspiring; being in D.C. itself gives one a sense of history. As two great journalist-observers of Washington, D.C. put it, "the numerous national monuments that give Washington, its physical and spiritual identity are as revered by the home folks as they are by the thousands of tourists who come streaming in every year at cherry-blossom time." Indeed, a great many people attempt to make it to Washington, D.C. not only because they seek to honor America's great national heritage, but also because they want to be part of it, in however small a way.

But on this summer night of June 16, 1975, I felt that somehow I just might be a part of the history of the United States and of my country, the Philippines, or perhaps as an insignificant footnote, but certainly a part of the historical record of one of the chambers of the bicameral Congress of the United States of America. In the midst of such heady thought, I was, however, sobered up by a warning given earlier by former Senator Raul S. Manglapus, president of the "Movement for a Free Philippines," that I should not expect too much — presumably by way of publicity — out of this visit to Washington, D.C. I should rather think of my mission in Washington, D.C., Manglapus suggested, as a bold strike for a great national struggle being waged by Filipinos back home in the Philippines. I told Manglapus that I was going to Washington, D.C. in response to an invitation of a committee of the United States Congress. I will not be seeking headlines. I am not going to perform any heroics.

I told myself that I almost did not make this trip to the U.S. capital, were it not for the foresight and valued assessment of a greying Bataan warrior who, while his colleagues are enjoying the blissful luxury of retirement and quiet life, has taken on a second struggle for the freedom of his country. It was Col. Narciso L. Manzano (USA Retired), a Bataan war hero whose exploits are documented by Gen. Carlos P. Romulo in his book, "I Saw the Fall of the

above the law or tampers with sacred and hallowed institutions of the United States of America. I was thinking at the time that, whatever condemnation might be reserved for the ill-fated Nixon presidency, Nixon, alone of all people, acted heroically to make the American system work by his resignation from the premier White House post. Nixon himself being a part of that system knew exactly what to do when the fateful event came upon its hour, never for a moment, it seems, did Nixon think that all the screaming agitations within the various sectors of U.S. society to have him disciplined for his breach of faith were an illegal conspiracy of the rightists, the centrists or the leftists in collaboration with members of the American media, youth movements and the general American public, to overthrow the duly-constituted government of the United States of America.

The conditions in Washington, D.C. and across the continent of the United States at the time of Nixon's Watergate crisis suited to a "T" the description of conditions in the Philippines a few months before September 1977, as described by Romulo, in his capacity as secretary of foreign affairs of the Philippines, before the Commonwealth Club of California on May 24, 1973, in San Francisco. Romulo declared that the Philippines at the time was "mired in the other darker depths of democracy — the bickering, the factionalism, the corruption, the aimless drift, and more than these, the rebellion of the alienated x x x." Romulo's employer in the Philippines viewed and interpreted the conditions in Manila in a different light, in a most absurd way. And yet, freedom-loving Americans viewed the agitations in their country in the wake of the Watergate scandal — agitations which also paralleled Philippine conditions resulting from official corruption, abuses and ineptitude — as developments that are as serious and as normal as that with which democracy is faced and for which democracy does, in its own tedious, humane and noble way, ultimately found the proper solutions. As for Nixon, he obviously viewed all the exercises resulting from Watergate, concerted or disparate as they may have appeared, as a solid indication that America no longer wanted him to rule for he had lost his moral and legal authority to lead the country from the seat of the ever-living presidency. He saw the light; that democracy rejuvenates itself in the system of government of the United States by the very act of renewal of faith by its own people in the system.

Indeed, Nixon could have contrived some serious crises, like plunging America into a new war in Indochina or provoking some economic crises that might have compelled his tormentors to forget Watergate in the meantime. As a matter of fact, in Manila at the time, the Department of Public Information, on instructions from the Office of the President, encouraged coffee shop talks that Nixon would hold on to the presidency by provoking some world crises that would require Americans to close ranks behind their President.

Nixon did indeed agonize over the decision he had to make in bowing to the superiority and workability of the American democratic system over and above the personal or ethical interests of one man, be he the President of the United States or the lowly street cleaner. And, as Nixon agonized personally over his duty to strengthen the fabric of the American system of representative government, voices of sympathy, admiration and condemnation for his strength of will in his hour of crisis crisscrossed the world.

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

Philippines is one of the more notorious lobbyists in Washington, D.C. There was even a time when a Philippine ambassador, now Leyte Gov. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a brother of Mrs. Marcos, resorted to *adobo diplomacy* by regularly distributing once a week to selected American senators and congressmen, and state department officials *adobo* *2 to-go. When Mrs. Marcos heard about her ambassador-brother's yeoman intestinal diplomacy in Washington, D.C., she even sent Kokoy a Filipino cook to enable him to pursue and expand his *adobo diplomacy*.

(*2. A Filipino dish of either pork or chicken, or both, cooked in vinegar and sauce, with crushed garlic, black pepper and bay leaf.)

The duumvirate wielding the powers of government in Manila have not spared anything in going all-out to woo visiting dignitaries, especially those of the U.S. brand. Expenditures running into millions of dollars were unnecessarily incurred to put up a so-called "spontaneous" one-million crowd welcome for visiting President and Mrs. Gerald Ford in Manila; the money presumably coming from the \$100 million foreign aid the United States doles out to the Philippines yearly.

On one occasion in 1973, the conjugal leaders in Manila broke precedent by tendering a state dinner, an honor usually reserved for visiting ranking officials of foreign governments, for Washington Post Publisher Katherine Graham and a team of staff writers. But in dining and dining did not influence the Graham team; it wrote objectively on the Philippine situation with the same seriousness that the Washington Post has chronicled the story of the Nixon Watergate saga. When clippings of the Post's were telexed to Malacanang, Mrs. Marcos ruefully stated that she and President Marcos obviously wasted their time, money and effort on the Graham team.

The lobbying by Marcos in Washington, D.C. and in Manila for his New Society among U.S. officials has not chalked up much success. Thus, he became more apprehensive when he learned that I, his former confidant, would "tell all" before a committee of the U.S. Congress. So, he tried on a new tack — a \$100,000-bribe offer.

In a rare display of great interest and faith in the story of a foreign chief of state attempting to bribe a witness of the United States Congress, Jack Anderson agreed with his associate, Les Whitten, that a second column coming up on July 3, 1975, was in order. That follow-up "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column read thus:

"EX-AIDE REVEALS MARCOS' CORRUPTION"

WASHINGTON — Yesterday we reported that Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos offered a former confidant, Primitivo Mijares, a \$50,000 bribe not to tell the U.S. Congress what he knows about corruption in the Philippines.

Today we can reveal the story that Marcos tried to cover up. It is another Watergate scandal, Philippine version — a story of highcrimes and misdemeanors, ranging from abuse of power to misuse of government funds.

dynasty in the Philippines shall be the thrust of my testimony today.

I was an unwitting tool in some of the plans of Mr. Marcos for the imposition of martial law. As a matter of fact, I was the first newspaperman to write the full story of the imposition of martial law 12 hours before its official announcement. I have access in advance to the original copies of the martial law proclamation and the first six General Orders issued by President Marcos.

I subsequently became a willing tool in the execution of measures designed to stabilize the martial regime. I became a close confidant of President Marcos, at times performing the role of a Joseph Goebbels and wielding greater powers in the propaganda field than his own official Information Secretary. And I performed my duties faithfully until it dawned on me that what I was helping to get entrenched was not a regime of constitutional authoritarianism dedicated to the establishment of law and order, and of a New Society. I began to realize that it was nothing but an infamous design dedicated shamelessly to the establishment by the law or the gun of an imperial dynasty in the Philippines.

If I now take a strong position against the martial regime of Mr. Marcos I do so with the sense of outrage of one who has been so thoroughly betrayed. I was hoodwinked into supporting the imposition of martial law. It should not take any longer for the armed forces generals and other influential civil officials still supporting Mr. Marcos to realize that they, too, are being hoodwinked. The truth will soon come out, and history will vindicate me, that the reasons used by President Marcos in imposing martial law were deliberately manufactured by Mr. Marcos himself in a manner that makes Hitler a piker in his burning of the Reichstag.

Initially, the Filipino people dutifully supported Mr. Marcos. We had no other choice. With a series of deliberately contrived crises that created a fearsome atmosphere of anarchy, Mr. Marcos made the people lapse into a state of paralysis; he made the terror-stricken populace lose respect for duly-constituted authorities and confidence in the ability of democratic processes to maintain law and order. Then he wove a labored tale of national horror which he eventually enshrined as gospel truth in the martial law proclamation (No. 1081).

We all went along with Mr. Marcos. We convinced ourselves that in a developing country, like the Philippines, with limited resources and great demands by the population on such resources, a firm authoritarian regime would be best equipped to bring about and maintain a program of development with the allocation of resources on the basis of priorities.

While I went along with a martial regime, I never shook off my training of 22 years as a cynical newspaperman. As I walked the corridors of the constricted center of power in Malacanang, I utilized my cynically observant qualities. I began to discover after the first year of martial rule that the so-called program of building a New Society was nothing but an ill-disguised plan of Mr. Marcos to perpetuate himself, his wife and/or son, Ferdinand Jr., in power, by consolidating the political, military and economic resources of the country under his firm control. What is now being forced down the throats of Filipinos by the guns of martial law is a long-studied, methodically prepared Oriental Design to take over an entire country politically, militarily

witness.

7) As the media confidant of Mr. Marcos, I orchestrated the reporting of stories on the referendum and other undertakings of the regime that were designed to stabilize the new government.

8) A dictatorial regime as it is, the martial government of Mr. Marcos has become all the more oppressive and corrupt in view of the meddling of his wife who has turned the martial regime into a conjugal dictatorship.

9) Aside from plundering an entire nation, the conjugal dictatorship is likewise misappropriating the various items of United States assistance (military, economic, cultural, etc.) to the Philippines to entrench itself in power and for personal glorification.

Towards the end of my testimony, I will request the honorable chairman of the committee to allow me to submit a lengthy memorandum, complete with exhibits, containing detailed elucidations on the points I have raised in this opening statement.

The committee will most probably be besieged by coached witnesses refuting my allegations and assailing my credibility. No one of them can make an honest claim that he has entered the presidential study room inside Malacanang without going through security and the appointments office, then he can speak with some competence. There are only six persons who may succeed in calling me a liar by coming before this committee and testifying perjury under oath. They are President Marcos, the First Lady, Gov. Romualdez, Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave and Presidential Assistant Guillermo C. de Vega.

Suffice it to say, at this point, that the faces of martial law I have pictured to the committee bring to mind a sharp repartee made by the leader of our independence movement, Don Manuel Luis Quezon, to a spokesman of the proposition to make the Philippines a state of the United States: "Better a government run like hell by Filipinos than a government run like Heaven by Americans." The United States could not, even if it wanted to, have given us a government like Heaven but certainly a Filipino is now giving the Filipinos a government like hell.

In the light of the foregoing, I respectfully suggest that, in aid of legislation, the committee take into account the following points:

1) Mr. Marcos is not a "dejure" President of the Philippines. He is a usurper, at best a "de facto" ruler, who holds power in a classic demonstration of a motto of China's Mao Tse-Tung (whom Mr. Marcos had just visited) that "power flows from the barrel of a gun."

2) The lack of a designated successor, or a provision in the New Constitution for orderly succession, in case of Mr. Marcos' demise or removal from office, for whatever cause, gives investors in the Philippines, especially foreigners, no guarantee of stability.

3) The Marcos regime, having gone corrupt and betrayed the rising expectations of a weary people, may soon become easy prey to a real Communist conspiracy, which is allowed to flourish underground, while legitimate dissenting groups are mercilessly repressed.

4) The U.S. government cannot just fold its arms on the Philippines with which it has had a long tradition of friendship and history of tutelage in

the United States who cannot return to the Philippines without being subjected to reprisals for their anti-martial law activities. Pictures of these "blacklisted" persons are posted at every point of entry in the Philippines, including Clark Air Force base, so that they can be seized and detained any time they land in the Philippines. The list includes American citizens of Filipino descent.

Even the so-called "balikbayan" program, which was launched by the martial regime to induce Filipinos abroad to visit their homeland, is part of the over-all program of the regime to conceal the Philippine Watergate; it has not really boosted the Philippines' dollar reserves as claimed by Tourism Secretary Jose D. Aspiras.

Marcos also exports his martial law to the United States through the vehicle of a well-oiled propaganda apparatus. Wherever possible, Marcos or his minions summon relatives of "blacklisted" Filipinos to Manila and order them to write their kins in the United States to stop their activities against, or their criticisms of, martial law in the Philippines.

The Manila regime has not hesitated to crack down on news organs of Filipinos which have been critical of the dictatorship. The glaring example is the pressure applied by President Marcos on the Filipino-owned travel agencies which are raking in on the "balikbayan" boom, to withdraw their advertising from the *Philippine News* and shift them to the propaganda organs operated by Gov. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez in the United States.

The shenanigans that President Marcos would still resort to in order to insure the stability and long duration of his authoritarian regime in the Philippines are still inconceivable, but, considering his satanic record and infinite capacity for diabolical cunning, I expect him to go to great lengths. The stakes are so high and are still escalating for Marcos to leave anything to the normal behavior of a man. The stakes in his New Society could even involve his own neck and those of the persons collaborating with him, including the diamond-studded neck of Imelda whose wrinkles have been stretched a *la* "Ash Wednesday."

Marcos already made a dastardly attempt to shield from the American government and people the Machiavellian design for his infamous power-grab in the Philippines when he sought to offer me a bribe to keep me out of a House committee hearing. His bribe offer appears so reprehensible when one takes note of the fact that Marcos did it to conceal the gory ways by which he went about dismantling the apparatus of a democratic government set up by the United States in Asia; it becomes specially condemnable considering that the bribe offer constitutes an attempt by a tinhorn Asian dictator to tamper with sacred and hallowed American institutions; it sounds so alarming when the fact emerges that it was done on the eve of the celebration by the United States of America of the bicentennial of the launching of the first great American experiment in democracy. To my mind, it betrayed Marcos' utter contempt for the principles of democracy, which he dismantled in the Philippines, whether they be established in the Philippines, in the United States of America or anywhere else.

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

The setting sun over Manila Bay gave a snugness to President Marcos' private Study Room at Malacanang that early evening of September 22, 1972. Marcos sat serene in his study, glancing once in a while at the bevy of red telephone receiver sets which linked his office with military camps all over the country.

What am I about to do? Marcos must have asked himself. Then, he imagined that in whatever direction he would be looking there would be soldiers sealing and closing down newspaper offices, and radio and television stations; soldiers knocking at and/or down locked doors and inviting or dragging out forcibly persons previously listed in an "order of battle" to go with them in a van; camps filled with men and women who have made the mistake of disagreeing with him or acting rather headily in seeking to consign Marcos prematurely to the dung heap of a lameduck presidency. How pitiful they would soon be, he must have mused.

Marcos pressed a button in his intercom, and when an ever ready aide responded to say "yes, sir," he commanded: "Get me Secretary Enrile." And then, with his line to the communications room aide still open, Marcos muttered to himself: "*Masyadong mabagal ang mga taong ganon kung kailan na nina kailangan magmadali.*" (Those people [without alluding to anyone in particular] move so sluggishly at a time when I want them to move fast enough.) Within a few minutes, he determined that his secretary of national defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, had left his office at Camp Aguinaldo "rather early in the day."

(*1. The main building at Camp Aguinaldo houses the office of the secretary of national defense and serves also as the armed forces general headquarters. Originally named Camp Murphy in honor of Frank Murphy, last American governor-general in the Philippines, the camp was renamed in 1962 in honor of the President of the first Republic.)

He was located by Sgt. Arturo Boquiren, agent on duty at the communications room near the President's Study Room, in the house of a "friend." Somewhat irritated, Marcos ordered Enrile in the following manner "Secretary Enrile? Where are you? You have to do it now . . . ya, ya, the one we discussed this noon. We cannot postpone it any longer. Another day of delay may be too late." Continuing his orders obviously after being interrupted with some remarks by Enrile, Marcos went on: "Make it look good. *Kailangan seguro ay may masaktan o kung mayroon mapatay ay mas-mabuti.* (May be it would be better if somebody got hurt or killed.) . . . O, hala, sigue, Johnnv (Okav. eo ahead) and be sure the story catches the 'Big News' and 'Newswatch'. . . and call me as soon as it is over."

My newsman's instinct told me that I would be handling the biggest news story of my life. I gained some inkling on the unfolding drama days earlier from the President himself. He instructed me during one of our luncheon sessions to prepare a "situationer" (a news round-up) on the encounters between elements of the government's armed forces and the Communist New People's Army, the "landing" of combat weapons and war materiel for the NPAs along the coast of Digoyo in Palanan, Isabela, the "terror bombings" in Manila and suburbs, and the violent demonstrations of the radicals.

"Make sure that the Daily Express puts out the situationer on or before Sunday (September 24, 1972)," Marcos said to me. "Tell them it is a direct

to attend the various bicameral conference committee meetings scheduled for late that evening, an aide of the Tarlac senator rushed to his side with a typewritten note. Upon reading the note, Aquino blurted: "Here it is, boys. The Times reporter has just phoned in a story that Secretary Enrile's party was ambushed by unknown gunmen near some bushes along the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club. The secretary was unhurt, but his white Mercedes Benz car was riddled with bullets at the back. He was not inside his official car at the time of the ambush. No member of his party was hurt. And the report states that a check on slugs recovered from the bullet-riddled car showed that the ammo matched those recovered from the bullet-riddled car showed that the ammo matched those recovered from Digoyo in Palanan, Isabela. This is it, boys. That guy Marcos must be escalating things. Let's go listen to Jose Mari Velez's 'Big News,' maybe we can have more details. I'll look into this, and I will get in touch with you guys later."

As Aquino rushed out of the Senate session hall, the journalists almost to a man, but especially *Free Press* staff writer Filemon Tutay, started thinking aloud that the government-announced discovery of a shipment of arms, purportedly for the New People's Army, at Digoyo Point in Subela, and the series of mysterious bombings that took place in the Greater Manila area may have all been a product of a suspected Malacanang-managed "Bureau of Plant Industry" for the month of August and the first three weeks of September, 1972. Only in one case was a culprit found: a Constabulary sergeant assigned to the Firearms and Explosives Section of the Philippine Constabulary confessed responsibility for the bombing of Joe's Department store in Carriedo, in Sta. Cruz, Manila on Sept. 5, 1972. Always ever-ready to throw off any suspicion, Malacanang announced an obvious implementation of the Communist terror plan have resulted in the "bombing of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company exchange at East Avenue, and of the Philippine Sugar Institute building at North Avenue, both in Quezon City, on August 17; of a water mains on Aurora Boulevard and Madison Avenue, Quezon City, on August 19, of the Philamlife building again on August 30; of the armored car and building of the Philippine Banking Corporation as well as the buildings of the Investment Development, Inc. and the Daily Star Publications, on August 30; of the City Hall of Manila, on September 8; of the water mains in San Juan, Rizal, on September 12; of the San Miguel building in Makati, Rizal, on September 14; and of the Constitutional Convention area at the Quezon City hall on September 18.

Malacanang said the terror-bombing program of the Communists included the attempted bombing of the Congress building on July 18, when an unexploded bomb was found in the Senate Publications Division and the attempted bombing of the Department of Foreign Affairs on August 30.

Out in the city streets, blue-painted cars and buses marked with the words "METROCOM" in dull red letters cruised near the buildings of Manila's newspaper, radio and television stations, this time filled with troopers from the Philippine Constabulary Metropolitan Command. People did not mind them as the vehicles went about what had become an apparent routine exercise of passing, parking and then leaving the media buildings and surrounding areas. Three weeks earlier, when the Metrocom exercises were first noticed, people were led to believe that the troopers were sent to provide security, especially for the Daily Express, against vandalism by violent demonstrators. "Ah, the

On the night martial law was declared, Zumel was as usual having a late night drinking spree at the NPC bar. He was summoned to the telephone by a caller at about 1 a.m. on Sept. 23, after which he invited some of the boys to transfer with him to Taboy's "Cinco Litros," a small bar at Ermita whose owner could sing lewd songs even in polite society. Zumel's group took a cab from the NPC. On the way, he told his colleagues, including Bobby Ordenez, that martial law has been proclaimed. When the taxicab reached the Rizal monument area on the Luneta along Roxas Boulevard, Zumel commanded the car to stop and told his companions that he was getting out. "Please take care of the fare, Bobby," he said addressing Ordenez. To the rest, he said: "This is going to be a long night. I hope we will meet when the dawn of freedom breaks. All right, guys, let's all try to stay healthy. Till we meet again!" Tony faded into the night. A rumor floated by the Department of Public Information claims that Zumel has been killed in an encounter with a PC patrol in Bulacan. I know that he is very much alive. As a matter of fact, he eluded a PC raiding team in May, 1974, in a "safehouse" in Bulacan where former newsmen Satur Ocampo and Jose F. Lacaba were apprehended with printing paraphernalia for the underground press. Ocampo and Lacaba indicated that the raiding team missed catching Zumel by just about 40 minutes. I am confident Tony will continue to elude other teams.

Zumel was the first NPC President to have denounced war on Marcos' martial law. He was all but vetoed by then incumbent NPC President Eddie B. Monteclaro who was authorized by martial law government to travel to New Delhi in February, 1973, to attend a "One World" conference. Instead of returning to Manila, Monteclaro denounced the martial law government and proceeded to the United States to seek political asylum. I became the third NPC President to denounce Marcos. However, I collaborated long enough with Marcos to convince myself that the imposition of martial law was just a stratagem employed by the President to perpetuate himself in power.

There were others who didn't have to wait to declare themselves against the imposition of martial law. Juan Quijano, the incorruptible lawyer of the Philippines Free Press and lawyer-later-publisher of the Chinese Commercial News, and newscaster Fred Espaldon of DZMT and Channel 5, hacked away at Marcos for what they termed as a "power-grab."

Quijano was in Taipei at the time martial law was proclaimed, having left Manila earlier on August 12 to be on hand for the release of Quintin Yuyitung on August 14 from imprisonment in a Taipei military garrison. He and Quintin proceeded to the United States in December. Later, Quijano was informed by friends in the military that the armed forces high command had "found" him "guilty of treason" for having uttered statements against the martial regime while he was in Taipei and upon his arrival in the United States.

Espaldon, on the other hand, went on record in the West Coast as the first Filipino to go on the air and submit to press interviews assailing the Marcos power grab in the Philippines. Espaldon was in San Francisco at the time, having left Manila on September 6 on a scholarship grant from Stanford University.

"We expected martial law to be resorted to by Marcos," Espaldon declared in one of his radio-TV interviews, "but there is really no justification for it. It is

stay in power. Marcos was unperturbed; he had other things in mind.

Marcos started tossing his own theories and ideas on the burgeoning movement for change during an informal session with some of his Cabinet members following the accreditation in Malacanang of a newly-arrived ambassador of a foreign country. Members of the Cabinet are usually invited to such accreditation ceremonials, which usually take place at about 10 a.m. at the Malacanang reception hall. After the accreditation ceremony, the President sits down informally with members of his official family. On one such occasion, a member of the Cabinet, as if on a cue from Marcos himself, opened up with an observation that the "violent demonstrations" were being supported, nay openly encouraged, by the media which, he added, has even used freedom of the press as license to abuse the President and his wife. In any meeting of the President with his subordinates, only Marcos may speak lengthily on anything; the others may interrupt with only one or two short sentences, unless he has an anecdote to relate that is calculated to make the President laugh. When the President said "ahhhhh" which was his signal for anybody talking at the time to shut up and give way to him, all eyes turned to the Chief Executive. True, he stated, the confrontation started by the reformist groups with the government was becoming dangerous, posing a threat not only to the party in power, but to the entire Establishment. There is even a real possibility, Marcos declared, that a new political party made up of young, ambitious men and women who have succeeded in identifying themselves with the interests of the masses in opposing foreign capital and the elitists, may replace the Nacionalista and Liberal parties.

A Cabinet member, who has never been known for being tactful, boldly asserted that the demands of the demonstrating groups focused exploitation of the Philippines by American business interests and on the need to restrict the United States on the use of its military bases in the country.

The Cabinet member had spoken more than two lines; he was not supposed to do that. The President cut him off. And as if speaking with a prepared script, Marcos then revealed that he has been assessing the possible adverse results that the "parliament of the streets" might bring about in the Philippines' relations with the United States. The President pointed out that there was a real possibility that the U.S. would get out of the Vietnam war, thereby requiring greater protection for the U.S. naval and air bases in the Philippines as insurance against probable expansion of Soviet power in Asia. Marcos added that the approaching end of parity demanded a trade agreement equally favorable to U.S. business interests which have just suffered setbacks in the newly-handed down decisions of the Supreme Court. And Japan, which is being urged by the United States to expand in Asia so that she can share in the protection of the area from Soviet expansionism, needed favorable business terms also in the Philippines. Marcos noted that the Senate had not seen it fit to ratify the pending Philippines-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation.

Then the tactless Cabinet member became pertinent for Marcos' purposes; it was as if he himself was following a script prepared by whoever drafted the President's own script for the day. What we need then, Mr. President, is martial law so that you can continue your good work for this nation; we need martial law to protect the two-party system; and we need it to protect the Republic

there were democratic niceties and rules with which he had to abide in his conduct of the affairs of state. Damn the legal niceties, damn democracy and free speech, he thought. With only a year left in his second term presidency, there certainly would be no time at all to even up scores with political opponents, newspapermen and the allegedly abusive oligarchy. An entire lifetime freed from the shackles of guarantees of civil liberties was needed; Marcos must have his vengeance.

That was the emergency situation that faced Marcos in mid-1972; it was very personal to him. Even from the single consideration that Marcos must carve out a nice niche for himself in Philippine history, there was a pressing emergency situation; the tightening noose of circumstances showed that, unless Marcos took some drastic steps, the inevitable verdict of history on Marcos, as of 1972, would be that he was nothing but a scoundrel.

Watergate is really peanuts, a mere drop in the bucket, compared to the chicanery that Marcos indulged in upon his assumption of power in the Philippines in 1965. At its worst, Watergate was a bungling attempt at espionage to insure an election campaign overkill by President Nixon's campaign strategists and a subsequent attempt at cover-up. In the case of Marcos of the Philippines, the regime is engaged in a series of cover-ups for numerous cover-ups.

My own assessment that martial law was resorted to by President Marcos as a means of perpetuating himself in power and covering up for his malfeasance and nonfeasance during his corrupt and abusive I and II presidency in Malacanang is borne out by various quarters.

From the dark confines of his solitary cell at Fort Bonifacio, the headquarters of the Philippine Army, AFP, in Makati, Rizal, imprisoned Senator Aquino, Jr. gave his own angry insight into the sanctimonious claim of Marcos that he imposed martial law only as a means of saving the Republic from its enemies.

Aquino declared:

"Mr. Marcos says he declared martial rule to establish a New Society. But what he created is the oldest society recorded by history — a society of absolute rule by one man who in various epochs was called a pharaoh, a shah, an emperor, a king, a *duce*, a *caudillo*, a *feuhrer*, a chairman or a president.

"Mr. Marcos says a new Constitution has been overwhelmingly ratified by the Filipino people in January, 1973. This new Constitution ordains a drastic change from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government. But what we have today is a worse centralized presidency, a totalitarian regime where both legislative and executive powers have been merged under one man. We have a parliamentary government without a parliament. Instead of moving forward to parliamentary democracy, we moved backwards to the very extremes of presidential authoritarianism.

"Mr. Marcos says he has checked, if not eliminated the privileges and the rule of an entrenched oligarchy. Yes, the rule of the few has been eliminated. It has been reduced to the rule of one.

"Mr. Marcos misses no stroke in his incessant flogging of the old society as if he is a complete stranger to that old society, having come from outer space on September 21, 1972.

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alternately, as a regime of "constitutional authoritarianism" operating under the aegis of martial law. But this is merely a resort to semantics. Martial law by any name is dictatorship; it becomes a conjugal dictatorship when the ruler's No. 1 wife not only enjoys the privileges, but also wields with greater gusto and irresponsibility the powers, of the dictator.

Marcos made no bones about his role under the new order when he went on the air at 7:30 p.m. on September 23, 1972, to announce his martial law proclamation, some 22 hours after he had given his military collaborators the command to start arresting his political opponents and closing down the media establishments. Several hours before the scheduled announcement of martial law on the air, Marcos directed Press Secretary Francisco S. Tatad to rehearse a broadcast voice that would have all the braggadocio and scary tone of an advance barker of a conquering army. Veteran radio announcer Vero Perfecto was originally tapped by the President to do it, but a jealous Tatad ordered Vero to "get lost." Thus Tatad barked the Marcos edict through his nose:

"x x x it is imperative for the (undersigned) President of the Philippines to assume greater and more effective control over the entire Government, to have the broadest latitude and discretion in dealing with the affairs of the nation, and to exercise extraordinary powers in my capacity as commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines in order to enable me to restore within the shortest possible time and thereafter to maintain the stability of the nation and to safeguard the integrity and security of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing lawlessness and all subversive, seditious, rebellious and insurrectionary activities throughout the land, with all the resources and means at my command, and by adopting such other measures as I may deem necessary and expedient to take to contain and resolve the existing national emergency and for the interest of the public:

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim that I shall govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire Government, including all its agencies and instrumentalities, in my capacity and shall exercise all the powers and prerogatives appurtenant and incident to my position as such Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines, x x x" ^{*1}

(*1. General Order No. 1, dated Sept 22, 1972.)

Invoking powers within the framework of his own edict, Marcos proceeded to exercise all executive and legislative powers, he issued General Orders to the armed forces in his capacity as commander-in-chief and Letters of Instructions to civil officials in his capacity as President. In the exercise of legislative powers, Marcos promulgated Presidential Decrees containing the vital resolutive portion stating that they "shall be part of the law of the land unless ordered repealed or amended by me or by my duly authorized representatives."

Marcos also assumed judicial powers. However, realizing that the judicial system was too intricate for him to be able to exercise judicial functions to the

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beyond the simple need of restoring order, to meet the other and even more important imperative of reforming society.

When I defected from the dictatorship in the Philippines, with a warning that Marcos was setting up an imperial dynasty in his country, I was greeted with skepticism, even derision by some, that I was just an embittered and disenchanted former camp follower crying wolf.

Of course, I knew whereof I was speaking, but I was not prepared — and neither am I now — to beg anybody to believe me. I always believe that the event will tell in its hour. One such event has already materialized in the first concrete confirmation by deed on the intent of President Marcos to set up an imperial dynasty in the Philippines.

This is how the “Associated Press” reported it: *6

President Ferdinand E. Marcos' wife, Imelda, yesterday took her first political post, as governor of Metropolitan Manila, a new government unit with 4.5 million residents.

The position will give her political exposure second only to her husband and increase the possibilities of her succeeding him in the presidency.

Marcos, who rules by decree under martial law, spoke in his wife after she made a brief acceptance speech broadcast on all major television and radio stations.

Six days ago, the President rejected a movement to draft Mrs. Marcos to head the new government, which integrates 17 municipalities. Mayors and prominent businessmen had asked her to head the area government because they said it needed a figure of national stature.

Mrs. Marcos told the audience of politicians at the ceremony in the presidential palace, “Not a single one among us can afford to beg off and just watch the metropolis decay and die. It is for this reason that I have accepted, in spite of many involvements with my national projects and international commitments this year and next.”

The move was strongly supported by newspapers either controlled or edited by Mrs. Marcos' younger brother, Benjamin Romualdez, governor of Leyte province, and by a cousin, E. P. Romualdez. *7

Before his wife spoke, Marcos signed the decree creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission for the Greater Manila Area.

(*6. “Political Job: Big Step for Mrs. Marcos,” page 17, San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 7, 1975.

*7. Enrique “Pocholo” Romualdez is a nephew of Mrs. Marcos, his father being a first cousin of Imelda.)

Even this early, Marcos has already seen fit to hold out Imelda as his would-be successor, just in case he is incapacitated to discharge his dictatorial duties while his only son by Imelda is yet too young to assume the powers of government.

With Imelda's new position as *gobernadora* (governor) of the Greater Manila Area, the Philippine situation graduates from the realm of speculation. It is an emerging fact that in the reasonably near future, Marcos' assumption of a crown and scepter would become a clear and definite reality.

4) the freemen, and 5) the slaves.

The royalty is, of course, to be made up of King Ferdinand and Queen Imelda; *lakan* is an ancient title which does not have a place for a meddling wife. Imelda definitely covets the title and position of Ferdinand. However, her ambitions also calls for barring any of the Ilocanos in the defense establishment, including Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, Jr., from ever gaining any slot in the line of succession to the presidency, and for propping up her favorite brother, Kokoy, as one of the important Palace guards — against the Ilocanos.

Occupying a pivotal position next in importance only to the royal class is the “warrior group” as laid out in the Marcos hierarchical scheme. Known as the “mandirigma” in ancient times, this class is now made up of the entire public armed forces of the Philippines, the principal enforcers of the martial law edict.

The exact role of the military in the conjugal dictatorial setup of things in the New Society was succinctly spelled out by Marcos when he announced the imposition of martial law on September 23, 1973. He declared: “The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover. I, as your duly elected President of the Republic, use this power implemented by the military authorities ...”

However, if one looks at the behavior of the members of the armed forces, he cannot but come to the conclusion that the AFP people are behaving like they were a conquering army.

While Marcos tolerates — or seems afraid to discipline — AFP members who indulge in irresponsible acts of spoliation, he had taken definite steps to insure that the military would have no higher political ambitions beyond its warrior class. Nevertheless, Marcos has awarded loyal officers and units with defined territorial jurisdictions to administer — and plunder — when they are not engaged in any action for the preservation of the royalty.

Slightly higher in esteem by Dictator Marcos, but still in the level of the “warrior” class, is the group of bodyguards of the royalty. In the modern Philippines under the conjugal dictatorship, it is designated as the Presidential Security Command, whose chief is Major General Fabian Crisologo-Ver. The main function of the PSC, as its name connotes, is securing the person of the President and his family. However, one of its major tasks is to serve as a “watchdog” on the armed forces, notably the ranking command officers like Major General Fidel V. Ramos, chief of the Philippine Constabulary; and the young colonels and majors who might be eyeing the jobs of their superior officers.

The mere existence of the Palace security command serves as a constant reminder to all other armed forces units and their commanders that, even under a martial regime where the military is supposed to be supreme, they are not supposed to aspire to anything beyond serving the interests of the commander-in-chief.

The third ranking group in the emerging Philippine system is the class of “imams” or high priests, although this caste is not allowed the privilege of enjoying worldly things. In ancient days, the “imams” were charged with the responsibility of regularly calling upon the deity to preserve the good health of the royal family.

or bought for unconscionably low prices, by cronies of the President and his brothers-in-law.

5) Licensing commanding generals and regional and provincial military commanders to exercise within their respective jurisdiction powers which were heretofore exercised by civil authorities. A number of generals control the flourishing smuggling in of luxury goods from abroad and smuggling out of premium export products, e.g. sugar, copra, lumber, cement, etc.

V. DICTATOR FOR LIFE

Having delivered the fatal blow against democracy and having consolidated his martial regime, President Marcos then took further steps to insure his authoritarian rule for life.

1) He retained all members of his Cabinet, and in cases where he had quarreling officials in one department, he split the said department to accommodate and/or calm down the protagonists.

Even at this stage of martial law, Mr. Marcos cannot afford to dismiss or displease members of his Cabinet, most of whom are either incompetent or aging, without running the risk of being exposed by them on numerous anomalous government transactions that plague the martial regime and the previous constitutional Marcos and Il-administrations.

2) Bribery, intimidation and coercion of the members of the Constitutional Convention to force them to approve the final draft of a proposed New Constitution which installed Mr. Marcos as a dictator for life.

3) Staging of a mock referendum from Jan. 10 to 15, 1973, by whose fabricated results he proclaimed that the people have voted to ratify the New Constitution.

4) Calling of other referendums as often as he wanted to in order to show his political opponents at home and the outside world, particularly the United States government and press, that his continuing martial regime had the clear mandate of the people.

5) Launching by his Department of Public Information of a program, dubbed as "Oplan Mystique", which set off the process of "deification" of Marcos the President. The central theme is the creation of an aura of mysticism around the person of Mr. Marcos.

6) Maintaining a tight grip on the country's economy by making sure that all major business transactions or the formation of new and big corporations carry his stamp of approval, or that they are undertaken with the participation of his front men, in-laws and cronies.

7) Suspension by the President for one year of a provision of the Constitution on the expiration of the so-called Parity Rights for American citizens by July 3, 1974, in order to curry favor with American big business whose home offices in the United States Mr. Marcos expects to turn in favorable reports on the martial regime to the State Department.

8) Appointment by the President of every provincial governor, city mayor, municipal mayor, provincial board member and city and municipal councilors when the term of the present incumbents expire on December 31, 1975.

9) President Marcos plans to sanitize his authoritarian regime by making a hollow gesture, perhaps in 1976 or 1977, of lifting martial law, but actually

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Education Secretary Juan Manuel, an uncle.

Another uncle, Modesto Farolan, is Philippine ambassador to Indonesia. A second cousin, Maj. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, is a West Point graduate who commands the constabulary. A top candidate to become the armed forces next chief of staff, he is one of the most powerful figures in the martial law regime.

Another cousin of Mrs. Marcos is E. P. Romualdez, executive editor of the Philippines *Daily Express*, which often represented the official martial law regime view.

The *Express* and the *Times-Journal*, controlled by Gov. Romualdez, led the campaign in the carefully monitored news media to publicize an effort to "draft" Mrs. Marcos as Manila governor.

The day after swearing in his wife, Marcos was shown in a picture in the Manila press playing a game of pelota with Col. Francisco Romualdez, his brother-in-law and presiding officer of a military tribunal.

Col. Edon Yap, married to Mrs. Marcos' sister, is his sister-in-law's aide-de-camp.

Among Imelda's varied activities in actively sharing the powers of the dictatorship, she enjoys most the task which gives her the illusions of a woman with vast pretensions of being a world diplomat as she goes about her royal hegira. Her international jaunts, while taken on the excuse of opening doors for the New Society, have taken her to Persepolis in Persia, to Moscow, many times to the United States, the United Kingdom and Rome, to China's Mao Tse-Tung, Cuba's Fidel Castro and Mexico's Miguel Echevarria. All these trips have been quite expensive and extravagantly financed, what with the First Lady spending money in certain places like money was going out of style.

Although, for Imelda, the job of international diplomacy holds a special allure, she also feels that it is the area of the conjugal dictatorship where she has a strong rival still from the direction of the incumbent secretary of foreign affairs, Gen. Carlos P. Romulo. The *goberna-diktadura*^{*13} realizes that old man Romulo is just too big a diplomatic giant for her to eclipse right away. For, whatever criticisms we may have labelled back home against Romulo, the inescapable reality is that the diplomat from Camiling, Tarlac, has built a name for himself in the United States and around the world, whether through genuine credits or phony strategem. The value of Romulo had long been recognized by Marcos so that the President had resisted attempts of the First Lady and Kokoy Romualdez to have the aging world statesman replaced as foreign secretary by Imelda herself. Besides, Marcos needs a respectable front for the ogre that is martial law, and Romulo is second to none in the urea where it really counts: the United States.

(*13. A corruption of the words "gobemadora" and "dictator," female version.)

Of course, Romulo has had to make his own accommodations and personal compromises with the martial regime. Among contemporary Filipino leaders, Romulo has distinguished himself for his uncanny ability of being able to determine just what o'clock of the day it is under any post-war Philippine regime. This has enabled him to make the proper and timely 180 degree turn that he must take, if necessary, under the tried and tested principle of flexibility. CPR has superbly avoided making any direct involvement in the

information secretary went about the round-about way to avoid the ire of the First Lady, thinking apparently he would get away with it. It turned out later that the Tatad memo was actually urged on the secretary by some Cabinet members during a regular Wednesday morning inter-departmental committee session at the conference room of the Development Bank of the Philippines in Makati.

Instead of just taking it out on Tatad, the First Lady blamed the conspiracy of Enrile, Romulo, Melchor and Tatad, saying it was part of a continuing plot to get rid of the President's "first line of defense." When the First Lady launched her counter-attack, which included a conference with Secretary of Tourism Jose I. Aspiras, Secretaries Clave, De Vega and key officials of the Department of Tourism, at her Music Room, she repeated her accusations against the conspiratorial group of Enrile, Romulo, Melchor and Tatad.

About October 15, 1974, Tatad submitted a 17-page letter of resignation to the President, blaming "officials" and "other persons close to the President" for putting him in trouble with the First Lady. Marcos held the resignation under advisement. Up to now, however, he has not allowed Tatad to make any foreign trip. Tatad could be an authoritative source of confirmation or emphasis for the contents of this book, if he should ever have the chance to behave like a true newspaperman beyond the reach of the martial regime. I am sure he is rarin' to have just the opportunity I now am enjoying.

Watching out for potential threats to the stability of the conjugal rulers is another important function the First Lady has imposed upon herself. And American Ambassador Sullivan is one such object of her sentry duty.

The assignment of Sullivan as replacement of Byroade in Manila has been, and continues to be, regarded by the ruling duumvirate with grave suspicion. They think that Sullivan, more than any other U.S. resident envoy before, is the man who could set up a potentially more troublesome atmosphere for the martial regime and President Marcos personally. They feel that Sullivan was purposely assigned to the Philippines at a time when both the Parity Rights provision and the Laurel-Langley agreement were expiring by July 3, 1974.

Sullivan actually has never been thought to be a tough individual outside his office. As a matter of fact, he is all smiles when he goes to the Palace. And this is what makes Mrs. Marcos so uncomfortable when Sullivan is around the Palace. The First Lady feels jittery about Sullivan even when the American envoy is just thought to be working in the U.S. chancery or delivering speeches in far-flung areas in the Philippines. Mrs. Marcos even notices the fact that Sullivan is in great demand as a guest speaker for all kinds of gatherings in the provinces.

So unsure and suspecting are the Marcoses about Sullivan that, from the first day of the envoy's arrival in Manila up to this time, they decided that he should be tailed, and his every movement watched and reported immediately to the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the command center of Marcos' secret police. Even Sullivan's Filipino driver reports to the NISA. Some of Sullivan's clerks in the U.S. embassy also report to General Ver's office.

"Bantayan natin itong puti na ito. . . o,o, si datu Puti. . . kay ito ang gagawa ng hindi mabuti sa atin," Mrs. Marcos remarked one day. (Let's watch out for this white man . . . yes, yes, the white datu . . . because he is the kind of a man

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who should get the juicy award of the construction job has not yet been indicated by the Palace.

This Davao situation is typical all over the country. So the work piles up. We have the spectacle of even the matter of local waterworks requiring the go-signal from Malacanang.

In some instances, local government officials have also found it advisable to address a little courtesy communication to Secretary of National Defense, or the local provincial commander that such and such projects have been addressed to the President for clearance.

All the project proposals pile up in the Palace. And Secretary Clave and, for a time, the late Secretary De Vega, whose duty it is to reduce the work load of the Dictator "so that he does not kill himself working," necessarily have to sit down on those unnecessary communications from the local officials.

The national stagnation and worsening situation in the country is clear and convincing proof that Dictator Marcos may not be in touch at all with the world or the Filipino people in particular. Some of his actions are obviously not in tune with the national desire for a return to normalcy.

Right now, Marcos pays more attention to the lobbies of his cronies, in-laws and other organized minorities with some access to him than to the broad spectrum of opinion.

Either by choice, or by the machination of Imelda and Kokoy, with witting or unwitting assistance from the military leaders, Marcos is now effectively isolated from the world, the Filipino people and reality.

Marcos has become a prisoner of Imelda!

Imelda and the military have so successfully and heroically convinced Marcos about the plots on his life that he is now confined to the Palace, the recreation facilities at the Malacanang Park, the presidential yacht which can take him with heavy security to either Poro Point or Nasugbu for water skiing. He can only go to these places after they are heavily secured by the elements of the Presidential Security Command some of whom are also in the payroll of Imelda as her own spies on Marcos.

Worse, Imelda keeps dreaming up those military-civilian plots about a possible coup d'etat. This has prevented Marcos ever leaving the country ; or, making only brief visits to nearby Asian neighbors as when he had to make a state visit to the Chinese mainland last June, 1975, or make a one-way visit to Menado to confer with Indonesian President Suharto.

In the case of the visit with Suharto, the Malacanang press office took great pains to announce that the trip from Davao to Menado was just as short as taking a trip from Manila to Tacloban City. The implied message was that there would hardly be enough time for any would-be plotters against Marcos in the military establishment.

The major reason for Imelda's "grounding" of her male counterpart in the conjugal dictatorship is at once clear. She would have to conduct the urgent business of global diplomacy for the Philippines, while Marcos is confined in his movements to a constricted area where the First Lady could still spy on him and check on his fidelity.

I can be allowed to spend the money allocated for the Miss Universe security for the peace and order campaign, I assure you I would be able to liquidate the New People's Army in northern Luzon and in the Bicol provinces in no time at all."

President Marcos just didn't know how much was really spent for and in connection with the Miss Universe Pageant. He even called my attention to what he thought was an erroneous report in my column to the effect that the amount of P40 million (roughly \$5.5 million) was spent for the Imelda extravaganza. Marcos reminded me that, when the First Lady sought his approval to hold the 1974 MUP in Manila, she said the government would have to appropriate only a minimum amount. Well, actually the First Lady didn't squawk when the President appropriated only a small amount from the government coffers for the pageant. She was so sure that she would be able to tap other sources, within or without the government, for the larger amounts needed to finance the pageant. And she conducted her fund-raising with the expertise of a special forces trooper.

Secretary of Tourism Aspiras let the word out on how much was spent for the Miss Universe affair. Answering press criticisms inspired by the Tied memorandum, Aspiras declared that, in terms of world-wide publicity and goodwill generated by the MUP to the Philippines, "the P40 million we spent for the pageant was worth it."

The rough estimate is that Mrs. Marcos collected not less than P100 million from government and private sectors for the MUP. The estimate may well have been correct. Even provincial and city governments were given quotas on how much they would contribute to the kitty of the MUP. And these local governments were given about 50 tickets each for the beauty pageants in exchange for the P50,000.00 they were directed to raise as their respective quotas. The allocation of tickets for the provinces and cities was even made to appear as a display of the solicitude of the First Lady for the provincianos; she wanted them to see the MUP "for free" and with pride that they edged out the elite of Manila from the international show.

If the collection went up to P100 million and the cost of the MUP was only P40 million, where did the rest of the money go? There is only one answer because there is only one collector in the Philippines today.

And yet, the extravagance and ability of Imelda to raise money for such extravagance actually constitute the very secret of Imelda's "lakas" or selling point with the President. She has somehow convinced the Dictator that her irresistible charm always worked like magic on things and people so that she can accomplish so much with so little. She plays on the Ilocano spirit of the President — getting so much for so little.

Here is where the First Lady plays tricks on the President — at least on this aspect of the conjugal dictatorship. I cannot guarantee that she does not deceive the President on other affairs. On almost all the projects that she had undertaken, Imelda always had made it appear that she spend only the minimum amount, although she actually overspends just to produce results which the President would figure he would never be able to produce himself for the budget allocated by him.

Actually, the Imelda projects for which she has been greatly admired and

whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad.

Just as Watergate was peanuts compared to the Marcos-espoused Philippine scandal so was the Segretti operations ^{*3} a child's plaything compared to the measures undertaken by Marcos to subvert the political process ever since he captured the Philippine presidency.

(*3. Donald Segretti was an aide of U.S President Nixon who confessed to political dirty tricks.)

The entire detailed plan for the imposition of martial law was a national contingency plan. It was a product of years of preparation that started from the day Marcos first took his oath as President on December 30, 1965. He set the preparatory process in motion when he himself assumed the Cabinet portfolio of defense secretary. It was not that he felt he could not entrust the position of defense secretary to anyone outside himself. To be sure, there were more men who could have run the department more efficiently than Marcos himself under normal conditions. But he wanted a full overview and control of the military establishment to plot his martial law program. He could not afford any deviation, or hesitancy that could conceivably be shown by a disinterested secretary of defense. Even then, he anticipated that there might be some leaks to the outside quarters on his plans about martial law. Cleverly, he disguised his plans as the contingency plan to cope with any emergency that might arise in the country owing to economic difficulties and the unsettled conditions of peace and order as influenced by external and internal factors. Members of the National Security Council, which Marcos convened every now and then to perorate on the contingency plan, were invariably told the threat of the rebellious Communists were increasing continually. They were also "informed" that Marcos had sent out pensionadoes to study "crisis governments" around the world. What they were not told was that the pensionadoes were specifically directed to study martial law situations abroad to help the President formulate the steps he would have to take to justify the imposition of martial law in the Philippines by 1972 or 1973.

Marcos' assumption of the DND portfolio and his activities as defense boss should have been a sufficient forewarning to the country's leaders who have greater respect for democratic ideals. At an early stage, when Marcos could still be stopped or dissuaded, they might have realized that the newly-installed chief of state was moving towards a situation that would justify his utilization of the contingency plan, which was clearly the use of the military for, among others, martial law. But the country's leading politicians were pre-occupied with standard political activities. They were more concerned with taking potshots at Marcos and landing the front pages of the newspapers. They hardly gave any thought to the danger that Marcos had started to create for them in particular and for the entire country in general.

Preparations for the eventual imposition of martial law naturally meant talking to men of the President's confidence in the military establishment. While he took up the contingency plan with the ranking armed forces generals, who were not his appointees, Marcos quietly consulted with junior officers who were "his men." They were the colonels and majors who, in 1965, cautioned their senior officers against allowing incumbent and reelectionist President

academic before it could be handed down. The decision was handed down by Judge Felix Anover on Jan. 11, 1972, thus making the restoration of the writ also effective that date. The decision was adverse to the government, and it also adversely affected Anover when martial law was declared; he was one of the first to be canned by Marcos.

The sinister aspect of the Supreme Court decision on the Lansang case is the fact that the 1935 Constitution provided that the President, "in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it x x x may suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." The Supreme Court ruled that the President acted within his rights in suspending the writ on these constitutional grounds — the very same grounds enumerated by the Constitution for the imposition of martial law. The high tribunal did not bother to state, however, whether the rebellion or insurrection that goes on in the country is the kind that calls for drastic measures as the suspension of the Bill of Rights, or whether it actually jeopardizes public safety. The Court stuck to the Latin principle of *dura lex, sed lex*. (The law may be harsh, but it is the law). The Supreme Court did not take into account — a grave sin of omission to history and the Filipino people — the consequences to democracy arising from the suspension of the writ.

Marcos did take into account the significance of the high court decision in relation to his martial law powers under the Constitution. Thus, when Marcos fashioned out Proclamation No. 1081, he quoted freely from the judicial findings of the high court in the Lansang vs. Garcia case. He had decided to exploit and make hay out of the Supreme Court. He still allows the Supreme Court to function under his martial regime for only one purpose — to cloak his dictatorship with a semblance of legitimacy.

In the Lansang decision, the Supreme Court declared that it "cannot hesitate, much less refuse — when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied — to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him to this extent of such power, and therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize."

The decision detailed the army evidence as alleged in the texts of Marcos' Proclamation No. 889. So the main underpinning of the decision was the so-called intelligence report or evidence compiled by the military and submitted as the basis of the presidential decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. This was actually the most unsettling feature of the *Lansang* decision.

Considered against the backdrop of the hearings on the notorious cases of the Yuyitung brothers (Quentin and Rizal) who were the publisher and editor, respectively, of the Chinese Commercial News, the Supreme Court decision became a laughing stock for the weight that it gave to the military intelligence report. The star witness in the Yuyitung hearings was an army officer who faked his name on the witness stand. He produced a bundle of documents, marked "secret," and identified them as army intelligence "A-I" reports. He unscrambled the military abracadabra by stating that the sign "A-I" meant reports gathered

alleged Communist “terror plan and succeeding in creating a situation of extreme anarchy in Manila to justify the declaration of martial law, two major developments in the Constitutional Convention somehow derailed Marcos’ plans. There were early indications that the 320-man Convention might approve a resolution to include in the proposed New Constitution a provision that would ban any former President, his wife and relatives by affinity or consanguinity to the fourth degree. This became known as the ban Marcos resolution. There was even stronger indications that the Convention would preserve the existing presidential system and throw out a Marcos-espoused shift to the parliamentary form of government.

Now, martial law could not be imposed by Marcos, who always wants to cloak his every unorthodox or unconstitutional moves with legitimacy, with the unresolved problems in the Constitutional Convention. Without a shift to the parliamentary system, Marcos would be barred from further seeking reelection to the premier post of the land under the terms of the 1935 Constitution. In order to continue in power, he would have to field Imelda in the presidential elections of November, 1973. He could not accept a situation where Imelda would be in the forefront of political mudslinging, an expected bitter fight whose results either would be unacceptable to Marcos. If Imelda loses, the two of them would be out of power; if she wins, Marcos would be the unhappy ex-President.

The possibility of the “ban-Marcos resolution” being adopted by the Convention presented President Marcos with even darker prospects for a contemplated “legal” martial law. If the ban resolution should be approved and Marcos declares martial law as the only means to stay in power, the resort to that drastic move would be completely devoid of any semblance of legality and thereby appear as a naked power-grab.

No. Marcos would have none of the plans of the Constitutional Convention. Marcos assigned Presidential Assistant De Vega the most delicate task of maneuvering in the Convention to make the sovereign gathering conform to his wishes.

At about that time, an old and respected delegate, a retired Ambassador, began exposing a Convention “payola” launched in Malacanang Palace on January 6, 1971, by no less than President Marcos and the First Lady. The objective, according to Quintero, was to win the Convention delegates into voting for the parliamentary form of government. Quintero was so maligned that he later on found himself facing charges instead of the bribe-givers.

Anyway, De Vega succeeded in his mission to manipulate the Convention. The perceptive presidential assistant got his due recognition from the First Lady sometime in November, 1972, during a conference between the President and the military leaders. At the time, the generals were gloating over the “wind-falls” that martial law has brought unto their lives. The First Lady interrupted the meeting to quip: *Pasalamat kayo at mayroong Gimo de Vega. Kung Hindi siya nag-maniobra sa Con-Con upang matalo ang ‘ban-Marcos’ resolution, wala tayong ‘1081’ ngayon.* (You people should be thankful that we have a Gimo De Vega. If he had not successfully maneuvered in the Constitutional Convention, there won’t be any martial regime that you are enjoying today.)

The maneuver of Secretary De Vega in defeating the ban-Marcos move and obtaining Convention approval of the shift to the parliamentary system was simple enough: massive spending to buy off wavering delegates and to stay

"bought." De Vega's resources were unlimited. He had the full authority of President Marcos and the First Lady to draw any amount he needed from the "special fund" set up for him by Internal Revenue Commissioner Misael P. Vera. In fairness to De Vega, he accounted for every centavo he disbursed to the delegates-for-sale. And made sure that the error of Delegate Venancio Yaneza in withholding a P5,000-envelope intended for Delegate Quintero was not repeated. It was said at the time that Quintero received an empty envelope in the presence of the President in Malacanang on January 6, 1971.

The waves stirred by De Vega's "Operation Con-Con" was a spectacle to behold. Lousy with money, the delegates would squander their ill-gotten wealth in the plush restaurants and nightclubs, some in the legally-tolerated casinos along Roxas Boulevard. Some would gamble with just pieces of paper that, when presented by the casino operators to De Vega's lieutenants in the Convention, were immediately redeemed. The delegates were paid in full for selling their votes to Marcos. This is probably the reason Marcos has no qualms of conscience at all when he maintains in an indefinite suspension of animation the interim National Assembly where the Con-Con delegates are supposed to be members, too.

The ban Marcos resolution was really a most popular proposal. All things being equal, it really should have been adopted despite the paid and loud protestations of Delegate Antonio Tupaz that it was perpetual condemnation without trial of an entire family (the Marcoses) to the ignominy of perpetual disqualification from the presidency. All logic pointed to the ban-Marcos resolution's approval. The spirit of the proposal was itself enshrined in the Constitution that the President should hold no more than two terms.

Like the ban-Marcos proposal, the proposal to retain the presidential system stood a strong chance of being approved overwhelmingly. A total of 106 delegates ran and won on the platform of "no reelection for Marcos" and "retention of the presidential system." Later, they were joined by 97 more delegates. Originally, therefore, only about 100 delegates favored the parliamentary system and rejected the presidential reelection ban.

But the anti-Marcos forces lost in the final vote because of the cockiness of delegates like Jose Mari Velez, the over-confidence of others like Sedfrey Ordenez. Most of them thought that, by embarrassing Marcos on the Quintero expose, they would get all the delegates to think that Marcos is such a repugnant and repulsive man that all delegates would just vote for the ban resolution and the presidential system. They failed to reckon with the corrupt mind and unbridled appetite for money of the unprincipled delegates and the vast resources made available by Ferdinand and Imelda to De Vega.

As Gimo was maneuvering brilliantly in the Constitutional Convention, Marcos kept hammering without let-up on the Communist bugaboo. Five days after the Supreme Court handed down its decision on the Lansang case, on December 11, 1971, Marcos summoned 1,000 newly-elected officials to listen to his lecture on the alleged Communist plans for the rural areas. He told them that the subversives have established "rural sanctuaries in the provinces in a move to expand their influence and pave the way for a Communist take-over of the country."

"It is now obvious that the subversives are implementing the original program of the Communist Party of the Philippines to erode the faith and

Chapter VI

The Other Villains

The unerring judgment of history would easily condemn Ferdinand E. Marcos with having, at the discerning age of 55, pulled the trigger that snuffed out the life of democracy in the Philippines by his declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972.

Whatever might be the attenuating circumstances, history will hold Marcos accountable for the dictatorship (circa: 1972-197?) that inexorably followed his proclamation of martial law. To be sure, Marcos is already compiling volumes addressed to historians to show that his decision of September 21, 1972, was a “great and heroic” one for the Philippines.

There is very little dispute indeed about the validity of an oft-repeated statement that before the proclamation of martial law, the Philippines was a “sick society.”

In his second book, *Notes on the New Society*, published on the occasion of the first anniversary of the martial regime, Marcos stated:

“I am, to be sure, accountable to history for 21 September 1972 when I signed the proclamation placing the entire Philippines under martial law. And yet solely and completely responsible for this decision, I cannot escape the sense that events, the thrusts of history, and even the will of the people, somehow guided my hand to the deed.”

True, the Philippines was in such an awful mess that the common man despaired over the situation. It was a challenge to the country's leadership to avail of the bargaining process so necessary in a democratic society to harness all the energy coming from the various sectors of the national fabric. Marcos did not see it fit to accept the challenge. He chose the path of authoritarianism, with an eye single to perpetuating himself in power. He preferred to use the boundless energy of his people as an excuse to declare martial law over the entire country.

Indeed, there were many facets of Philippine life that “guided” Marcos' hand to declare martial law. In their totality, however, they did not constitute a compelling reason for a man — and his No. 1 woman — to clamp down a dictatorial rule over the Filipino people.

Long before Marcos declared martial law, distribution of wealth and income in the Philippines was lop-sided. It was and is still the central problem of the nation. Such was the situation even before Marcos became President of his country in 1965. However, no President before Marcos ever thought of callously exploiting this situation to justify a resort to martial law.

While the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few became a favorite Marcos topic to rally the impoverished behind him and his plans to seize power, Marcos himself got frantically busy acquiring wealth from the advantageous perch of the presidency so he could belong to the nation's grouping at the top of the pyramid controlling the bulk of wealth in the Philippines.

In other areas of national life, there was much to be desired. The press was free but often irresponsible. The courts were slow, too technical and sometimes

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"The presidency is not designed for enduring friendships, for it attracts temporary allies. And the sentiments that the Office generates depend on favors that it confers.

"It is easy to put this down as the curse of our political system, but only the man who has become President knows that the Presidency must avail itself of the talents, skills, and influences at hand in order to pursue a policy or implement a national project."

Marcos tried hard to throw off the accusation that he was an ingrate in his relationship with Don Eugenio Lopez. Without the Lopez millions and tri-media which went all-out for Marcos in the 1965 battle for the presidency against Macapagal, Marcos would have met a sudden political death in that pivotal electoral contest. And the first thing Marcos and Imelda did was to nail down Eugenio Lopez, and his brother, Vice President Fernando Lopez, "the biggest oligarchs among oligarchs blocking government reforms."

The fatal mistake of the Lopezes in their dealings with Marcos was that they assumed that the Ilocano politician would turn against his benefactors. So, they simply went about twisting Marcos' arm for government concessions so necessary for the expansion of their petticoat economic empire. They tried to avail of their political influence even under the Marcos avert to further their economic horizons without even hinting to Ferdinand and Imelda that they would have a stake in their expanding enterprises.

Quid pro quo was the principle by which Marcos started operating from the vantage point of the presidency. I give that you may give. He was not adverse to granting government concessions provided that he got a substantial kick-back later on. This was the way he dealt with all those favor-seekers or temporary allies attracted by the presidency.

The Lopezes would have none of this give and take arrangement. Besides, most of their enterprises were closed family corporations that could not admit someone like Marcos who could gobble the entire Lopez clan overnight. Even Eugenio (Geny) Lopez Jr. who had started taking active command of the Lopez business empire by 1965 took the position that the Lopezes have already given so much to Marcos before the elections and even after his ascension to Malacanang.

"No," Geny once said, "we should not yield any more to that s.o.b."

Marcos stood his ground. The President confided to Secretary Clave that he was declaring war on the Lopezes. He outlined the pattern of attack that would be followed against the Lopezes. Marcos had to resort to this because he knew very well that the Malacanang reporters would deal with Clave in digging out background materials for the Palace onslaught against the Lopezes. Press Secretary Tatad was too unsophisticated, too shallow to handle the kind of propaganda war Marcos had in mind waging against the Lopez oligarchy.

The thrust of the onslaught against the Lopezes was going to be a take-off from the attack which a former President, Diosdado P. Macapagal, waged against the Lopez empire. In 1962, Macapagal pinned the label of "vested interest" on the Lopezes. Marcos, in 1971, decided to stigmatize the Lopezes as constituting an oligarchy exercising undue influence on the political authority, i.e. President Marcos. He would borrow the lines of Aristotle and Plato

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Institute of Management on December 9, 1969, and, much later on May 15, 1972, on the occasion of the inauguration of Meralco's Snyder Station No. 2 also in Barrio Sucat, Paranaque, Rizal.

But Marcos may even have been biased in favor of old man Lopez when he had nothing but praise for the man from whom he owed so much political debt. So, I would refer the gentle reader to a "message of inspiration" which Dr. Stephen H. Fuller, former president of the Asian Institute of Management, in introducing Eugenio Lopez during the presentation of the Distinguished Service Award to him by the Harvard Business School Association in Boston, Massachusetts, on June 9, 1972. It read:

We honor today a Harvard alumnus whose life of achievement has brought credit to his university in a great variety of ways. All of his accomplishments, however, have been firmly grounded in one single purpose: to maximize the sound growth of any organization, economic, political, educational or cultural of which he was a part and, simultaneously, to assure the fullest personal development and greatest profit to the individuals who comprised those bodies. In an age when so many occupants of leadership positions throughout the world are being accused of irrelevancy and anachronism, and when the world's youth are faltering for lack of acceptable role models, his story brings a unique message of inspiration.

This school, like this man we honor today, has never separated the political, economic, social, and spiritual aspects of the world as we sought to develop people fit to administer it. We, and he, have worked with the whole man, the basic integrity, the unifying forces that vitalize and render even more effective the human performance. Perhaps, however, since we, like he, labor to achieve our broader goal primarily in a business milieu, we should cite, very briefly, his more conspicuous achievements in that area.

In context of the present-day problems of the under-developed countries of the world and of the discontent that rages in them because of the seeming unconcern of business and industry for the welfare of the working man, two pages in the life history of this man have special meaning for us. After completing his education in Law in the Philippines and at Harvard, he returned as a sugarcane planter to his native province many decades ago. And there he and his brother, now the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines, revolutionized landowner-laborer relations on sugar-cane plantations by paying the highest wages in the industry and by extending to workers and their families better working conditions, modern housing, free medical care, and free education for their children — an example which other landowners in the area were soon to follow. Over time, his activities expanded to include a modern ocean shipping line, the first air way in the islands with multi-motored planes, and the re-establishment and expansion of a newspaper begun at the turn of the century by his father, a newspaper dedicated to fight for clean, democratic government and the exposure of corruption wherever it existed. In more recent times, he has led a group in acquiring the Manila Electric Company from its original American owners. And in the ten short

his love of country and his love of God.

He epitomizes all that is best in the word “Nationalist,” a word so often misunderstood by representatives of our own country. A universal humanitarian and a true twentieth century Filipino — he whom we honor today has already honored Harvard more — Don Eugenio Lopez.

But it was Imelda who was the more dedicated in the fight to crush the Lopez empire. “*Tignan natin kung gaano katigas ang amo mo, Tibo,*” (Let us see how tough your boss is, Tibo.) Imelda once declared with fire in her eyes when Malacanang reporters found an occasion to talk to her following a press conference with Marcos. In those times, it was always beneficial to see the First Lady in her Music Room. The Palace reporters would have envelopes containing “money for your night-clubbing.”

The Marcos-Lopez war didn't do either side any good. The protagonists succeeded only in hurting each other deeply. And given the circumstances of normal run of political fighting under a democratic atmosphere, it was almost a certainty that Marcos would run out of time in the fight. The Lopezes would have outlasted him; they would have succeeded in making another man elected President of the Philippines.

In the end, it was Marcos who was forced to capitulate to the Lopezes. In late May, 1972, the humiliated President of the Philippines went to the Paranaque residence of Don Eugenio Lopez Sr. for a breakfast conference. The same day, he helicoptered to the Manila Chronicle in Pasig, Rizal, for a peace conference with the Vice President.

The following day, I wrote a story of the Daily Express, entitled “Together Again” after a famous song.

The Marcos-Lopez reconciliation was actually instigated by Marcos himself. He had his brother-in-law, Leyte Gov. Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, arrange a lower-level meeting with Ernesto del Rosario, former editor of the Manila Chronicle serving as Vice President for Public Relations at the Lopez-controlled Manila Electric Company (Meralco). Kokoy meekly started the approach by asking Del Rosario if he could have lunch one day at the famed Meralco “Starlite” restaurant, on the 14th floor of the Lopez building in Pasig, Rizal. Sure, Del Rosario said, he would even play host to the Leyte governor.

When Romualdez went over to the Starlite Restaurant for lunch, he brought along with him the two Marcos children, Ferdinand Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene. When Don Eugenio Lopez Sr. heard about the presence of the Marcos children and Governor Romualdez, he sent instructions that the bill would be on him. He likewise suggested to Del Rosario that he might invite the ambassadors of peace from Malacanang to pass by his office on the 13th floor on their way out. This was just the opportunity Romualdez wanted to effect a reconciliation conference between Marcos and the Lopezes. The details of the Paranaque breakfast conference and the visit to Vice President Lopez were arranged and on that very day Romualdez raised Malacanang's white flag of surrender to the Lopezes.

The terse official announcement that the Malacanang press office made of the reconciliation was that the President and the Lopezes have agreed to forget their differences and collaborate in solving the problems of the country.

However, Marcos told a different story about that meeting when the time

Heaven” which the sainted Marcos allegedly perceived as go-signals for him to declare martial rule surfaced within the halls of the Constitutional Convention.

When the Constitutional Convention came into being in 1971, Marcos pinned his hopes on this constituent assembly to extend his occupancy of Malacanang. He was confident that he could manipulate the majority of the delegates to scuttle the presidential system in favor of the parliamentary form of government. Marcos would then be able to continue at the helm of government as the Prime Minister. There would be no need for him to resort to martial law.

However, some irresponsible delegates carried their “hate campaign” against Marcos to the extreme. They filed a proposal banning former Presidents and their relatives by consanguinity or affinity to the fourth civil degree from seeking the position of President or Prime Minister under the new Constitution then being drafted by the Convention. The proposal was clearly directed against Ferdinand and Imelda and it was labelled as a “ban Marcos resolution.” Delegate Antonio Tupaz cried that the resolution was “perpetual condemnation without trial of an entire family to the ignominy of perpetual disqualification from a public office.” The proponents of the “ban Marcos” move figured that there must be a clear and definitive ban on the Marcoses under the nascent new Constitution. They feared that Marcos was bent anyway on prolonging his hold on the presidency; he could easily re-hash with greater sophistication the machinery by which he won reelection in 1969 with the three Gs — guns, guons and gold.

The filing of the “ban Marcos” resolution proved to be the last straw for the President. Marcos felt he had been pushed to a corner, frustrated; there was no further elbow room to maneuver for a compromise with the Marcos-haters. Martial law is the last resort of a government under siege. And Marcos had decided long ago that he was the government, and the critics and enemies of Marcos were enemies of the government.

But, as a man obsessed with providing a veil of legitimacy to his every move, however flimsy, Marcos felt that he had to dispose of certain matters first before he could declare martial law. The Convention had to be manipulated to approve the shift to the parliamentary form of government and to disapprove the ban Marcos resolution. Presidential Assistant Guillermo C. De Vega handled the dirty operations for Marcos. With the two ticklish issues in the Convention handled to his satisfaction, Marcos felt assured that he could legally parry any accusation that he resorted to martial law because his occupancy of Malacanang would have legally ended on December 30, 1973.

History will be able to record in its finality and proper perspective that the ambitious politicians, rapacious wealthy and the Marcos-haters actually did democracy a disservice in the Philippines. They provided Marcos with the final excuse to declare martial law with their ban Marcos resolution. The vitriolic and underhanded criticism lobbed at Marcos by presidential aspirants and his enemies constituted one more of the nails that sealed the coffin of democracy in the Philippines.

While the Marcos opponents subjected the President to pillory at every turn, they were disparate in their efforts and discordant in their voices; they were united only in their criticisms that Marcos was an unredeemable crook. They were so thoroughly divided on the approach to ending Marcos’ tenure in

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"Blue Ladies" of Imelda for the victory of Marcos.

I would like to quote at this point a report submitted to the United States Congress on the acquisition of the Lopez assets by Marcos' friends and relatives.

The dual case of political prisoners Eugenio Lopez, Jr. and Sergio Osmena III has served to bring to light another result of the martial law of President Ferdinand Marcos and his closest advisers, including his wife, the beautiful Imelda Romualdez Marcos.

XXX

In 1965 when Marcos left the liberal party to attempt to unseat the incumbent President on the conservative ticket, it was Eugenio Lopez, Sr. who sold Marcos to the conservative convention. Fernando Lopez went on the ticket to help the team to victory. (Voted upon separately, Lopez out-pollled Marcos in both 1965 and 1969.)

The reasons for the Marcos retaliation against the Lopezes — in which the imprisonment of the younger Lopez is a key element — appear to be three: (1) a desire to destroy the Lopezes as a political force; (2) a stifling of freedom of the press; and (3) a naked desire for money. It is with that third goal we deal here.

The Lopez family was wealthy — one of the wealthiest in the Philippines. Furthermore, it was "old money," grounded in sugar cane and rice. After the Japanese occupation (in which the Lopez family at times lived in caves in the hills), principally through the abilities of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. the fortunes were increased by branching out into industries including the newspaper and the radio and television network. In 1960, Lopez, Sr. organized group of investors as "Meralco" to purchase the Manila Electric Company from American ownership. As Manila became larger and more modern he guided the enterprise to eight or nine times its former size — now worth more than \$400,000,000. The stock went public, but the Lopez interest was still sufficient to maintain management control — in fact, it had never been questioned.

Upon declaration of martial law the Manila Chronicle, increasingly critical of Marcos, was shut down under a censorship order. Later the facilities were taken over by the Times-Journal owned by Governor Benjamin Romualdez, brother of Mrs. Marcos, under agreement for leasing of the facilities from the Lopezes. The contract of lease itself was not based on a free negotiation. Payments have been sporadic and amount to about half the amount due. With the publisher in prison and the other two owners — Eugenio Lopez, Sr. and Fernando Lopez — effectively silenced, there was no one to complain.

The confiscation of the media network, ABS-CBN, was cruder. Upon the arrest of Eugenio Lopez, Jr., president of the company (and other officials) the government ordered all ABS-CBN stations closed down. Commencing June 8, 1973, the ABS-CBN outlets were turned over by the military one-by-one to a small network, KBS, owned and operated by Ambassador Roberto Benedicto, a close associate of President Marcos and an option to purchase given to Governor Romualdez (brother of Mrs. Marcos). At first, "leases" were prepared by KBS which included the

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of Airport Manager Luis Tabuena. However, he abrasively put me off when I reminded him that the President wanted a conference on the Lopez case, saying “*Pabayaan mo na muna ang mga Lopezes.*” (Leave the Lopezes to their doom.)

A week passed and Kokoy did not do anything. In the meantime, a friend who has been acting as the Veep's contact man with me, informed me that because of the tension of waiting for the Marcos clearance, the Vice President collapsed in his home one night. He quoted the Vice President as saying that, “unless Tibo helps” in the effort to get him a passport, he might die ahead of his brother.

At the risk of being accused of showing an unusual interest in the passport application of the Vice President, I approached the President again. He told me that he had given instructions to Kokoy to see the Vice President.

The following day I sought out Kokoy at the coffee shop of the Intercontinental Hotel and told him about what the President had told. I inquired if he would see the Vice President, and he said he would. I then called up the house of the Vice President to say that Kokoy would see him that day. Before leaving the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel, Kokoy asked me to prepare a series of statements which the Vice President would have to issue in his own name in connection with the trip.

I found out three days later, when I submitted to Kokoy the prepared statements he sought from me, that Kokoy had not seen the Vice President at all. It was becoming evident to me then that Kokoy wanted to give the Vice President a hard time.

I even tried to guess at the time that it was possible Kokoy wanted to renew or extend his option to buy the ABS-CBN network from the Lopezes. In any case, he clearly showed resentment over my attempts to press him on the passport of the Vice President.

Then it happened all of a sudden. This came about when the international press raised hell about the investigation I was conducting, in my capacity as chairman of the Media Advisory Council, of Arnold Zeitlin, “Associated Press” bureau chief in Manila. The President disauthorized me publicly from continuing the investigation.*⁴ (*4. See Chapter on “The Era of Thought Control.”)

On the same day, Kokoy sought out the Vice President, brought him to the presidential yacht to be told that he would be allowed to leave to see his ailing brother in San Francisco.

The statements which I prepared were subsequently issued by the Vice President abroad.

The Vice President wrote Marcos a letter pledging to return to the Philippines and placing his properties at the disposal of Marcos.

The New Society of Marcos and his gang is a society of the *nouveaux riche*. They are the new oligarchs who did not have any “seed money”. And yet they succeeded in taking over lock, stock and barrel, the properties of the Lopezes and of other established affluent families in the country.

The rapacious plundering jobs undertaken by Kokoy and Roberto S. Benedicto on the properties of the Lopezes is one of the more notorious ever known. However, there have been equally more heinous extortion activities carried on with the brutal use of the naked powers of martial law by other

among others. In the case of the pre-martial law critic of Imelda in the old *Manila Daily Bulletin*, Amelita Reysio-Cruz, she was clamped in jail, too, along with other pre-martial law media critics of the President.

As for Imelda, her obsession is to make the rich families who ignored, despised or shied away from her when she was not yet the First Lady of the land pay for their impudence by now forcing them to pay obeisance to her as the Lady Dictator of the Philippines. Ladies forced into this humiliation belong to the affluent families of the Yulos, the Madrigals, Lopezes, Aranetas, Cojuangcos, Felicianos, et al. Now, most of them are her "Blue Ladies" subject to her beck and call. After all, she is now more wealthy than all of them put together.

But what they consider insufferable is the paranoiac fits Imelda goes into when, without warning, she would regale them with tales of men and women young and old, dirty and unwashed, swooning over her as she passes them. All these, she would claim, mean that the people have nothing but love and admiration and adoration for her.

One of the reasons that eventually goaded the Marcoses to declare war on the Lopezes in 1971 was the resentment that had built up in Imelda over the continuing claims in public and private circles that the Lopezes were the principal power brokers that won the 1964 Nacionalista presidential nomination and the 1965 presidential election of Ferdinand. Imelda would not acknowledge the big role played by the Lopezes in the capture by Marcos of Malacanang.

"*Wala naman talagang naitulong sa atin 'yan mga bosses mo, Tibo.* (Your bosses did not really help us.) We had to pay for every minute of air time that they gave us in 1964 and 1965 at the ABS-CBN radio-TV networks," Imelda told me one day. Imelda insists that she was the vital difference in that heated 1965 election battle between President Macapagal and challenger Marcos, and because she is being disputed, nay belittled by the Lopezes, she would show the real power of a woman whose efforts the Lopezes were doing everything to denigrate.

As for Kokoy, he has made a deal with Imelda that he would establish their power base among the officials of the local governments, who are more numerous than the members of the armed forces which they have written off as "lost" in the event of a power struggle with Enrile et al upon the disability or demise of Dictator Marcos. Imelda and Kokoy realize that they cannot rely on the armed forces for support to any Ilocano leader of consequence in a post-Ferdinand power struggle — for the simple reason that 70 percent of the manpower of the public armed forces are Ilocanos. Thus, Imelda and Kokoy are concentrating on the local officials, making them swear personal oaths of loyalty to them. As a matter of fact, a question included in the February 27 (1975) referendum asking the people to indicate their position on whether they would want to empower the President or not with the task of appointing local officials after the expiration of their term on December 31, 1975, was the handiwork of Kokoy. This was fed by Kokoy to the late Secretary De Vega and Secretary of Local Government Rono, a recommendee of Kokoy, who formed the draft of the questions for the referendum for submission by President Marcos to the Commission on Elections. Of course, the "vote of the people" was "overwhelmingly" in favor of granting the President the power to appoint

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

In the December 1975 issue of *Cosmopolitan* magazine what had long been rumored in the Philippines was finally confirmed.

An article reported that Imelda 46, wife of Philippine Dictator 58, is one of the 10 richest women in the world.

She was listed along with Queen Elizabeth of England, Queen Juliana of The Netherlands, Christina Onassis of Greece, the Duchess of Alba, Madeliene Dessault of France, The Begum or widow of Aga Khan, Barbara Hutton, Doris Duke and Dina Merrill.

In the same month that the article came out, the Philippine celebrity, while basking under the glory of the report, flew back to New York City where columnist Earl Wilson reported on December 15: "x x x Playing it like a queen Philippine First Lady Marcos gave costly baubles (diamonds and pearls) to party guests Monique Van Vooren, Rudolf Nureyev and Van Cliburn. ." between champagne.

Nobody therefore can question the veracity of the *Cosmopolitan* magazine article on her wealth. That Imelda Marcos is indeed one of the world's 20 richest women, she herself has not denied.

Being wife of a chief of state, illegally though in power he may be, it may seem natural to her fellow-international jetsetters that she is a rich woman, but to Filipinos who know her background, where she came from and how she started, this feeling is not shared.

Manglapit's leader of the Philippine opposition in the United States, succinctly reported that "If Imelda is the richest woman in the world today it is because Marcos is the biggest thief!"

Indeed, if Marcos is the biggest thief, then he must also be the richest man in the world today.

Which brings us to the big question, how on earth did Imelda Marcos amass such wealth? What is the story of her rise from rags to riches?

In 1970 Chit Pedrosa, former staff member of *The Manila Chronicle*, after two years of research, provided part of the answer when she came up with a very revealing book, the *Untold Story of Imelda Marcos*.

It traced Imelda Marcos' history, ancestry, and fabulous rise from the gutter to wealth and fame, complete with official records, eyewitness accounts, and family photos.

For writing that book, the writer was sued for libel and hounded out of the Philippines. She is now living in exile in England, like a few other Filipino journalists who have incurred the wrath of the Marcoses and who are now also living in exile abroad.

Imelda Marcos was always a big question mark from the time she was born on July 2, 1927, in Manila. Her baptismal certificate at the San Miguel Cathedral was unsigned by the parish priest.

Until 1938, she lived in a garage in San Miguel district, just walking distance to Malacanang Palace, with her mother and kid brother Kokoy.

Imelda's family tree goes back to her grandfather Daniel Rongialdez of Pandacan, Manila, who married Trinidad Lopez of Ermita, Manila. They bore three sons - Norberto, Miguel, and Vicente.

Norberto had a son Norberto Jr. who later became secretary of labor, Miguel produced two sons — Daniel who became speaker of the House of Representatives, and Eduardo who is now Philippine ambassador to the U.S.,

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

Ernest Pineda, Col. Barangan, Col. Romeo Ochoco, Press Counsellor Alejandro del Rosario and I attended the conference at the MUP offices. We came up with the following draft of a "strategy" to neutralize the Manglapus demonstration:

Talk Strategy with Picketers

Friends would be strategically located on the East side of the street. Friends would approach the picketers and engage them in conversation. We will try to keep their attention away from the action across the street if necessary.

Talk to Newsmen

If local newsmen ask questions of the picketers the Friends would barge in and ask of the newsmen an American's opinion of the Philippines having returned from five weeks visit.

Contact News Executives

News stations would do a story of Pre-Opening, Pre-Interview and Opening especially with the involvement of so important a personality as we are discussing.

New York news hounds are a special breed and do not like to be led astray. The mere mention of "at the opening there might be some clowns with pickets" told in a straight forward manner and with security thrown in for good measure, might completely divert their attention away from the picketers to only the main story -- The opening of the building.

Package offered to the News Executives

Pre-Opening -- A tour of the building with the First Lady on a pool basis or exclusive.

The Opening -- If ribbon cutting outside between 4 pm and 8 pm is still the desired approach, supplemental lighting would be required for the dusk and dark event. A small generator would be required for good picture quality of the celebrities. Newsfilm crews on a daily basis use "sun gun" equipment. This necessitates tight shots. Newsfilm crews would use "sun gun" equipment across the street questioning picketers (few people in picture, not full demonstration, due to darkness).

Adding Screen of Vegetation

Adding large pots (same type as directly across the street) with; Philippine National Vegetation for the event would screen off the main event from the picketers across the street.

Rush Hour

The normal rush hour of buses, taxis and other vehicles also screen off main event and picketers across the street not only by traffic but by noise level.

Bus Screen

Get permission to park special charter buses for dignitary arrival and departure in front of the building.

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

"Oh, no, wait a minute. Ferdinand. I really would want to serve this country as President one of these days. But, if the condition is that you will be my Vice President, forget it. I love life, too, and I want to live a little longer, while serving my people. Don't ever think that I have forgotten the sharp aim of that man who felled Nalundasan with a single rifle shot. In these days of the telescopic sight, my God, I may hardly have the time to take my oath as President before my own Vice President guns me down with that deadly aim of yours. Oh, no, Ferdinand, forget it."

"Padre, puro ka biro, eh. Kalimutan mo na iyan kalokohan natin, nakaraan na iyon (Padre, you are always joking. Let's forget the past mischiefs)", cut in Marcos.

Lacson boomed: "I am not kidding, Ferdinand. I will not do anything which would in any way help you become President of this country. As a matter of fact, I make you this promise. You can become President of this country only over my dead body!"

Lacson was still fuming mad over the Marcos proposition. And the Ilocos Norte congressman had left the M. Earnshaw residence.

"*Salbahe talaga itong si Marcos.* (This guy Marcos is really a scheming deadly man). Just because I was ahead of him with Imelda, he wants to get even with me in a most convoluted manner!" Lacson would declare occasionally in recalling the Marcos visit to his house, and with a mischievous look on his Visayan face, would add, "Of course, if I should be President, and Marcos is my No. 2 man, then maybe I can requisition the Vice President's lady once in a while." *1

(*1. Lacson died on April 15, 1962 of apparent heart attack. At the time, he was already being groomed by the Nacionalista leadership to become the party's presidential candidate in 1965, while incumbent President Macapagal was being egged by Marcos to make good his pledge to support Marcos for the Liberal party presidential nomination.)

At that time, the nation had just very little knowledge of the workings of the heart and mind of Marcos.

The shot that catapulted Marcos for the first time into national notoriety was fired, according to a trial court, on September 21, 1935. Marcos, according to later findings of the trial court, gunned down reelected Assemblyman Julio Nalundasan.

Nalundasan was a perennial political rival of the father of Ferdinand, Mariano Marcos. Julio Nalundasan and Mariano Marcos, both of Batac, Ilocos Norte, were rival candidates for the office of representative for the second district of said province in the elections of 1934. Nalundasan was elected. The term for which Nalundasan was elected was, however, cut short as a result of the approval of the 1935 Constitution under which the general elections for members of the National Assembly were by law set for September 17, 1935. In the general elections, Julio Nalundasan and Mariano Marcos resumed their political rivalry and were opposing candidates for assemblyman in the same district. In the strife, Nalundasan again came out triumphant over Marcos. In the afternoon of September 19, 1935, in celebration of Nalundasan's victory, a number of his followers and partymen paraded in cars and trucks through the municipalities of Qirrinao, Paoay and Batac, Ilocos Norte, and passed in front of the house of the Marcoses. One of the trucks in the parade was so made up

to shift the form of government from the then existing presidential system to the parliamentary system. Marcos' problem was resolved when Garcia died of a heart attack on June 14, 1971, three days after his election to the Con-Con presidency.

The real motivation for the Nalundasan murder can only be truly gleaned into at this time — in the light of Marcos' own declaration, Marcos had nurtured his dream of becoming a dictator of the Philippines as early as his U.P. days when he would tell Leonilo "Noning" Ocampo, Felicisimo Ocampo and Roberto S. Benedicto about what they should get from marriage. For his part, Marcos said he would look for a girl coming from a rich and politically-powerful family so he can short-circuit his travel to power. He actually sought Baby Quezon, but things soured when he was accused on the Nalundasan murder.

Noning Ocampo was to comment wryly later, "*E yon pala ay isang salesgirl lang ang kailangan to become President,*" (For all his planning, Marcos needed only a salesgirl to help him become President!) For his tactless statement, which had been relayed to the Palace by Imelda's spies and courtiers, Noning Ocampo has never been forgiven by the First Lady.

The real motive then behind Nalundasan murder was the goal of Marcos to become the dictator of the Philippines. When the father was defeated by Julio Nalundasan, Marcos obviously saw what could have been a political eclipse for the Marcos family. As one who could coolly scheme in crisis, Marcos assessed the situation and decided on the ultimate solution to the big stumbling block to his political future: Kill Nalundasan. This was his first display of the "overkill" type of operation for which he has acquired notoriety.

There seems to have developed for some time a nationwide Nalundasan syndrome in the wake of first political killing in the Philippines. When people would talk about politics, the conversation would invariably turn to Nalundasan's murder, and end with a joking statement that one should be careful about his political enemies, "*baka ma-Nalundasan ka.* (You might be killed like Nalundasan). And it seems to have possessed Marcos himself. Everytime he would make a speech, Marcos would characteristically make a motion with his right hand, with the trigger finger pointing up straight. On one occasion, Arsenio H. Lacson and Ferdinand E. Marcos, then both freshmen members of the House of Representatives, were engaged in a debate over President Quirino's suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when Marcos showed his mannerism of the trigger-finger pointed towards Lacson. Lacson, then already noted for his irrepressible character, addressed the chair, thusly: "Mr. Speaker."

"What is the pleasure of the gentleman from the second district of Manila?"

"Mr. Speaker, I demand protection from the chair!"

"The gentleman from Manila should explain his demand for protection."

"Mr. Speaker, I demand protection from the gentleman from Ilocos Norte who reminds me, every time he points his trigger finger at me, of the murder of Nalundasan."

Marcos managed to shout, "*Anak ka ng tao*" (You son of a....) before the entire hall and the gallery burst into uncontrolled laughter. Lacson was one of the junior assistants of Vicente Francisco who handled the defense of Marcos, et al in the murder trial.

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

One day, I got secret instructions from old man Lopez to work closely with Marcos. Manila Chronicle General Manager Rafael Salas received the same instructions. Since I was "covering" Marcos as part of my duties as Senate reporter of the Manila Chronicle, and having earlier offered him my endorsement upon the death of Lacson, I carried old man Lopez's instructions to "cooperate" with Marcos with gusto.

Later on, when then Senate Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez found out about my working for Marcos, he demanded that I be fired from the Manila Chronicle. Lopez said: "How this Mijares works for the Chronicle, of which I am half-owner, and he supports my opponent!" Lopez, the politician, was himself a candidate for the Nacionalista presidential nomination in direct rivalry with Marcos. However, on direct instructions from his father, then Chronicle publisher Eugenio "Geny" Lopez, Jr. stood by me. When his uncle (Fernando) lost the NP presidential nomination to Marcos on Nov. 17, 1964, Geny shed tears over the defeat of Don Fernando, and even gave me accusing looks for what happened.

The ascension of Marcos to the highest position with the gift of the Filipino people gives us license to take a close look at the character and manner of life of the man.

"If Imelda Marcos is the richest woman in the world today, it is because Ferdinand Marcos is the biggest thief in the world today."

This was the most applauded line in the speech of Manglapus, considered the Philippines' best orator in many languages and former foreign secretary, during the third annual convention in Los Angeles of the Movement For A Free Philippines of which he is the president.

Manglapus was referring to the article in the December 1975 issue of Cosmopolitan magazine listing Imelda Marcos as one of the ten richest women in the world and "is rumored to be the richest woman in the world bar none."

On May 11, 1975, eight months before the Cosmopolitan expose of the incredible Marcos wealth, John Marks, co-author of the best selling book "CIA-Cult of Intelligence," stunned an audience of scholars attending a seminar at the Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago with the revelation that as early as 1969 Marcos had already amassed "stolen funds ranging from not lower than several hundred million US dollars to two billion US dollars!"

Marks, former assistant in the bureau of intelligence and research under Ray Cline in the US Department of State, told his audience in Chicago that he was risking legal sanctions and jail by revealing the psychology profile prepared by the CIA on Marcos which he saw while he (Marks) was still with the State Department in 1969.

Marks said the document showed how "incredibly corrupt" Marcos was. The Marks expose elicited from the audience, according to newspaper reports from Chicago, "whistling and head-shaking spiced by remarks such as Marcos could easily make two billion American dollars before martial law with all those supposed checks and balances, one can imagine how much he and Imelda are able to milk from a Philippines now under their total control."

In my own memorandum dated August 26, 1975 to the Fraser Congressional Committee on International Organizations, I reported:

could lay his hands on — including scrap metal which may have found its way to Japanese factories and used in the manufacture of bombs and armaments.

It appears that the mother of Marcos was the practical one in the family and by her wits fed and supported the family through its hard times. The father on the other hand remained an eccentric recluse alternately given to moods of depression and dreams of grandeur.

A physician in San Francisco, Dr. Ernesto Hilario, a provincemate and friend of Ferdinand, said that Mariano Marcos and his family “were different from you and me.” Asked to elaborate, Dr. Hilario pointed out that Marcos’ father, for example, would often walk around his town dressed up in riding togs, breeches, horse whip and all, but without a horse.

Rafael Salas, now an Undersecretary General of the United Nations who served as the first executive secretary of Marcos, summed in an interview for the Asia Philippines Leader April 1, 1971 issue the most accurate and prophetic evaluation of the type of person that evolved from the turbulent and sinister factors that influenced the thinking and character of Ferdinand Marcos.

According to Salas “Marcos has a certain style of politics. It is unique with him and I think he’s a most successful practitioner of it. He may not know his individuals but he knows the average Filipino to what degree the average Filipino can be scared, what are the limits before he becomes violent. Within these limits, he will apply the sort of artifice. I think thus far he has succeeded.

“Now this style has evolved from two experiences: his experience with domestic politics in the Ilocos, where there are only two methods; violence and money; and his experience in Congress, where there are really no rules. In short, any type of dissimulation or chicanery or bribery or coercion is applicable. This he brought to the Executive Office.”

ORIGIN OF THE MARCOS WEALTH

The December issue of the glamour magazine Cosmopolitan is making the rounds of Filipino circles here.

The issue has struck the fancy of its dazzling article on “The Ten Richest Women in the World” in which Mrs. Imelda Marcos — hail! — was voted as one of the walking gold mines.

The inclusion of Imelda in the fabulous list was indeed judicious considering that the yardstick used, apparently, was ostentatious wealth.

Writer Richard Baker, however, appeared to have deliberately spun a veil of mystery as to how the fabulous Imelda and her consort came to their fortune which Cosmopolitan gingerly estimated at “multimillions,” and with a question mark, at that.

All Baker did was to hint at it by using the apt verb “amassed.” If he probed any further, then, he might have decided to place Imelda in another list — that one for “the world’s top women of ill-gotten wealth.”

Of course, Imelda has a very naive way of denying that they only found their treasure chest right at the doorstep of Malacanang Palace.

Imelda is very vocal about the fact that when she met and married Mr. Marcos after a whirlwind courtship, Ferdie — then a congressman — was already a millionaire in his own right.

There is a story she apparently loves to recall to friends which she did tell one time (before martial law) to Malacanang reporters.

to the United States.

In January, 1970, when there was widespread indignation over Marcos' having suddenly become the "richest man in Asia," Marcos called in the Malacanang reporters for a news briefing at the ninth hole of the Malacanang golf course. He complained that he was being unduly pilloried by the mass media and the opposition party for his alleged ill-gotten wealth.

"I will admit that I am rich. But, you know boys, how I made my pile? I discovered the treasure of Yamashita," Marcos declared.

It was widely reputed in the Philippines that Yamashita, the last commander of the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines, buried a lot of treasures which he had looted from Burma, Malaya and Singapore before he surrendered to American forces.

If it is true, then Marcos has committed and continues to commit a violation of law. He has not shared half of the hidden treasure he had discovered with the Philippine government as provided by law.

Chapter X

The Loves of Marcos

"Sabihin mo sa sir mo, at nasabi ko na rin sa kaniya ito. Kapag hindi siya tumigil ng pagloloko, gagawan ko siya ng eskandalo na maluluma si Profumo." (Tell your sir (i.e. President Marcos), and I have myself told him about this. If he does not stop his philandering, I will expose a scandal about him that would dwarf the Profumo case.)

British Defense Minister John Profumo was forced to resign from the Cabinet of Prime Minister Harold MacMillan when he was denounced for having allegedly consorted with a prostitute, Christine Keeler. This brought down the government of MacMillan.*1

(*1. British Defense Minister John Profumo was forced to resign from the Cabinet of Prime Minister Harold MacMillan when he was denounced for having consorted with a prostitute, Christine Keeler. This brought down the government of MacMillan.)

The party giving the warning was none other than the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, who was so distraught one day that she found Teodoro F. Valencia, pro-Marcos newspaperman willing to listen to her sympathetically.

At the time, Mrs. Marcos felt like a woman scorned. She had good reasons to be. She had discovered not by herself, but by the admission of the "other woman," that her husband had acquired a mistress who, according to the woman, was promised by the President the prospect of being a future First Lady in lieu of Imelda Romualdez who was becoming fat and obese, and an old wag. The other woman turned out to be Dovie Beams, an upcoming star from Hollywood. Of course, there were other Marcos affairs, but this was the one that made the headlines; the only instance wherein the woman herself admitted to being a mistress of the President of the Philippines.

more "Blue Ladies" from their respective husbands than votes. The more notorious, of course, was Marcos' affair with "Blue Lady" G.C. It is said that G.C.'s husband, who found out about this affair, simply agreed to behave like a pendejo as he loved his wife too much and could not live without her. Besides, he was more preoccupied with helping Marcos win the presidency in order that he would have a power base to trounce his own political rival in his own constituency.

The affair of F.M. with G.C. also came to the attention of Mrs. Marcos. However, Meldy restrained herself from warring on either Ferdie or G.C. as she herself was more concerned with Marcos' winning the presidency. No, she decided, she would not rock the boat during a most critical period of the campaign. She would steel herself. The support of G.C. in the campaign effort was more than providing Ferdinand with emotional comfort in bed. G.C. and her husband were also among the heaviest financial contributors to the campaign chest.

However, Meldy felt one day during the campaign that Ferdie's affair was something she could no longer stand and must be stopped — diplomatically. She summoned another "Blue Lady," a Mrs. P, and requested her to get the wam G.C. that "the coffy shops are ripe with rumors" about her affair with Ferdie, and that she should break off her tete-a-tete with Ferdie as "further spread of this vile rumor might wreck the presidential campaign efforts. Mrs. P did as she was told by Imelda, and her beautiful friendship with G.C. ended right then and there.

Mrs. P also incurred the ire of Ferdie who confronted her several days later with these words: "*Hoy, ano ba ang pinagsasabi mo kay (G.C.). Aba, eh, hindi na yata titigil ng kaiiyak ang kawawang babaeng 'yan* (Hey, whatever did you tell G.C.? Gosh, it seems that the poor woman will no longer stop weeping.) Ferdie intimated that G.C. had come to him weeping as soon as Mrs. P had delivered Imelda's message to G.C.

Somehow, the G.C.-FM affair ended with the presidential victory.

As President, Marcos acquired greater means and power of persuasion to satisfy his lusts, he went after celebrities, mostly movie actresses and nightclub singers.

A television and nightclub singer who caught the fancy of Marcos was a woman named C.S. She was statuesque and looked very much like Imelda in height, but she was more stately, and was equipped with a more comely face, legs better shaped than Imelda's and bosomy. She also had a better voice than Imelda.

C.S. was one woman Imelda really hated. At one time, Imelda even sought out C.S. in 1970 in San Francisco - even after she had given up Ferdie — to get her to make a statement that she had never gone to bed with Marcos. They met in an apartment house in San Francisco. Imelda was accompanied by then PNB Executive Vice President Ernesto Villatuya. When C.S. told Imelda to go to hell, Imelda took a swing at C.S. who managed to duck. Villatuya, who was standing near C.S. at the time, caught the blow and fell to the floor. For catching Imelda's blow, Villatuya was rewarded with an appointment to the presidency of the Philippine National Bank which he held until 1972.

Easily, however, the most notorious of the romantic escapades of Marcos

standard.

On the other hand, Meldy, the OLD beauty queen, has also completed her second "face-lifting" which, reportedly, raised her navel to a dimple on her chin. While the dimple looks cute on her chin, the "lifting" created a new "unexpected problem".

It seems that everything else of Meldy has been raised up in proportion to her navel, and Ferdie now has to search "elsewhere" to find what he can no longer find in Meldy.

Chapter XI

Philippine 'Gulag': A Paralysis of Fear

A telling evidence on the repressive character of the military dictatorship of Marcos is the unending interment of thousands of political prisoners in various military stockades and concentration camps all over the Philippines. The truth is that the entire Philippines is one vast "Gulag Archipelago" where the Filipinos, whether inside or outside a military stockade, are subjected to continuing deprivation of their civil rights, some of them suffering cruel and unjust punishments in the hands of soldiers.

The undermining effect of the military concentration camps on Filipino society constitutes an open and apparently unhealing wound, but at this stage it would be difficult to quantify the national tragedy represented by the indiscriminate detention without charges of non-supporters and opponents of the Marcos military regime, or the influence it continues to have in ordinary Philippine life.

For as long as Marcos rules as a dictator backed by the military, the horror of internment of political prisoners would go on and on. And like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, I must apologize to those whose plight I may be unable to reproduce in this work for I am unable to remember or acquire knowledge of every incident, every injustice, every cruelty of the regime, of which I was a part and which I have renounced. As Solzhenitsyn wrote, "The whole scope of this story, and of the truth, is beyond the capabilities of one lonely pen."

While still working for Marcos as his chief press censor, I have had occasions to look into the isolated cases of political prisoners. One of them was the case of Lilia Hilao, whose death was brought to my attention two days after it happened by her own sister. I did bring this matter to the attention of President Marcos, but he never saw it fit to inform me about the action he had taken on the most glaring "atrociousness ever committed on a political prisoner under the martial regime."

The matter of political prisoners has always been a source of monumental embarrassment for Marcos. He even earned the sobriquet of "lying dictator" for his many prevarications on the issue of prisoners of conscience. That the Marcos military regime has adopted as part of its official policy the shameless resort to prevarications, falsifications and even bribery of a congressional witness, to mislead or prevent the United States and other foreign governments from gaining full knowledge, on political repression and tyranny in the

happened to this young man? Why has his name suddenly been dropped without explanation? The following verified story provides the answers.

Association of Major Religious Superiors.

From well-informed sources we received the following report in a blatant case of murder perpetrated by the military in Baguio City in the morning of Monday, December 9, 1974. The report is based on an eyewitness account by a certain Ofelia Castillo, a former public school teacher.

The murder victim was Eddie Ceneza, 21 years of age and a native of Bo. Salinognon, San Mateo, Isabela. He was also known by the names of "Rey," "Dave" and "Frank" and to neighbors in Baguio Citlas "Eleazar Bartolome." He endured the savage torment dealt by the military without compromising his principles. The killers included such military men as Arnold Sineres and Jose Rivera.

For a clearer picture of what happened, a narration of events in chronological order follows:

- 8 December 1974: Eddie Ceneza and his companion Alberto Yanes were taken, to the agents' residence at Leonila Hill. Ofelia Castillo was arrested that same day and brought to the agents' residence. The three were then taken to a nearby "safehouse" of the military agents.

- 9 December: All three were tortured while being interrogated. In addition to being beaten mercilessly, Ceneza and Yanes were made to endure electrodes (electric shock) applied to different parts of the body. Ceneza was continuously clubbed on the head until blood oozed out of his nose and ears. Ofelia Castillo was stripped of her clothes, subjected to indignities, slapped, kicked and beaten with a .38 caliber revolver. The torture session took all of December 9 and went into the following day.

- 10 December: There was no let-up in the brutal treatment of Eddie Ceneza. Unable to break his spirit, the military concentrated on hitting him with a .45 caliber pistol. Later, his body was found on the pavement outside the house apparently flung from a second floor window. Ofelia Castillo escaped while the agents were distracted.

Alberto Yanes, Ofelia Castillo and Eddie Ceneza were mentioned by the Times Journal of January 3, 1975, as numbering among the 30 plus persons arrested in the same series of raids during which Fr. Edicio de la Torre SVD and Fr. Manuel Lahoz were arrested. They were supposed to be under military custody and were to be charged on January 25, 1975 with conspiracy to commit rebellion. But Alberto Yanes has for reasons known only to the military "escaped". Ofelia Castillo escaped from the military safe houses (houses outside the prison camps where the military can 'safely' torture or dispose of political prisoners) in Baguio and is now in hiding. And Eddie Ceneza — no one knows where his remains lie, except perhaps his killers.

VII. COMMITTED RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Even priests, nuns and lay leaders have not escaped the political persecution of the Marcos dictatorship. As a consequence, the various religious organizations have united to become a major voice in denouncing the dictatorship.

Camp Crame, Manila for several hours, and then to Camp Olivas, Pampanga the same day. He was charged along with 29 persons with "illegal printing, possession, distribution, circulation of subversive materials."

December 14, 1974 — At 11:30 a.m., Fr. Restituto Lumanlan, the highest acting superior of the SVD's available in Manila at the time, was handed a xerox copy of a Memorandum to the Chief of the Constabulary, Camp Crame, with the authorization of the President, to arrest Fr. Edicio de la Torre "for acts inimical to national security and public order." Fr. Lumanlan objected that Fr. Ed de la Torre's arrest was in violation of prior agreements between the government and the Church-Military Liaison Committee which provides that the religious superiors be first informed of an impending arrest.

December 15, 1974 - 2:30 p.m., the military chaplain returned to Fr. Lumanlan with a Memo, this time for the arrest of another priest, Fr. Manuel Lahoz. Fr. Lumanlan then asked the military chaplain where Fr. Ed was. He said he wasn't sure but would check if he was already in Camp Olivas, Pampanga.

December 16, 1974 - At 9:00 a.m., not being able to get any further information, Fr. Lumanlan finally drove to Pampanga to check for himself the whereabouts of Fr. Ed. When Fr. Lumanlan was allowed to go into the detention cell, he found Fr. Ed and Fr. Manuel Lahoz eating. He also noticed a large bruise and a bad contusion on the back of Fr. Ed. Fr. Ed explained that this was a result of the rough handling at the time of his arrest. Fr. Ed continued that on December 15, a military visitor barged into Fr. Ed's cell shouting, "You. You say you are a priest. You are fooling us," and with that the military person hit Fr. Ed in the abdomen with a heavy fist blow. In his surprise and unexpected pain, Fr. Ed cried out, "My God" and then called for help. The man hit him once more on the nape and answered, "You still believe in God pala. We thought you were a member of the Communist Party." Fr. Ed was then handcuffed to his bed.

December 26, 1974 - More specifically in his letter to all concerned, and on the 36th hour of his fast, he clarified the reasons for this hunger strike:

1. "It is not primarily to protest the "symbolic" blows I have received. It is not even to protest Fr. Lahoz' and my own prolonged detention without investigation although these are reasons enough for a protest. Despite the relatively privileged treatment we have received (separate quarters, visitors, food) detention is still imprisonment and freedom remains wanting. A comfortable cage is still a cage.
2. The primary reason is to focus attention on the other political prisoners who are not as well known and who are not treated as well. For snatches of conversation, we have gathered that there is not much sign of torture in Z-2 itself, although cases worse than what happened to me have happened. However, during arrest and "tactical interrogation," severe torture has been reported and we have seen some of the results.
3. Another reason is to share with the poor, the starving, the malnourished, especially laid off workers, sugar workers, "squatters" and share tenants - the experience of hunger and poverty."

December 27, 1974 - On the 72nd hour of his fast, Fr. Ed exposed excerpts of notes from recent prisoners.

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

On February 24, 1974, he was arrested and detained at Fort Bonifacio without formal charges. For three days, he was denied food and water. During his interrogation he was savagely beaten and made to drink his urine in the hope of forcing a confession from him. The military authorities also gave him constant serum injections and electric shock treatment to various parts of his body. Rev. Taguba was subjected to so severe abuses and torture that he required hospitalization at the V. Luna Medical Center.

As of January, 1975, Rev. Taguba was in his tenth month of detention despite a military circular assuring the release of the religious to their immediate superiors. Reports claim that because of this inhumane ordeal. Rev. Taguba is suffering from a case of schizophrenia.

On January 8, 1975, an Ecumenical Worship on Human Rights was held in Manila on behalf of all Filipinos who have suffered under the martial law repression. Sponsored by the NCCP Ecumenical Ministry to Political Detainees, the service cited Rev. Taguba along with many others who suffered torture and martyrdom in the hands of the military.

XII. REV. PAUL WILSON

Rev. Paul Wilson is a minister of the Christian Church. He served as a consultant for the Commission on Development and Social Concerns for the NCCP (National Council of Churches in the Philippines). He assisted in promoting cooperatives and credit unions among the churches and private sectors in the Philippines. Arriving in Manila in September 1973, he was to serve a "two-year term" in cooperation with the Philippine Government's Department of Local Government and Community Development.

Facts about arrest, charges and detention

On June 26, 1974, officers of the Philippine military forces barged in during a dinner at the Wilson's residence and arrested Rev. Paul Wilson together with all the men present. They were all taken to Camp Crame in the Manila Area where they were interrogated and held "incommunicado" for four days. Later that night, the military forces came back and arrested Wilson's wife and their ten-year-old son. Their home and jeep were searched five times in their absence. Their books, magazines, private pictures and about \$1000 in personal property and cash were stolen by military personnel from their home. For ten days, Rev. Paul Wilson was imprisoned at one of the detention centers at Camp Crame. The last four days of his stay in the Philippines, he was held by the Department of Immigration and Deportation and deported back to the U.S. on July 12, 1974.

Bits of Information

During his interview at the Dirksen Senate Building on December 9, 1974, Rev. Paul Wilson described the conditions of the detention center as deplorable.

For the first four nights, we were made to sleep on bare concrete floors. Food consisted of rice, thin soup and coffee. Once or twice a week, we would get a small piece of fish. For the 200 political prisoners, four toilets and four showers were shared among themselves. I brushed my teeth over the urinal and it was not uncommon to wade through 3-4 inches deep of water in the

for us in the 1969 elections," intoned Mrs. Marcos. Of course, what was not articulated was that both Mrs. Marcos and Gov. Romualdez wanted to get even with Ablan's efforts to serve the personal and romantic needs of his benefactor. Young Ablan is even suspected of having been with a gang which manhandled Kokoy and left him for dead in Ilocos Norte in 1959.

For Alberto, however, there was a different score to settle. As chairman of the powerful House committee on appropriations, it was within his power to approve or veto requests for special appropriations in the general appropriations bill. He had steadfastly refused to approve funding with bloated outlays the special image-building projects of the First Lady, Mrs. Marcos considered his an affront. She bided her time, and the time came on September 24, 1972.

Accounts of mass arrests and torture, and abuse of families of political detainees have appeared in the world press. I have read most of them and find them to be substantially correct. The conditions in these concentration camps are generally filthy, although the detention camps known as "A", "B", "C", and "S" in the Greater Manila area are in Camp Aguinaldo, Camp Bonifacio in McKirfley, Camp Crame and the Sampaguita Rehabilitation Center in Muntinlupa, Rizal. I have examined and read two articles on political prisoners, and I find them accurate accounts of conditions in the Philippines. The first, entitled "Inside the Marcos Concentration Camps", written by Dr. John M. Swornley, Jr., professor of social ethics at the St. Paul School of Theology (United Methodist), Kansas City, Missouri, appeared in the *Christian Century*, issue of November 13, 1974; and the second, entitled "Marcos House: Chambers of Torture", was written under the pen name of Concepcion Aguila by one still residing in the Philippines and was first printed in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, issue of November-December, 1974.

The Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines compiled the following list of prisoners subjected to torture and other forms of military atrocities while in detention:

1. Mr. Reynaldo Guillermo (address: Camp Holmes)-electric shock all over body; -beating; -tried to escape but was shot at (not hit).
2. Isabel del Pilar (wife of Reynaldo Guillermo); detained. Four months pregnant, and sick with amebiasis.
3. Alejandro Arellano (address: Taguig, Rizal)-electric shock and beating all over body.
4. Flora Corpus (wife of Alejandro Arrelano); detained. Two months pregnant
5. Charley Palma (address: Tatalon, Quezon City) -electric shock and beating; burned with lighted cigarettes.
6. Rosario Salvador (wife of Charley Palma); aged 20; detained
7. Victor Quinto (Baguio City) -electric shock torture and beating; burned with cigarette butts; truth serum administered.
8. Elita Ponce (wife of Victor Quinto); detained. Two months pregnant.
9. Pedrade Guzman, Jr., aged 25; - electric shock and beat-ing.
10. Virginia Atening (Catineng?), aged 22 (wife of Pedro de Guzman, Jr.);detained
11. Reynaldo Rodriguez, aged 23;- electric shock; beating; strangling (sinakal); burned with cigarette butts.
12. Ma. Cristina Verzola, age 20 (wife of Reynaldo Rodriguez);-beating; burned with cigarette butts; some sexual abuses.

Under the conditions of the tightly-controlled media, the contents of Philippine newspapers may be likened to stones in a desert. It is really an intellectual desert that has developed in the Philippines. Right now, the most important criterion for a news story or magazine article is: Will it please or anger President Marcos, the First Lady, Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, Information Secretary Francisco S. Tatad or the officers of the military establishment? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the story becomes a "must," otherwise, the story will never see the light of print. The usual No. 1 criterion that a story must be informative or instructive has taken a second billing under the martial law norms in the Philippines.

As to the conditions of ownership, control and management of news media, including broadcast media, in the Philippines, I had occasion to write a brief article on the subject matter for the Philippine News in its issue of March 13-19, 1975, to wit:

ABUSE OF POWER AND CORRUPTION

With a stroke of the pen, President Marcos wrote a govt. crisis to the heyday of the "freest press" in Southeast Asia.

By the stroke of the very pen that imposed martial law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972, the one-man ruler paved the way for the odious meteoric rise - from a slavish and lapwing errand boy of Manila's elite political writers to a "nouveau riche" newspaper oligarch - of his brother-in-law, former Ambassador to the United States and now absentee Leyte Governor Benjamin 'Kokoy' Romualdez.

The entry into the Philippine media field of Kokoy, the favorite brother of the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, was at once an indelible blot on the once shining shield of a martial regime that Marcos imposed ostensibly as an instrument, among others, of reform in a "sick" society.

Either by design or plain subsequent acquiescence on the part of President Marcos, Kokoy Romualdez forced his way into the country's media industry clearly with a corrupt and vindictive motive.

The sly insertion of Gov. Romualdez into the area of big time publishing, with his overnight ownership of a daily newspaper, the Times-Journal (which unashamedly copied the logo of the defunct Manila Times), spotlights the perversion of the instruments of power at once made available to one man upon the imposition of martial law in the Philippines.

It will be recalled that the blueprint for a proposed New Society that is at best an illusion now in the Philippines called for the mighty interplay of three major arms of an authoritarian government.

THREE MAJOR ARMS

These instruments of power are: 1) the military arm, to provide the coercive process to establish peace and order and reform society; 2) the economic and social arm, to improve the economic and social conditions of the people; and 3), the information and propaganda arm, to provide the needed circus (when economic hardships set in) and other functions to re-orient the Filipino mind.

All these have been perverted by Marcos and his gang. Known for their notoriety in behaving like they were leaders of a conquering army going after the "spoils of war", the more notorious members of the gang are, aside from

to be greeted with smiles. He took no chances. He would have none of the rays of his "smiling martial law" shine upon the journalists. He was so infuriated with some newspapermen and their lack of restraint in criticizing him.

The vengeance of Marcos came not only with the arrest of journalists and the closure of media establishments. He laid down his restrictions on those who would be allowed to engage in media once more.

Thus, the directive issued by the newly-created Department of Public Information (DPI Order No. 1) required all media to "print and broadcast accurate, objective, straight news reports of positive national value, consistent with the efforts of the government to meet the dangers and threats that occasioned the proclamation of martial law and the efforts to achieve a "new society." The news media were prohibited from carrying "any editorial opinion, commentary, comments or asides, or any kind of political, unauthorized, or objectionable advertising." The new regulations also expressly prohibited:

- a. Materials that tend to incite or otherwise inflame people or individuals against the government or any of its duly constituted authorities.
- b. Materials that undermine the people's faith and confidence in the government or any of its instrumentalities.
- c. Materials that are defamatory, not based on facts, or otherwise without definitely established and well-identified verifiable sources, or based on mere allegation or conjecture.
- d. Materials that downgrade or jeopardize the military or the law enforcement authorities, their work and their operations.
- e. Materials that abet, glorify, or sensationalize crime, disorder, lawlessness, violence.
- f. Materials that destroy or tend to destroy public morals as well as morale.
- g. Materials that foment opinions and activities contrary to law.
- h. Materials that sow or generate fear, panic, confusion, ignorance and vulgarity among the people.

During the first few days of the martial regime, Marcos' media policy was erratic. However, he was sure of one thing: the government needs media to disseminate its propaganda. So the Marcos-owned *Daily Express* and radio-TV network, the Kanlaon Broadcasting System, which consisted of television Channel 9 and two radio stations, were allowed to operate less than 10 hours after they were closed down. The resumption of the operations of the tri-media was in accordance with Letter of Authority No. 1 signed by Marcos.

Marcos initially sounded out the *Manila Times* at about 3 p.m. on September 23, 1972, if it could re-publish on a temporary permit. Jose Luna Castro, executive editor of the *Manila Times* Publishing Company, told Tatad flatly that his paper would not resume publication on a temporary permit. Besides, he added, there would be no time to summon the editorial staff and employees of other departments to report for work that day. Castro was still angry over the closure of his newspaper and the arrest a few hours earlier of his publisher, Joaquin "Chino" P. Roces. The government offer to re-open the *Manila Times* was never renewed.

Two weeks later, the *Philippines Herald* was given a permit to operate,

Mass Media Council in the OCR building at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City. Secretary Enrile was in a bad mood. He had just bawled out an OCR junior officer, Major Templo, for having surreptitiously paved the way for the grant of a number of MMC permits for various publications, including a weekly newspaper which he eventually tried to convert into a daily newspaper for the armed forces. Presently, he turned to Camacho, the secretary of the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures, whom De Vega had earlier named as liaison man between the movie censorship body and the MMC. Enrile demanded to know of Camacho why the BCMP had allowed the advertising of the movie, "The Godfather," for exhibition. He pointed out that there was so much violence and other features of the film which were contrary to the new mores and morals which the New Society seeks to develop. Camacho replied that it had been reviewed and allowed for exhibition by the BCMP.

Enrile shouted: "I don't care, if the picture or any other picture has been approved by the Board of Censors. In my capacity as defense secretary, I can order the military to prevent or stop the exhibition of any motion picture, regardless of whether it has been reviewed and approved by Gimo de Vega personally. I want to take a look, at that picture."

The defense boss issued a direct order to Colonel Andaya, the OCR chief, to demand of the BCMP that the movie, "The Godfather," be submitted for review by the DND secretary.

Camacho reported glumly to De Vega.

At the headquarters of the OCR itself, there was glee and the intoxicating smell of success. The Enrile posture on movie censors was the kind of stance which the officers of the OCR have been itching for. However, they could not invade the area of motion picture reviewing since they could not, at their level, risk a clash with De Vega. Now, they can intrude into the De Vega territory with the virtual pronouncement of a directive by Enrile.

I became concerned with Enrile's posture on film review, particularly as it might affect a benefit premiere showing of "The Godfather" to raise funds for the National Press Club of the Philippines. The Enrile outburst was reported to me by Estrella D. Alfon who happened to be at the OCR on the day the MMC was holding its weekly session. "It looks bad for Gimo, Tibo. Johnny was in a pugnacious mood," Alfon said. I rushed to Dr. De Vega and reported the incident to him. The presidential assistant told me not to worry. He had been apprised by Camacho about Enrile's threat.

"Let's find out whom the President would uphold, the Mam (Imelda) or Enrile," De Vega told me hesitating. By that time, De Vega had already prepared his battle plans. He knew exactly how the attack on Enrile would have to be made, and where the initial salvo would have to be launched.

In any in-fighting and power struggle among the ranking officials of the martial government, the best way to do battle would be to have the female half of the conjugal dictatorship on your side. De Vega was sure of that side of the ruling triumvirate.

De Vega opened up on Enrile with a casual report to the First Lady, Mrs. Marcos. Then, he moved in for the kill by stating that he may no longer be able to perform his job as BCMP chairman efficiently. He explained that Enrile and the military want to invade the movie censorship field by imposing themselves as the higher reviewing authority for films. Mrs. Marcos needed no further

- larger than any allocation for a Western European country, including that for Spain
 - larger than the allocation for Brazil, the largest recipient in Latin America, and larger than the combined totals of aid for the "southern cone" countries, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile
 - In East Asia and the Pacific, larger than the allocations for Japan and Indonesia, and greater than the combined allocation for Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka.
- Clearly, then the United States government has, in matters of military assistance, granted the Philippines an extremely favorable treatment, contrary to the Marcos government's propaganda claims - aimed specifically at the U.S. Congress - that the United States has treated it as some sort of "poor cousin."

U.S. Military Assistance and Counter-Insurgency

American defense officials have at times been quite candid about the purposes of military aid. The stated objective of propping up the "external-defense" capability of the Philippines against the "Red China threat" which was so frequently cited in the 1960s has given way in the seventies to the one about improving the "internal-defense" capability of the Philippine Armed Forces. Thus Admiral Thomas Moorer, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated quite frankly during the congressional hearings on the 1974 military assistance proposal that:

The security assistance material program . . . are designed to provide mobility, firepower, and communications - the three basic elements required to combat insurgency forces. We are providing helicopters and transport aircraft, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and other weapons, together with long-range communications equipment. *19

(*19. House Appropriations Committee, op. cit. p1280.)*

An examination of the types of technical assistance and weaponry reaching the Philippine Armed Forces during the last three years would more than bear out Admiral Moorer's assertion.

JUSMAGP and the formation of Battalion Combat Teams. The Battalion Combat Team (BCT) is the basic Philippine military counterinsurgency force. Composed of about 600 men, the BCT grew out of the anti-Huk campaign of the early fifties with American advisory, and operational assistance.*20

(*20. For the close operational role of U.S. military officials in the anti-Huk campaign, see Edward Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars* (New York Harper and Row, 1972), passim.

Unlike MAAG's in most other countries, the role of JUSMAGP in the Philippines has not been limited to being a liaison for weapons aid. After martial law the advisory and operational role of JUSMAGP in the formation of BCT's appears to have intensified. As Senator Strom Thurmond reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 22, 1975, after a tour of U.S. military facilities in the Asia/Pacific area, "The mission of JUSMAGP is to assist the Philippines Armed Forces in attaining the capability to maintain internal security . . . During recent years the primary effort of JUSMAGP has been to assist the Philippine

Congressionally-Unauthorized Aid to the Marcos Government

In its April 1973 report to the Congress on U.S. military assistance to the Philippines, the General Accounting Office repeatedly complained of the various methods "by which military assistance to the Philippines has been augmented without Congressional approval or authority." *47 While the GAO study covered the patterns of U.S. military assistance from 1964 to 1971, instances of "extra-official" aid have continued during the martial law period.

Use of U.S. Base Facilities. That military assistance has been augmented without Congressional approval or authority with the use of U.S. base facilities for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) military and other operations before martial law was documented in the 1969 hearings on security agreements with the Philippines, in spite of the weak qualification of DOD spokesmen that participation in Philippine counterinsurgency operations was not a "general policy" of U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines. *48 This section will focus on post-martial law instances of base support.

During the hearings on the 1975 military assistance proposal, a spokesman for the State Department admitted that Filipino pilots were partly trained to fly C-123K aircraft by a U.S. Air Force mobile training team at Clark Air Force Base from October to December 1973. *49 These cargo craft, incidentally, are now being used in supply operations in the Marcos regime's military campaign against the Muslims in the southern Philippines.

(*47. General Accounting Office, *Military Assistance and Commitments in the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1973), p. 25.

*48. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1971), p. 355.

*49. See statement of Linwood Holton, State Department liaison with Congress, included in U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, FY1975* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1973), p. 497.)

In November 1972, two months after the declaration of martial law, an investigating team of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that:

... a squadron of Philippine F-5's has been located at Clark for some months. Base officials told us that they were pleased to have the opportunity to assist the Filipinos. They did not seem concerned about the problems which could arise as a result of the use of a U.S. base for counter-insurgency operations. Officials in Washington were unable to say whether the F-5's have already been used for such purposes or whether they would be in the future. *50

(*50. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, *Korea and the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1973) p.40.)

The observation and suspicions of the Senate investigating team evokes several comments. First, the Philippines has only one squadron of F-5's, which means that in late 1972 the whole modern fighter component of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) - most other fighters being obsolete F-36's — was stationed at Clark. *51

(*51. Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1973-74* (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1973).

base personnel in areas adjoining the bases,*56 to which the "Communist insurgency," according to a Defense Department spokesman in the 1973 congressional hearings, "represents a . . . direct threat." *57 Since 1970 U.S. civic-action projects began to acquire a more coordinated character and a nationwide scope. Before 1970 the formal policy on the use of U.S. personnel in the Philippines was enunciated by James Wilson, deputy chief of mission of the U.S. Embassy in Manila during the congressional hearings on the United States' base and security arrangements with the Philippines in 1969: "It is a well-established policy that U.S. military personnel are not authorized to participate in AFP operations of any kind." *58 This "well-established" policy was reversed with the arrival of Special Forces teams from Okinawa who went to work "on a co-equal, integrated basis with the Armed Forces of the Philippines counterpart (civic-action) team." *59 From October 1970 to May 1974 civic action activities embraced twelve provinces and had direct and indirect effects on some three million Filipinos. *60

According to a State Department statement regarding the Special Forces area of operations, "As a general policy the presence or current insurgent/dissident activities or a recent history of such activities in the exercise area automatically eliminates the area for further consideration" for civic action activities.*61 An examination of the provinces where Special Forces have been deployed since the beginning of martial law reveals that the general policy was more the exception than the rule: four of the six provinces where Green Berets were assigned were clearly either insurgent areas or had a history of chronic insurgency.

- Zamboanga Province has been the scene of sporadic guerrilla activity since 1969, and this escalated into large-scale armed resistance immediately after martial law was declared in September 1972, the period when the Green Berets were there.
 - Bataan and Zambales have been expansion areas for NPA firefights being recorded there before and after martial law. The most recent proof of the "high in- surgency" potential of the area two servicemen were killed in a mysterious encounter with guerrillas on the outskirts of the Subic Naval Base.
 - Capiz, where Special Forces units were assigned in April-May 1973, has witnessed NPA activities since the imposition of martial law. AFP intelligence reported NPA "sightings" in the Madya-as Mountain Range. *62
- In January 1974 the army admitted NPA footholds throughout the island of Panay, where Capiz is located.*63

(*56. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op. cit., p. 355.

*57. House Appropriations Committee, op. cit.

*58. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op. cit.

*59. Holton, op. cit. p. 491.

*60. Ibid.

*61. Ibid.)

*62. News from Free Philippines (BMP), Series No. 5, May 16, 1973.

*63. New York Times, January 13, 1973.

After martial law such forms of aid have apparently continued. A State Department spokesman revealed, for instance, that 16 U.S. Army communications technicians have been "in and out of Cefcu City to assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in constructing a troposcatter radio installation on Mount Luay," an activity which is supposed to last until October 1975. *69 The GAO's concern with such unofficial forms of aid is understandable - and not merely from an accounting perspective. Though seemingly harmless and "scientific," such activities undertaken by U.S. and Philippine military personnel often serve less edifying purposes. To cite merely one example, U.S. Air Force crews and technical personnel from the Naval Weapons Center in China Lake, California, undertook "cloud-seeding" projects in the Philippines in 1969, ostensibly for humanitarian, "anti-drought" purposes. The Naval Weapons Center, it was later revealed in the secret Congressional testimony on "Weather Modification" in March 1974, was involved from 1966 to 1972 in developing and applying effective rain-making techniques for the creation of adverse climate conditions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. *70 Given the questionable objective of their mentors, it is difficult toathom exactly what a Naval Weapons Center representative meant when he asserted during the hearings that "... it appears that the Filipinos will continue to make wise use of the capability (for cloud-seeding) as it is needed." *71

*69. Holton, op. cit., pp. 497-498.

*70. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Ocean and International Environment, Hearings, Weather Modification (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1974), pp. 46, 91.

*71. Ibid.

Selected Aspects of the Employment of U.S. Military Aid by the Martial Law Regime.

Inefficient and Wasteful Use of Military Aid. The most important conclusion of the GAO study on military assistance to the Philippines in 1972 was the extremely inefficient utilization of MAP-provided equipment by the Philippine Armed Forces. "...major equipment items have been deadlined," asserted the report "for maintenance or parts for extensive periods without prompt and effective followup by command and logistics personnel." *72 Fifty percent of the 67,000 line items stocked at the Philippine Armed Forces Supply Center were non-active stock, as were 23% of the 70,000 line items at the Philippine Naval Supply Center. *73

(*72. GAO, op. cit.)

(*73. Ibid., p.33)

In spite of these findings the Defense Department sharply escalated the level of aid to the Marcos regime in 1973, especially in the areas of excess defense articles and ship transfers. The inefficient use of U.S.-provided military equipment — and thus the waste of American taxpayers' money - has continued during the martial law period and, in the conditions of armed civil strife, acquired new but familiar forms. The wasteful application of military resources by the Philippine military must, however, be seen not as a local phenomenon but as one which is intimately connected with the training in military strategy and tactics it has received from the United States military

"The truth is that investment by foreign capitalist corporations has always accomplished precisely the opposite of what the theory claims. Whatever short-term local stimulation of business and rise in employment and wages might initially take place, the long-term consequences are invariably that more wealth is taken out of the underdeveloped country by the foreign corporation than they invested in it. This is the whole point of such investments. The foreign investments do not diminish the disparity in the rate of development between the advanced and underdeveloped countries but aggravate and increase it. . . They are pumps designed to suck up the country's wealth and transfer it abroad."

The Rodriguez article easily points out the indubitable fact that multinationals operating in a poor country invariably tend to control its economy. They ruin or buy out local enterprises unable to compete with them, borrow working capital from local banks and financing institutions, transfer obsolete or overpriced technology, engage in transfer pricing and in the massive outflows of foreign exchange, corrupt the local ruling elite through all sorts of devices and pressures, expose the native population to consumption patterns suitable only to affluent societies, and aggravate a poor country's dependence on foreign technology, foreign investments, foreign markets, foreign credits, and imported styles and products. Instead of helping develop a poor country, the evidence shows that most of them actually prolong its underdevelopment.

And yet, it is a never ending source of pride for Marcos to be able to announce through the controlled media that new foreign loan commitments have been obtained, that a multinational company has been convinced to make Manila its regional headquarters, that another foreign group has decided to make an investment in the Philippines, that more hotels and tourist resorts are being built, and that strikes are no longer possible.

With the open-door policy of Marcos, foreigners have now assumed a quantitatively commanding role in the national economy. Filipino capital has been dispossessed of its economic birthright. Verily, the development program of Marcos is being pursued at the expense of the country and the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people and at the sacrifice of economic sovereignty.

Marcos threw the country's investment field wide open to foreign capital and multinational corporations by offering attractive tax and foreign exchange incentives, and an even more attractive labor situation. Marcos offered the country's large pool of unemployed and underemployed labor, ban on labor strikes and an unalterable ceiling on workers' wages and salaries.

While offering the attractive investment incentives, Marcos dictated to the Constitutional Convention a martial law constitution that:

- 1) Reversed the Supreme Court decisions in the Quasha and Luzon Stevedoring cases, and
- 2) Gave the dictator power to disregard all restrictive laws on foreign investments in concluding treaties and executive agreements. *3

(*3. 1973 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 15.)

Not content with providing for favors in the martial law Constitution to foreign investors, Marcos himself executed acts further calculated to strengthen

Now, it is a principle of government that where the courts of justice fail to function on account of a breakdown of law and order, martial law may be declared. Conversely, where the courts are able to function freely and independently, there cannot be any further justification for the operation of a government under martial law.

When Marcos declared martial law, he "ordered" the judiciary "to continue to function." It was a very astute move; Although he had made it plain that he was assuming all powers of government, there was a benevolent Mr. Marcos allowing the Supreme Court "to continue to function." But he didn't leave any room for doubt that the Supreme Court should derive its authority, not from the Constitution, but from the "order" of the dictator.

Marcos also let it be understood that he needs, and would allow the functioning of, the Supreme Court only for the purpose of vesting the martial law regime with a cloak of legitimacy. Any pretense, therefore, that the Supreme Court is an independent tribunal falls flat. The high tribunal shamelessly exists today for only one main function, i.e., to cloak the conjugal dictatorship and its every decree, act, or decision with legality. Since September 1972, the Supreme Court has never ruled against the martial regime.

If the Supreme Court should ever muster enough courage and sense of patriotism and over-rule Marcos on anything, without the dictator's consent, then as surely as night follows day, Marcos would abolish the high court the next day.

The behavior of the Supreme Court under the martial law backed dictatorship is reprehensible, but not so surprising. It was captured and turned into a political instrument by the men of Marcos as early as 1971.*2 Thus, as early as October, 1971, the Philippine Supreme Court started desecrating the spirit of the U.S. Miranda ruling and delivered by December 1971, the civil liberties of the Filipino people to President Marcos.*3

(*2. See Chapter on 'Infrastructure of Martial Law.')

(*3. Ibid; case of Lansang vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33965, December 11, 1971.)

The Supreme Court decision on the infamous case of Lansang vs. Garcia was a complete over-turning of its libertarian-philosophy as spelled out in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515. Promulgated in the early 50s, the Hernandez decision earned for the Supreme Court the accolade of an entire nation, and the sobriquet as the "last bulwark of the civil liberties" of the Filipino people. The decision pronounced that individual liberty is "too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract considerations of public safety."

Today, the Supreme Court would scream "rebellion, continue martial law" on a mere citation by Marcos of the most trivial episodes of disorder in the Philippines. I stated the following when I testified before the Fraser committee on June 17, 1975, by way of answer to a question propounded by Congressman Fraser:*4

(*4. Page 306, printed copy of transcript of hearings held by the House Sub-committee on International Organizations on "Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy.")

As they were specifically excepted from the demanding tone of LOI No. 11, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court thought they were going to be spared the Sword of Damocles by the President. However, when Marcos dictated the provisions of the "new Constitution" to the Constitutional convention he saw to it that the threat of dismissal covered the members of the high court, the new Constitution provided that justices of the Supreme Court may only "continue in office until they reach the age of 70 years unless sooner replaced" by the President.

The consequences of the series of "judicial reforms" initiated by Marcos since the advent of martial law left no doubt that all judges, from the highest to the lowest, work under threat of dismissal at any time, Marcos can replace any judge any time he is disposed to do so, and in fact, has repeatedly done so. Veteran judges of long service have been dismissed through curt notices of acceptance of their compulsory resignations. Judges have been summarily booted out, their names, careers and reputation ruined and their futures shattered, without being heard in their defense, even without being told what were the charges against them.*7

(*7. Section 9 and 10, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the martial law Constitution)

The *Philippine News*, issued for the week of March 14-21, 1975, published the following piece which wrote on the administration of justice under martial law:

MARCOS IS THE LAW

Backed by an oppressive martial law, President Marcos has transformed the Philippine judiciary into a submissive adjunct of the executive for the purpose of assuring the Oriental dictator's claimed infallibility.

Thus, anybody who might dare oppose Marcos or challenge the constitutionality of his acts or the weight of evidence of charges filed or caused to be filed against his enemies might as well abandon all hopes of succeeding in this stage of judicial development in the Philippines.

By his imposition of martial law on Sept 21, 1972, Marcos created a climate of fear so pervasive in the country. Then, in a series of decrees and orders, he gave all sectors no choice but to do his bidding.

The fearsome power of martial rule was dramatically demonstrated by Marcos in the firing squad execution of opium dealer Lim Seng on Jan. 9, 1973.

While it is true that Lim's execution was demanded by the people, the only public blood-letting thus far resorted to by the martial regime was calculated more to make all sectors aware that the dictator would not hesitate to press the trigger—when necessary.

The dire message of this two-pronged "propaganda of the deed" resorted to by Marcos in the Lim execution was not lost to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

The high court lost no time in choosing the side of Marcos in selectively deciding some of the "urgent" cases brought against the dictator.

Of course, Marcos set out his own infallibility - insofar as forces within the Philippines were concerned — when he imposed martial law.

7) Having been previously held out by the President as the only private media man with ready access to him and to whom he confides some of his plans, I was assigned by the referendum committee to take charge of the orchestration of media. In this project, I functioned over and above, and to the exclusion of, the official Information Secretary, with the open and official backing of the three top presidential assistants.

8) I prepared the advance stories announcing the holding of the referendum and dished out copies to the other newsmen covering the presidential beat.

9) In the afternoon of every referendum day, we held briefings for the local and foreign press, during which they were handed copies of the original story I had prepared for publication in my own paper, the Daily Express. The other newsmen got their figures on the "votes" turned in for the day from my own news copy.

10) On one occasion, we tried to utilize the Secretary of Information to conduct the briefings, but he just did not prove knowledgeable about what we wanted to deliver to the foreign newsmen that he was rudely shoved aside by Gov. Romualdez from his own chair in the office of information secretary and told to yield the briefing to Secretary Rono.

Marcos has made much of his alleged "submission" to the supremacy of the Supreme Court. In his second book, he made a balanced claim that "Our martial law is unique in that it is based on the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military and on complete submission to the decision of the Supreme Court." (Italics ours).^{*8}

(*8. Page 121, "Notes on the New Society," by Ferdinand E. Marcos.)

The dictator has repeatedly protested that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of his proclamation (No. 1102) declaring the ratification of the martial law Constitution. He has said this was the ruling in the case of *Javellana vs. Executive Secretary*.

Note, however, the conditions under which Marcos submitted to the challenge as presented in the case of *Javellana vs. Executive Secretary*. "Inasmuch as the issues in turn raised the question of legitimacy of the entire Government and also to meet the insistent suggestion that, in the event of an adverse opinion, I proclaim a revolutionary government, I decided to submit to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court xxx." (Italics ours).^{*9} (*9. Page 123, *Ibid.*)

The implication was very clear. If the Supreme Court did not uphold Marcos, he would organize a revolutionary government. Necessarily, he would abolish the Supreme Court and, perhaps place its members in military stockade on a charge that they took part in government.

The threat to organize a revolutionary government was actually a threat to formalize what is already a matter of fact. The Supreme Court and other adjuncts of the judiciary are complete captives of Marcos and the military.

The lone woman member of the martial law Supreme Court, Associate Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma, could not help but allude to the prostrate figure of justice in a well-applauded speech on Law Day, which coincided with the third anniversary observance of martial law last September 19, 1975. The lady justice called the judges and the members of the Philippine bar to "muster the

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Whereas before, a respondent in a criminal case enjoyed the right to be present at the investigation, to confront the complainant and his witnesses, and to crossexamine the said witnesses, these rights have been eliminated by decree.*14

(*14. Presidential Decree No. 77 dated December 6, 1972.)

Under the said decree, mere affidavits presented by a complainant charging a person with the commission of an offense would be sufficient basis for a finding by the investigating officer of the existence of a prima facie case. The person against whom the charges are levelled need not be present in order that the preliminary investigation can proceed. Neither is it necessary that said respondent be represented by counsel.

The 1973 Constitution provides in its Article IV, Section 20, that: "x x x Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the right will be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." This provision is not found in the 1935 Constitution.

The effective implementation of the above-quoted provision still has to be seen. The employment of force and violence by the police authorities in extorting a confession or admission from a person arrested and detained for some crime is of such common knowledge that it need not be recounted here. The military, on the other hand, are not to be outdone. If the police can employ the "water cure", the military can do them one better. In fact, they have made efficacious use of electricity - coursing the hot, tingling current not only on the forefingers of the detained suspect, but also through his naked body, testicles, or rectum, while he stands with his bare feet on wet cement.

A Joint Circular dated July 11, 1974, of the Department of Justice and National Defense prescribed rules and regulations in the conduct of criminal investigations with a view toward implementing the aforequoted constitutional provision. The said circular makes it mandatory for the person being investigated to be informed of his right to remain silent, that any statement he makes therein could be used against him as evidence, and that he has a right to the presence of counsel.

This circular, however, is a toothless measure. For one thing, it is being ignored. For another thing, while it allows the presence of counsel if so requested by the suspect being investigated, "the one conducting investigation on custodial interrogation is authorized to exclude a counsel who impedes or shows an obvious inclination to impede the administration of justice x x x."

The circular is dead silent, however, as to what act would constitute "impeding the administration of justice" so as to justify the exclusion of counsel. Indeed, what the circular seems to have granted on one hand, it has taken away with the other.

At most, the circular is an implicit admission of the atrocities being committed by both civilian and military authorities in the conduct of criminal investigations.

Powers under Transitory Provisions have lapsed —

But let us assume that the decision of this Court in the Ratification Cases is equivalent to a ratification of the 1973 Constitution, so that President Marcos is the "incumbent President" referred to in said Constitution. Can he exercise now the powers and prerogatives conferred upon him by the transitory provisions of that constitution?

Petitioners submit that he cannot, because the clear intent and meaning of the transitory provisions is that the powers and prerogatives it confers upon the "incumbent President" lapse unless exercised as soon as possible after the effectivity of the Constitution or at the very latest, before the end of the term for which he has been elected as President under the 1935 Constitution. *And, for President Marcos, that term ended long ago.*

This is crystal clear from the very character and language of the transitory provisions, from the nature of the principal changes in the structure of government that the 1973 Constitution introduces, and from the disastrous consequences that would result from a contrary interpretation.

Transitory Provisions fleeting by nature —

It is the very nature of transitory provisions that they are "of a passing nature", "temporary, fleeting or ephemeral", "not enduring or permanent" (Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 1966 ed., p. 1547). This being so, the powers conferred by transitory provisions cannot be exercised indefinitely; they must end after some time; and that time must be short or fleeting. Therefore, they must be exercised as soon as possible; if not, they lapse.

To hold otherwise is to make such transitory powers permanent, exercisable during the lifetime of the "incumbent President". This is not and could not be the intent of the 1973 Constitution, surely, no one can seriously contend that the Convention or the people intended to make President Marcos the "incumbent President" for life, an "incumbent President" who could, moreover, during his lifetime rule by himself alone, and by his sole decisions determine the destiny of more than 40 million Filipinos.

Yet that would be the result if the transitory provisions were interpreted to mean that simply because he was the "incumbent President" when the 1973 Constitution was considered in force and effect, President Marcos may continue to exercise all the transitory powers under said Constitution indefinitely or for as long as he wants to do so. And that could be during his entire lifetime.

We must never forget that both the 1935 and 1973 constitutions were ordained and promulgated to secure for all Filipinos of today and tomorrow "the blessings of democracy" and a regime of justice (and) liberty. (Preambles, 1935 and 1973 Constitutions). Every clause of the 1973 Constitution must therefore be so interpreted as to achieve these ideals and aspirations. There is only one interpretation of Section 3 (1) of the transitory provisions that would be consistent with these aspirations. And that interpretation is that the transitory powers of the "incumbent President" lapse if not exercised as soon as possible after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or at most only during the term for which the people had elected him President.

be known as Sandiganbayan and the office of Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan (Art. XIII, Sec. 6)

The "incumbent President" cannot exercise these powers. Even if he could exercise all the powers of the President under the 1935 Constitution and those of the President and Prime Minister under the 1935 Constitution and those of the President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution, he cannot exercise the powers of impeachment or ratification of treaties or creation of the Sandiganbayan and the office of Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan without the interim National Assembly; and there is no Assembly interim or otherwise.

Unless there is a body that can exercise these powers, the consequence is that Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals, members of the Civil Service Commission, of the Commission on Elections and of the Commission on Audit - even if caught in the act of treason, bribery, or graft and corruption - cannot be impeached or removed. Surely, the Convention and the people could not have intended that such a state of affairs should last indefinitely.

On the contrary, the 1973 Constitution directs immediate action. This is evident from the provision of the Constitution which requires the interim National Assembly to "give priority to measures for the eradication of graft and corruption" (Art. XVII, Sec. 5).

The only conclusion that flows from all these is that there can be no indefinite stalling of convening the interim National Assembly. The "incumbent President" must convene it as soon as possible after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, and at the latest during his term as President. If he fails to do so, as he has, he loses all transitory powers.

No independent Judiciary: No security of tenure for Civil Service —

Another disastrous consequence, one already upon us, that results from the claim to exercise transitory powers indefinitely is that our inferior courts have lost their independence and our civil service its security of tenure.

Sections 9 and 10 of the transitory provisions empower the "incumbent President" to remove all who, at the effectivity of the new Constitution, were members of the Judiciary and of the civil service, by simply appointing their successors. If it be held that this transitory power may be exercised without first convening the National Assembly, and even after December 30, 1973, the effect would be that all Judges and Justices holding office on the date of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, and who have not been reappointed, can be removed at will and without cause, even before they reach the age of 70 years, and this situation can last as long as President Marcos wants it to. In the pungent language of the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, "our judges have become casuals."

The same holds true of the civil service.

This state of affairs is so contrary to the ideal of an independent judiciary and civil service, based upon security of tenure, that is inconceivable that the Convention and the people could have intended it to continue beyond December 30, 1973.

ORDERS WITH THE EFFECT OF LAWS EITHER UNDER THE 1935 OR THE 1973 CONSTITUTION AND, THEREFORE, HAS NO AUTHORITY TO CALL THE REFERENDUM.

Both under the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution the legislative power is lodged in the legislature:

"Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." (Art. VI, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution).

* * * * *

"Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a National Assembly." (Art. VIII, Sec. 1973 Constitution).

President Marcos cannot exercise legislative powers —

As a private citizen, President Marcos does not possess legislative power or any other powers of government. Even as "incumbent President", his transitory powers - assuming they have not lapsed - are purely executive powers.

As incumbent President, he has the powers of the President under the 1935 Constitution; but that Constitution did not confer any legislative powers on the President. He also has the powers of President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution; but the latter confers no legislative powers either on the President or Prime Minister. Congress did not grant him any emergency powers under Section 26, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution, although it could have done so because it was in session when he declared martial law. The National Assembly has not granted him any emergency powers either under Section 15 of Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, and it could not have done so because he has never convened it. So, as "incumbent President" under Section 3 (1) of the Transitory Provisions, President Marcos has no legislative powers at all.

Martial Law does not give President Marcos legislative powers -

It cannot validly be considered that the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972 gave President Marcos any legislative powers.

Martial law gives no powers to the President (III Willoughby 592), and as the Constitution is the Basic Law, in times of crises more than in times of normalcy, the national emergency merely affords the basis or reason for the exercise of a living power already existing or enjoyed (Wilson v. Reed, 243 US 332): it does not create power, nor increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved (Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 US 398).

Section 3 (2) of the Transitory Provisions confirms this. If the proclamations, decrees, orders and others and other acts done under martial law prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution had had the force of law, there was no need to make them "part of the law of the land" as Section 3 (2) of the Transitory Provisions does. And if martial law automatically granted President Marcos

legislative powers, then there was no need to confer upon him the power to "modify, revoke or supersede" his orders, proclamations, decrees, etc.

Any doubt about whether President Marcos does or does not have legislative powers under martial rule is dispelled by Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions. For, under this section, all laws existing at the time of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution continue in force insofar as not inconsistent with said Constitution, and only the regular Assembly - not President Marcos - can amend, modify or repeal them.

Assuming President Marcos has legislative powers, these do not include calling a Referendum —

Even if we assume that martial law grants legislative powers to President Marcos - a proposition we do not concede - he may not perform any legislative act that the legislature itself could not do.

Calling a referendum is essentially a legislative act, which can be performed only in the manner and for the purpose prescribed in the Constitution.

"Referendum is the right reserved by the Constitution to the people of a state or local subdivision thereof to have submitted for their approval or rejection any act, or part of any act, item, section or part of any bill, passed by the legislature, and which, in most cases, would without action on the part of the electors become a law" (82 C.J.S. 193).

"There can be no valid referendum of any enacted law except pursuant to constitutional authority. By the referendum the people are a coordinate branch of the legislative body, with coextensive power." (82 C.J.S. 197).

There are grave doubts, too, over the constitutionality of Marcos' invoking of the "commander-in-chief" provision of the Constitution as authority for declaring martial law.

If Marcos' own rhetorical development of the "causes" for his declaration of martial law were to be followed, then he could not legally invoke the "commander-in-chief" provision to impose martial law. In the final "whereas" of Proclamation No. 1081, Marcos declared: "x x x the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the communist and other armed aggregations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines." (Italics supplied). If such had been the case, then the constitutional thing for Marcos to have done was to ask Congress to declare war by two-thirds votes of both chambers voting separately. And, with Congress having declared war, Marcos would have had to carry out the instructions of Congress on the conduct of the war as the "commander-in-chief" of all the armed forces.*¹⁵

(*¹⁵. Raoul Berger's "Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth" is very enlightening on this subject.)

The question is whether or not the President, as commander-in-chief "waging war" without congressional authority, can rule by decree, suppress or disband one branch of government, as he did with the bicameral Philippine Congress, while allowing other agencies to function, like the Supreme Court —

which he needs only to anoint his regime with legitimacy. Then, if the courts are open and can administer justice, as Marcos claims they do, is there a real and actual emergency for which martial law has to be maintained? Marcos must realize the incongruity of his position. At the moment, he can rule by the law of the gun. Before the bar of history, he would be a faceless litigant.

The Martial Law Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972, under pressure from the guns of martial law. The delegates did not have any other choice. However, the handful of courageous hearts who dared vote against the Marcos-dictated Constitution voiced the hope that the Martial Law Constitution would be rejected by the people during a plebiscite to be called to either ratify or reject the new charter draft. President Marcos did in fact schedule a plebiscite on the new Constitution for January 5, 1973, and proclaimed a period of "free and untrammelled" debate during the campaign for ratification or rejection of the New Constitution.¹⁶ Marcos soon discovered though that the new Charter which would legitimize his martial law regime did not stand a ghost of a chance of adoption in a free plebiscite. He immediately cancelled the scheduled plebiscite, and instead called for a national referendum on various burning issues" of national import.¹⁷

(*16. Presidential Decree No. 73, dated December 1, 1972, and Presidential Decree No. 82, dated December 20, 1972.)

(*17. Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972. Two other decrees, PD Nos. 86-A and 86-B, bearing on the submission of the martial law Constitution to a referendum have been withheld from general circulation.)

In efforts to falsify the records for history, Marcos later wrote:

"There was, however, another question regarding my swift action on the Constitution, and I can understand how this must have bothered the legal "constructionists" among us. On 30 November 1972,¹ I called a plebiscite after the Constitutional Convention had approved the new Constitution; this plebiscite was set for 5 January 1973. But on December 23, 1972, I suspended the plebiscite upon the petition of some parties, including jurists, who pointed out that a longer period was necessary to prepare the citizenry and thoroughly inform them about the Constitution. And yet right after I had suspended the plebiscite, I immediately organized the barangays and called for a show of hands regarding the new Constitution on 10 to 15 January this year. Why this sudden decision on my part?

"I know that some old society politicians thought it was their 'eloquent' and 'brilliant' opposition which precipitated my action. This was understandable, for they could not have imagined that the truth was that martial law had peculiar ramifications in the Muslim areas, which were one of the sources of a three-pronged rebellion and conspiracy that included the communist rebels, the rightist conspirators and the Muslim secessionist, xxx

"The only possible maneuver dictated by the national interest was to meet this incipient 'splinter state' with a government and a republic duly supported by the great majority of the people, especially the Muslim citizenry, operating under a Constitution of their own making and already ratified so as to be enforceable by the government."¹⁸ (*18. "Notes on the New Society", pp. 125-129.)

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sufficiently tamed with bribes of money and promises, like appointments to the new offices to be created under the new Constitution.

Two other delegates hostile to Marcos, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., of Misamis Oriental, and Manuel Martinez, of Masbate, were arrested after January 17, 1973, and detained without charges. Their only known crime was that they campaigned vehemently in December, 1972, for the rejection of the Martial Law Constitution. Pimentel and Martinez were among those who voted against the draft of the new Constitution.

The pertinent provisions of Article XVII follow:

Section 1. There shall be an interim National Assembly which shall exist immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall continue until the members of the regular National Assembly shall have been elected and shall have assumed office following an election called for the purpose by the interim National Assembly. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the interim National Assembly shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.

Sec. 2. The Members of the Interim National Assembly shall be the incumbent President and Vice President of the Philippines, those who served as President of the nineteen hundred and seventy-one Constitutional Convention, those Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall express in writing to the Commission on Elections within thirty days after the ratification of this Constitution their option to serve therein, and those Delegates to the nineteen hundred and seventy-one Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for this Article. They may take their oath of office before any officer authorized to administer oath and qualify thereto, after the ratification of this Constitution.

Sec. 3 (1) The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by sub-sequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

Sec. 4. The interim Prime Minister and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and shall be subject to the same disqualifications

did not hesitate to declare martial law when it became apparent that he would be unable to extend his stay in Malacanang beyond December 30, 1973, through a constitutional amendment.

And, having wielded the guns of martial law, Marcos' one major concern turned to cloaking his dictatorship with legitimacy. He could not content himself with the string of Supreme Court decisions "upholding" his dictatorship for he himself realized that he had extorted those decisions. Marcos extorted statements from certain national leaders either by cajolery, threats and intimidation, promises of political favors or assurances that they would be spared from harassment by the minions of the dictatorship. Marcos calls it "favor for a favor."

However, Marcos miserably failed to extort endorsements for his regime from national leaders who really count. Among those who have brusquely turned down Marcos' plea for public endorsement of the dictatorship were Senate President Gil J. Puyat, Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and the entire Laurel clan, including Senator Salvador H. Laurel, Senators Jose W. Diokno, Jovito R. Salonga, Ramon V. Mitra, Jr., Gerardo A. Roxas, Arturo R. Torralba, Ambrosio S. Padilla and Eva Estrada Kalaw, and former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada.

Marcos seems to have succeeded, however, in extorting a statement of support from his own bitter rival to the presidency in 1969, Osmeña, Jr. It seems that Osmeña wrote from Los Angeles Congressman Donald Fraser, chairman of the House subcommittee on international organizations, a letter endorsing continued U.S. military and economic assistance to the Philippines. The letter, dated July 9, 1975, was sent by Osmeña following representations made in behalf of Marcos by Former Ambassador Amelito R. Mutuc and former Supreme Court Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez. Although Osmeña denies that his letter of July 9 to Fraser was a "favor for a favor," his daughter-in-law, Marilita (wife of imprisoned Sergio Osmeña III) and son, Sergei, and a daughter, were allowed by the Marcos dictatorship to leave for the United States on July 17, 1975, so that Sergei IV could undergo intensive medical care in the United States.

Marcos' controlled media in the Philippines and in the United States blared out in their front pages in glaring headlines the contents of the Osmeña letter to Fraser.

Now, the point is that Osmeña, Jr., son of a former Philippine President and the man who ran for the Presidency against Marcos in the 1969 elections, has the least reason to support the Marcos regime through the letter he had sent to Congressman Fraser. The elder Osmeña has been accused by Marcos of the worst possible crimes, including alleged assassination plots. His son, Osmeña III, has been a "hostage" of Marcos for the last three years, accused also of alleged conspiracy in the assassination plot. The son and daughter of Sergio's elder daughter, Minnie, have still not been given any permit by Marcos to join their mother in the United States. Perhaps, another "favor" will be extorted by Marcos of Sergio before his two grandchildren, Paulo Osmeña-Jacinto, age 10, and Stephanie Osmeña-Jacinto, age 8, can be permitted to join their mother.

Marcos' holding of Minnie's children as hostage even touched the hardened sensibilities of the dean of students, Archie C. Epps III, of Harvard College in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that the man was compelled to write the

Lourdes) must continuously endure on account of the incarceration of Serge III and the holding of the two Minnie children as Marcos' hostages.

Of course, it underscores the ruthless, nay the heartless make-up of the conjugal dictatorship.

However, it is precisely the heartless nature of Marcos that the public perceives which gives Ferdinand and Imelda the utmost satisfaction of their inhuman exercise on the lives of the Osmenas. Both Ferdinand and Imelda realize that their dictatorship can only be perpetuated through force and with the support of the military. Now, when known opponents, like Serging, whose legions of Cebuano supporters in the United States and in the Philippines are waiting for his signal to revolt against Marcos, are compelled to support (instead of attack) Marcos, it becomes obvious that Marcos' power and strength acquire the false quality of impregnability. Who would think of opposing Marcos when even his known worst enemies have succumbed to the pressures and agreed to express public support for him?

Marcos would make use of any stratagem; he did not hesitate to spend and bankrupt the country to win a reelection; he did not hesitate to declare martial law; he would not hesitate to use helpless women and children.

President Marcos conceded that, upon the proclamation of martial law, as a place Filipinos want to visit, the Philippines ranks somewhere between the dentist's office and Muntinlupa.

Such thoughts inspired him to give his country its jaunty new paint and cosmetics job, with "balikbayan", various beauty contests and other forms of circuses for the entertainment of foreigners and natives as well.

The *Philippine News* published in late July a piece by Renato Yuson and I would like to reproduce it here with approval:

Part XLI The Marcos Coliseum

There's a big hunt for the Great Entertainment. Financed, managed, encouraged and pushed by Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, this drive is to leave no stone unturned for that Show-of-all-Shows, that Circus-of-all-Circuses. New Society agents are combing every nook and cranny of amusement capitals of the world. They are everywhere, from the ballet schools of Russia to the karate dojos of Okinawa and Japan, from the concert halls of Manhattan to the basketball courts of the Bronx. Every manner of entertainment is being scrutinized, studied, listed and catalogued for possible import to the Philippines.

Money is no consideration. The New Society is ready to throw everything - not just greenbacks and facilities and manpower - into the deal. Who cares if the Filipino people are starving? They will have circuses to keep them amused. Marcos is master of the tricks of a successful dictatorship: keep the natives on a steady diet of entertainment opium. It's the same recipe Nero used to keep the citizens of Rome pacified.

Of course, we cannot have slaves and lions and gladiators nowadays. But the New Society is trying its best to present their moral equivalent. Ali-Frazier III. Fisher-Karpov Match. Miss Universe Contest. Ad Nauseam. The idea is to nurture the basest instincts of the masses for sadism, fun, identification and

in Isabela.

One of the long-range plans of Marcos is to suffer or tolerate within certain limits the anti-Marcos political activities of the "old society" politicians, while countering their every move with his own controlled propaganda machine. His gambit is to outlive most of them, or hasten the demise of most of them. He knows that the upcoming generation may no longer have any memories about constitutional democracy, but only a forced liking for his constitutional authoritarianism.

And, in order to swing the youth to his side, Marcos has ordered the organization of secret training camps for youth corps in the Visayas and Mindanao, and parts of Northern Luzon. He has not dared organize this in the more sophisticated areas of the Tagalog regions of Central and Southern Luzon. The training camps, operating under the guise of National Youth Service, will turn out what would be the New Society equivalent of Hitler's youth corps.

It is not only the youth that Marcos' various ruses of survival will work on. Every aspect of life in the Philippines will be subjected to continuing barrage of oppression, coupled with propaganda, in order to insure Marcos' perpetuation in power.

Chapter XVII

Whither Marcos?

It will be a very long time before there can be a final perspective on the martial regime in the Philippines, and indeed on Ferdinand E. Marcos. Surely, that perspective has been greatly accelerated by the behavior of Ferdinand himself, his extravagant and jet-setting wife, Imelda, his in-laws and cronies, and select rapacious armed forces officers.

In spite of the evidently tightening noose of circumstances pointing to an adverse historical verdict on his regime, Marcos will seek to maneuver around in the vain hope that history would deal with him kindly. To be sure, his misdeeds are many.

The Office of the President of any country is one of the most vulnerably public positions in the world.

Society is so contrived that it is virtually impossible to combine power, position and privacy - or even celebrity and privacy. Those willing to court fame, or assume leadership, are by those very terms forced to relinquish seclusion. What one takes in the way of glory or influence, one must pay for in constant exposure to public scrutiny. No one in the ambit of fame is exempt from the inexorable equation.

Hardly anyone disputed the wisdom of the imposition of martial law, since they did not hold the martial guns anyway, and it was held out as temporary, to be lifted just as soon as rebellion is ended and certain reforms are effected.

But what started out as a reform movement has grown into an ill-disguised plot to perpetuate Dictator Marcos and his ilk in power, backed by their rapacity

businessman, the old dictum of Goethe applies: if he has to make a choice between disorder and injustice, he would choose injustice.

By and large, the military cannot be expected to give up the power they now enjoy. They have received tremendous material benefits and they see their Commander-in-Chief as the source of their power and privileges. Discipline, their own brand of loyalty, regional and personal considerations will weigh heavily on the senior officers. How the junior officers and enlisted men will react to a crisis that can no longer be reversed and which will affect their own families and relations, is anybody's guess.

The explosive Muslim situation will continue to plague the authorities, despite the apparent breakdown of the rebellion in some places. The basic problems have not been resolved. They may have been exacerbated by the coddling of the "balikbayan" rebels and the appointment of new officials who are not accepted by the Muslim community.

The NPA is a source of endless headaches to the military establishment. It had the ideology, the organization, and the willingness to fight against odds. Unless a third alternative is presented to the people, the country may well be polarized between an army-supported dictatorship and a Maoist inspired movement.

When I appeared before the truth committee on June 17, 1975, I stressed the following pertinent point in the prospects for the future of the totalitarian regime:

XIII. MY FINAL POINT OF ORDER

In addition to the aforecited and other known evils of an authoritarian regime, I would like to stress that the betrayal of the high expectations of the Filipino people for a reformed society under an authoritarian regime and the dangerous flirtation being carried on by Mr. Marcos with the Communist colossus in the Asian mainland should find direct relevance to the present task of the honorable committee.

It has been argued before (including by myself), and with justification, that, in developing countries where the resources are limited and the demands on these resources by the population are so great, a firm authoritarian regime would best be equipped to bring about and maintain a program of development with the resources allocated on the basis of priorities.

Likewise, foreign investors have also found out that, in their relations with the host country, it was always easier to deal with "strong man" governments. And so it was with the American investors in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, to curry favor with American businessmen, President Marcos unconstitutionally suspended the operation of a provision of the Constitution in order to extend by one year the lifetime of the Parity Agreement, which should have expired July 3, 1974. The American businessmen then dutifully reported to their home offices which, presumably in turn reported to the State Department, that American investors and businessmen are enjoying a bonanza under martial law.

However, an inquiry would show that American investors in the Philippines are among the most disappointed lot. The old corruption which they dreaded so much under the pre-martial law government is back. Every now and then,

political parties "recessed," the press closed down and only the controlled ones authorized to re appear, and Congress disbanded.

He also set up a varied network of secret police. He forced the retirement of armed forces ranking officers whose loyalty to him was in doubt and set up the nucleus of the secret police, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, and the Presidential Security Command to insure himself against any coup d'etat by a misguided military commander. Both the NISA and the PSC are headed by Major Gen. Fabian C. Ver.

Manila today has an outward semblance of tranquility, with few of the surface signs of a police state, what with several hundreds of the Marcos opponents, including the young activists, still in jail.

The continued imprisonment without charges, nay trial, of Marcos' opponents, notably Senator Aquino, Jr., Lopez, Jr. and Osmena III, has drawn so much attention and criticism from abroad, not to mention the anguish and torment of the families and relatives of these prisoners at home.

To counter the foreign critics, Marcos recently freed several thousands of the political prisoners under "house arrest." He would not let any one of them leave the country because they can make disturbing noises abroad, especially in the United States.

Marcos is relying on too much cosmetics to improve his image instead of getting to the root of his world-wide isolation, which is his oppressive martial regime.

To indicate the kind of people who are collaborating with Marcos, a top American newsmagazine said that the best Filipinos were in jail while the scoundrels and thieves were running the government. Indeed, no Filipino president has corrupted his nation and people as Marcos has. If Marcos corrupts everything he touches, the same can be said of his effect on people beyond the shores of his country. He has fooled unsuspecting people of the world media, for example, to swallow as fact his hoaxes calculated to make him look like an authentic war hero and a reform-minded leader.

By throwing away hundreds of millions of dollars on public relations and cosmetic projects that his impoverished nation can ill afford, Marcos has so glamourized despotism and repression that nations around the Philippines have seen fit to follow his example. Indira* Gandhi must have been so impressed with his success in placing the Philippines under his heel that she is trying the same tactics on what used to be the world's largest democracy.

South Korean Dictator/ Park was probably emboldened the way Marcos has been getting away with banditry and murder that the world is now witness to the worst and most callous wave of repression to hit South Korea. Under Marcos' influence and inspiration, the strongmen of East Asia, particularly Singapore's Lee and Indonesia's Suharto, are organizing themselves under Marcos' leadership into some kind of a Dictators' Club that authoritarianism is becoming the world's latest status symbol.

Behind its smokescreen of Miss Universe beauty contests, boxing and weightlifting bouts, chess tournaments and the kind of circuses that the Marcos regime has become an expert on, the Filipino dictatorship may have looked good on newspapers. But documented mass murders, torture and inhuman violation of human rights establish beyond doubt that the Marcos tyranny as the most repressive in Asia. It is only under Marcos that the Philippines has seen a