c) **Role of Duke of Newcastle**
   - managed parliamentary intrigue & funds so Pitt could focus on war

d) **Prussian Alliance**
   - enable Br to concentrate on colonial war

e) **French Weaknesses & Mistakes**
   - no comparable minister to Pitt
   - couldn’t commit as heavily to colonies as Br
   - duties in Europe

f) **Pitt Resigned**
   - 1761 but war continued until 1763 with significant success in W.Indies
   - e.g. captured Havana from Spanish
   - Bute was PM when Treaty of Paris signed

g) **Reputation Exaggerated?**
   - some historians claimed Pitt’s reputation rather exaggerated?
   - e.g. Graham Goodlad’s article on Pitt in ‘History Review Sept. 2008’ in which argues Pitt’s reputation not fully deserved
   - e.g. Piers Mackesy, ‘War For America’ 1964: ‘...the more one lifts the curtain of adulation from the ministry of the elder Pitt, the less does the scene appear to match the script, and the more one uncovers the characteristic inefficiencies of the age. One finds delay days in dispatching expeditions; vital reinforcements held up by contrary winds; time lost by naval commanders in securing prizes. There are shortages of shipping...departmental friction over transports...and piecemeal embarkations. Pitt in his friends planned distant offences...with no allowances for wastage from sickness and an optimistic reliance on precise timing.’

**PITT’S RESIGNATION**

- by 1761, Pitt advocated extending colonial war against Sp, for in Aug King Carlos III of Spain had signed 3rd Family Compact
- however, Br’s new king, George III, opposed Pitt’s plans as did some of cabinet
- therefore, Oct, Pitt resigned

**Reasons**
1) George III disliked way Pitt & Pelham Gov had dominated grandfather & wanted rid of such dominant ministers. New young king sought to restore balance of power between crown & parliament & therefore, may have deliberately opposed Pitt over Sp in order to force resignation. Theory can be supported by fact George III did declare war on Sp 1762
2) Pitt may have realised would have to share power with George III. On resignation, said: ‘I will be responsible for nothing I do not direct.’
3) may have resigned realising Br’s success at peak & that nation was becoming somewhat war-weary & resentful of high wartime taxation
4) may also wished to disassociate himself from growing peace-making process which feared could possibly be unpopular in Br. In order to bring France to negotiating table, some concessions would have to be made & some conquered French territories returned.
therefore, cancelled Townsend Duties except that on tea (1769)
North hoped this would save face of Brit. parliament by showing colonists Br still had right to tax them
also hoped that by abolishing 3 out of 4 duties, Am would be conciliated

The Tea Duty
was 3d in the 1lb
same tea entering Br had duty of 1s in 1lb
North pointed out Am was getting off lightly & hoped this would further pacify them
Brit. troops had been sent to Boston in Sept. 1768 after disturbances in city & were not reinforced in order to enforce law&order & ensure collection of Tea Duty
an amendment in House of Commons to repeal Tea Duty (March ’70) was defeated

The Boston Massacre
led to further trouble in Boston & when Brit. troops were snowballed by angry mob, panicked & opened fire, killing 4 Bostonians
instantly became martyrs & whole incident exaggerated into ‘Boston Massacre’
was a bad start for Lord North as new PM & bad situation got worse
from now on, Br & colonies slid towards war & no one seemed able to control situation

The Gaspée Incident
1772, revenue cutter, the Gaspée, ran aground off Rhode Island
was boarded & burned by colonies
had been used to escort tea clippers into Boston & therefore associated with hated Tea Duty
situation became worse when colonists refused Br. gov.’s demands for compensation

The Boston Tea Party
late 1773, few young radicals from Boston disguised as Red Indians
boarded tea clippers in Boston Harbour & emptying tea chests into sea (see document 9)
was defiance of Brit. authority & substantial loss of revenue

The Intolerable Acts
BTP provoked Brit. gov. to pass what Amer.s called the Intolerable Acts (Coercive Acts)
amounted to institution of direct rule in Massachusetts
the colonial charter was withdrawn, right of Boston to function as port was cancelled & port closed
General Gage made military governor & whole colony placed under martial law
2 of Int. Acts, Administration of Justice Act & Quartering Act, applied to other colonies too

The Quebec Act
inevitability of confrontation was seen when Quebec Act of 1774, which allowed for colonial expansion in Canada, regarded by Amer.s only as deliberate provocation of their interests
what had been denied them in 1763 with Proclamation Act, now allowed as far as French-Roman Catholic inhabitants of Can. were concerned

The American Olive Branch Petition
both Lord North & colonists made conciliatory proposals in 1775 eg. the AOBP
however, alienated the Dutch as their economy heavily based upon overseas commerce & carrying trade on the principles of ‘no questions asked’  
therefore, 1780, the Netherlands also declared war on Br  
by which time, Br was at war with 3 European powers as well as with colonies  
Brit. naval power was stretched to breaking point:  
1) Fr & Sp both attempted to recover lost W.Indian islands  
2) Fr encouraged Mahratti chiefs of India to rebel against Brit. so reinforcements had to be sent there  
3) Sp attacked Gibraltar & recaptured Menorca in Mediterranean > 50 Brit. warships diverted there  
4) Brit. gov. became anxious & preoccupied with possibility of French invasion on Br  
5) in particular, Fr sent troops to Am & ships to help break Brit. blockade of colonies  
matters got worse when Russia, Prussia & Denmark became alienated against Brit. naval policies & formed League of Armed Neutrality  
their armed merchant ships sailed in convoys to resist Royal Navy’s stop-and-search policies  
therefore, greater part of Europe had become hostile to Brit.  
Saratoga not only Brit. disaster during this stage of war  
also, French fleet of Admiral D’Estaing disrupting Brit. naval supremacy in Am. waters  
however, Savannah in Georgia captured by Brit. under Campbell by end of year

1775-78

Washington been able to maintain Am. Cont. in Am. in the field, despite severe hardships (such as at Valley Forge in winter 1775-6)  
was also able to rely on colonial militias who, now started to be called the Patriots, for extra support  
Brit. commanders had been unable to bring Am.s to a decisive battles  
poor planning & coordination, insufficient troops for a mobile army as well as for garrisons  
failure to harness substantial amount of loyal Brit. support in Am. (Loyalists), especially in southern colonies, led to indecisive war so far & future trouble  
also problem of poor motivation amongst Brit. troops, many of whom= hired German mercenaries  
vast distances & differences in climate&topography hampered a regular army  
by contrast, Am.s fighting for common cause, on home soil & in familiar regions  
additional problem for Brit. of how ruthlessly to pursue the war  
politicians & several generals (eg. Howe) reluctant to antagonise Am.s too much as hoped that eventually they would return to being loyal members of Brit. Empire  
finally, much has been made of Am’s Kentucky rifle which was quick loading & more suited to many of the guerrilla-style conflicts of the war

1780-1783

May 1780, Gen. Clinton finally captured Charleston in very successful campaign which gave Brit. much-needed southern port
‘Foreign Intervention in 1778 onwards was the key factor in Britain’s loss of the American colonies.’ Do you agree?

– foreign involvement began June ’78, with Fr undoubtedly influenced by Brit. defeat at Saratoga:
1) French navy played major role in defeating Corn. at Yorktown ‘81 whilst French troops under Rochambeau formed Allied Army with Washington’s
2) Fr also sent troops to advise & support colonial militias
3) Sp entered war ’79 & gave support to French at Yorktown
4) real value of foreign support was fact that Br now fighting on much wider front. needed to deploy soldiers to W.Indies, Mediterranean & even India to guard against threats to her interests & possessions from those countries anxious for revenge for defeats in SYW. Royal Navy had to spread itself more widely & even defend Br itself from possible French invasion

– although 9000 French troops fought in Am., entry created more intensive war effort in Br than had existed before
– moreover, Patriots found it hard to fight side by side with French & French fleet kept moving off to safeguard French possessions in W.Indies
– joint operations to fail several times, partly through difficulties in reaching clear agreements
– also adds to argument that Spanish help even less effective & League of Armed Neutrality never actually came to blows with Br
– clearly other reasons for Brit. defeat:
1) Brit. military weaknesses – Brit. troops, used to fighting on European continent, inexperienced in dealing with local opposition & obstruction. Some commanders made serious mistakes both during campaigns & on battlefield (e.g. Burgoyne & Corn) with lack of communication, such as between Howe & Burgoyne
2) Brit. politicians – often unaware of seriousness of situation in colonies with poor direction from War Office. The difficulties of Transatlantic communication added to their problems in retaining firm control of war with instructions from Lord North & George Germaine often taking months to reach N.Am. This led to serious logistical difficulties (e.g. supply, reinforcements)
3) geographical factors which Brit. army never able to master. Included nature of terrain, weather & long lines of internal communication & supply which seriously hampered Brit. war effort e.g. Lord Howe explained such problems to parliamentary inquiry into defeat in war: ‘Is not the country in general so covered with wood, and so fitting for ambuses’
4) contribution made by colonial military leaders & skilful way in which they exploited environmental factors & inexperience of Brit. troops in dealing with these factors. Also, colonists fought with genuine commitment & a desire to achieve freedom unlike many of Germ. mercenaries in Brit. army
5) Timothy Pickering, Am. commander: ‘Tis the boast [of European commanders] that their men are mere mechanics…God forbid that my countrymen should be degraded…standing armies are composed of very different men. These serve only for their own pay.’
6) loyalists proved to be less numerous or willing to stand up & be counted than Brit. commanders/politicians had assumed