crack WEP has been drastically reduced; meaning that no implementation of WEP should be considered secure.

**WPA/WPA2**

IEEE 802.11i introduces two areas of authentication to the 802.11 suite: WPA Enterprise and WPA Pre-shared key.

WPA Enterprise leverages IEEE 802.1x (not part of the IEEE 802.11 suite) which relies on the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) to relay authentication messages from a wireless client (supplicant) through the access point (authenticator) to a RADIUS server (authentication server). EAP in itself is an extremely simple messaging protocol. However, when it is combined with more sophisticated and proven authentication mechanisms, such as TLS, it becomes a reliable means of authentication.

WPA Pre-shared key (WPA-PSK) relies on a similar concept to WEP with the idea that a previously negotiated string is required in order to join the network. This string can be anywhere between 8 and 63 characters.

**Encryption**

WPA was originally released using an encryption mechanism based on RC4 called temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) which was meant to be a temporary solution until the official 802.11i standard was released. Although TKIP was built with several improvements to the RC4 implementation that is employed in WEP, and there are currently no known attacks against TKIP specifically, it is considered inherently insecure because of its roots in RC4. To offer greater security, CCMP, an AES based encryption protocol was released in the final IEEE 802.11i standard (referred to as WPA2). CCMP is currently the only cryptographically sound protocol for 802.11 networks which is recognized by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) and holds a FIPS140-2 certification.

The lack of a physical boundary as previously relied on with standard Ethernet networks is the major appeal of wireless networks to attackers. In the past, a certain level of implied security existed due to the assumption that an intruder would require some means of physical, hard-wired connectivity in order to access the internal network. With wireless networks, this is obviously not the case. Using easily obtainable but specialized equipment, an intruder can launch an attack on a wireless network from upwards of a mile away, given the right conditions.
With your BackTrack USB stick inserted, start your computer. BackTrack should automatically load all of the necessary drivers for your system and provide you with a full Linux distribution with all of the tools you need preloaded.
MAC Spoofing: MAC address spoofing is a trivial technique used by attackers to assume the identity of another system. This is accomplished by changing the wireless adapter’s MAC address to match that of an already connected client. To perform this attack, use a wireless sniffer to identify a previously authenticated client, and then change your wireless adapter’s MAC address. Note: You must wait until the previously authenticated client is off the network before assuming their MAC address.

Linux: In Linux, it is relatively simple to change your MAC address using the ifconfig command:

```bash
ifconfig eth0 hw ether 00:00:DE:AD:BE:EF
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eth0</td>
<td>Interface to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hw ether &lt;MAC&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the MAC address to change to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that certain wireless drivers can be a little picky when changing MAC addresses. To make life really easy, BackTrack includes “machanger.pl”. This utility works excellently. However, when it comes to madwifi-ng, there are a few additional concerns that need to be taken into consideration. So to make sure that everything works properly, I’ve created the following script to change your MAC address without issues when using an Atheros adapter.

```bash
#!/bin/bash
#
# athmacchange.sh - Atheros MAC Changer
# by brad a
# foundstone
#
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
  echo Atheros MAC Changer
  echo -------------------------
  echo IMPORTANT: this assumes we want to change the MAC of wifi0
  echo "    if you want to change the MAC of another wifi interface"
  echo "      (i.e. wifi1, wifi2, etc...) change the script!"
  echo
  echo usage: $0 [mac]
  echo exit
fi
  echo Atheros MAC Changer
  echo -------------------------
```
**Aircrack-ng Suite:** To launch a brute force attack against WPA-PSK using the Aircrack-ng Suite, type:

```
aircrack-ng -w dict wpapsk-linksys.dump
```

![Aircrack-ng 1.0 beta2](image)

**Attribute** | **Description**
---|---
-w <FILE> | Specifies the dictionary file to use

The last attribute is the capture of the 4-way handshake:

![coWPAtty](image)

**coWPAtty:** coWPAtty is another WPA-PSK cracking tool which can accept input from standard in as a wordlist for its dictionary attack. This means that we can take the output from a password generator and simply redirect it into coWPAtty.
**Raw Wireless Tools:** Laurent Butti’s “Wi-Fi Advanced Fuzzing” presentation at BlackHat Europe 2007 introduced us to this set of proof of concept wireless fuzzing tools. This presentation is a required read if you are getting into the realm of 802.11 fuzzing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Fuzz-e:** Fuzz-e was specifically developed with 802.11 fuzzing in mind. It is included as part of Johnny Cache’s airbase utilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airbase</td>
<td><a href="http://www.802.11mercenary.net/code/airbase-stable.tar.gz">http://www.802.11mercenary.net/code/airbase-stable.tar.gz</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scapy** - Scapy is a packet manipulation/forging application written in Python. I haven't had very good luck with it yet, but it is seen to be very powerful because of its Python base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
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</table>
Denial of Service Attacks

Denial of Service attacks result in a disruption of the connection between an authorized client and the access point. Generally speaking, 802.11 wireless networks are more susceptible to these types of attacks because the standard heavily relies on the use of MAC addresses for identification.

De-authentication Attack

As mentioned previously, the IEEE 802.11 standard defines certain conditions where the client must obey an instruction originating from the access point to which it is associated. This Denial of Service attack takes advantage of this behavior by forging 802.11 management frames in a way which tricks the client into thinking the access point wishes it to disconnect. Normal client behavior will immediately attempt to reconnect the client to the access point. However, by sending the client with de-authentication frames, an attacker can effectively force the client to constantly reconnect and disconnect.

Performing the Attack:
The De-authentication attack is the classic wireless denial of service attack and is supported in a number of different tools. Using the BackTrack Linux distribution, you should be able to perform this attack with ease. Keep in mind the adapter will need to be set up already on the target channel and in monitor mode.

Aircrack-ng Suite: To perform the attack using the Aircrack-ng Suite, simply type:

```
 aireplay-ng --deauth 25 -h <TARGET MAC> -b <AP MAC> ath1
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--deauth &lt;NUM&gt;</td>
<td>Specify de-authentication attack with number of deauth frames to send</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-h &lt;TARGET MAC&gt;</td>
<td>Target MAC Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-b &lt;AP MAC&gt;</td>
<td>AP MAC Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ath1</td>
<td>Injection interface</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To obtain the Prism Test Utility, try Googling for “PrismTestUtil322”. The checksum for the version I have is below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>MD5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PrismTestUtil322.zip</td>
<td>a7c04ff2783f94e1f60dc45425b926d0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PrismTestUtil322.exe</td>
<td>0088fd7f41dc972935bb7bb6d546b8de</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Prism Test Utility