In 1939, 1/3 of the world’s population lived under colonial rule, today less than 0.1% of the world’s population lives under colonial rule.

- Decolonization was widespread, rapid, and recent in the 1960s-1990s.
- UN member states: 51 in 1945, and 193 members today.

 Colonial legacies: stability implications. Many states were born weak and some are still young. Some of these states are artificial; they have difficult demographics, new political arrangements, and limited institutional capacities.

- There are dozens of weak states (such as Somalia, Congo DRC, Sudan, Yemen, etc.) 125 states are under “alert” or “warning” conditions, and only 36 states are defined as “stable”.

 Good governance and rule of law: 120 states now have medium-to-strong corruption problems. It’s not just a crime problem; it’s a threat to the rule of law, the functioning of states. It’s not just a local problem it’s transnational.

- This is growing due to globalization, rise in drug use and human trafficking, and rise in transnational criminal organizations.

- “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the alternatives” – Winston Churchill.

- How democracy promotes stability: mechanisms for participation in governance, promotes transparency, feedback to improve policies, mechanisms for conciliation and conflict resolution.

- Democratization is difficult. Democratization is a contest for power, dictators are tenacious and vicious, political institutions and civil society are usually weak. Democratization does not happen overnight, it takes years and decades.

- Democracy is winning: over the past 40 years we have seen huge changes all over the world where authoritarian government is overthrown and replaced with democracy. We have to remember that democratization is difficult, and it is possible for countries to go backwards.

 Security and Conflict: why this matters.

- 19th century, 19 million killed. 20th century, 110-180 million killed. The cold war was the very real threat of global thermonuclear war, and during this period 20 million were killed from conflicts. In the 1990s, there were 6 million people killed.

- Conflict trends: inter-state war has declined since 1945, level of intra-state conflict rose and fell in the 1980s but is still high. In 2012 there were 32 active conflicts (down from 37 in 2011) and 6 active wars (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen).

- Less than 20% of all wars since 1945 have been inter-state.

 Nuclear Concerns:

- Bad news: 17,000 weapons in 9 countries, including Pakistan and North Korea. 18 cases of nuclear theft/loss. 50 nuclear energy plants under construction. Stability, security, and proliferation concerns: Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, Iran, US-China relations.

- Good news: no nuclear weapon used in war in 65 years. 190 countries signed the non-proliferation treaty. 4 countries have given up nuclear weapons: South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. End of cold war was the end of the US-Soviet arms race. There is a new START treaty (April 2010), which has led to some reduction in nuclear weapons.

 Policy challenges framework (look at powerpoint slide).

- Some seemingly intractable problems have gone away. Many potential conflicts have not become violent conflicts. International actions can be effective. Some structural pressures will ease after 2050. It’s hard to make predictions, especially about the future (Yogi Berra).

September 3rd, Is War Passe?:

- “An armed conflict is considered to be a war if at least 1,000 battle or battle-related deaths are inflicted in the indicated year.” – Mueller, p.300

- Mueller argues that we have seen the demise of conquest, as now conquest is seen to be illegitimate. According to Mueller, war is an idea, and great powers have changed their minds about war over time. This is constructivism.

- If war is an idea, then we can change our minds about it.

- Joshua Goldstein “Winning the War on War”. For Goldstein, he really emphasizes the role of peacekeepers (ie. the United Nations), so he believes that agencies are causing the general decrease in war over time (since WWII).
• Economic interdependence raises the threshold for war – US/Russia Cold War didn’t have this problem.

• Presentation on Fearon:
  o What’s a rationalist? We put everything aside and just look purely at the facts. We also assume that all states are rationalist actors. The rationalist explanation is based on two parts:
    ▪ There is always a peaceful compromise. If you go to war you will always sacrifice something because war is costly. No rational state would ever go to war.
  o Why do states go to war then? Sometimes states believe that the benefits will outweigh the costs.
  o Fearon believes there is never a good reason to go to war, and he believes that compromise is more beneficial than war.
  o The reason why states go to war often is because states withhold information on their own states in order to get a better deal. An example of this is the Russo-Japanese war.
  o States inherently do not trust each other, and they all lie as well.
  o Because there’s a military incentive to withhold information, this leads to failed compromises, and thereby leads to wars. Fearon believes that everything is divisible, and that indivisibility is a human construct.

• Fearon believes that war is an extension of bargaining. It doesn’t mean that bargaining has failed, it’s just that war is an extension of the bargaining and the war resolves this bargain according to Fearon. This is important.

September 10th Lecture:
• Resolve is your willingness to fight – how long you’re going to fight, how much you’re going to fight, etc. an example of this is Vietnam.
  o Resolve can complicate bargaining and lead to war, especially due to miscommunication: US willingness to fight Japan (WWII), Britain’s commitment to Poland (WWII), Germany’s commitment to Austria (WWI), and Russia’s commitment to Serbia (WWI).
• Fearon: what are the implications of bargaining? There are some implications for democracy and for predictability.
• Democracy: imagine two kinds of countries
  o On the one hand there are knight, who always tell the truth, the whole truth, no matter what. On the other hand there are knaves, who say whatever they think will serve their own interest.
    ▪ There is no such thing as knights. But some countries are more knight-like than others.
• Bluffing is more difficult when some people who know the truth have an incentive to blurt it out, such as opposition parties, journalists/whistleblowers/Manning/Snowden.
• The process of figuring out national preferences is public: elections. This makes it more difficult to bluff to other states.
• In the over 40 major wars since 1816, only 2 have had democracies on opposite sides (Finland in WWII and the Spanish-American War in 1898).
  o Since 1816, there have been about 1800 crises, but democracies issue fewer threats than non-democracies (likely because in democracies it is harder to bluff due to more transparency), and threats by democracies are less likely to be met by armed resistance.
• Fearon Conclusion: indirect evidence that the problem of incomplete information with incentives to lie can contribute to war.

September 10th Lecture on Wendt: Anarchy?
• Lecture is on the following: Ways to think about international affairs, Anarchy – a social construction? Legitimacy – does it matter?
• Anarchy: how constraining? Surmountable?
• For Alex Wendt, he is not convinced that anarchy is such a big deal (anarchy is not a necessary constraint). He claims that anarchy is what states make of it. Wendt also believes that power can be tamed.
  o Self-help: logically necessary or contingent? Wendt argues that self-help is contingent. Anarchy does not define “friends” and “foes”. Like Fearon, Wendt therefore argues that “anarchy” is incomplete.
• Relative gains and absolute gains. Realists tend to focus on relative gains – the idea that it is a zero-sum world; therefore what one gains is at another’s expense. Therefore you have to look at how other states are doing relative to you.
  o Absolute gains are when you are looking at just the individual state. With absolute gains you are looking at the outcome in isolation from the other state involved and what that state is losing. If you think about the world in relative gains, there will be less cooperation.
    ▪ You can think of gains on a spectrum: Competitive, Atomistic/individualistic perspective, collective/interdependent.
• Are foreign policy identities and interests exogenous to the state system or endogenous to the state system?
  o Exogenous: Waltz, competition, socialization, and rationalism.
  o Endogenous: Wendt, meanings emerge through interaction; social threats are constructed not natural.
• Alex Wendt Conclusion: realism is a social construction and realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

**September 17th, 2013: Jervis Reading**

• Jervis: How can actors distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and policies? If clearly defensive = easy care. If inferences wrong = trouble.
• According to Jervis the worst of all possible worlds is when offensive posture is not distinguishable from the defensive posture, AND the offense has the advantage. This is when the spiral model kicks in and war is very likely to break out.
  o The next worst of all possible worlds is when the offensive posture is distinguishable from the defensive one, AND the offense has the advantage. In this case aggression is possible, but there is no security dilemma. The status-quo states can pursue different policies than aggressors, and they receive warning of this. War can still happen in this instance.
    ▪ The better safer world is when the defense has an advantage, but you can’t distinguish offensive from defensive posture. There is a security dilemma, but security requirements may be compatible. It’s always safest when defense has the advantage.
• The best of all worlds is when neither has an advantage, and you can distinguish offensive from defensive posture. This is doubly stable according to Jervis.
• Jervis: under what conditions is the spiral model likely to kick in, and in what conditions is it unlikely to start.

**September 17th, 2013: Managing Anarchy**

• Waltz’s “Second Image”: breaking open the “black box”, Kant’s “perpetual peace” and liberal states versus non-liberal states.
  o For Doyle, he focuses on internal characteristics of liberal states. These kinds of states don’t emerge until the 1700s. Citizens enjoy juridical equality and civic rights, sovereigns rule by consent of the governed, private property rights are respected, and economic decisions are driven by supply and demand (more of a market economy).
• The international implications of liberal principles and institutions according to Doyle:
  o Mutual respect for principles, freedom from foreign intervention, and representative governments’ rights to political independence. Liberal states tend to respect these principles.
    ▪ Woodrow Wilson’s war message at the end of WWI in 1917: it’s the US’ duty to oppose “selfish and autocratic power” and to set up concert of purpose among “free and self-governed peoples of the world”. Again this is all about the 2nd image in Waltz. Concert of purpose really means mutual non-aggression among liberal states.
• From Kant there are three articles of peace according to him – titled the 3 Articles of Peace (1795):
  o The first article is republican government: private property/market, legal equality of citizens, representative government, separation of powers.
  o The 2nd article of peace is a pacific union: steady spread of liberal republics, not one treaty at the end of one war and it wouldn’t be a world government; it’s basically mutual non-aggression.
  o The 3rd article of peace is cosmopolitan law: “universal hospitality” – anyone is welcome to visit your country, right of access to fellow member states for commerce, entry. Citizenship is not a requirement for universal hospitality.
China has an underdeveloped financial sector, underdeveloped markets, there are rising wages and labor unrest due to dwindling jobs, and an ageing population.

- China and Russia lead the BRICS in outward FDI (foreign direct investment).
- Top three countries by economic dominance: in 1870 it was UK, then Germany, then France.
  - By 2030 China will have a larger economy than the US, and then India will be third. As of 2010, US in first, China is second, and Japan is third.
- McNally: argues that China is a particular challenge to Western capitalism.
  - Saull (disappointed Marxist guy): argues that the BRICS are partners – “legitimizing properties of liberal-democratic forms of governance and liberal capitalist markets” “consensual acceptance”. He thinks BRICS will be partners going forward.
- BRICS: committed to global markets (yet hybrids tailored to domestic and historical circumstances). They are engaging in trade and engaging in investment, as well as investing inwardly. They are hybrids though because the state plays a more prominent role than early developers.
  - BRICS: drawn into globalized production chains and globalized finance. This is a difference between the East Asian Tigers and today. The production chain has become very globalized.
- Financialization of world economy.
  - 2006: global stock market = $40 trillion.
    - Financial instruments (and credit derivatives) = $450 trillion.
  - Saull: vulnerabilities of uneven growth are domestic. Versus the kinds of uneven growth that Gilpin discussed that lead to hegemonic war.
  - The issues that these countries will have to deal with are social and political stability.
  - Ikenberry: “the liberal intentional order has no competitors” (2011).

October 24th Lecture: Failed States, Crises, and the United Nations
- Failed states, responsibility to protect (R2P), and the United Nations.
- Somalia and Congo are considered failed states by the Failed State Index (fundforpeace.org). There are many failed states in the continent of Africa.
- In regards to failed states -- Elliot Ross, The Guardian, June 28th 2013: “it offers a version of the world to the American public that bears no relation to reality, but it works very well as a way of rationalizing overseas interventions past and present.”
- James Traub: what is a “failed state?” “A threat to US national security?” “Ungoverned” spaces?
  - Some failed states are considered threats to US national security, but Traub argues that there are many failed states that really aren’t a threat to US national security, like Chad.
    - But there is concern over failed states like Afghanistan or Somalia because Al Qaeda is present in these countries.
- Some people refer to failed states as ungoverned spaces.
- Traub: are failed states mainly a threat to their own people? Or is it more a national security issue for the United States? Is it the West’s fault?
  - Some critical theorists argue that failed states are the West’s fault, due to the imperial scramble in the 1800s and 1900s, where borders were drawn arbitrarily.
    - Traub claims that this is true in some cases in regards to failed states, but some states that were colonies of Britain are now highly functioning, so this isn’t a good explanation for why states fail.
  - Traub refers to states that are a threat to their own people as intentional states, because why they may be considered failed states by us (such as North Korea or Sudan), but these states do have state capacity and their actions may be intentional (such as with famines or purposefully starving citizens, etc.).
    - They are not failed in the sense of lacking capacity, but that they use their capacity for something else. This is a different category of a “failed” state by Traub.
- Are failed states destined to fail? Do we have a moral obligation? Do we need a policy?
  - Issue with Syria – could the civil war stir up a region wide conflict that could spin out of control? Therefore should we get involved for this reason? Etc. or do we have a moral obligation to the North Korean people?
- Intentional states: Burma, Sudan. Sudan wants control over the oil and wants that revenue.
  - Do states want to be helped? The Somali warlords didn’t want us to intervene, and North Korea does not want us to intervene.
October 29th Lecture: Responsibility to Protect

- State sovereignty and non-intervention.
  - If a state cannot or will not exercise its sovereign duty to protect its vulnerable populations, intervention to save civilians in danger trumps sovereignty, and non-intervention yields international R2P.
- Tanguy: “need to limit and codify the costliest and thorniest tool in international relations – forcible action against a sovereign state”
- At the moment the responsibility to protect is a bundle of norms, it’s a legal doctrine as well (only the Security Council can authorize intervention under R2P).
  - People interpret the bundle of norms differently, so it’s not really settled as of yet. These debates have been very vivid in the case of Syria.
- Many constructivists hope that R2P will become an overarching norm in international politics. On the other hand Realists remain skeptical and dismissive.
  - Realists: why should we intervene when there is no overarching institution or norm or grand strategy to benefit international politics?
- Tanguy: “the principle of state sovereignty is no longer absolute, but paradoxically, it remains sacrosanct.”
- The role of the United Nations: the realists perception of the Security Council is that it’s just a fig leaf, it doesn’t have an independent effect, and it’s just a fig leaf for the great powers legitimation.
  - The great powers would do whatever they wanted to do regardless if there was a UN or not.
    - The UN tends to be more effective when the great powers buy into whatever the UN wants to do. It has a harder time to act when the great powers are at odds as well.
- The UN follows the charter, to be the guardian of peace and security, rather than does follow the flag of the great powers according to an article we were assigned to read.
  - Permanent members of the Security Council, Os narrative analysis 1945-2002 over a broad range of UN intervention activities (e.g. forces to force). Un follows the charter more than the flag.

October 29th Lecture: Humanitarian Intervention and Civil War

- The UN Security Council, Rwanda, and Darfur.
- The UN Security Council: can authorize military intervention in a sovereign country. However, in order to do so, it needs the consensus of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council, as each of the permanent members has veto power.
  - The United Nations also lacks a standing army. It must rely on contributions of member states in order to engage in armed interventions.
- Since the Cold War ended, (Post-Cold War) there has been a shift towards “peacekeeping”. The United Nations has been much more involved in peacekeeping than before.
  - Peacekeeping operations are generally designed to offer humanitarian protection, and to manage failed states.
- 1992 UN’s “agenda for peace”: the idea was they wanted to expand the conditions for intervention, such as in the case of genocide. It was a more ambitious approach to peacekeeping than before.
  - UNSC Resolution 1674: passed in April 2006. It asserted responsibility to protect populations from: “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
- The case of Rwanda: in 1916 Belgium took over Rwanda from Germany (Germany had Rwanda in the late 1800s), and after WWI Belgium took it over from Germany.
  - Hutus and the Tutsi lived as one people: they spoke the same language, intermarried, and obeyed a nearly godlike Tutsi king.
  - After independence in 1956 when the Belgium troops withdrew, the monarchy dissolved. This caused a power vacuum in Rwanda.
    - Whenever there is a power vacuum, others will compete (conflict) in order to fill that vacuum in order to gain power.
- Two new countries emerged in 1962: Rwanda (dominated by Hutus) and Burundi (by Tutsis). Ethnic fighting flared on and off in the following decades.
- Ethnic conflict erupted in 1994 with the civil war in Rwanda. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed.