**Sino-Soviet Relations**

**Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950)**
- Friendship – USSR granted aid to China ($300 million)
- Alliance – military alliance against ‘Japanese militarism’ (capitalist nations), guaranteed USSR would aid China in event of conflict with capitalist nations
- Mutual assistance – agreed to trade/share secrets

**Korean War (1950-1953)**
Stalin had series of priorities:
- China must do most of fighting – avoid nuclear war
- No military aid to China – too expensive
- Stop US taking North Korea
- Not be forced to fight under Treaty of Friendship

USSR left strategic matters to China – could overrule/intervene
USSR/Chinese advisors had differing views – Soviet views prevailed

**Death of Stalin (1953)**
Short term – relations continued to improve
USSR continued to increase technical support
Khrushchev appeared more accommodating than Stalin

**Geneva Conference (1944)**
Presented good working relationship

**Taiwan (1954-1955) [Crisis 1]**
Mao felt PRC not fully liberated until in control of Taiwan
Shelled Quemoy – highlighted Taiwan issue/register China’s displeasure
US ‘Mutual Defence Treaty’ signed with Taiwan – Khrushchev reluctant to get involved, avoid jeopardising peaceful coexistence
Publically supported China, privately didn’t
Worried Mao’s foreign policy may lead to nuclear war

**Khrushchev’s denunciation speech (1956)**
Mao had little respect for Khrushchev – Stalin had been courageous revolutionary
Khrushchev reluctant to stand up to US
Many of Khrushchev’s criticisms of Stalin – actions Mao was taking
Post 1956 – Mao regarded Khrushchev as ‘dangerous revisionist’ - disagreed with him publically

**Taiwan (1958) [Crisis 2]**
Mao frustrated at Taiwan’s lack of concessions at negotiations (1954 →)
Wanted to test US commitment to Taiwan
Tensions intensified – Khrushchev refused to support China
Feared Sino-Taiwan dispute would drag allies (USSR/USA) into nuclear war
Mao convinced Khrushchev couldn’t be relied on, more in favour of compromise than revolution
Came to conclusion of advantages of leaving Quemoy/Matsu – valuable tool to pressure USA/Taiwan

**Nuclear technology**
Mao’s attitude horrified Khrushchev – willing to see half of world population die to advance communism – massive impact of USSR foreign policy
1958 – proposed joint control over Chinese nuclear programme
Seen as patronising – USSR slow to share own nuclear secrets
Khrushchev tried to get Mao to end Taiwan attack – offer to share nuclear secrets
1959 – changed mind, proposed Pacific ‘atom-free zone’ – mean China abandoning nuclear programme, Mao felt betrayed
Proposal for state of the art radio tracking station in China – monitor US submarines, seen as patronising