target for terrorists. We are not part of Europe or North America. We talk about an Asia first policy but we 
don’t practice it.” p64

“Our concern over Ukraine and Russia is a typical example of what not to do. Ukraine is a European 
problem. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created to contain the Soviet Union and seems to put Russia in the same boat. Australia is not in the North Atlantic. We mindlessly join the United States which wants to maintain its position as the Number 1 world power. Russia is undoubtedly meddling in Ukraine but the United States has a long history of doing the same thing in its region and even beyond. Neither country can claim the international moral high ground. We would be well advised to stay out of a complex and sensitive subject rather than engaging in hairy chested histrionics to please conservative Americans and look good domestically to unthinking Australians.” p65

“For a country that faces no identifiable external threat we give far too much attention to military 
matters.” p65

“What threats exist?...The only foreseeable way in which we could get involved in military activity in our region is as part of a US operation. In other words, the American alliance is more likely to drag us into trouble than to get us out of it.” p66

“The world is in a state of flux with old certainties no longer certain. This is particularly true of our region. It is too early to get worked up about the decline of the West but while the fall may be a long way off I think a future Gibbon will write that the American Empire has begun its decline. Because things are changing, we should not get locked into positions that we may find it hard to get out of. Flexibility must be our watchword.” p66

“While we should not apologise for our views on government and human rights we must avoid sliding into arrogant missionary activity.” p66

ART 7: A Tilt Toward China? Australia Reconsiders Its American Ties, Lee

“China has emerged as the largest or second-largest trading partner of every major country in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Australia. This trade dynamic sits uncomfortably alongside the fact that China is allowed very little strategic role in the region, with countries preferring to outsource their security to America.” p63

“White’s arguments for a regional concert of powers have also generated strong support from the mainstream press, and from business groups - especially in the mining sector - who believe that backing America’s “strategic competition” is an unnecessary distraction from the wiser policy of seeking closer economic relations with China.” p63

“White himself is no fan of the Obama administration’s so-called pivot back to Asia, which has been a chief indication that America isn’t ready to relinquish its dominant strategic role. Instead he urges Canberra to do all it can to persuade America that maintaining primacy is all but impossible and that forming a stable concert of great powers is the region’s best prospect for peace and stability. But it will be an awkward conversation. As the argument goes, a stable concert of powers - à la the hundred-year peace that steered Europe until the outbreak of the First World War - can only be achieved if Washington is prepared to step back and accept Beijing as its strategic (and moral) equal in Asia, and this, so far anyhow, the Obama administration seems unwilling to do.” p64

“Indeed, China continually accuses America of perpetuating a Cold War-era mentality by virtue of the alliances it has forged and the military deployments it has made throughout the region.” p65

“Australia’s decision to welcome an enhanced American strategic role in Asia, it is worth noting, comes on the back of significantly increased Chinese assertiveness in the region, from 2009 onward, over territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and American and South Korean naval activities in the Yellow Sea. That Beijing’s pub relations gains could be so easily undermined through a couple of year of rash and
- Alliance if about joint facilities
- Benefits:
  - US will come to our aid if we’re attacked in pacific (talk about it)
  - Access to US intelligence about friends and foes
    - Higher access to US secret military hardware
  - Because of our loyalty, seat at table at councils in Washington
    - Can be heard if we want
    - Do we have a voice? Use it?
- Costs:
  - Countries may think military bases are aimed at them
    - Openly regarded as high priority SU targets
  - Possible central Aus base is high priority to China
  - Burden sharing
    - Pay for things
      - New US facility in Darwin - who will pay?
      - Military budget is expanding, other things to spend on
  - Loss of foreign policy autonomy
    - Committed to ally - ability to discern difference between whose interests

Aus’s discovery of the sharp limits of US extended conventional deterrence obligation 62-65

- US can enact treaty however it like
- Provider of security - worried about being dragged into wars they have no interest in
  - Drawn in
  - Entanglement
- Recipient wary of abandonment
- Kennedy admin on 2 occasion made clear Aus foreign policy concerns weren’t shared by US
  - Indonesia nationalist, Dutch takeover
  - US worried about communist take over of South East Asia
  - Confrontation against Malaysia
    - Grew out of 3 British colonies
    - Imperialist plot - trying to take control
    - Low level military conflict
      - Aus special forces and Indonesian forces
    - US more concerned about communism than Malaysia formation
    - Couldn’t look to US for support
- Aus participation in alliance wars
  - Korean War
  - Vietnam
  - Gulf war
  - Afghanisatn War
  - Iraq War I
  - Iraq II
  - Syria

The Pacific Pivot - The Obama Admin’s response to “the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia”

- B Clinton hopefull for China partnership - now adversaries
- Pivot: not purely military