IR203- INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS

REALISM

IR203 Realism- Reading Notes

*The False Promise of International Institutions*- Mearsheimer 1994

Realists vs Institutionalists: Realists and institutionalists particularly disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international stability. Realists say no; institutionalists say yes.

- Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior. Realists therefore believe that institutions are not an important cause of peace. They matter only on the margins.

- Institutionalists directly challenge this view of institutions, arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relative power positions. Institutions are independent variables, and they have the capability to move states away from war.

Defines institutions as set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior.

- Institutions are not a form of world government. States themselves must choose to obey the rules they created. Institutions, in short, call for the "decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of
RATIONALIST INSTITUTIONALISM

IR203- Lecture- Rationalist Institutionalism

Rests on the premise that international cooperation is possible without hegemony and posits international institutions as the tool which allows this cooperation- **States create international institutions because institution help to overcome obstacles to mutually beneficial cooperation.**

Precondition for cooperation: **interdependence** (i.e. the welfare of their citizens depends on what other states do: Interdependence makes joint gains from cooperation possible, but cooperation’ requires mutual adjustment of policies.

There are obstacles to cooperation, mainly:

- Enforcement problems (‘prisoner’s dilemma’)
- Distribution problems (‘multiple equilibria’)

International institutions are tools for solving these ‘second order’ problems

**I. Prisoner’s dilemma/Enforcement problems**-

- **Enforcement problems** refers to the risk of states not complying with the terms of an agreement (fear of cheating/defection).

- States can gain most from not cooperating in a situation in which the other state cooperates. If both states choose to not cooperate, as often happens, then the gains are far less than if both states choose to cooperate. The situation in which both states choose to cooperate is called pareto optimum, a condition in which no pareto improvement (constellation that makes at least one actor better off without making any other worse off) is possible.

- Application to International relations:
  - Under uncertainty about other actor’s behaviour, rational behaviour by each actor leads to suboptimal outcome (i.e. no mutually beneficial cooperation);
  - ‘Dominant strategy’ for each actor is not to cooperate
‘Mixed motive’ games: shared interest in cooperation but at the same time incentive to cheat. Examples: arms races and control; reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; reduction of trade barriers

Problem: how to make promises/commitments to cooperation credible?

Institutions solve enforcement problems in four ways, three of which involve information facilitation and deployment:

1. **Repeated games**: International institutions have fairly stable membership and promote ‘repeated games’: the same participants interact repeatedly in relation to the same or similar issues
   - Repeated games are less prone to defection than one-shot games because they allow reciprocity-based strategies such as “tit-for-tat”
   - Institutions help states build a valuable reputation of complying with commitments.

2. **International institutions define and adjudicate compliance**: Formulation of clear rules and neutral interpretations about what constitutes compliance alleviates incomplete contracting problems.

3. **International institutions monitor compliance**: Institutions typically require the provision of standardized information on state behaviour, often with quality assessment.

4. **Institutions can have independent monitoring and inspection powers (e.g. International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on Chemical Weapons)**: International institutions can **impose/authorise sanctions against non-compliance**
   - Institutions can sanction non-compliers directly (e.g. EU)
   - Institutions can authorise decentralized sanctions (e.g. UN, WTO) and facilitate them by reassuring states that the costs of punishing defectors will be shared, and helping coordination.

Institutions allow states to make a credible commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation:
Example: Economic and Monetary Union in EU.

- Common interest in stable exchange rates and the single currency as most credible form of fixed exchange rates
- But: differences between Germany and France about requirements for economic convergence & fiscal behaviour
- Germany: prior economic/fiscal convergence and independent Central Bank
- France: convergence follows creation; government influence over monetary policy
- Solution: Plans developed by ‘Delors Committee’ (plus convergence in economic ideas and impact of unification?)

Summary

- Rationalist institutionalism shares assumption of anarchy and self-interested actors (states) with realism, but very different conclusions about the likelihood of cooperation and the role of international institutions
- States create institutions to benefit from the mutual gains of cooperation
  - Institutions are necessary to solve enforcement problems (fear of defection) and distribution problems (‘mutual equilibria’ for cooperation)
- States accept the constraints imposed by institutions in order to reap the benefits from cooperation
- Institutions are useful tools but cannot force states to do what they do not consider in their (long-term) interests; institutional constraints are self-imposed

READINGS


Analyses why states form IOs by investigating both the functions IOs perform as well as the enabling traits that help them perform that function. Takes both a rational-institutionalist as well as constructivist take on the question:
• Draws from decentralised cooperation theory, taking into account the various institutional capacities other than centralised enforcement (for example, high quality information) that are required for overcoming collective action problems.

• Regime theory:
  o Praises emphasis in Keohane's (1984) After Hegemony on how regimes help states reach specific agreements by reducing transaction costs, improving information, and raising the costs of violations.
  o Critiques regime theory for treating IO as a passive actor. Instead, authors approach IOs as an actor of their own, possessed with a certain degree of autonomy. These autonomous functions of IOs—such as monitoring—are termed ‘operational activities’ by the authors.
    ▪ Krasner’s definition of regime (1983) encompasses only norms and collective choice procedures, making no provision for the active and independent IO functions.

• Legal theory: Careful differentiation among institutional forms and emphasizes institutional details. Authors add this to their analysis.

• Realist: Accepts realist argument that states are concerned over relative power and distributive consequences. But argue that the powerful states still create and structure IOs to further their interests, they also depend on IOs because they need to induce weaker states to participate.

• Constructivist: Merges constructivist approaches that IOs are—in part—both reflections of and participants in ongoing processes and prevailing ideas (Finnemore 1996) with rationalist approaches dealing with how IOs reduce transaction costs.

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism and IOs: Lecture

Constructivism: Key Insights
- International structure is not only material but also ideational:
  - Anarchy is not ‘given’ by material structure of international system but constructed in social interactions (‘mutual constitution’)
  - --> fundamental criticism of rationality assumption
- Actors do not (always) act according to cost-benefit calculations but according to **normative standards of appropriate behaviour**
- Institutions do not only regulate/constrain behaviour but can have deeper (constitutive) effect on actors’ identity and interests
- Constructivism believes that
  - A. Causal Impact of Institutions is **high**
  - B. Institutions have **constitutive** impact

### Rational Institutionalism and Constructivism: Key Differences

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<tr>
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<th>Rational Institutionalism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor preferences</strong></td>
<td>Exogenous; fixed (welfare)</td>
<td>Exogenous, depend on state identity and social context</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Actor behaviour</strong></td>
<td>Logic of consequences; instrumental rationality (cost/benefit calculations)</td>
<td>Logic of appropriateness; normative rationality (norm-guided, role-playing)</td>
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<td><strong>Interaction between actors</strong></td>
<td>Bargaining, strategic action</td>
<td>Not only strategic: communicative action, persuasion, arguing</td>
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<td><strong>Institutional Impact</strong></td>
<td>Regulative impact (constraints, resources) on behaviour/strategies (interests remain unchanged)</td>
<td>Constitutive impact on state identity and underlying interests; socialisation</td>
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<td><strong>Conditions for Impact</strong></td>
<td>Incentives (long-term benefits from cooperation)</td>
<td>Legitimacy, identity</td>
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False Differences

- Rationalist vs Constructivism debate is not about rational behaviour vs irrational behaviour.
- Not egoism vs. altruism - although constructivism can conceive of altruistic behaviour if ‘appropriate’ for given identity in a specific context
- Constructivism does not only explain ‘nice’ behaviour

Causal models

Rational Institutionalism:

- Creation: Actor preferences create institution
- Impact: Institutions has a regulative impact on actor behaviour -
- Change: Actor behaviour leads to formal changes in rules and procedures of institutions

Constructivism:

- Creation: Preferences based on cost-benefit analysis as well as state identity leads to creation
- Impact: Institutions have a constitutive impact on actor preferences by shaping actor identities - final actor behaviour is result of interactions/collective outcome
- Change: Actor behaviour leads to normative change of the institution

Example: State identity and creation of international institutions

- Different national identity constructions in relation to European integration explains attitudes towards European monetary integration in UK, France, Germany (Thomas Risse et al.
- NATO: NATO as expression of common liberal democracies reinforces a transatlantic ‘security community’ that enabled practices of collective defence (Thomas Risse)
• All of this hinges, of course, on an intersubjectively agreed upon notion of what socially valuable behavior looks like. I would argue, then, that the production of positive and negative social sanctions sufficient to induce cooperation in the absence of material side-payments or threats rests on two tiers. First, there must be an intersubjective normative consensus about what "good" behavior looks like. Without this shared standard, then the "fact" of some particular action will have no agreed interpretation, and consequently it will have no meaning, generating no shaming or backpatting effects. Second, even if there is a shared interpretation of the meaning of a particular behavior, these actions will not generate social pressures if they are unobserved and private. Thus the second layer is a forum or institution that makes acting a particular way public and observable.

• Deficiency: Difficult to know whether certain socially conforming behaviours are a result of identification with a group or the desire to gain material benefits from the group. Possibly a combination of both, but latter is likely to be more prevalent among states which desire to be part of the in-group but are not already.

Relative gains model: Johnston uses the example of an actor which has been socialised into the realpolitik concern with relative gains but at the same time is also sensitive to social rewards and punishments. Thus relative gains may not be abandoned in order for constructivist theory to succeed in providing a convincing explanation.

• The backpatting benefits in case of conformity and the social costs of opprobrium in case of defection ensure that the utility received an actor increases in case of compliance and decreases in case of defection. This is in contrast to such a situation in a non-social environment, where defection utility is always larger than the compliance utility. Moreover, in a non-social environment this utility gap only increases as more actors cooperate as the relative gains from defection are made against a larger pool of actors. In a social environment however, larger number of cooperators in an institution lead to greater utility effects from backpatting or defection. However, in larger organisations, shared meaning on what constitutes appropriate behaviour is hard to establish. This may lead to smaller organisations based on common identity working better in this respect.

• Cooperation as a result of material side-payments or sanctions is not a social effect of the institution. Cooperation due to social influence, however, is a social effect only, and would not exist without interaction with a group. Therefore, backpatting and
States created science bureaucracies, with UNESCO's help, to comply with the new norm about states' responsibility for science. Thus, the organizational innovation was supplied to states from outside, from an international organization, rather than being the product of any characteristics internal to or inherent in the state itself. (p. 566)

… the apparent responsiveness to state conditions in a few early-adopting states followed by a pattern of adoption unrelated to state conditions, can be reconciled in the following way: science policy bureaucracies appeared as an innovation in the international system in response to clear domestic demands in a few prominent developed countries. The innovation was then picked up and popularized by an international organization, UNESCO, for reasons of its own and spread by that organization to other states in which the conditions that ordinarily would prompt such demands did not exist. (p. 575-6)

The early organizational structure of UNESCO also reflected this understanding of science and culture as transnational and often nongovernmental activities. While the General Conference was composed of equal member states, UNESCO's executive board was to be composed of eighteen individuals, elected by General Conference delegates for their distinction in the organization's substantive fields. Board members were to serve on behalf of the conference as a whole and not as representatives of their respective governments. In 1954 UNESCO members voted to amend the constitution and reorganize the executive board into a body of twenty-two governmental representatives. The shift toward a governmentalized secretariat was justified on several grounds. The reason cited most often was a financial one; since states were footing the bill for UNESCO's operations, the organization should serve states… participants also understood the shift to be in keeping with a larger shift in the international climate from postwar Kantian transnationalism to cold war Hobbesian nationalism… At best, ideas were irrelevant to the intense power struggle raging in the world; at worst, ideas were viewed as divisive and dangerous, in which case states could not afford to leave them to a collection of unaccountable individuals. (p. 579)
activities received a boost in 1960 when Pierre Auger, then acting as a special consultant to the United Nations as a whole, issued a report recommending that national scientific policy be one of the
"foremost preoccupations of governments": States should make it their business to ensure [that] interaction between the encouragement of scientific research, on the one hand, and economic and social progress, on the other, operates smoothly to the advantage of both. It is, at the same time, the duty of organizations in the United Nations family to assist States in this matter.”

Auger's detailed report, requested and approved by the larger United Nations, validated the science policy activities in which UNESCO had been engaged over the last five years and provided a basis for formalizing what had been an ad hoc collection of activities… This is surprising given that until only a few years earlier, conventional wisdom had held exactly the opposite—that government involvement stifled scientific creativity. (p. 582)

Initially scientists sought to harness state resources to further their own scientific projects by claiming a piece of an interstate organization. To do so they had to proclaim science an appropriate concern of governments. The debate over this in UNESCO and Wilkinson's comments in prompting it reveal the scientists' success in this. However, when scientists and the other epistemic communities lost control of UNESCO to the member states, the situation did not simply revert to the status quo ante. The norm that science was now an appropriate concern of states remained firmly entrenched, but the relationship between science and states was redefined to reflect the new world climate and UNESCO's new dominant constituency. (583-4)

UNESCO's reorientation toward states fit well with the climate of national self-determination in the 1960s. Among the large and growing membership of newly independent LDCs, the notion that states should and could promote and direct science, with all its economic and military applications, was popular. For these states, science as a transnational activity spelled continued dependence. Science had to be a national pursuit to be normatively compatible with the nationalism of the newly created state and provide it with the means of resisting encroachments from outside. (p. 584-5)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationality</th>
<th>Actors have ‘perfect’ rationality (full information, optimising choices) and are utility ‘maximising’</th>
<th>Rational actors but ‘bounded’ rationality and ‘satisficing’ (leading to unintended consequences)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Constraints</td>
<td>Voluntary institutional constraints on short-term interests</td>
<td>Unintended consequences result in undesired constraints</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional Efficiency</td>
<td>Efficiency of institutions</td>
<td>Unintended consequences leads to (persistent) sub-optimal institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional development</td>
<td>Functional explanation of institutional creation, design and development</td>
<td>Inertia, incremental change, path-dependence of institutional change (including ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional change</td>
<td>Ahistorical, static perspective</td>
<td>Dynamic perspective, path-dependence</td>
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<td>Institutional autonomy</td>
<td>Member states always maintain control over institutions</td>
<td>Institutional agency can exploit gaps in member state control</td>
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- **Rationalist institutionalism:**
  - Effect of institutions: constraining behaviour
  - Nature of these constraints: voluntary constraints (‘tying of hands’ to realise gains from cooperation)

- **Historical institutionalism:**
  - Possibility of **unintended constraints**
  - Insights into why states comply with unintended constraints
  - Insights into why (suboptimal) international institutions do (not) change and survive

- **Similarity in underlying assumptions:**
  - States (as ‘rational actors’) follow logic of expected consequences rather than logic of normative appropriateness.

- **Key difference in underlying assumptions:**
Beliefs, identities and interests can change as a result of the negotiation process.

**Differences between Bargaining and Arguing**

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<th>Bargaining</th>
<th>Arguing</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aim of actors</strong></td>
<td>Obtaining the most favourable outcome- larger share of the pie (relative gains focused)</td>
<td>Reasoned understanding- outcome must be agreed on by everybody based on international norms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Actions of actors</strong></td>
<td>Making promises or threats</td>
<td>Presenting empirical or normative arguments</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Role of third parties (such as IOs)</strong></td>
<td>Mediators or enforcers</td>
<td>Moral or technical authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Desirable Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Compromise (no change in preference)- preference remains to benefit</td>
<td>Consensus (with transformation of preferences)- preference based on what is ‘right’</td>
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**Institutional Design and Arguing:**

Decision-making bodies with regular interactions and insulation from political pressure conducive to arguing (socialization and persuasion)

- Delegation to *technical bodies*: 
Studies Testing Theories of Institutional Design: Examples

- Rational design project’ (Koremenos et al. 2001):
  - Testing rationalist institutionalist explanations for different design features for different IOs
- Studies explaining specific design features:
  - Pooling (decision rules) and Delegation (Hooghe and Marks 2014)
- Hooghe and Marks’ (2014) statistical analysis found that:
  - Higher number of members is associated with more pooling and more delegation
  - A broader policy scope is associated with more delegation but less pooling
  - Larger power asymmetry between members is associated with less delegation, but no effect on pooling
  - Average democracy scores of members has no effect- states replicate internal model of governance in IOs.

Summary: Explaining Variation in IOs

Key design features of international institutions: membership; scope; decision-rules; delegation

- Variation in institutional design:
  - Rational institutional design: design reflects the nature of the cooperation problems an institution has to address: the severity of enforcement problems, the severity of distribution problems (and the number of member states)
  - Realism: institutional design (or informal rules) privileges the more powerful members
  - Constructivism: institutional design conforms to norms of appropriateness or mimics prestigious models

Summary: Institutional design of ‘strong’ international institutions

What makes international institutions ‘strong’?
Independent impact of institutions on state behaviour

- Larger membership, larger issue scope: stronger institution since it sets institutional rules for the behaviour of a larger number of states on a larger number of issues
- But:
  1. Do these rules actually affect state behaviour: can the institution elicit compliance?
  2. Is compliance within institutional rules costly/inconvenient or are institutional obligations only ‘shallow commitments’?

What design features make compliance more likely?

- More delegation of enforcement tasks (monitoring, sanctioning), more compliance
- More autonomy of institution in carrying out these tasks, more compliance

What design features make costly obligations more likely:

- Decision-rules (to implement general treaty provisions): more majority voting, more likelihood of creation of inconvenient obligations
- More delegation of adjudication tasks (interpretation of obligations by judicial bodies); more independence, more likelihood of inconvenient obligations

OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (2016)

Chapter 1: International Organisations in World Politics- Pevenhouse and Borzyskowski

What drives IO Formation?

- Realism’s Hegemonic stability Theory (Gilpin, 1981): Hegemon created regimes and organisations (for example GATT, World Bank, IMF) to facilitate leadership. In this
IO IMPACT

Two types of Institutional Impact

- Impact of issue addressed by institution: effectiveness of problem solving, Example: Slowing global warming, Avoiding warm, Increasing international trade etc.
- Impact on state behaviour: effectiveness of obtaining compliance with states’ institutional obligations
  - Examples: Reducing CO2 emissions, eliminating trade barriers, refraining from the use of force in inter-state relations.
  - IOs forbid or require certain behaviour—does this institutional get that kind of behaviour from the states.
  - Compliance ties in with problem solving most of the time. Compliance may be necessary for problem solving but not sufficient.
- Not sufficient because:
  - Commitments are shallow: prescribed behavioural changes do not go far enough to solve problem
    - E.g. Kyoto Protocol on climate change
  - Commitments are deep, but key states do not accept them (“depth versus participation dilemma”)
    - USA did not ratify Kyoto Protocol
    - ICC another example
    - One way IOs get around this is by specifying a certain number of states or certain type of states who need to ratify treaties for it to come into force.
  - Commitments are based on faulty beliefs
    - E.g. IMF conditions for loans to crisis-stricken countries
    - Climate Change: Some people refuse to accept that CO2 emissions are responsible for global warming. Leads to different approaches to problems, some of which may not be successful.
    - If there is insufficient scientific evidence, states may commit to certain actions to solve a problem but these commitments do not lead to the problem being solved sometimes.
Voluntary non-compliance:
  o States with higher policy adjustment costs are less likely to comply (e.g. threat to domestic firms through trade tariff reductions)- Developed countries with high environmental standards comply better with environmental treaties than developing countries.
  o Domestic institutional and partisan veto players reduce compliance (obstacles to domestic policy change to implement international obligations)- Italy and Greece comply less due to partisan veto players and inefficient administration.

Involuntary non-compliance:
  o States with weaker administrative and financial capabilities are less likely to comply (e.g. effectiveness of domestic enforcement, including courts)

Constructivism:
Compliance more likely in states that
  • are ‘novices’ in international relations (‘newness’ of situation facilitates socialisation)
  • have political elites and/or publics that assign normative legitimacy to/identify positively with an international institution (e.g. mass support for EU)- Especially observable in Eastern Europe after fall of communism and dictatorship.
  • have a normative fit (‘resonance’) of international rules with domestic political culture
  • have a stronger domestic culture of ‘law observance’- Italy has a poor domestic culture of law observance which leads to poor international law observance

Studies
  • Zangl(2008): higher legalisation (more delegation of enforcement) explains better compliance in WTO than under the GATT, confirming rationalist institutionalism and constructivism but contradicting realism.
  • Boerzel etal.(2010): compliance across EU member states best explained by a combination of state power and administrative capacities; legitimacy does not matter. Realist argument.
DOMESTIC POLITICS

Lecture: IR203: International institutions and Domestic Politics

Domestic politics play a role in explaining:

• Decisions to create (or join) international institutions and agreement on particular institution design

• Decision-making within international institutions

• Compliance with institutional rules and obligations (☞ last week’s lecture)

What is domestic politics?

1. Preferences and power of specific actors or groups within countries- different types of interest groups (public and private), bureaucracies, trade unions, political parties, voters, public opinion.

2. Political institutions of countries- electoral system (majoritarian vs. coalition/consensus). Democracies vs. autocracies, ruler selection processes (elections or otherwise), executive-legislative relations, majoritarian vs. consensus democracy, federal vs. centralised states, independent judiciary and rule of law.

Role of domestic politics in international relations theories:

Realism, rationalist institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism do not deny the importance of domestic politics.

• But domestic politics is usually not considered as a component of the theory itself.

– Realism: primacy of international politics (‘The pressures of [international] competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures’; Waltz 1986: 329). National interests supersede domestic politics.
But too much overlap increases the number of possible agreements and may prevent any of them from coming about (distribution problem)

• Effect on distribution of gains:
  o Governments with smaller win-set are more likely to obtain an agreement closer to their preferred outcome because it leads to greater bargaining power of the government.
  o Governments with small win sets (tied hands) will gain more concessions from governments with large win-sets (Schelling Conjecture).
  o International strength as a result of domestic constraints.

What determines size of win-set: (Putnam’s three points)

• Domestic preferences:
  – Relevant domestic actors, their preferences, and their relative power
• Domestic institutions
  – Determine what actors’ access to policy-making and their influence
• Negotiator strategies

Negotiator’s strategies: Negotiator can change the size of the win-set.

• Within international institutions, a negotiator can try to misrepresent her win set as more constraining than it really is- this increases their bargaining power.
• A negotiator can try to change her own domestic win-set:
  – Enlarging it may facilitate ratification.
  – Reducing it may increase the share it can claim.
• A negotiator can try to enlarge the win-set of another negotiator.
  – Offering package deals where domestic groups in other countries gain benefits.
  – Negative consequences for certain domestic groups: Threaten economic sanctions on specific sectors, incentivising certain domestic groups to pressure their governments to compromise more.
**The Setup:** “At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.” Moves that are rational on one board may not be on the other; but a leader must negotiate a policy consistent on both boards. Failure at the international board may lead a player to topple it; failure at the domestic board may result in the leader being toppled. A leader is purely an agent with no personal motives in this model.

**Sequential Model:**
Level I: bargaining between negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement.
Level II: separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. At this stage, the domestic groups can only vote up or down; any amendments require agreement from all other parties involved.

**Win-Set:**
A “win-set” for a given Level II constituency is the set of all possible Level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when voted up or down. The size of a win-set is important for two reasons. First, larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely, ceteris paribus. The smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk of involuntary defection, and hence the more applicable the literature about dilemmas of collective action. Involuntary defection is when an agent is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification, as distinguished from voluntary defection, which is when a rational egoist reneges on an unenforceable contract. Second, the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. A small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage.

**Determinants of the Win-set:**
The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents.
- The lower the cost of no-agreement to constituents, the smaller the win-set. Ceteris paribus, more self-efficient states with smaller win-sets should make fewer international agreements and drive harder bargains in those that they do make. Small countries with open economies are more likely to have “internationalist” all-purpose support for international agreements.
- Issues can be (a) boundary disagreements (hawks vs doves) or (b) factional disagreements (same point elicits comments of “too far” and “too little”). (a) raises the risk of involuntary defection. (b) may improve chances for cooperation by creating transnational alignments.
- The composition of the active Level II constituency affects the character of the win-set. This composition is affected by variation in participation rates and the issue that is politicized.
- If you allow for transnational issue linkage, you create opportunities for side payments and iso-vote or “political indifference curves” (I can’t recreate the picture here). The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions.
- Ratification procedures. The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger their win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement;
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<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
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<td>Recognises social nature of alliances, therefore drawing attention to NATO’s ideological underpinnings.</td>
<td>Despite recognising NATO as a social institution, the analysis is restricted mainly to the elite level through the method of elite contacts.</td>
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<td>Provides a good detail of how alliances are designed for mutual defence, but only focuses on securitisation against states outside the alliance community. Alliances can be created or transformed to securitise against non-state actors such as terrorist organisation (NATO &amp; War on Terror) or even against structural phenomenon such as political instability outside the alliance members’ borders. Moreover, as terror is a transnational phenomenon, Walt’s definition of an alliance as something exclusively directed towards the outside of a community is not analytically useful.</td>
<td>Walt contends that alliances are more likely to collapse in a multipolar world because of the larger range of alternatives to the alliance that will result out of the larger number of great powers. However, this is empirically incoherent with NATO’s renewed strength as the world becomes more multipolar. The reason for this incoherence is Walt’s realist conception of states as blackboxes without any distinct identity. Even if it may be rationally advantageous for certain states to be allies, their identities may prevent them from</td>
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Problem with Liberal Institutionalists such as Wallander (2000)

- Are right to address how NATO has used its general assets to address instability but they do not explain the processes through which the alliance has acted to shape identities and norms perceived as a source of peace and progress.

Against Reiter (2001):

- Reiter argued that, to the extent that democratization has occurred in ex-communist countries, this has been a result of domestic, rather than international, factors.
- However, Reiter fails to see that through the Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan, and various other programmes, NATO has ‘co-opted’ Central and East European actors into activities that are likely to affect the ways in which the latter think and behave. In other words, NATO has been involved in socializing Central and East Europeans into Western ways

Against Rationalist Socialisation Theory:

- Rationalists (such as Farrell, 2002) argue that Eastern European countries have adopted new NATO norms to reap the material benefits of NATO membership in a unipolar world where NATO represents the strongest power source.
- I argue in this article that the logic of socialization of Central and Eastern Europeans into the norms prescribed by NATO departed in important ways from the rationalist logic of socialization. Two dimensions of this process are relevant to this study:

  1) Dynamics of the process:

   a. Czech Republic Example: Membership was not what induced Czech’s to adopt norms. As an example, vis-a-vis the Czech Republic, NATO’s ability to
appeals, involving effort at persuading actors to adopt specific reforms by pointing to the special expert of NATO on a given question, or/and invoking the moral reliability of an institution that embodied the liberal-democratic community. Finally, NATO officials sometimes resorted to social proof, seeking to convince Czechs or Romanians to promote a series of legal and institutional changes by pointing to examples of established and even emerging democracies who had set up similar institutions. This argument posits that if everyone followed a similar course of action, then it must the right thing to do, because everyone else could not be wrong.

Effects

- **Czech Republic:** Change in discourse on both the elite and the public level which reflected greater desire to adopt liberal democratic norms. 1998 Constitutional Act on National Security passed to reflect this- military brought more under civilian control and limits placed on abusive suspension of the right to property or freedom of movement during crises.

- **Romania:** Similar reforms in state-society relations. The change was not confined to their discourse but came to be inscribed in key documents adopted by the Romanian government, including the *1999 National Security Strategy and the White Book of the Government on Romania and NATO*.

**Conditions for Socialisation**

The education of Czechs and Romanians by NATO was facilitated by a particular set of social relations, in which the parties' mutual recognition of their respective roles as teachers and students was essential. There was a prevailing collective understanding within NATO that Central and East European actors could learn "correct" liberal democracy, and that, given its identity and expertise, the alliance could act as teacher in such a process of learning. In addition, there was a shared allied view that the establishment of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe would be a key factor of European stability.
US-EU Dispute Cases: Across 4 pair-wise similar disputes between the EU and the US, Zangl observes that the US’ compliance with the dispute settlement mechanisms was higher under the judicialised WTO than the diplomatic GATT.

Two Hormones Case Example should be mentioned.

Weaknesses:

- Zangl analyses disputes between two states with proportional power- due to different power relations disputes between the US and less powerful states may look different and work more in favour for the US. This is especially relevant with respect to developing countries.

*New powers in the club: the challenges of global trade governance*- Narlikar (2010)

**Abstract:** No good deed goes unpunished: the WTO’s timely response to accommodate the new powers—Brazil, India and China—at the heart of its decision-making has produced new inefficiencies, has heightened its proclivity to deadlock, and has exacerbated disengagement and disillusionment among all its stakeholders. Particularly in the context of a major economic crisis, a reliable international institution is necessary to ensure the continued provision of freer trade—well-recognized as the route to recovery. With the WTO’s recent record to provide these necessary public goods under doubt, where do the solutions lie? This article discusses the changing role of the new powers in the WTO, and further analyses the opportunities and challenges that these developments generate. The concluding section examines possible routes to reform. While very little can, or indeed should, be done to alter the balance of power itself, it is argued that appropriate institutional reform can help the multilateral trading system retain the advances it has made on grounds of fairness and further address the concerns of efficiency that are central to the crisis that it faces today.
interests of the powerful states, yet can be accepted by all participating states and generally considered legitimate by them. **Invisible Weighting** assures that legislative outcomes reflect underlying power.

- **Conclusion:** **Organised hypocrisy in the procedural context:** Organised hypocrisy involves patterns of behaviour that are decoupled from rules, norms, scripts, or rituals that are maintained for external display. Such hypocrisy in WTO rules serves to legitimise WTO outcomes.

Consensus rules: Requires no manifested opposition from any of the parties for the decisions to be taken. But WTO Article IX also makes provision for majority voting if decision cannot be arrived at by consensus. However, there has never been voting at the WTO.

- Logically follows that decisions will be Pareto improving, since legislation that would make any state worse off would be blocked by that state.

**Invisible Weighting:** **Possible for powerful states to simultaneously respect procedural rules and use various practices to escape the constraints on power apparently intrinsic to those rules.**

How is bargaining power calculated by Steinberg? Draws on market size as a proxy for bargaining power. Internal trade possibilities of larger markets give them a better best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) than smaller countries. **Deficiency:** political interests cannot be separated from economic interests. Countries may bargain based on their political position, providing concessions in the political sphere for parallel concessions in the economic sphere of trade negotiation. However, as political power is still heavily concentrated with the US and EU, this deficiency does not prevent Steinberg’s analysis from producing empirically coherent and convincing explanations.

**Power tactics in the GATT/WTO:**
such as openly refusing to abide by an international court decision, may be the source of pride or greater domestic support to a member of Congress.

When dealing with members of Congress, other models may better describe compliance behavior. Members of Congress appear less responsive to the current levels of prospective remedies available at the WTO than the executive branch. Nonetheless, legislators may nonetheless be responsive to the material consequences of non-compliance that would affect their constituencies. Thus, the levels of cooperation that can be sustained when legislative action is necessary may depend on the level of retaliation that can be authorized for non-compliance. In dispute settlement design terms, this means that permitting higher retaliatory remedies, including retrospective damages or progressively higher damages, may be helpful to create the necessary domestic conditions for compliance to occur.

Many WTO disputes end in negotiated settlements. The litigating parties agree to an outcome that falls short of full compliance with the WTO adjudicatory decision. Interestingly, in bargaining for a settlement, the well-known intransigence of the U.S. Congress in complying with WTO decisions may be a bargaining asset. Two-level bargaining suggests that having a domestic barrier to compromise makes a state’s bargaining position more credible. Where legislative action is needed to cure the violation, the Executive can credibly argue that United States is unlikely to comply fully or quickly because of the difficulty of securing the necessary congressional action and, thus, the complaining state should accept a settlement that is less than what the WTO law demands.

For instance, in the ongoing dispute between the United States and Brazil over American subsidies to cotton farmers, the American Executive has been able to use legislative intransigence as part of its bargaining strategy. To cure the breach of WTO rules, the United States needs to alter the level and type of subsidies that it offers to cotton farmers. Agriculture subsidies are generally included as part of the U.S. “Farm Bill” that Congress considers every five years. When bargaining with the Brazilian government, the Executive could credibly state that Congress was unlikely to revisit the issue of cotton subsidies before the “farm bill” came up for another vote, and in the short term, Brazil should accept a compromise solution that allowed American cotton subsidies to continue. The Brazilian government would have preferred the elimination of U.S. subsidy payments, but was willing to accept the compromise given the domestic bargaining constraint the Executive faced.

As the United States’s legislative inflexibility on trade issues becomes common knowledge, states may expect that compliance will be slow or not forthcoming, and may therefore be

Abstract: This article offers an alternative account of the performance of the World Trade Organisation- an institution whose performance is usually assessed in terms of its capacity to function as a forum for the exchange of mutually beneficial trade concessions, its ability to act as an arena in which trade rules can be negotiated and its capacity to serve as a forum for settling trade disputes. The article argues that when understood in these ways, the performance of the WTO inevitable appears lacklustre. However, the fact that member states remain committed suggests that the criteria on which an assessment of the institution’s performance ought to be based are different and the way in which we conceive the institution is flawed. This article argues that if WTO performance is measured as the institution’s capacity to act as a strategic device to maintain and exacerbate the advantages of a group of industrial states over their less powerful and developing counterparts (an aim that is much closer to the institution’s intended purpose), then it has actually been quite successful, albeit undesirably so.

- Treats WTO as a resource, and not simply as a forum or as an actor (borrowing from Hurd, 2013’s typology of different kinds of IOs).
- GATT/ WTO was a strategic device during its creation: designed to enable the leading industrial states to open markets in areas of economic benefit while protecting and/or forestalling the liberalization of those that were and are politically and economically sensitive; and it has offered developing countries the prospect of trade-led growth via the promise (but seldom the realization) of market openings in key sectors (largely agriculture but also textiles and clothing).
- Bulmer and Burch, 1992: ‘Institutions reflect a particular bias, allowing access to some interests while denying it to others and encouraging and highlighting some points of view at the cost of others.’ For Wilkinson, they structure power relations in ways which reflect the particular power configurations of which they are a product, which in turn, privileges the powerful. Deficiency: This is not the case with all institutions, some of which emerge due to community norms and not simply due to the
labeling, marketing, manufacturing, investment policy, competition policy, and many other areas of government authority.

EU problems:

- Democratic deficit: Creating common policies in these areas, in turn, has led to a demand for a range of further institutions to manage their implications. Thus, the European Parliament is a response to the fact that these central institutions of the EU are exercising their powers without democratic accountability – they expressly bypass domestic institutions, and as a result they are not included in the democratic processes that have developed in the states.

- Compliance: Opposition of some members to new provisions do not stop their application for the rest, with the result that the EU does not represent a common set of rules:
  - Euro area and ECB: The Greek financial crisis in early 2010 showed not only that governments find it very difficult to keep their resources within the allowable deficit range of less than 3 percent of GDP, but also that governments will behave strategically and even deceitfully in constructing their spending and borrowing decisions to mask violations of rules.
democracy, the rule of law, human rights; and a normative power - diffusing its norms primarily through example and persuasion rather than hard power.

- Core values are trumped by economic interests when EU sees fit - Common Agricultural Policy defended despite trade distorting effects on farmers in developing countries.

- Robert Kagan: EU’s normative preference for international institutions and the rule of law actually reflects the EU’s underlying military weakness and hence its preference to utilise the institutional frameworks most likely to secure it its preferences on an international level.

- Realists on EU normative power: EU’s selective deployment of peacekeeping troops to the Congo and other African nations represents not a desire to spread its norms but an effort to increase the credibility of the European Security and Defense Policy where the aim can be achieved at relatively low cost and high probability of success (Goldsmith and Poser, 2008) Counter this - why would states still want credibility for the ESDP? Surely, though material calculations are present, there is also a desire to increase credibility of common European norms (human rights) etc. and cause norm diffusion through such credibility.

Intergovernmentalist Theory: Nation state had not proven obsolete but obstinate.

- Moravcsik’s ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ - emphasises a three step model of
  - Liberal theory of national preference formation- National leaders aggregate the interests of their constituencies as well as their own interests and articulate their respective national preferences towards the EU. Ignores how the EU shapes the preferences of both the constituents as well as the national leaders through its normative influence. Participation in the EU, as neofunctionalists and constructivists have written, can shape preferences- thus the combination of domestic and EU effects on preference formation needs to be analysed, not domestic alone.
  - An intergovernmental mode of bargaining: National governments bring preferences to the EU institutions- agreements reflect the relative power of each member state - supranational organisations such as the Commission exert little influence Disagree- EU as actor thesis important here.
These contrasting images of the EU as an international organization or a political system comparable to other domestic systems have, however, been rejected by a governance school, which views the EU as neither an international organization nor a domestic political system, but rather a new and unique experiment in governance beyond the nation-state. Drawing in parts from both comparative politics and international relations, this third approach portrays an EU in which nation-state governments are losing ground to both subnational and supranational actors, raising important questions about the governance capacity and democratic legitimacy of the EU and exploring recent experiments in new governance such as the EU’s Open Method of Coordination (OMC). (p. 358)

Put simply, Moravcsik’s liberal inter-governmentalism is a three-step model combining a liberal theory of national preference formation with an intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining and a model of institutional choice emphasizing the importance of credible commitments. (p. 361)

What makes historical institutionalism distinctive, however, is its emphasis on the effects of institutions on politics over time. In a sophisticated presentation of this strand of historical institutionalist thinking, Paul Pierson (2000) has argued that political institutions are characterized by increasing returns, insofar as those institutions and policies create incentives for actors to stick with existing institutions, adapting them only incrementally in response to changing circumstances. Insofar as political institutions are indeed subject to increasing returns, politics should be characterized by certain interrelated phenomena, including: inertia, or lock-ins, whereby existing institutions may remain in equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political change; a critical role for timing and sequencing, in which relatively small and contingent events at critical junctures early in a sequence shape events that occur later; and path dependence, in which early decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the past, even when the resulting outcomes are manifestly inefficient. (p. 363)
signatories shall attempt to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into the EU's legal framework, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, by 1 January 2018 at the latest

- EU therefore bypassed member state objections (UK and Czech Republic) - IO autonomy important here.

- Verdun argues that this can be explained by historical institutionalism - IO used past experience of building institutional rules on earlier experiences so that they could be operational first temporarily, and then after few years permanent institution could be inaugurated. She introduces the new historical institutionalist terminology ‘copying’ to describe this process. However, she fails to adequately acknowledge IO autonomy here.

Starting from late 2007, ECB president, Jean-Claude Trichet, was already emphasising the need for the European Union (EU) to pursue further economic and economic and financial integration within certain areas (amongst others labour mobility and flexibility and reaching retail banking convergence financial integration within certain areas. Moreover, the Fiscal Compact itself was built on the Six pack and two pack regulations to reform the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary Union. Both these sets of regulations were proposed by the European Commission. Neofunctionalist accounts offer a better explanation.
- Threats to food and water supplies
- Extension of endemic disease areas
- Armed conflict over scarce resources
- Flows of climate refugees
- Global costs of adaptation: $75-100 billion per year (World Bank)

- History of climate Change Regime:
  - Scientists discussed changes to climate due to carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG) since the 1960s.
  - UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization promoted discussions since the late 1970s, and established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988
  - Late 1980s: proposals for binding agreement on curbing GHG emissions
    - Cleavage in debate: US and OPEC vs EU and small island states.

- 154 states signed Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) at Earth Summit in Rio, 1992
  - Signatories declared aim to cut emissions to their 1990 levels and committed to develop national plans
  - Created Conference of the Parties (COP), in effect a new international organisation.

- 155 states signed Kyoto Protocol in 1997
  - Developed countries committed to reduce GHG emissions by 5-10% of their 1990 levels by 2012 (‘Annex 1’).
  - No binding commitment by developing countries
  - Entered into force only in 2005 (required: 55 Annex 1 countries accounting for 55% of 1990 CO2 emissions)

- Negotiations on successor agreement to Kyoto:
  - Various COPs failed (Bali 2007, Poznan 2008, Copenhagen 2009, Cancun 2010)
    - Disagreements: commitments by all countries, or renewal of Kyoto commitments by rich countries first? Funding for developing countries first, or commitments from them first?
  - Doha 2012 COP agreed extension of Kyoto Protocol but only for emissions of Europe and Australia (15% of global emissions); acknowledgement of responsibility for damage caused by emissions.
Almost all countries lose from ozone depletion; distribution problems and relative gains problems less severe | Some countries harmed by warming much more than others; distribution problems and relative gains problems more severe; benefits for future generations

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**Conclusions:**

- Constructivism accounts for norms of environmental protection and equity concerns.
- Domestic politics matters because of social preferences and because of institutional constraints on ratification.
- Comparison of Montreal and Kyoto shows that institutional effectiveness varies depending on factors highlighted by rationalist institutionalism, realism, and constructivism.

**Background Content**

**Paris Agreement (COP 21 outcome)**

- Agreed on December, 2015 and signed on 22nd April, 2016.
- According to the UN's press release, the agreement's "main aim is to keep a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius and to drive efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels." (UN, 2016)
- As well as setting a long-term direction, countries will peak their emissions as soon as possible and continue to submit national climate action plans that detail their future objectives to address climate change.
- This builds on the momentum of the unprecedented effort which has so far seen 188 countries contribute climate action plans to the new agreement, which will dramatically slow the pace of global greenhouse gas emissions.
Particularistic uncertainty calls for adaptive forms of flexibility, which allow certain actors to depart from institutional rules while the institution itself remains stable.

I also identify a distinct form of flexibility, means flexibility, which has both adaptive and transformative properties and therefore provides an especially robust response to uncertainty.

- **Main hypothesis:** uncertainty creates incentives for efficient flexibility, and outline a set of observable implications
- **I also introduce two competing explanations:** that power and compliance costs explain states’ positions on flexibility. A case study of climate change institutions follows. I discuss the major forms of uncertainty in the issue-area and explore the extent to which institutional flexibility has been employed as a response. While the efficient flexibility hypothesis works well to explain the Kyoto Protocol (the institutional outcome as of 1997), it does not explain subsequent changes to the regime whereby enhanced flexibility resulted from more selfish distributive concerns and bargaining power. In other words, while uncertainty and institutional flexibility were evident throughout, the causal link between them breaks down over time.

**Observations:**

1. The issue in question is characterized by uncertainty
2. Actors are concerned with uncertainty as a barrier to cooperation
3. Actors consider flexibility as a solution to the uncertainty problem
4. Actors bargain over the nature of flexibility
5. The institutional outcome is consistent with the prediction, i.e. it is flexible
6. Cooperation problems with greater uncertainty are associated with more flexible institutions, on average

**Uncertainty, flexibility and the road to Kyoto**

- **Different types of uncertainty:**
  - There is uncertainty about the severity of the global warming problem. Models of temperature change, sea-level rise, and other aggregate impacts are still
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<td>Explaining the occurrence of incremental institutional (and sometimes inefficient) changes</td>
<td><strong>Path dependency</strong> helps to explain the emergence of a myriad of institutions that make the IEG system increasingly complex and difficult to change. Through self-reinforcing cycles in path-dependent developments, debates stagnate rather than trigger IEG reform, leading to a “vicious” rather than “virtuous” process</td>
<td><strong>Socialisation</strong>: the institutional context of the IEG system influences actors’ world view and can create the norm to establish—not necessarily efficient—institutions or promote incremental change within the IEG structure</td>
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<td>Explaining the persistence of institutional structures</td>
<td>An analysis of <strong>power inequalities</strong> draws attention to a trust gap between nation states and turf wars among international organisations, which are a key hurdle to change</td>
<td><strong>Calculus approach</strong>: the lack of political will to substantially change the IEG system and incentives to retain the status quo can explain the lack of substantial change in the form of establishment of an international environment organisation</td>
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Historical institutionalism: With the use of path dependency, historical institutionalism helps to explain how incremental changes in the form of a growing number of international organisations create trajectories that make the system more and more complicated and increases the overlap and duplication between organisations. This makes it increasingly difficult to establish an international environment organisation that aims to coordinate the entire system. The fact that not all outcomes of path dependency are “virtuous” can help to
consumption of ODSs was of relatively low social value. Industrial uses such as dyes, solvents, and coolants are not negligible, yet none of them served basic social needs such as food, energy production, or transportation. Second, production of these substances was a negligible part of national economies. CFCs accounted for only 2 percent of the revenues of the largest producer, DuPont (Wettestid, 1999:135). Moreover, by 1981 it was clear that substantial cuts could be achieved at low costs (Parson, 1993:73). In a risk assessment, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1986) estimated the global costs of 50 percent cuts in ODS to be $27 billion, whereas their benefits would be $6.4 trillion in the U.S. alone! Clearly, even rough cost-benefit calculations were in favor of regulations; and they were made possible by undisputed information about the consequences of the problem.

- **Cost of compliance was therefore low:** This is very different from the current problem with climate change. Cost of compliance may be very high for some countries whose whole economics depend on fossil fuel production and exports, such as Saudi Arabia or Russia, as well as major energy consumers, such as Japan or the US. It can explain why all four of these countries did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, either in the first stage or in the second commitment stage.

- **Information about the extent or cause was therefore not as important as information about the consequences when it came to regime formation.**

### The Forests Non-Regime

**Failed efforts at Regime Formation:**

- Regime is deeply fragmented. The global institution that is most directly relevant to forests is the International Tropical Trade Agreement (ITTA), established in 1983 and renegotiated in 1994.

- The design of the ITTA makes it far from adequate for protection of forests, for three reasons. First, the agreement is limited in geographic scope: it covers only tropical forests even though 80 percent of industrial wood comes from temperate and boreal forests (VanderZwaag and MacKinlay, 1996:12). Second, the ITTA is narrow in thematic scope: it is a commodity agreement that regulates trade in timber and largely disregards the ecological functions of forests. Member states have rejected a proposal for certification of tropical timber from sustainably managed forests (ibid.). Finally, the agreement has no monitoring and compliance mechanisms, and the ITTA has no authority to conduct independent reviews of national forest policies.

- Despite repeated talks, no solid outcome establishing a regime has developed.
adopted restrictions on their carbon emissions at Kyoto were either members of the European Union or countries that hoped to become members in the near future, and that it was the immediacy of on-going accession talks that gave the EU leverage in Eastern Europe. Bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force eventually became a European project, and what modest success it achieved relied almost exclusively on European diplomatic efforts. Indeed, we present evidence that countries with secure membership were less pliable than applicants. Consequently, the new members may become reluctant to make further environmental concessions, now that their membership is secure.

**Strengths:**

- Recognizes power of EU as a norm entrepreneur.
Arguments and Evidence:

- **Economic interests can overwhelm even widely held norms:** The norm of environmental multilateralism (NEM) is widely accepted as a principle agreement that the world should act to maintain a healthy and sustainable environment. Deforestation poses a severe threat to the global environment in which the global community should act multilaterally in order to preserve the territories. However, the NEM has not been able to create a deforestation regime that creates and exercises policies for several reasons (primarily) regarding economic reasons. Institutions such as the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) exhibit the norm of NEM and global participation, but it does not implement policies. The UNFF is “internalized”, not “externalized” through this behavior. The global community and nations respond to NEM by creating and funding incompetent institutions that state a purpose, but do not act on it. Developed countries do not want to implement policies that could potentially hurt their economy. Therefore, the UNFF is viewed as a wasteful institution that looks good on paper and to the public, but in reality it is greatly ineffective. The creation of vapid institutions that waste funding and time are examples that not all norms can overcome a nation's economic interests. UNFF causes skepticism and criticism over international institutions because of their ineffectiveness. NEM could undermine the idea and purposes of global institutions. Dimitrov calls these regimes “decoys” because in reality governments do not want to implement policies because of economic interests, but they are accepting the norm. To participate and initially fund an environmental regime, but not be pro-active for the cause exhibits that economic interests prevail over widely held norms.

- **Economic interests cannot sufficiently explain the establishment of the UNFF:** Dimitrov questions why governments create “blank” international institutions, such as the UNFF. He argues that the creation of the UNFF cannot easily be explained by economic interests. Dimitrov presents the possibility that perhaps developing countries want financial incentives to follow forest policies. As much as financial aid might motivate a state, the West will not provide it and refuses to give funds. Deforestation continues to be an issue because developing countries do not want to implement policies without aid from the West, who will not budge on the issue and has not for more than ten years. Foresters also have an economic disincentive to reduce economic benefits from logging: the cost of losing the forests is far lower than the financial benefits of logging it. As much as many states do not want a global deforestation policy, many do. This is because they would be perceived as states interested in sustaining the global environment, but would also be able to increase their logging industry by lower environmental standards than current domestic policies.
The problem is not that there is no norm regarding deforestation, the problem is that a norm has indeed been established and that norm is to create empty international institutions that will ease the “collective conscience” by providing a pretense of working on an issue without giving the institution any real governing power to affect substantial changes.

- It is unclear through Dimitrov’s arguments whether he is saying that no effective norm has been created to deal with deforestation or if he is arguing, as I do in the paragraph above, that a norm of creating decoy institutions has been established. His intentions being so unclear reflects a weakness in his presentation, if not with his fundamental arguments.

**Author to Author**

- *The life cycle of global forest protection norm:* If we analyze the ‘norm’ of international forest protection by using Finnemore’s ‘norm life cycle’ we may be able to figure out why states are not entering into real treaties to protect forests globally. Finnemore would look at the three stages of norm emergence and determine which stage the norm is at to figure out why it is not taking hold. While there has obviously been a ‘norm emergence’ of forest protection since that states are holding conferences on the issue and establishing institutions to ‘deal’ with it, perhaps the norm has not reached its tipping point to move on to the next phase, a ‘norm cascade’. Since states are only establishing institutions that have no real power devoid of any binding treaties then it is safe to say that states are not convinced that this issue is a real norm or a large and important norm. Also, this new norm must compete with many other well established norms such as free trade, economic security, development, etc.

- *Understanding the environment by opposing realism and applying constructivism according to Wendt.* Wendt would argue that the environment is an important issue to the international community because ideas are always important, which opposes realist prescriptions. A realist would ask, “Why do ideas, as opposed to power and interest, matter” (Wendt 74). To them, they would answer this question by saying that only when those ideas have an effect on power and interest. However, Wendt would argue that ideas “always matter, since power and interest do not have effects apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such” (Wendt 74). In Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, Dimitrov’s poses a question at the beginning of his article, “First, why have efforts at regime formation failed?” He is referring to the past 4 failures at creating at an institutionalized effort to produce forest policy. Wendt would argue that these attempts failed because policy-makers do not understand the social structure. Many powerful nations, whether intentional or not, follow a realist prescription that dictates policy in correlation to security and material capabilities. To achieve success, and overcome material capabilities, a nation