According to Djokic, by 1910, the intellectual classes, who were still the principal pool for Yugoslav sympathizers, had grown to approximately 16,000 persons; but this barely represented one per cent of the population of Croatia-Slavonia.\(^5\)

We therefore see how the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy meant that the south Slavs in Croatia-Dalmatia did not strive toward being independent from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but rather looked for a stronger voice within it.

Despite being liberated from the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the south Slavs in Croatia-Slavonia were in a precarious position at the end of World War I, simply because they were on the losing side, meaning that the Allies would not be concerned about their demands and that therefore their fate was not in their hands.\(^6\) Neither the Yugoslav Committee in London, nor the ‘NarodneVijece’ (later joined by the members of the Serbo-Croat coalition), were recognised by the Allies. This situation was very precarious in the first place, and because it was also combined with the fact that the south Slavs in Croatia were looking to claim land that was also claimed by Italians in Dalmatia, recognition was desperately needed. Rusinow points out that the Croats’ primary understanding of Yugoslavism was protection against Italian, Austro-German or Magyar domination.\(^7\) Serbia would therefore act as a counterweight, which could hold the south Slavs in the former Habsburg lands in security. A union with Serbia, who had both recognition and a protective quality, was therefore the ideal solution. Like Rusinow puts it, “only if bound together would the Serbs in the Vojvodina, the Croats in Dalmatia and both of them in Bosnia Herzegovina be able to secure their national

