hand, representation is the normative function of language which is said either to reveal
or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women.’
- ‘The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms.’
- ‘The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion
by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is
extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject.’

PAGE 1-2
- ‘In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before
representation can be extended.’

PAGE 2
- JURIDICAL NOTIONS OF POWER – ‘Foucault points out that juridical systems of power
produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent.’
- ‘the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them,
formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those
structures.’
- The juridical formation of language and politics
- ‘the political construction of the subject proceeds with certain legitimating and
exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively concealed and
naturalised by a political analysis that takes juridical structures as their foundation.’
- ‘Juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent; hence, politics
must be concerned with this dual function of power; the juridical and the productive. In
effect, the law produces and then conceals the notion of “a subject before the law” in
order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalised foundational premise that
subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony.’

PAGE 2-3
- ‘Perhaps the subject . . . is constituted by the law as the fictive foundation of its own
claim to legitimacy.’

PAGE 3
- Suggests that subject “before” the law (in temporal terms) invokes ‘presocial ontology
of persons who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, constitute the legitimacy of
the social contract.’ – ‘Foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject.’
- ‘there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term
women denotes a common identity. Rather than a stable signifier that commands the
assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women, even in the plural,
has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety.’
- ‘gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical
contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional
modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to
separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is
invariably produced and maintained.’
- A false assumption of ‘an identity assumed to exist cross-culturally’.
- Universal “women” demands that the oppression of women has some singular,
universal form – ‘the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine
domination’ – ‘failure to account for the workings of gender oppression in the concrete
cultural contexts in which it exists.’ – only finds examples/illustrations ‘of a universal
principle that is assumed from the start.’
acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no
gender at all.’

- ‘Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective
agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural
fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions – and the punishments that
attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction “compels” our belief in its
necessity and naturalness.’

- ‘Consider that a sedimentation of gender norms produces the peculiar phenomenon of
“natural sex” or a “real woman” or any number of prevalent and compelling social
fictions, and that this is a sedimentation that over time has produced a set of corporeal
styles which, in reified form, appear as the natural configuration of bodies into sexes
existing in a binary relation to one another.’
  o ‘what kind of performance might reveal this ostensible “cause” to be an
“effect”?’

- ‘the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated. This repetition is at once
a re-enactment and re-experiencing of a set of meanings already socially established;
and it is the mundane and ritualised form of their legitimation.’

- ‘There are temporal and collective dimensions to these actions, and their
public character is not inconsequential; indeed, the performance is effected with the strategic
aim of maintaining gender within its binary frame – an aim that cannot be attributed to
a subject, but, rather, must be understood to found and consolidate the subject.’

- ‘gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space
through a stylised repetition of acts.’

- ‘The effect of gender is produced through the stylisation of the body and, hence, must
be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles
of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.’

PAGE 141

- ‘a conception of gender as a constituted social temporality.’

- ‘Significantly, if gender is instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous,
then the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a
performativie accomplishment which the mundane social audience . . . come to believe
and to perform in the mode of belief.’

- ‘Gender is also a norm that can never be fully internalised; “the internal” is a surface
signification, and gender norms are finally phantasmatic, impossible to embody.’

- ‘If the ground of gender identity is the stylised repetition of acts through time and not a
seemingly seamless identity, then the spatial metaphor of a “ground” will be displaced
and revealed as a stylised configuration, indeed, a gendered corporealisation of time.
The abiding gendered self will then be shown to be structured by repeated acts that
seek to approximate the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their
occasional discontinuity, reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this
“ground”.’

- ‘If gender attributes . . . are not expressive but performative, then these attributes
effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal.’

- ‘If gender attributes and acts, the various ways in which a body shows or produces its
cultural signification, are performative, then there is no pre-existing identity by which
an act or attribute might be measured; there would be no true or false, real or distorted
acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity would be revealed as a
regulatory fiction.’