Furthermore, it may be argued that the Korean War was responsible for the shift in American foreign policy attitudes. After World War Two, Korea was split along the 38th Parallel with the USSR controlling the North and the US controlling the South. However, Dean Acheson’s Asian Defence Perimeter speech in 1950 suggested that the US were not interested in Korea because it was of little geographical significance and thus the North invaded the South in 1950. The speed and efficiency of which the North had captured the Southern capital Seoul surprised the American government and it wasn’t until they had taken the majority of the Southern Peninsula that Truman realised that there was a need for US intervention. This would have caused a shift in US foreign policy because of the risk it posed to American interests in Japan. Joseph Dodge’s reverse course plan in Japan had meant that the US government had spent large sums of money not only on economic interests but also on the democratisation and stabilisation of the Nation. Furthermore, Japan was of paramount importance to maintaining peace in Asia and thus there was a requirement to keep Southern Korea Capitalist, else it may influence the spread of Communism in Japan. In 1950, whilst the USSR were boycotting the UN, Truman managed to get a resolution passed which enabled intervention in South Korea. This was the complete opposite of the Asian Defence Perimeter. Although the surprising strength of Communist forces in North Korea sparked a reaction from the US, and led to a change in foreign policy, it cannot be deemed the primary reason because the American government were already concerned with the spread of Communism in Asia.

In addition to this, the events in Indochina could be responsible for the shift in American foreign policy simply because Vietnam was pivotal to the US in halting the spread of Communism in South East Asia. It had become a crucial market for the Japanese economy and the US government realised that it was vital for Indochina to remain Capitalist in order to achieve peace in South East Asia. After all the money it had committed to Japan in the Dodge plan, it was indispensable that Indochina do not turn to Communism because it could severely damage American democratisation attempts by leading to an increase in poverty. This would hence put Japan in danger of “swinging to the left”. However, this may be argued that the US were still in a regional focus in their foreign policy because here they are only concerned with a single country in one continent. Whilst the creation of SEATO was an example of encirclement, these events suggest that America were primarily based around the containment of Communism in South East Asia. Therefore, the evidence suggested does not imply that events in Indochina were responsible for a shift in US foreign policy towards globalism.

After examination of all the evidences, I conclude that although the doctrine of Joseph McCarthy certainly contributed to a shift in US foreign policy, it cannot be deemed the primary reason. Indeed, his suggestions created a “Red Scare” to sweep across America and led to headhunts for Communist revolutionaries. However, there is firmer evidence to indicate that in fact, the election of Eisenhower in 1952 was the principal cause because the new presidency brought a range of new opinions on diplomatic matters. For example, where Truman believed a complete build up on conventional forces was necessary to contain Communism, Eisenhower deemed that a series of strategic security alliances and a nuclear umbrella would be far more effective.