This is my hand. If this is my hand then I am not a BIV so I am not a BIV.

According to the reliabilist, it is only when we ask whether we know that our ways of coming to our beliefs are reliable that the threat of scepticism arises. But knowing that we know is not required for knowledge.

Nozick’s view and knowing that you know
- ‘S knows that p’ does not entail ‘S knows that S knows that p.’
- Nozick admits that there are counterexamples to the KK thesis that have nothing to do with scepticism

Objections to Reliabilism
- There is pressure towards reliabilism and E.E. from the need to eliminate epistemic luck
  (a) Problem of Individuation of Methods
    - The train clock example. Reliable method of looking at the clock when it is noon, but it is just lucky true belief, not knowledge. If you looked at the clock at 11:59 and it showed 12:00 you would have been false.
    - S has a belief that p, formed by method m in circumstance c. S’s belief is true in c. But in c* S’s belief no longer counts as knowledge because it is slightly different and a belief formed by m would now be false. The method is only reliable in certain circumstances. “So the method is “using a certain method in circumstance c.” This is a reliable method. If having a true belief that is formed by a reliable method is necessary and sufficient for knowing that p, the case described in (i) is a case in which S knows that p. Every case of lucky true belief can be seen this way. Reliabilists are therefore unable to distinguish between knowledge and LTB. Given that knowledge must be distinguished from LTB, it follows that reliabilism is false.

  - One possible response of a reliabilist could be that methods of belief acquisition are individuated by their targets.
  - The generality problem
    - The reliabilist must say over what range of situations a method must deliver mostly true beliefs if it is to count as reliable. (Can’t be over all situations because the method would have to deliver mostly true beliefs even in a world in which we are all BIV’s)

  (b) Knowledge vs. reality
    - The knee-tingling—hard to deny this is a reliable method

  (d) The lottery paradox
    - 99.9995% I will lose. Seems reliable. But we don’t know that I will lose or else I would not have bought the ticket.

  (e) Knowledge across other domains
    - Can reliabilism work in other domains aside from external world? Like logic, mathematics, morals, etc??

Semantic Externalism
- The view that our words in our language have the meaning they do in virtue of relations holding between us and our environment (different environment= different meaning) a word means what it is appropriately causally connected to.
- Semantic internalism: the view that words in our language have the meanings that they do in virtue of facts about us which are independent of our environment. (how the ways we use the word relate to our overall behaviour)

Arguing for semantic externalism
(a) Putnam’s first argument from ordinary speaker intuition
  - Ant and Churchill—need for a causal connection between the pattern the any produces and Churchill himself.

(b) Putnam’s second argument from ordinary speaker intuition
  - Planet earth has water (H₂O), twin earth has something in lakes and rivers looks identical to water but is actually XYZ. We are false to call this water. Water isn’t water because it is clear, in lakes, falls from the sky, water is water because of scientific properties H₂O. Reach past the appearances to scientific properties.

Using semantic externalism to respond to scepticism: Putnam’s proof that we are not BIV’s
- Suppose that we are BIV’s, we would be using ‘vat language’, so our word tree would be whatever appropriately causally connected with our envatted uses of tree (tree*), green would be green*our words used would stand for whatever is appropriately causally connected with our envatted uses of ‘tree’

  In particular, if I am a BIV then
  ‘I am a BIV’ is true iff I am a b* in a v*
  But in the vat world, I am not a b* in a v*, but a BIV
  So even in the world in which I am a BIV, ‘I am a BIV’ is false
It follows that ‘I am a BIV’ is *necessarily* false.  
(it cannot be uttered truly, because even in the world you are a BIV, the statement is false when uttered)  
So I can claim to know that I am not a BIV.

*necessarily*: what kind of necessity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition p is</th>
<th>If and only if</th>
<th>Or in terms of the ‘possible worlds’ account of possibility and necessity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemically necessary</td>
<td>P is necessarily true given what we know</td>
<td>P is true in every world that is consistent with what we know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically necessary</td>
<td>P is necessarily true given the laws of nature</td>
<td>P is true in every world which shares its laws of nature with the actual world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysically necessary</td>
<td>P is necessarily true given a right metaphysics</td>
<td>P is true in every metaphysically possible world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logically necessary**</td>
<td>P is necessarily true given the laws of logic</td>
<td>P is true in every logically consistent world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**
- Philosophers pursuing traditional responses to scepticism tried to show how we know we are not BIV’s (that it is epistemically necessary that we are not BIV’s)
- Nozick and those pursuing the response from a counterfactual account of knowledge argue that it is epistemically possible that we are BIV’s but irrelevant to our ordinary knowledge claims.
- Epistemic externalists argue that in order for it to be epistemically necessary that we are not BIV’s it does not have to be epistemically necessary that we know that we know we are not BIV’s.
- Putnam is referring to logical necessity*, his claim ‘I am a BIV’ is logically necessarily false because it is false in every world in which it is uttered.

The objection to Putnam’s claim to have established logically necessary truth of ‘I am not a BIV’
- The argument won’t work for all kinds of sceptical hypotheses. Putnam formulates his argument in very specific terms.

Consider the following sceptical hypotheses:

i. I became a BIV yesterday (your language used refers to actual trees you knew before you became BIV)
ii. I have always been a BIV but I talk to ordinary (embodied) people all the time. My friends don’t tell me I’m a BIV because they know I would be horrified (as a BIV you’ve received the meanings of your words from those you communicate with who are not BIV)
iii. We all became BIV’s 5 minutes ago
iv. I am now dreaming
v. I was created as an already fully thinking and speaking BIV by an intelligent creator who inhabits an ordinary world of tables, chairs, grass, tress, and so on.

**in each case, if you replace these hypotheses with #2 of his argument, it is doubtful that you are in apposition to make the step to #4. It each case it is plausible that brains* are ordinary brains and vats* are ordinary vats so ‘I am a BIV’ is true.

- Putnam’s defense can be to devise the definition of semantic externalism: The view that our words in our language have the meaning they do in virtue of relations holding between us and our environment, in order for my use of a term to stand for objects of a given kind, it must be the case that my dispositions to make statements using the term are causally sensitive to the way matters stand with things of the kind in a way that stretches into both the past and future.

**this still needs modification if every sceptical hypothesis is to be ruled out as logically necessarily false.

The objection to Putnam’s claim that the logically necessary truth of ‘I am not a BIV’ is significant from the point of view of answering the sceptic.

(a) Setting up the objection

For all x, if x is a person and all people are mortal, x is mortal. This is logically necessary. If you exchange all occurrences of this expression with another expression in the same category, the result is still a logically necessary truth.

Putnam’s claim shares none of these characteristics, according to Putnam’s proposal, it is physically possible for there to be conscious beings who are BIV’s, it is just that even if I am a BIV, when I say I am a BIV, I say something false.

(b) Knowing that you are a BIV vs. knowing that ‘I am a BIV’ is false.

- #6 can be reworded as: It follows that ‘I am a BIV is false whenever it is uttered’…in this way it is hard to go from #6 to ‘I know I’m not a BIV,’ (e.g., you can go from “I know that I am here” to “I know where I am”, the second doesn’t necessarily follow.

(c) Humanity and its place in nature

He think we can reject BIV scepticism without claiming that we know any more than the BIV does—this would make a mockery of humanity and its place in nature… we must have ways of knowing about our environment which put us in a position to know things that we would not know if we were systematically deceived—the job of epistemology is to find out how these ways of knowing work.
### Epistemology

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive accounts</td>
<td>Lays down how people acting in accordance with a practice behave—tells how the practice itself is and not whether it is as it should be.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative motivation</td>
<td>Traditional, normative epistemology has failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive motivation</td>
<td>Some of our claims to know are so fundamental that they cannot be either questioned or justified—looking for a normative account of these basic claims makes them subject to assessment, justification or criticism.</td>
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</table>

### Naturalism (moves from normative to descriptive)

- Naturalism about a given question is the view that the appropriate answer to the question either is or rests on account of our place in the world, so naturalism in epistemology is the view that the right answers to epistemological questions are purely descriptive, or rest on purely descriptive answers to other questions.

### Motivation for Naturalism

**Negative motivation:**
- Traditional, normative epistemology has failed

**Positive motivation:**
- Some of our claims to know are so fundamental that they cannot be either questioned or justified—looking for a normative account of these basic claims makes them subject to assessment, justification or criticism.

### Quine's 'Scientific Naturalism'

1. Our words mean what they do because of their connections with our experience AND
2. An account of S could be justified by showing that p is true must take the form of an account of how S's belief that p is justified given what the words in p mean SO
3. If there is any justification of S's belief that p, it must be a justification which shows how the truth of p can be derived from my experiences BUT
4. The enterprise of deriving the truths of ordinary and scientific beliefs from our experience has failed (traditional epistemology has failed)
5. Our ordinary and scientific beliefs are not justified.

Quine says we should give up the search for justification (stop treating justification as a normative notion) and turn to an alternative. Keep (i) and add:

- An account of how S's belief that p relates to S's evidence for p will be an account of how, given the available sensory evidence, S comes to form the belief.—rather than just how beliefs are justified (rational reconstruction/traditional epistemology), you move to a position to explain how we come to have the beliefs that we have because of our sensory experiences.

### Philosophical Naturalism

- Like positive motivation above^^
- There are some beliefs or practices that are so basic that they are not subject to justification or rational criticism.
- This is a compromise position...tries to provide an account of knowledge that is normative down to the basic beliefs that are descriptive...like foundationalism. Some beliefs are so basic you waste time explaining why the belief is held.
- Philosophical naturalists can still try to provide accounts of which non-basic beliefs are justified and which are not by showing which non-basic beliefs can and which cannot be justified in terms of beliefs to which we are committed in this unshakeable way.
- They can still engage in the kind of rational reconstruction that Quine rejects.

How is this different from foundationalism?

- Foundationalists= basic beliefs are self-justifying...they are not justified in terms of our beliefs, they are themselves justified
- Philosophical naturalists= basic beliefs are not subject to justification or criticism.

Quine's motivation is purely negative, philosophical naturalist appeals to both negative and positive motivations.

### Contextualism about Knowledge

- Sentences are context dependent iff their truth conditions vary with context of utterance—what is required for a token of the sentence to be true depends on the situation in which it is uttered. Different kinds of context dependence:
  2. Sentences containing predicates ‘is flat’, ‘is round’, ‘is red’, ‘is tall’
- Contextualism about knowledge is the view that sentences of form ‘S knows that p’ are context dependent.

### Contextualism and Scepticism