January 14th – fall of the president in Tunisia. 11 days following discussing which country and which regime is next, a couple of false starts in this period. January 25th in Egypt is where it all breaks through.

- Protests had been happening in Egypt for a long time, but generally speaking this remained confined to a core of activists or a particular location or workplace. What never happened was the large-scale mass involvement in the protests. It was generally a small slice of society that actually protested in Egypt, until January 25th.
  - This change in protest size on January 25th was likely due to them watching what happened in Tunisia, and the model they had for a successful uprising and revolution. When they call a protest they do not take the regime by surprise in Egypt.
    - Without the example of Tunisia, it’s pretty likely that the protests would’ve continued to have no response in getting more of the public to join their protests. There was no context or political frame prior to Tunisia.
  - Regime was ready on January 25th with security forces blocking Tahrir Square. Alexandria protests go on as well at this time, but the real battle is fought in Cairo. It takes about 3 days as the initial attempts to occupy the square are defeated, but then the protests win and occupy the space.
    - Mubarak goes to the military and the military says they are not going to open fire on their own people. Now Mubarak is with the same dilemma that the Tunisian president dealt with. He tries to negotiate with the opposition but no one really represents the opposition. The only thing they agree on is that Mubarak must go.
  - Assault on the square by thugs – remember from documentary The Square. 18 days go by from there and the army basically removes Mubarak and the revolution happens and everything is awesome lalala.

- This was a generally unprecedented experience in modern Egyptian history; even if people now look back and say that it was just a military coup. Now the floodgates open because everyone concludes that if it can happen in both Tunisia and Egypt then it can happen anywhere.
  - The demonstration effect is truly powerful in this aspect. It was a script for nonviolent political action that seemed to be working, leading to large-scale protests breaking out across the region almost simultaneously.
    - They used the same occupation techniques that were used in Egypt and Tunisia and the same slogans and whatnot, but the protests in each country were being affected by each other in real time, as this was all happening at the same period. There was a lot of solidarity and a lot of diffusion and a lot of passion and expectation of rapid change.
      - Rapid resolution expected, general unity of the public against the bad corrupt regime. Happens quickly and relatively peacefully, and it always succeeds. This lasts for about a month.

- What you don’t see is regimes kind of giving up and this is where the script changes in other countries in the region. The regimes learn from the knockouts in Tunisia and Egypt: they learn to get the military on your side, raise the costs of protests, whatever you do don’t give up, and use violence in response.
  - Libya and Syria are the most extreme of cases where the governments respond with large-scale bloody repression. Libya protests come on February 17th, but Gaddafi starts the bloodshed on February 16th. Gaddafi can do this because he has a mercenary army and they aren’t connected to the people.
  - Bahrain: you have one of the most mobilized protest movements, more than 50% of the entire citizen population out on the streets protesting – they occupy pearl roundabout, talk about unity and democracy etc. regime tried to portray the protestors as Shi’a.
    - Bahrain invites Saudi troops in, and Saudi troops basically clear the square and begin a large-scale campaign of arrests. Massive campaign of oppression and arrests against Shi’a population or those who are suspected to be Shi’a.
Foreign Policy Paper Notes due April 25th:

- 2000 word paper for this assignment, it is due April 25th. The easy way to write this would be to pick something you find interesting and come up with thoughts about them and just write it down. That’s not what Lynch is looking for in this essay.

- He wants you to write a good version of this article and be able to identify what the current state of knowledge and current state of the argument of some issue is, and place yourself in that ongoing conversation in a way in which you can make a good contribution to that ongoing argument.
  - He’s looking for you to be able to show that you have a sense of what exactly is at stake regarding what you are addressing, what did people say about this issue, why did they say it, and why is this not enough for you – why should something else be said? Why do we need another article about something that has been so thoroughly discussed?

- Ideas: nuclear Iran, Arab-Israeli conflict. So much has already been said, so you need to really think about it. Is there a fresh way to frame the question? Everyone asks this question but actually they should be asking this question instead. Everyone thinks the appropriate comparison is this, but actually the appropriate comparison is that.
  - Intervening in Syria, is Iraq the wrong comparison? Look at Northern Ireland for the religious conflict with Israeli-Palestinian issue.

- Another way you can go about writing it is this: I am not going to solve the conflict in such a short paper, but I can look at just a small issue and solve that, such as the return of refugees who lived in Palestine before 1948. Where can I fit myself in and move the ball forward just a little bit?

- Or take stock of a debate as it actually exists. But all the arguments fall into this camp or that camp, and come up with a novel argument from that. Engage with real people making real arguments, actual writers etc. like Pollock says this, Waltz says that. Use footnotes to also get into a debate that actually exists, not some big picture bullshit. How can you extend, contradict, or reframe the arguments that are being made.

- Who tends to get quoted a lot for this issue? Who is the most influential for this issue? Where can you then make your contribution? Footnotes don’t count against your word total.

March 31st Lecture: Israel-Arab Conflict, 1948 – Schwedler, Tessler, Shlaim, Benvenisiti

- Jerusalem was a city and it gave identity to the surrounding area, in ways comparable to Damascus and Aleppo and their identities. So this was part of the Ottoman Empire, yet it still had its own character.
  - They are correct that there was never an independent Palestine there, but it was its own character regardless.

- There was always a Jewish community in Jerusalem however it was not large. There was this deeply held identification with Jerusalem in particular that spread way back. Creating a Jewish state was an idea that surfaced in the 19th century.
  - Zionism and the idea of creating a Jewish state was a minority position in these Jewish communities and it threatened the existence and assimilation of Jewish communities in Germany or France or the UK.
    - Palestine was only one of a number of places considered for a Jewish state, such as in Africa etc. but Palestine had a unique appeal due to the existing Jewish community there and because of Jerusalem.

- Early Zionists tried to convince Europeans to leave and move to Palestine, but they didn’t have much success. There were a series of waves of migration prior to WWI, but they were small. Creating a Jewish state in Palestine was considered by many Zionists to be impossible, given the area and territory and the small population of Jews in Palestine.
  - Most of the political talks at the time centered on having a homeland, not an actual state. By 1922, by the time the mandate is established, the Jewish population of Palestine was only 11%. It was a very small and scattered population.

- How does this very small population become a state? The biggest part of it comes through high-level diplomacy. The leading Zionist organizations of the day persuaded great powers of the importance of them having a state.
really bad alliance partners in this war. Israel’s crucial advantage: Arab failure of coordination and integration of their militaries in the war.

- Israel also had the military advantage of internal lines of communication and resupply, while for Palestinian and Arab side it was coming from many different directions with long line of supplies. Palestinians/Arabs ran out of bullets, food was rotten, etc. Asymmetry of a system of preferences. The Israelis just wanted it more.

April 7th Lecture: Israeli-Arab Negotiations – Kurtzer, Quandt, Sela

- Negotiations between Israel and Arab states are negotiations that are between roughly equivalent entities, as they are all states with recognized international status etc.
  - The main issue that is being negotiated is territory and peace negotiations etc. this is different between Israel and Palestinian negotiations, because Palestine is not a recognized state, and none of the conditions from Israel/Arab negotiations apply.
    - These negotiations are not just about territory but also about identity and cultural history for Palestinians.
- Negotiations are generally about the dispensation of territory conquered by Israel during the 1967 war. The 1973 war largely establishes the balance of power within the negotiations will be conducted.
  - Golan Heights, West Bank/Gaza strip are the conquered territories being discussed. The potential negotiations of the return of these territories and some kind of peace agreement ensued.
- You can negotiate with all of these actors simultaneously, and a grand bargain is reached in exchange for everybody getting peace. Or Israel could do a series of bilateral negotiations, such as negotiating with Syria, Jordan, and Egypt separately.
  - In power terms, #1 in straight forward balance of power terms Israel would generally prefer to negotiate one on one with individual states because it can then maximize its balance of power in the bargaining relationship. Israel would generally prefer to negotiate individually.
    - However the payoff of doing so is that if you negotiate one state at a time you only get an agreement with one state, and the follow through of this bargaining is uncertain. That’s the dilemma from the Israeli point of view post 1973.
- On the Arab point of view it’s a different set of questions. Each state wants different things: they all want their terrirory back, but this isn’t all that they want from Israel. They are also fighting a game of inter-Arab politics and are trying to maximize their power in this Arab community, they have to look at how this plays out in terms of the broader set of inter-Arab politics, especially for Egypt and Syria.
  - They see that if they can unite and bargain together collectively, they would seriously maximize their relative power of bargaining. Yet they don’t trust each other and can’t cooperate together, and they each have powerful individual incentives.
- For Arabs, this is the classic stag-hunt dilemma. Stag-hung dilemma is a hunting party goes into woods and must catch animals to bring back and eat. If they want to feed entire village they have to catch a stag, to have the best chance of catching the stag you need the entire hunting party to work together.
  - Along the way there are rabbits and shit everywhere, if you get a rabbit you can feed your own family, and there is a strong incentive to feed your own family. The village starves, but your own family eats. As time goes on, you get hungrier and more impatient and the temptation to grab a rabbit and go home gets even greater. That’s the structure of the Arab side of negotiations with Israel.
  - For instance with the Palestinian situation, the situation of the west bank was functionally equivalent to the situation of the occupied Golan Heights and cyanide peninsula. Should have been negotiated with return of this territory to Jordan.
    - Yet now there’s an emergence of Palestinian nationalism via the PLO, so from Jordanian negotiating perspective they are faced with a challenge that neither other countries have. In late 1974 an Arab summit meeting issues a resolution that labels the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people – takes away rights of Jordan to negotiate on behalf of the west bank.
  - #3: Palestinian issue is perhaps the stag in the dilemma. Negotiating and creating a Palestinian state could be the defining symbolic center of the Arab identity claims and the terms of which the success of the negotiations will be judged. This is the lasting peace with Israel.
Basically Israel withdraws its forces, Lebanon goes into civil war, and Syria wins by getting Lebanon to become its protectorate. This was ratified by the US in return for Syria helping in Iraq in 1991.

- Israel doesn’t withdraw completely until 2000 when Hezbollah drives it out, but basically Syria is negotiating from a position of domestic weakness and regional vulnerability in the 1980s, but by 1990 it is in a considerably stronger position for negotiations.
  - It has rebuilt some of its relations with the US, its included in the Madrid Peace Conference (Kurtzer book, read it). Syria then is involved in a minimum of 7 solid years of continuous peace negotiations with Israel.

In Syria’s peace negotiations with Israel, it’s a classic negotiation. It got all the way to the point where the only thing separating the two sides was a disagreement of approximately 50 yards or a couple kilometers of the demarcation of the old colonial border.

- Assad wanted to get no less than what Sadat had gotten, which was return of all conquered territory. From Israel’s bargaining position, there was less water in the lake being negotiated hence the 50 yard difference, but regardless this is where the negotiations broke down. The Kurtzer book makes this clear.
- Structure of these negotiations was still a little bit of a stag hunt between the Palestinian track and the Syrian track. What Israeli prime ministers were doing during this period was trying to move back and forth between the two tracks in order to gain leverage on the other tracks.
  - Syrians and Palestinians absolutely distrusted and hated one another, so Israel was in a pretty good position of playing the hunters (Syria and Palestine) off one another.
  - In the 1990s, the expectations game was also going on at this time. Expectations put time pressure on both sides. Palestine had until 1999 to tie things up with their negotiations given the 1993 Oslo Accords. On Syrian side time pressure came from Assad’s health and no guaranteed successor.

- Rabeen deposit – gives Clinton his bottom line, shows how he’s willing to give if Clinton could get Assad to do what he wanted. Problem was Rabeen was killed, and Assad took this as bad faith on part of the Americans.

- Basically over the course of negotiations between Syria and Israel, they agreed for Israel to completely withdraw from Golan Heights, limits on Israeli ability to put military in that area. Basically Syria gets its territory and Israel gets a secure border. A sticking point was whether this would lead to normalized relations or not. One line to fruition is the ever 50-yard lake problem. Assad was a great negotiator, he was patient and had long endurance, but was very single-minded with negotiations.

- When this all fails in 1999, you get all kinds of finger pointing. Syrians blame Americans more than Israelis, Israelis blame Syrians, etc. there’s no analytical consensus on whom to blame, but Lynch tends to blame everybody. A final offer was made, it was rejected, and then Assad died. There have been no meaningful negotiations since.

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**April 9th Lecture: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations – Barak, Inbar, Danin, Eldar, Roy**

- Talk about bargaining and negotiations in terms of negotiations or lack thereof between Israel and the Palestinians. We often think of negotiations as being discreet and that’s not a helpful way to think about this. It makes more sense to view it as an ongoing strategic interaction that often takes different forms.
  - Israel and Egypt were in tension for decades, but there were only a few times where it ended up in war, things have to align perfectly for war to happen. Going to war is extraordinary and risky, but so is moving towards peace. There’s always a risk involved, and one of the big risks is that it might not work, and that it might fail.

- A peace agreement is just a piece of paper. There’s a bargaining phase and an implementation phase of any negotiation.
  - A warm peace versus a cold peace – normal relations are taken as an indicator as whether the treaty will hold up over time. The changing of territories doesn’t matter, it’s about whether the relationship changes, and whether war then becomes impossible to consider in the future.

- The treaty is about the security of land. But look at Israeli Palestinian negotiations and a much broader range of issues is at play. These are issues that an outside force has a much harder time trying to protect.
- Frustration of Israelis for the peace created with Jordan and Egypt, as it didn’t turn into a warm relationship it remained a cold treaty.
1948 partition plan where Egypt has Gaza and Jordan has the west bank, and then in 1967 where Israel has control of both Gaza and the West Bank. You don’t know who is negotiating for Palestinians.

Pre 1967 strategic interactions – the Palestinian/Arab demands are universal in that they want to discuss whether the existence of a Jewish state will continue. The very commencement of negotiations over the position of the west bank involves the Arab removal of its claims for the rest of the Jewish state.

From 1967 until 1993, Israel did not recognize the existence of the PLO in regards to negotiation. It was illegal for Israel to negotiate with PLO, as they viewed them as a terrorist association.

- Jordan wanted the West Bank to go back into the control of Jordan, but with the rise of the PLO, now there was an increase in desire for Palestinian statehood.
- In 1974 with the Rabat declaration, there was a key moment when the Arab League declared the PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinians.

In 1985 there was a confederation agreement between Jordan and PLO regarding negotiations, and in 1987 they came close to really making an agreement for Jordan to rule the West Bank. And then the intifada breaks out.

The intifada breaks out at the end of 1987, it was an unprecedented social movement, and it took everyone by surprise. It shifted a great deal of the political power away from the PLO and back towards the inside, it forced the Jordanians to abandon their claims on the west bank.

In 1988 Jordan repeals its claim on the west bank, and it reveals the cost of the west bank and Gaza for Israel. Prior to the intifada, this was not very costly for the Israelis.

- There weren’t a lot of international costs being paid, or economic costs or violence costs either.
- The mass uprising changes that. This imposes pretty severe costs on Israel, and it suddenly becomes very expensive and brutal. It sees Gaza in ways that weren’t true prior to 1987.

Israeli soldiers are then confronted with what it really means to occupy a group of people. The international media coverage is imposing real reputation costs on Israel in the international sphere, real human and military costs – people are dying on both sides.

It also created a political crisis in Israel, because now the occupation of Palestinians was really controversial until the early 1990s. They were terrified that the uprisings would spread into Jordan.

The promise was that there would be an international conference for a bid for a peace treaty with the Palestinians.

- Palestinians not invited to the Madrid conference, so Jordanians were invited instead. Then the bilateral peace talks convene. Who was going to negotiate for the Palestinians? Look at Kurtzer’s book. The entire negotiations with Israel really represented who was going to represent the Palestinians.
- Jordan umbrella included some Palestinians, but which Palestinians and what role do they play?

For months of the Washington talks, the negotiations were not about refugees or borders or anything else, they were about the shape of the table and who was involved in the negotiations.

- It ended up where the real talks took place on couches outside of the negotiation room. This went on indefinitely. The US broker of the Washington talks never resolved this; it was an issue they could never get past.

It ended by the secret Oslo process, where PLO members met with Israelis secretly to create a new treaty. So without international supervision, the Oslo track becomes the main track.

- September 1993 the declaration of principles, moment of handshake between PLO and president of Israel. It set the frameworks for negotiations. It was not a treaty, but a framework for negotiations. It established the PLO as the negotiator on behalf of the Palestinians.

So now by 1993, PLO represents Palestine in peace talks. Oslo starts out a 5-year negotiation process, in which the issues would be defined, negotiated and resolved.

- Creation of a Palestinian negotiating team was created. But the recognition of identity is a crucial part of these negotiations from the beginning – recognition by Israel of Palestinian nationalism and legitimacy was a big accomplishment.
• Wickham’s piece – embracing of democracy by the Brotherhood over the years. It was not liberal democracy however.
• Typically in your average country the brotherhood would exist as an important part of a broader Islamic sector (Ismail piece).
  o This would include saddafis, the Muslim brothers, Sufi orders, official Islamic sector – state employees, famous high-ranking members of the religious establishment. The brotherhood would end up being a significant part of the broader Islamic sector.
• In Jordan, the brotherhood was not an oppositional movement. It was, up until 1990, actually a core part of the Hashemite coalition.
  o Because it was conservative and therefore resistant to ideas of communism or Arab nationalism, it became one of the foundational pillars on which the regime was built. It held key government ministries (education, health, culture, etc.)
    ▪ This only changed after the temporary democratic opening of 1989. When Jordan makes peace with Israel in 1993/1994, the brothers are against it, and they move to being the official opposition, and then increasingly repressed and barred from public activity.
    ▪ They boycott elections that follow, they found their networks being compressed and crushed, and their embrace of an oppositional political role cost them a great deal.
  o The brotherhood in Jordan today is deeply divided between being active opposition and between those who want to get back to their role in public life.
• In the Gulf you see something very different: in Saudi Arabia there was no Muslim brotherhood (well a formal establishment at least). But they did start staffing the Saudi government; so then over time organizations develop and lead to the awakening in the early 1990s.
  o Not officially Muslim brotherhood, but religious networks formed and come to play an extremely important role in how official Saudi Islam develops, and how political opposition is organized.
  o Similar to situation in Qatar, but the Muslim Brotherhood there dissolved in 1999, because they believed they had successfully Islamized society in Qatar.
• Another template is Syria or Tunisia, where the brotherhood faced really fierce and harsh oppression. They had a strong public presence in Syria, but in 1981/1982 they faced a severe civil war, which almost destroyed their organization completely in Syria.
  o Led to the reconstitution of the brotherhood as a political movement in exile.

April 16th Lecture: Al-Qaeda – Gerges, Farrall, and Hoffman
• Jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, and how they are linked to mainstream Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.
• Al Qaeda is a tiny fringe of Islamism. They speak of a vision of a world where there is an existential profound conflict between Islam and the West where only one can be the victor. This is not a description of the world, as it actually exists.
• Muslim brotherhood is a mainstream minority trying to change things from within. Al Qaeda is a fringe group trying to turn its vision into a reality, and understanding that the reality doesn’t currently exist.
• Al Qaeda comes from the splinters of the Muslim Brotherhood out of Egypt, and they also come from the splinters of Saddafi jihadism, which comes from the Gulf, specifically Saudi Arabia.
  o The Saddafi part is the part that tends to adopt a much more simplified and bipolar existential approach to the relationship of Islam with the rest of the world. It also tends to be more anti-Shia than Muslim Brotherhood Islam is, which is rooted from anti-Shi’ism from Saudi Arabia.
  o Ideologically Al Qaeda is the extreme fringe of the Muslim brotherhood, united with the hardline approach from wahabi Islam, and then this saddafi fringe coming together with this new fringe.
  o Al Qaeda itself started in roughly 1996, and publicly emerged in 1998. Its origins are found a bit earlier than that. The real place it emerges is in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s.
  o After Soviets invade Afghanistan in the 1980s, you see wide jihadist support for the removal of the Soviets from Afghanistan.
• Bin laden is a creature of the Saudi system.

April 21st Lecture: Islamist Politics after the Arab Spring
• In the 2000s, there was a general sense that Islamist movements were doing very well. They seemed to have a greater and greater foothold in areas of informal and formal politics and areas of life.
• Sykes-Picot agreement divided the conceptual greater Syria. The severing of tribal relations, trade routes that had been long established, it became like Iraq but messier.
  o Kurdish concentrations up in one part of the country, a Sunni majority, which exists within this broader multi-ethnic and multi-religious community.
• It didn’t have the same clear sectarian divides that Iraq has. But it is still very diverse and that’s an important part of what Syria becomes. They also have well-established cities, like Aleppo and Damascus.
• King Faisel comes in Syria, before the French kick him out and establishes the French mandate. It is not an easy mandate – there are constant rebellions and challenges to the French elite. It resists the civilizing mission, and the French come to regret it.
  o It is only relatively pacified by the military that comes in from France, until the French suffers in WWII.
• Before the French are a part of it, Syria is a profoundly weak state. It becomes an important arena for which the great powers fight their battles.
  o This was the” struggle for Syria”. Syria was the heartland of these dreams of Arab unity. This is very important. Syria was a prize to be won by colonial powers, it had great normative power and great appeal.
    ▪ Syria in the 1940s-1960s, you had a state that was extremely desirable as an ally, occupied by a central space of Arab politics, but it had a very weak government, relatively limited resources, and a highly dysfunctional political realm.
• The currency of politics in this period was the military coup and the power of politics. The root of power was through the military coup.
  o Military gains power by gaining external patrons, which gives them guns. They are lots of outside takers for this. In order to seize power you had to see the political crisis and manufacturing of it in order to get the public out into the streets.
• Period of United Arab Republic from 1968 to 1971. Syria ceases to exist during this period as it offered itself up in union with Egypt.
• Mid 1940s until 1970, military coups dominated Syrian politics. Throughout most of this, there was a parliament and elections, but it was far from where politics were happening. This changes in 1970 roughly.
  o 1970, after a series of military coups and the 1967 defeat, Assad comes to power. he launches a correctional movement which was an extraordinary successful effort to deal with the problems plaguing all previous regimes.
    ▪ Over time he establishes a stifling form of authoritarian rule. It succeeded to remove popular politics and popular protests and most forms of civil society and political freedoms.
      • This was justified by overcoming the instability of the past, and finally standing up to foreign interceptions and foreign presence.
  o Assad also moved to remove the possibility to the best of his ability of a military coup. Popular mobilization and foreign intervention and military coups are the biggest threat to his power. He decides to coup-proof his military.
    ▪ Coup-proof: getting rid of any officer or general who might pose a political challenge and replacing them with your brother or cousins, whose entire political survival depends on your own survival.
      • These are the people that you trust and no politically independent base other than you. If he dies, and he is removed, all of them die with him.
• There are a couple of challenges to Assad’s rule over the first 15 years of his control of the country. In order of importance: the first comes from the various wars in Lebanon, which exposed the military weakness of the regime.
  o Second: his cousin tries to launch a military coup against him, which is one of the few flaws in the coup-proofing strategy. Someone else in your family could replace you; you just need an Assad at the top.
  o Third: from 1979-1982 he faces a profound challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood, which was a pretty well established political force that appealed to the conservative urban merchant class across the country.
    ▪ There’s rising protests by them, more people in the streets, and the Iranian revolution is spilling chills down the spines of every authoritarian leader in the region. This leads to
- Even when you have the OPEC oil crisis and oil boom, which dramatically increases the price of oil, this hurts the US a lot less than it hurts other countries. A great deal of that money gets recycled through the US financial system. Called petro-dollar recycling.

- Two major US interests in the Middle East were oil, and keeping the soviets out. It was a vital national interest for the US to get rid of soviets. Viewed any challenge to pro-American leaders in the Cold War framework. These were zero-sum politics. Any loss to the US was considered a win to the Soviets.

- The US viewed it extremely important to deny the Soviet Union to disrupt shipping in the Gulf, and to try to deny soviets from allies, and for the US to hold onto their own allies. So they tried desperately to hold onto any American allies. They deployed military to the Middle East whenever there is a challenge to the pro-American allies, ex. Lebanon 1958.
  - If we lose Lebanon, it rebounds to the benefit of the soviets – zero sum politics.

- All of this was done in as indirect an approach as possible. Until 1990, they maintained only minimal active basing in the region. Prior to 1990, the US never had more than 10,000 regularly stationed troops in the Middle East. This was about supporting local partners, holding out the possibility of intervention, but really about strengthening the allied regimes, such as with the Shah of Iran.
  - Allies are Turkey, Iran, Israel, and then small countries like Jordan or Lebanon that don’t really factor into the balance of power. Up until 1972, Egypt is a soviet ally, Syria is a soviet ally, and Iraq is a soviet ally. The strong Arab states are soviet allies, and weaker Arab states and strong non-Arab states are American allies.
  - This was to deny access to the gulf from the soviets, and having Turkey and Iran as major allies is a remarkably good way to geographically and physically denies soviets access to the peninsula.

- Third enduring interest was the security and survival of Israel. It was deeply rooted, bipartisan, and has remained for a very long time.

- Iranian revolution takes Iran away as an ally, but it does not ally with the soviets either. It turns the gulf into the primary focus for security concerns and policy focus giving way to the US to upset the balance of power from its revolution.
  - After 1979 you have the wars in Lebanon and everything, but in terms of military strategy and planning, it shifts from the Israel-orientated cluster to the Iraq-Iran cluster.

- Over the course of the 1980s, you go back eight years, and it is the war between Iran and Iraq. The US adopts an offshore balancing responsibility to this. It simultaneously sends weapons to Iran secretly, and at the same time it tilts increasingly towards Iraq. By the end of the 1980s, they had placed US flags on Kuwaiti tankers as a way to protect shipping in the gulf, and it becomes increasingly direct presence in an indirect way.
  - By keeping the two sides fighting and preoccupied, the US was able to keep stability in the region by keeping them totally occupied. As Iraq becomes increasingly desperate, we are now beginning to take away one of the Soviet allies in the region, because the US keeps moving towards alliance with Iraq. Iraq tilts towards a pro-US position.
    - It pacifies the region and establishes itself as the central dominant force in the Levant, maintains a balance of power in the Gulf, while trying to attract Iraq away from the soviets.

- Soviet Union collapses. The end of the Cold War. This is the moment that Saddam decides to invade Kuwait. The US responds to this by forming a coalition with Egypt, Syria, and the gulf states, with UN authorization, and then bases half a million troops in Saudi Arabia, to operate the first desert shield and then the desert storm.
  - Now you have direct military presence from the US, which you never had before. Plus you have a major Arab coalition aligning with the US, without losing an alliance with Israel. When the war is over, the US withdraws a lot of troops, but also leaves a lot of them in the region.

- Then you get 9/11 that leads to another dramatic shift in US foreign policy. The bush administration decides to become a revisionist power in the Middle East instead of a status quo power. It decides that the status quo in the Middle East was not in America’s interest. By failing to deal with the underlying problems – absence of democracy, rise of jihadist groups – it had created an environment that produced things like 9/11. So it launches a revisionist strategy in the Gulf and the Middle East.
  - You get the invasion of Iraq, between 100-160 thousand troops. But also all of the ways in which the war on terror is understood, conceptualized, and it’s a massive change in the surveillance and intelligence gathering in the region.