• Strains on economy necessitated economic liberalization and support from home and abroad – these trends reinforced perception of Arabism’s failure
• 1980s: Pattern of subregionalism – GCC, AMU, ACC: not much success, apart from some from GCC
• “In the early 1990s, a stale Arab League had become even more discredited as an institutional option for a new era
• 1991 Gulf War had shattered Arabism – let to internal divide – League a casualty
• 1993 Oslo Accords: US played a key role in this unprecedented meeting but domestic and regional forces were also responsible – various motivations for different countries (self-interested)
• The League passed over 4000 resolutions by the 1980s, 80% of which were never implemented
• Failed to regulate inter-state conflicts and disputes between members
• Arab League “brought back from obscurity” by second Israeli infatada and international pressures stemming from 9/11 – but faced even more difficult challenges
• Second Gulf War: Secretary General said that “weakness and disunity” had prevented the League from playing a decisive role in the war's prevention
• Gap between rhetoric and practice
• Refusal to condemn human rights abuses – chemical weapons and genocide in Iraq
• Arab Charter for Human Rights (1994) has not been endorsed by any Arab countries
• 2004 Tunisia Summit proposed by Bush administration

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• 2008 Arab League role in Doha Agreements between warring factions in Lebanon
• Border conflicts can trigger international Arab-Israeli/inter-Arab wards

Algeria/Morocco – 1963 – still affect relations today
First Gulf War (Iran/Iraq): contentious about borders on the Shatt al-Arab waterway
Second Gulf War (US/Iraq) – about colonial border demarcation
Third Gulf War (US/Iraq) – economic and human costs

Ch 5: Husseinbusch
Inter-Arab Politics amidst Supra-State Identity

• Arab League: liberal institutional solution to anarchy: both sovereignty and collective defence
• Failed its first test – coordinated Arab policy on the defence of Palestine: ever since, gap between League rhetoric and state practice
• Resolutions represent the lowest common denominator – no collective action or enforcement means, so dependent upon leadership of strongest states
• Nasser (Egypt) propounded pan-Arabism: to have anti-Arab policies as a leader was to be delegitimized (especially in countries with a politicizing middle class)
Many oligarchies, such as pro-Western Iraqi regime in 1958, were overthrown
Pan-Arab norms of behaviour constrained all states
Nasser's success due to: bipolar world order, Egypt's strength (militarily, economically) and stability afforded him hegemony over other ME powers
For a short time, the core-periphery structure model was inapplicable – disunity of the bipolar powers and (relative) unity of the ME region
• Pan-Arabism was strong enough to use to threaten other state elites, but not strong enough to force a uniform policy across the region – checked by Western military intervention in 1958 when Lebanon and Jordan appeared threatened; as other countries gained strength they could challenge Egypt and reclaim their sovereignty
• Post-Nasser, axis of Syria (most pan-Arab), Egypt (largest) and Saudi Arabia (richest) – equality and trust between individual leaders