mission but, conversely, short-term stability can be purchased at the expense of long-term stability. This is why a sequential conceptualisation of peace-keeping operations does not work.

**E.g Afghanistan and the Opium Challenge.**

On the one hand, illegal opium production in Afghanistan is tied into regional and global networks of processing and trade and was integral to the war economy, benefitting the Taliban and international criminal networks. In the long-run, it was an obstacle to development and stability. In the short-run, waging a counter-narcotics war impacts the country’s economy and has a real effect on people’s livelihoods. This poses a complex and morally uncomfortable dilemma. The innate optimism of liberal internationalism often does not take the possibility of these dilemmas into consideration.

3. **CASE STUDIES**

3.1 **What is the political context and the political/strategic end to be achieved?**

All the challenges presented in building peace after war are characterised by the depth and durability of the political settlement that brought that war to an end. Peace settlements have varied greatly and place limits on the scope of what the operation can achieve. Peace settlements are basically an understanding on who should, within society, access power and resources within society. Ideally, the settlement is inclusive, as this would resolve most of the challenge of peace-building operations.

After the end of Yugoslavian wars, **East Slavonia** was still under Serb control. A UN operation was set up to make sure that this piece of territory would be returned to Croatia by Serbia within 2 years. This was achieved in 1999. The key to success here was the clarity of a political end state: the return of the territory to Croatia and its political integration there. There were not many Serbs still left on this territory, but the few that remained did not raise issues with this integration. The same can be said of **East Timor** – independence from Indonesia. This certainty cushioned problems with disarmament, humanitarian concerns etc.

The Resolution 1244 (1999) on **Kosovo** stated that this piece of territory should have substantial autonomy. This was ambiguous and despite the huge UN presence in Kosovo during and after the operation, there are still considerable unresolved issues in this country today. The Lome Peace Accord was also a non-starter given Nigeria’s reluctance to take a leading role in peace-keeping in **Sierra Leone**, which then discouraged other powers from taking up the task.

**A clear political strategy is necessary and any uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of governance structures will undermine a peace-building operation regardless of its size.** In some cases, operations are launched out of a feeling of humanitarian necessity and urgency and that an operation is launched in full cognisance of the absence of a political strategy.

3.2 **What is the historical context and the psychological climate?**

Success of operations in post-conflict societies depends on the nature of local politics, the history of those societies and the degree of reception by the local people. There is little willingness to engage with societies on their own terms and to understand that