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DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

AND

REINTEGRATION

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One of the criticisms that academia on DDR/SSR faces is that it is very technocratic and that
it ignores the political dimensions
...
DDR and SSR are particularly
political and by ignoring this factor during the execution of exercises, one ignores the
political outcomes as well
...
 DDR  

WHY  DOES  DDR  EXIST?  
Post-­‐conflict,  lives  and  livelihoods  are  torn  apart  and  governments  are  not  in  a  position  to  
deal   with   the   fallout   of   conflicts
...
 It  is  a  fundamental  part  of  how  the  UN  
approaches  post-­‐war  reconstruction
...
 
Moreover,   the   thought   that   the   Soviet   and   American   governments   would   not   longer   be  
backing  up  dodgy  governments  instilled  optimism
...
 
In  Central  America,  such  intervention  had  occurred  as  part  of  a  peace  process  and  mostly  
on   the   invitation   of   the   government   there
...
 There  needed  to  be  some  kind  of  consensus  
in  Somalia  as  a  starting  point
...
  They   included   legal   frameworks,   the   existence   of   trust   in   the  
peace   process   (which   is   generally   hard   to   measure),   a   willingness   of   the   parties  
involved  and   minimum  guarantees  of  security
...
   
 
Second   generation   DDR   was   more   human-­‐centred   and   community-­‐centred
...
 
They  brought  on  board  communities  to  devise  their  own  programmes  that  included  what  
worked   for   them
...
 
 
In  practice,  however,  DDR  is  predominantly  top-­‐down  and  is  still  imposed  by  the  UN  from  
the  outside
...
 
 
The  so-­‐called  ‘Next  Generation  DDR’  tackles  situations  of  minimum  security  and  lacking  a  
peace   agreement,   and   may   be   applied   to   Libya,   Liberia,   Mali   and   the   Eastern   DRCand   other  
countries  where  security  is  minimal  and  where  a  full-­‐blown  civil  war  isn’t  necessarily  being  
waged
...

-­‐ Distrust: in divided societies, for all of the efforts credited with DDR, some decide to
put down their weapons and bury them as an insurance policy
...

-­‐ Physical challenges: the vastness of a territory (Sudan/ South Sudan), the occurrence of
the rain season and other physical impediments complicate DDR
...
War is profitable and warmongers who have profited during conflict for a
long time will hinder efforts to end it
...
Mats
Berdal: ‘weapons always have an economic and a security value for those who possess
them’
...
In such situations, DDR ends up being a process of peace building, which is
not designed to be
...
One of the advantages of winning a war outright is a
strong position to call the shots across the board and to determine the attributes of the DDR
process
...
Coercive
disarmament is not ideal after the experience of Somalia
...
In the end,
patchy disarmament was accomplished, where certain factions were demobilised (in the
South, in Mogadishu) first to their ultimate detriment
...
Arguably this
exercise gave legitimacy to groups that did not deserve it
...

Failure to disarm clans simultaneously - `a recipe for continuous civil war in the country’ –
UN Special Representative, Mohamed Sahnoun
...
Cash for weapons
schemes have been shown to fuel the arms trade in neighbouring states
...

There also needs to be a balance between resources channelled into DDR programmes and
assistance given to victims of warfare
...
Negotiating with such commanders gives them
legitimacy and in many case they are the middlemen between those carrying out the DDR
programme with all the incentives they include and the soldiers who should be the ones
benefitting from the programmes directly
...
Additionally, in some cases, rank and file soldiers have to hand in their weapons
to benefit from the incentives of DDR programmes behind their commanders’ backs
...


DEMOBILISATION  
In   Mozambique   soldiers   were   given   six   months   salaries   and   bonuses,   whereas   in   Angola  
soldiers  got  $15  and  sent  home
...
 Cash  injections  have  limited  efficacy  if  soldiers  are  
likely  to  blow  it  on  commodities  that  fuel  habits  that  came  about  because  of  war
...
  Many   ex-­‐combatants   end   up   in   urban   areas   and  
automatically   fall   back   into   the   same   social   ranks   as   in   the   armed   groups
...
 Demobilisation  and  disarmament  are  sometimes  carried  out  quickly  
to  prevent  ex-­‐combatants  from  recognising  the  bleakness  of  their  future  outside  the  armed  
group
...
  Some   are   not  
run  properly;  in  Somaliland,  soldiers  were  meant  to  be  in  the  camps  for  2  weeks  and  their  
stay   stretched   to   8   months
...
  Communities   close   to  
demobilisation   camps   do   not   feel   safe   and   might   drive   them   to   violence   to   protect  
themselves
...
 Firstly,  reintegration  implies  that  there  is  an  original  structure  that  still  exists  that  
ex-­‐combatants  can  return  to
...
 Soldiers  who  were  taken  
from  their  communities  aged  6  do  not  recall  ever  being  integrated  in  an  economy  to  begin  
with
...
 
 
Secondly,  if  an  ex-­‐combatant  does  not  go  back  to  his/her  original  community,  then  they  are  
relocated
...
 The  resources  to  do  so  are  
unavailable  –  micro-­‐negotiation  is  simply  unavailable  for  every  solider
...
 Resistance  to  the  integration  of  children  is  common  
and   UNICEF   and   similar   organisations   do   not   have   a   particularly   coherent   strategy   to  
counter  it
...
  The   experience   of   DDR   in   Sierra   Leone   (72k  
combatants   disarmed;   71k   formally   demobilised;   55k   re-­‐integrated,   although   not   all   of  
them  finished  the  re-­‐integration  programme),  leads  one  to  question  the  degree  of  efficacy  
of   such   expensive   and   complex   programmes
...
 
 
‘…  We  find  little  evidence  that  UN  operations  were  instrumental  in  facilitating  DDR  at  
the   individual   level
...
’     -­‐   Humphreys   and   Weinstein,   ‘Demobilisation   and  
Reintegration’,  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution,  Vol,  51,  2007
...
  The   flipside   of   this   is   that  
such   governments   are   weak   and   will   not   take   DDR   action   at   all
...
 
Moreover,   the   concentration   of   people   with   the   same   skills   (carpentry,   tailoring,  
hairdressing   etc)   that   were   taught   through   the   DDR   programmes,   was   not   beneficial   to   the  
macro-­‐economy  nor  to  the  livelihoods  of  the  individual  ex-­‐combatants  who  did  this  work
...
   
‘Human  security  as  a  child  who  did  not  die,  as  disease  that  did  not  spread,  a  job  that  was  
not   cut,   an   ethnic   tension   that   did   not   explode   in   violence,   a   dissident   who   was   not  
silenced
...
 

THE  EMERGENCE  OF  SSR  
-­‐
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-­‐
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Roots  in  Easter-­‐European  transitional  states  
Arrived  on  the  development-­‐donor  scene  in  the  late  2000s  
Coincided  with  growing  recognition  of  links  between  security  and  development  
Championed   by   the   UK’s   new   Department   for   International   Development   DFID  
established  in  1997  
In  2004,  the  OECD  published  guidelines  on  core  principles  and  good  practice  of  SSR
...
g
...
Operational  effectiveness  and  efficiency  
Development  of  affordable  security  bodies  capable  of  providing  security  
2
...
Conflict  Legacies/  Post-­‐conflict  reconstruction  
Addressing  legacies  of  past  conflict,  including  DDR  of  former  combatants,  judicial  reform  in  
the   form   of   transitional   justice,   and   tackling   the   proliferation   of   small   arms   and   light  
weapons
...
g  Afghanistan  and  Iraq

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