

of being. He says, "We find the answer to the question; What is Philosophy, not through the historical assertions about the definition of philosophy but through conversing with that which has been handed down to us as the Being of being."²⁷

Being is an ontological entity, undefinable yet an undeniable fact. It is that reality which is hidden as a possibility in every human being which he alone can transform into actuality. In this sense man can also exist but not everyone does actually exist in this sense. When a being is there not actualizing itself, it is called *Dasein*, that is, 'being-in-the-world'. *Dasein* becomes what it is, the possible becomes the actual, only through an active realization by the human being himself.

Jean Paul Sartre views being in his own inimitable way by neither considering it as the origin of consciousness nor believing it to be dependent on consciousness for its existence. Sartre believes that only man is capable of raising question of being but even he can not create it by his consciousness. "Being is already there without reason of justification".²⁸ Sartre talks of two modes of being: Being-in-itself (*L'etre en-soi*) and Being-for-itself (*L'etre pour-soi*). In-itself (*en-soi*) is that existence which is given in an objective situation and no efforts are made either deliberately or out of ignorance to use free choices to actualize one's possibilities. Thus, this quality of being (*en-soi*) belongs to things and to those human beings who live like inactive objects avoiding taking free decisions involving anxiety, distress and responsibility. Being-for-itself (*L'etre pour-soi*) is that existence which is authentic and concrete and which is aware enough to make choices involving responsibility for oneself and for

means that *Dasein* can be in existence, that is, as *Dasein*, because its essential constitution is *Being-in-the-world*".⁵⁹

The human existence is finite and temporal and is full of anxiety of anguish (Angst) created primarily by a fear of inevitability of death. With this realization of certainty of death, individual confronts 'nothingness'. Thus, 'death' is not merely non-existence of human being but is given philosophical importance by Heidegger. Man's existence means 'being for death' and in the progression towards death, human beings take decisions which are risky as any decision can fill the gap between existence and death. Death is thus the capital possibility of *Dasein* since it is the innermost, unrepeatable, non-transferable, irrelative, individualizing, and inevitable possibility of *Dasein's being-in-the-world*.⁶⁰

Heidegger defines basic relationship between human beings and the world as that of care or concern (Sorge). Care is not merely one of the qualities of human beings, it is the totality of human existence. Heidegger also distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic existence, former being a life successful in separating individual potentiality from the impersonal mass of mankind and later being meekly sailing in time without realising one's possibilities. Heidegger also talks of transcendence without any theological connotation. He talks of time-transcendence for the individual from his momentary existence, full of anxiety and preoccupied with death.

*Karl Jaspers*⁶¹ (1883-1969)

subject. The Spaniard *Miguel de Unamuno*⁹⁴ (1864-1936) gave his philosophy a tint of existentialism under the influence of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. He had a pessimistic outlook regarding material world and he appealed for a spiritual revolt. *Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev*⁹⁵ (1874-1948), a Russian bourgeois mystic philosopher and the founder of the so-called “new Christianity” is also considered an existentialist. He believed that the existence of the subject, whose creativity is based on ‘absolute freedom’, is the only reality. *Maurice Blondel* (1861-1949) although not classed as an existentialist, certainly helped in developing a personalistic kind of existentialism.

*Maurice Merleau-Ponty*⁹⁶ (1908-1961) the French Philosopher in his unfinished book, *The Visible and the Invisible*, tried to discuss “Being” in general in the manner of Heidegger. Later on, he developed his thesis on perception, the analysis of which, according to him, can give a clear understanding of the relation between consciousness and the world. His phenomenological study of perception, points out the futility of Science as a theory of the world because only through personal perception a theory can be built. This antiscientific, passionate, personal approach towards the world reminds one of Kierkegaard.

*Albert Camus*⁹⁷ (1913-1960) represents another type of French existentialism which concentrates on the concept of absurd. He believed that the human life has become absurd because of routinised behaviour of human beings conditioned by the scientific technological surroundings. Because of this absurdity of life, he began his philosophical probe by maintaining that, “There is but one truly serious philosophical

NOTES

1. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1967, Vol. 8, pp. 964.
2. Walter Kaufmann (Ed.) *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, New York, Meridian, 1956, 11.
3. Like Martin Heidegger, most of the existentialists do not want to be classified as existentialists, as they are against any type of classification of people as it belittles their individuality. See: Roger L. Shinn (Ed.) *Restless Adventure: Essays in Contemporary Expressions of Existentialism*, New York, Charles Scribners, Sons, 1968, 13.
4. Note 2, 11.
5. John Macquarrie, *Existentialism*, New York, Pelican Books, 1978, 4.
6. Richard Gill & Ernest Sherman, *The Fabric of Existentialism: Philosophical Literary Sources*, New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs, 1953, 3.
7. H.J. Blackham, *Six Existentialists Thinkers*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961, 152.
8. Eugene J. Neehan, *Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study Illinois*, The Dorsey Press, 1967, 38.
9. Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, In Note 2, 289
10. See: Emmanuel Mounier, *Existentialist Philosophies*, Trans. By E. Blow, G.London, Rockchiff, 1948, 2.
11. I.M. Bockenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, Trans. by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, California, University of California Press, 1957, 159.

29. Cited in Note 22, 59.
30. For detail See: Note 28, especially introduction and first thirty pages. Mary Warnock remarked, "The idea of nothingness is central to Sartre's Existentialism", See: Note 22, 93.
31. See: Note 22, 94.
32. Ibid, 94.
33. For a detail discussion of Existence see: Milton K. Munitz, *The Mystery of Existence*, New York, 1965.
34. Note 13, 267.
35. See: Note 18(c), 144.
36. See: Note 5, 66-67.
37. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. By J. Macquarrie and E.S. Robison, New York, Harper & Row, 1962, 67.
38. Karl Jaspers, *Philosophical Faith and Revelation*, trans. By E.B. Ashton, New York, Harper & Row, 1967, 63-66.
39. See: Note 5, 68.
40. For a detailed discussion of these characteristics. See: Note 5, 69-76.
41. For detail see: George J. Seidel, *Martin Heidegger and the Presocratics*, Lincoln, Neb; University of Nebraska Press, 1964.
42. Many concepts dear to existentialism like 'being', 'nothingness' and 'anxiety' have been treated at length in Buddhism. See:
- a. D.T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, New York, Weiser, 2 Vols. 1971.

- b. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. By D.F. Swenson Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1944.
 - c. *Either/Or: A Fragment of life*, trans. by D.F. and L.M. Swenson (Vol.I) and W. Lowrie (Vol.2), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955.
 - d. *Fear and Trembling and the Sickness unto Death*, trans. By W. Lowrie, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1954.
 - e. *Journals*, Edited and trans. By Alexander Dru., New York, Peter Smith, 1959; and
 - f. *The Last Years: Journals 1853-55*, trans. and edited by R. Gregor Smith, New York, Harper & Row, 1965.
48. See Frank Thilley, *A History of Philosophy*, Allahabad, Central Publishing House, 1984, 583.
49. *Ibid*, 584.
50. See: H.J. Paton, *The Modern Predicament: A Study in the Philosophy of Religion*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955, 120.
51. Note 13, 281.
52. Note 22, 12
53. Martin Heidegger's major works are:
- a. *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E.S. Robinson New York, Harper & Row, 1962, and London, SCM Press, 1962.
 - b. *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. by J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund, New York, Harper & Row, 1966.

allowing over oneself to see possible choices, and thereby avoiding responsibilities and the anxieties of decision making.

90. Although in 1946 Sartre criticised Marxism in an essay in his journal-*Les Temps Modernes*. The essay was later on translated as *Materialism and Revolution*. The major criticism of Marxism according to Sartre was to be found in inner contradiction in the concepts of dialectics and materialism. In 1957 Sartre's writings were published under the name of *The Question of Method*, which shows liking of Marxism and in 1960 came, *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*, which firmly established Sartre as a unique Marxist.
91. See: E.M. Burns, *Ideas in Conflict*, London, Methuen & Co., 1963, 298.
92. See: Note 22,13.
93. See: Note 2,22.
94. The important work of Miguel de Unamuno is *The Tragic Sense of Life*, trans. by J.E.C. Fitch, New York, Dover, 1957.
95. The important works of Nikolai A. Berdyayev are:
 - a. *The Beginning and the End*, trans. by M. French, New York, Harper & Row, 1957.
 - b. *The Destiny of Man*, trans. by N. Duddington, New York, Harper & Row, 1960.
96. The important works of Maurice Merleau Ponty are:
 - a. *The Structure of Behaviour*, trans. by A. Fisher, Boston, 1963.
 - b. *The Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by C. Smith, London, 1962.