- generous tax incentives to encourage foreign investment. p100

Cogan and McDevitt (2000) listed the following factors: *
- fiscal policy, *
- national wage agreements, *
- SEM, *
- EU structural funds, *
- institutional learning, *
- foreign direct investment, *
- human capital, and *
- demographic trends p100

<u>ART10</u>: "the beginning of Ireland's latest and most spectacular boom–bust cycle can be dated back to the incoming Fianna Fáil administration of 1987, which implemented a swingeing austerity budget immediately on taking office to bring the decade-long problem of the country's large foreign debt under control. This turned the economy around much faster than most had predicted, laying the foundations for the <u>boom years that began in 1994 and lasted, with a brief decline in 2002, until 2007.</u> While most accounts of the Celtic Tiger period have focused on the policies that helped bring it about (such as the success in winning high levels of foreign investment, the ways in which EU structural and cohesion funds were spent to support the boom, and the role of social partnership in engineering a consensus between employers and the trade unions)," p71

"The following section examines in more detail how the changing political priorities of parties in power helped undermine the foundations on which the boom was initially built, focusing particularly on the role that property development began to play from the early 2000s, and how virtually the entire national banking system came to be implicated." p71

"namely the ways in which the productive economy relates to the society – in other words, the relationship of the regime of capital accumulation, whether in private or public hands, to that of distribution. Both **<u>accumulation and distribution rely centrally on the relationship of state and market and for this reason they constitute a political economy model</u>**." p74

"What interested policy makers and observers abroad in the Irish model – particularly in regions such as central and eastern Europe and Latin America, which had shared many of Ireland's development problems – was that it seemed to contradict key tenets of the dominant neoliberal development prescriptions actively promoted by the World Bank at the time. Viewed from a distance, they saw the Irish state as having played an active role in winning high levels of foreign investment in cutting-edge high-tech sectors, thereby upgrading the industrial and services economy and coordinating policy making between the main stakeholders through social partnership, resulting in a spectacular increase in living standards and employment. This appeared to offer a new state-led road to successful development, one able to manoeuvre deftly amid the pressures and threats of globalisation" p74

" the two parties that ran the state at the height of the boom, Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats" p81

"It is almost certain that, had the parties that made up the left-of-centre coalition from 1994 to 1997 been re-elected in the general election of 1997, **very different policy priorities would have shaped the Irish model, with greater emphasis not just on market regulation, but also on social investment, with the goal of greater social equity**. Not only would **<u>this have helped avoid the collapse of 2007</u>,** but it would have created a very different Irish society, one less obsessed by growth for its own sake and more attentive to the need to manage growth carefully. The choice made by the electorate in 1997, confirmed in 2002 with the re-election of the FF–PD coalition and partly confirmed in 2007 with the re-election of FF as the largest party but the rejection of the PDs, places the focus on the third dimension of any political economy model, the role of civil society" p82

<u>ART8:</u> "The current crisis might bring into question the assumption that being outside the EMU does not mat- ter for supervision. Indeed, the role of the Central Bank as the lender of last resort, which has been highlighted by the current situation, has also put in evidence the need for the **Central Bank to exert a closer control on the banking and financial institutions**." p131

ART9:
"In response to the Eurozone crisis, European Union leaders have undertaken a number of dramatic reforms, including the **imposition of a new regime for fiscal governance of Eurozone Member States**. The 2012 Fiscal Compact Treaty, one of the lynchpins of this package of reforms, **<u>requires states to incorporate judicially enforceable balanced-budget rules into national law.</u>** This article explores this effort to judicialize austerity in the European Union.." p379

"The Eurozone crisis exposed, in dramatic fashion, the inadequacies of the economic governance regime put in place when the Euro common currency was created." p379

"Of course, fiscal rules had been part of Eurozone governance from the outset. The Maastricht Treaty, which created the original legal framework for the Eurozone common currency area, <u>had established limits on deficit and debt levels for Eurozone states</u>.5 In 1997, to strengthen and reinforce these fiscal supervision and enforcement provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union <u>adopted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).</u>6 However, this “Maastricht regime” of fiscal governance <u>left the enforcement of these rules mostly up to political actors in the Commission and Council—with a limited role for European courts.</u> The Maastricht Treaty began to break down in the mid-2000s and was abandoned altogether in the midst of the crisis.7” p380

"First, **the Maastricht Treaty included a no- bailout clause** (Article 104b, now Article 125 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), which stipulated that neither the Community nor any individual Member State could bailout (i.e., assume the debts of) another Member State.20 Second, the **Maastricht Treaty required that Member States avoid excessive government deficits,**21 and put in place a detailed, punitive excessive deficit procedure.” p384

"So, Germany and other lender countries faced a choice that was not simply between providing bailouts to governments of peripheral Eurozone economies or not providing bailouts. Rather, it was a choice between bailing out peripheral governments or bailing out their own banks that were exposed to bad debt in those countries. **For countries like Germany and France, it was politically more palatable to bail out debtor countries than to let them default and then have to bail out their own banks.**40” p389

"There could be no bailouts without conditionality, so the EU money came with legally enforceable strings attached. At the behest of Germany and other lender countries, the European Union put in place a new regime of Eurozone fiscal governance.” p390

"Finally, on January 30, 2012, twenty-five member governments agreed to the terms of the **Fiscal Compact,48 a new intergovernmental treaty outside the scope of EU law.**49 This treaty was tied to the European Union’s new bailout regime because EU states could only qualify for support from the European Stability Mechanism if they ratified the Fiscal Compact.50” p391

"As in other policy areas, the European Union is seeking to make up for its lack of a strong centralized administrative apparatus or large central budget by leveraging domestic courts to pursue its policy objectives.” p392