First published 1998
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Smith, Anthony D.
Nationalism and modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism/Anthony D.Smith
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Nationalism. I. Title.
JC311.N5388 1998
320.54'01–dc21 98–18648
CIP

ISBN 0-203-16796-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-26302-2 (Adobe eReader Format)
0-415-06340-X (hbk)
0-415-06341-8 (pbk)

For my research students

from whom I have learnt so much

of the contemporary field. On the other hand, to have given each of these trends their proper attention would have doubled the length of the book, or required another volume. In the end, I compromised by focusing on four major trends, briefly describing their contributions, with special emphasis on their theoretical relevance or lack of it to an overall understanding of nations and nationalism.

A book of this scope required some clear parameters, if it was not to become unwieldy. I have confined myself, for the most part, to analysis of perspectives and theories of *nations and nationalism,* concentrating on books in the first place, and using articles only where they seemed to provide more succinct and accessible statements of the theory. The one exception to this focus was the need to introduce, in Part II, sections on *ethnicity,* because for primordialists, perennialists and ethno-symbolists, ethnic identity and community is a major point of reference and a vital building-block for theories of nations and nationalism. I have excluded, as far as possible, separate analysis of other major sources of cleavage and identity–racial, gender, class and religious–except where these sources are invoked by the theories of nationalism themselves; not because I thought them unimportant or irrelevant but because to have treated them in any depth *in their own right* would have muddied the primary focus of the book and greatly extended its scope and length. In this respect, it was necessary, in the interests of clarity of focus and purpose, to hew close to the chosen path. Similarly, I have omitted the many important and fascinating normative debates which have developed over the last decade in political science and international relations, over the compatibility or otherwise of liberal democracy with mainly civic forms of nationalism. Once again, limitations of space and the desire to focus on explanatory theories precluded consideration of these debates.

I am all too conscious of the many other omissions, to some of which I allude all too briefly in the text or notes. The relationships between nationalism and such developing fields as migration, diasporas, post-colonialism, neo-fascism, genocide, ethnic cleansing, minority rights and multiculturalism–all much-discussed topics today–I have had to leave on one side. My reasons, apart from considerations of space, are twofold. First, I felt that serious examination of the contribution of these topics would have deflected attention from the book's main purpose, the description and evaluation of explanatory theories of nations and nationalism. Second, while analyses of these issues are vital and immensely valuable in their own right, it is by no means clear that they can further the task of explaining the origins, development and nature of nations and nationalism, or that they seek to do so. It seemed therefore advisable to exclude them from this theoretical survey.

I am also aware of failing to give due space to all the theories considered here, and of having done less than justice to the views of some authors. Once again, I have had to be selective and concentrate on the main representatives of each major approach in the field. If this has meant that I have treated cursorily, or overlooked some contributions–which is inevitable in a field that is expanding

Introduction

The modernist paradigm

A single red line traverses the history of the modern world from the fall of the Bastille to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Emerging fitfully in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England and Holland, it rises bright and clear in late eighteenth-century France and America. Dividing and redividing lands and peoples, it stretches the length of Central and Latin America, pushes across southern, central, eastern, then northern Europe into Russia, India and the Far East, and then winds its way in many guises into the Middle East, Africa and Australasia. In its wake, other protest and terror, war and revolution, the inclusion of some, the exclusion of many. At last, the red line becomes blurred, fragmented, faded, as the world moves on.

The name of the red line is nationalism, and its story is the central thread binding, and dividing, the peoples of the modern world. Though its forms are many, it is all one red line. The story of its progress is one of emergence and decline, the rise and fall of nations and nationalism. Historians may differ over the exact moment of nationalism's birth, but social scientists are clear: nationalism is a modern movement and ideology, which emerged in the latter half of the eighteenth century in Western Europe and America, and which, after its apogee in two world wars, is now beginning to decline and give way to global forces which transcend the boundaries of nation-states.

The rise and decline of nationalism?

At the outset, nationalism was an inclusive and liberating force. It broke down the various localisms of region, dialect, custom and clan, and helped to create large and powerful nation-states, with centralised markets and systems of administration, taxation and education. Its appeal was popular and democratic. It attacked feudal practices and oppressive imperial tyrannies and proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and the right of all peoples to determine their own destinies, in states of their own, if that was what they desired. Throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries, nationalism was found wherever native elites fought to overthrow foreign imperial and colonial administrations, so much so that for a time it seemed indistinguishable from popular democracy. But already by the mid- to late nineteenth century, imperial and colonial rulers

understanding of these elusive and protean phenomena has been greatly enriched and deepened. We can envisage, at least, combinations of elements from the main paradigms in the field, which in turn may generate some fruitful historical and comparative research programmes for the elucidation of the most vexed issues in the field.

empathy, still others of interest aggregation, political religion and systems of mass mobilisation. But each subscribed to the idea, and ideal, of the nation as a mass participant political culture and as a popular civic-territorial community, into which, as Bendix's work in particular demonstrated, ever wider strata of the territorial population were drawn through processes of employment, mass education and citizenship. This emphasis on civic participation was indicative of the modernism of their outlook. For it was only in a 'modern', i.e. both recent and industrial-bureaucratic, era that a high level of political participation by the masses was possible; and so it was only in the modern era that nations could flourish and become the sole political actors and units of government. The modern era was the first era in which self-government of the people could be conceived and achieved (see Bendix 1996).[14]

Equally important, this was the first era in which self-government was essential. It was necessary because the nation was the ideal agent and framework for social development, and the modern era was the first era in which sustained social development could take place. This in turn implied that nations, and nation-building, were functional for social development. In a non-developmental era, there was no need, no room, for nations. On the contrary: traditional religions acted as barriers to the formation of both nations and the desire for social change and development. With the erosion of traditional religions and the rise of nations, national self-government was the only way to harness the social and political resources necessary for social development. Hence the first aim of nation-building must be to secure the independence necessary for citizens to participate in political decisions and govern themselves. Without independence, as Engels had realised long before, there could be no sustained economic development, because there could be no real commitment and self-sacrifice demanded of those who were not masters of their own destinies (Davis 1967).

Modernism and perennialism

Behind this immediate model stood the larger paradigm of classical modernism. Broadly speaking, it contended that:

1 nations were wholly modern—modern in the sense of being recent, i.e. since the French Revolution, and in the sense that the components of the nation were novel, i.e. part of the new age of modernity, and so modern by definition;
2 nations were the product of modernity, i.e. their elements were not only recent and novel, but also could only emerge, and had to emerge, through processes of 'modernisation', the rise of modern conditions and modernising policies;
3 nations were therefore not deeply rooted in history, but were inevitable consequences of the revolutions that constituted modernity and as such tied to their features and conditions, with the result that, once these features

From a logical standpoint, however, these dichotomies underlie many of the positions adopted by theorists of nationalism. As such, they demand clearcut choices between the polar types, or a conscious decision to combine elements of each type. In each case, the logic of these paradigms and their dichotomies requires the theorist to clarify the arguments and produce the evidence that has led him or her to adopt a particular standpoint in the debates about nations and nationalism.

The modernist paradigm, and its nation-building model, became the standard orthodoxy by the 1960s, at a time when functionalism was dominant and when even its critics stressed the role of classes, elites and leaders in the processes of modernisation and nation-building. Scholars as different in their theoretical persuasions as Elie Kedourie, J.H.Kautsky, S.N.Eisenstadt, W.C.Smith, Peter Worsley and Ernest Gellner all adhered to the modernist paradigm, and stressed the role of active participation, elite choice and social mobilisation in the building of modern nations, factors which Karl Deutsch and the communications theorists had popularised. Whatever their other theoretical and ideological differences they all agreed that the age of nation-states was recent and modern, that modern conditions provided fertile soil for the formation of nations and that nationalism was one of the more successful ideologies of modernisation.

In the following chapters I propose to examine in more detail the main varieties of classical modernism—sociocultural, economic, political and ideological—as they were developed during the 1970s and 1980s. In these different versions, classical modernism reached the limits of its explanatory power and heuristic utility, and ultimately exhausted its possibilities, paving the way for critical movements which carried with them the potential for its dissolution.

2 The culture of industrialism

Perhaps the most original and radical statement of classical modernism was that of Ernest Gellner in the seventh chapter of *Thought and Change* (1964). In that chapter, Gellner outlined a new theory of nationalism that focused on the effects of processes of uneven global modernisation. Likening modernisation to a great tidal wave that sweeps over the world from its West European heartlands, hitting successive areas at different times and rates, Gellner traced the rise of nationalism to the new role of linguistic culture in the modern world. Traditional role relationships in villages and small towns had been shattered by the effects of uneven development, many villagers had been uprooted and driven towards the great, sprawling cities, and their lifestyles and beliefs had been largely destroyed. Dislocated and disoriented in the anonymous city, the new impoverished proletariat of uprooted peasants no longer possessed anything on which to rebuild communities and stave off anarchy except language and culture. In the new urban setting, language and culture replaced the village and tribal structures of role relationships as the cement of society. Hence the growing importance of a critical and ambitious intelligentsia, the producers and purveyors of these linguistic cultures. But it was also incumbent on everyone to become literate as well as numerate, to be a 'clerk' so as to become a citizen and 'an acceptable specimen of humanity'. That in turn required a new kind of schooling, mass, public, standardised schooling, supervised and funded by the state. The size of the education system was directly related to the scale of nations.

But there was another side to uneven development. Not only did the tidal wave erode traditional role structures, it also generated social conflicts in the swollen cities. Conflicts between the waves of newcomers and the urban old-timers, between the urban employed in the city centres and the underemployed proletariat in their shanty-towns on the edge of the cities. Such conflicts were usually social–class conflicts between the propertied and educated and the destitute and illiterate masses. But in some cases social conflict became ethnic antagonism. This happened when the newcomers, the uprooted proletariat, were visibly different, had entirely different belief systems and customs, or spoke unintelligible languages. In such cases the urban old-timers resorted to cultural exclusion and ethnic job reservation. In these circumstances, the intelligentsias on both sides of the cultural divide were able to turn ethnic conflicts into nationalist movements demanding secession from the

this in turn requires a large-scale public mass education system funded and controlled by the state. It was only with the onset of modernity that these conditions could be realised, and they explain why the modern era is *ipso facto* an age of nationalism.

This remains a powerful and relevant thesis, which seeks a deep and underlying cause for the impregnability of nations and the recurrence, and proliferation, of nationalisms in the modern world. But it is not without its problems. We might start by asking, with some historians, whether there is indeed such a phenomenon as 'nationalism-in-general', as opposed to the specific varieties, or even instances, of nationalist movement. Gellner counters this objection by elaborating his own typology of nationalisms, and by delineating a general or pure (ideal) type to which particular instances more or less approximate. Of course, this still leaves open the question of whether a particular instance, or even a whole group of instances, should properly be subsumed under the general concept. But the very fact that the participants and their opponents generally do subsume their activities under an overall concept of 'nationalism' testifies to its analytical necessity and utility.

More important is the problem of causation. One might well conclude that nationalism is, in some sense, functional for modern, industrial society (on a variety of grounds), but this in no way explains the origins and spread of nationalism. This is not just a question of the logic of explanation. It is borne out by empirical observation of cases where the movement of nationalism quite clearly antedated the arrival of industrialism. In Serbia, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, West Africa and Japan, to take a few cases at random, there was no significant industrial development, or even its beginnings, at the time of the emergence of nationalism. In Denmark and Australia too, where development occurred through the modernisation of agriculture rather than through industrialisation, nationalist movements emerged in the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries respectively. In the most striking case–Japan–the Meiji rulers sought to inculcate nationalist values and myths in order to modernise a country emerging from semi-feudal isolation. Even in the West–in France and Germany–nationalism became a powerful force before the onset of industrialism, though it coincided with the first movements towards modernisation.[6]

In Gellner's theory, it is the logic of industrial social organisation that determines the movement from 'low' to 'high' culture and the rise of nations. There is even the suggestion that nations and nationalism are the outward appearances of much deeper structural changes, and can be reduced to those changes. This impression arises out of Gellner's polemic against the self-image of nationalism. It is not nations that constitute the underlying reality waiting to be 'awakened' by nationalist Prince Charmings; it is the cultural homogeneity required by *modern* industrial social organisation that becomes visible as nations and nationalism. Nations and nationalists are, on this view, devoid of independent activity and volition; rather they constitute the *form* of industrialism, the way in which its workings become manifest in the phenomenal world.

This raises a further question. Given the plurality of routes taken by different

prepared to the en masse for the *patrie en danger*? Is the sacrifice for the fatherland really a defence of an educationally sustained high culture? The problem becomes even more acute in authoritarian states–especially for non-dominant ethnic communities–as we have been so often reminded in recent years.[9]

It is perfectly true that modern citizens invest a great deal of time and effort in their education. But that of itself cannot explain the often intense commitment and passion for the nation which characterises so many people in all parts of the world. Public education is certainly strongly bound up with personal advancement, but the links between individual career paths and loyalty, let alone self-sacrifice for the nation, are far from clear. Even investment in their linguistic education by an intelligentsia cannot fully explain the ardour of their nationalism.

Nationalism and public education

In Gellner's second theory the mass, public system of education is given the fundamental task of instilling ardent loyalty to the nation in its citizens and sustaining the high cultures necessary for industrial societies. That was very much the role assigned to the new standardised system of mass education in the French Third Republic. In an effort to train and inspire a large number of fervent citizens after the great defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, the republican leaders devised a universal system of mass public education based on a standardised curriculum, especially in 'national' subjects like literature, geography, history and physical education. In history, for example, the standard textbook by Lavisse was circulated for all French schoolchildren at various grades, and its message of French grandeur and territorial integrity became an important element in French national consciousness for succeeding generations. There were similar attempts to forge a national consciousness through mass public education in newly independent national states such as Japan, Turkey and Nigeria.[10]

There is little doubt that the leaders of new states (and some older ones) have taken the civic role of public education very seriously. But those that have done so with the greatest fervour are in most cases the leaders of nationalist regimes. These public, mass education systems and their values are the product, not the cause, of the nationalist movement once it has come to power. If we retrace the genesis and course of these nationalisms, we find that the first nationalists in each designated population, those that proposed the category and championed the cause of the nation-to-be, are not–cannot be–the product of the national mass, public education system which at that point in time had not come into being. In fact, they are more likely to be products of a traditional village education or of some other system of public education–usually of a colonial or imperial variety–within 'their' territories, or of both. In addition, they may have had some access to the education system (or its products) of another, usually distant national state through travel, reading or the mass media. Partly through a desire to imitate and compete with such systems, the first

peasants and understanding co-nationals, and of hostility between them and the bureaucrats who do not share the low culture.

There is, in fact, plenty of evidence that it is these low cultures which inspire such ardent loyalties. Thus the culture of the Czech-speaking peasants was not that of the earlier Bohemian aristocracy, nor was the Finnish culture continuous with that of the Swedish-speaking upper class minority. The links between Ukrainian peasant culture and that of Kievan Rus many centuries earlier are equally obscure, as are those between Slovak peasants and their shadowy heroic ancestors over a millennium earlier. In all these cases, it is the 'low' culture of the peasants that has triumphed and become institutionalised as the new high culture of these East European national states.[14]

This is one variation of the Gellnerian model. The other is where a new mass high culture is a modernised version of an older elite high culture, as in France and Poland, Japan and Ethiopia. Here we may wonder whether it is the needs of industrialism that explain and underlie the new high culture, or whether the shape and content of that culture is not better explained as derived from the old elite high culture of a dominant *ethnie*. That such pre-modern elite high cultures are modernised, their concepts developed, their vocabularies extended and their forms streamlined is obvious question. The point at issue is how far the modern, mass public culture of the national state is a modern version of the pre-modern elite high culture of the dominant *ethnie*, or how far it simply uses 'materials' from that culture for its own quite different, and novel, purposes (see Fishman *et al.* 1968, 1972; Edwards 1985).

As we saw, Gellner returns several times to this question. Each time he suggests a range of scenarios: some degree of continuity with the old low or high culture; obliteration of the pre-modern culture; interested selection from its themes and motifs; radical transformation of its elements; indeed, the invention of pre-modern cultures and the almost random use of some of its cultural materials—as he puts it: 'any old shred or patch would have served as well'. This is all part of the repertoire of nationalism and its cavalier use of the past.

The 'uses of history' model has its attractions. Historical precedents may be useful for nationalist rhetoric, as well as nationalist reformers who want to push through painful new measures to strengthen the nation. Historical *exempla virtutis* may also serve the purposes of nationalist moralists, teaching the heroic virtues of 'our ancestors'. The past can undoubtedly be put to good use and serve as a quarry of cultural materials for didactic illustration. In each case, the 'national past' serves the preoccupations, needs and interests of present-day leaders and followers, as is evident in the many territorial claims made by nationalists everywhere. In this Gellner subscribes to the modernist view of the past being shaped by present needs and circumstances (see Gellner 1997, ch. 15).[15]

But can 'the past' be ransacked in this way? Is it composed only of *exempla virtutis,* moral tableaux worthy of emulation? And can nationalists make use of ethno-history in such instrumental ways? That they have tried to do so, sometimes successfully, is not in dispute. Tilak made use of several themes and events of the Marathi and Hindu Indian pasts, including the warrior cult of Shivaji, the

involvement as it gathers pace. This is one of nationalism's most successful self-images. But it can also be misleading and Eurocentric. The 'trickle' of scholarly circles of ethnic rediscoverers may suddenly break out into a flood, or the political movement of subelites may antedate the cultural revival, while intellectuals (as creators of ideas) may appear later on the scene. This latter scenario can be found in the Eritrean and Baluch struggles for independence, where only later was there any attempt to give cultural substance to an essentially social and political movement of liberation from oppression. Nor can we always count on the movement involving 'the masses'. To some extent this depends on tactical considerations of the leaders. Galvanising the 'people', beyond rhetorical appeals, may jeopardise middle-class interests or it may involve distasteful recourse to religious symbolism and uneasy compromises with traditional elites in order to mobilise strata with subordinate roles and traditional outlooks for the nationalist cause.[10]

Nevertheless, even if the east European pattern is not universal and cultural nationalism sometimes occupies a subordinate role, at least initially, it can still be convincingly argued that for a new nation to achieve lasting popular success and maintain itself in a world of competing nations, intellectuals and professionals have an important, perhaps crucial role to play. Beyond the immediate needs of propaganda, advocacy and communications, the intellectuals and intelligentsia are the only strata with an abiding interest in the very idea of the nation, and alone possess the ability to bring other classes onto the platform of communal solidarity in the cause of autonomy. Only they know how to present the nationalist ideal of autoemancipation through citizenship so that all classes will, in principle, come to understand the benefits of solidarity and participation. Only they can provide the social and cultural links with other strata which are necessary for the ideal of the nation to be translated into a practical programme with a popular following. This is not to deny the importance of other elites or strata like bureaucrats, clergy and officers, who can exert a powerful influence on the cultural horizons and political directions of particular nationalisms. But, whereas such 'leading classes' may vary between and even within movements at different times without endangering the success of the movement, the pivotal role of professionals and intellectuals must remain constant or the movement risks disintegration.

When intellectuals and professionals split into rival nationalist organisations fighting each other, the whole movement is weakened and jeopardised (see Gella 1976; A.D.Smith 1981a: ch. 6; Pinard and Hamilton 1984; and more generally, Gouldner 1979).

Internal colonialism

Some of the same class insights and structural problems can be encountered in a very different variant of socioeconomic modernism. But, with Michael Hechter's reading of the recent revival of ethnic sentiments and nationalist movements in the industrialised West, we move even further away from the original Marxist basis of so much socioeconomic modernism.

> or mineral. The movement of peripheral labour is determined largely by forces exogenous to the periphery. Typically there is great migration and mobility of peripheral workers in response to price fluctuations of exported primary products. Economic dependence is reinforced through juridical, political, and military measures. There is a relative lack of services, lower standard of living and higher level of frustration, measured by such indicators as alcoholism, among members of the peripheral group. There is national discrimination on the basis of language, religion or other cultural forms. Thus the aggregate economic differences between core and periphery are causally linked to their cultural differences.
>
> (*ibid.*: 33–4)

This (internal) colonial situation, as the product of external forces, reveals a further important difference with the endogenous development found in Europe and Japan: the development of a 'cultural division of labour'. Thus:

> colonial development produces a cultural division of labour: a system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed on class lines. High status occupations tend to be reserved for members of metropolitan culture; while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom of the stratification system.
>
> (*ibid.*: 30)

For Hechter, cultural distinctions have become increasingly important in an age of mass literacy and education; but the social conditions of modernity which encourage individuals to band together as members of ethnic groups are problematic. What is clear is that, in contrast to class relations in the advanced core, the backward periphery is characterised by status group solidarity. The reason for this difference is ultimately political:

> The persistence of objective cultural distinctiveness in the periphery must itself be the function of an unequal distribution of resources between core and peripheral groups.
>
> (*ibid.*: 37)

That unequal distribution of resources is in turn a function of the control exercised by the ethnic core over every aspect of the periphery's social and economic life, and its refusal to lower the barriers to incorporation and acculturation of the periphery. In which case, the reverse situation may later develop:

> if at some initial point acculturation (sc. of the periphery) did not occur because the advantaged group would not permit it, at a later time acculturation may be inhibited by the desires of the disadvantaged group for independence from a situation increasingly regarded as oppressive. This accounts for the cultural 'rebirths' so characteristic of societies undergoing

Ethno-regionalism

This is a powerful and persuasive thesis. It places the revival of nationalism, and the persistence of ethnic ties, firmly within the transformations of the whole social structure, deducing these outcomes from the situations to which those changes give rise. It correctly predicts the continual resistance of smaller ethnic groups situated at the margins of large states to the pressures of modern state and capitalist penetration. It demonstrates how those very processes of penetration necessarily engender sharp political reactions on the part of the besieged peripheral communities. Moreover, it offers a two-stage historical account, in terms of, first, political conquest, and then economic subordination, to account for the backwardness, exploitation and neglect of the periphery for the development and benefit of the core and its elites.

But how well does the model of 'internal colonialism' fit the many instances of exploited and impoverished regions in the industrialised West? Take the case of Brittany. Here, until the 1980s, we find a relatively neglected region, designated in the 1962 Debre Plan as part of the western deserts to be turned into 'parklands'. Without proper communications and infrastructure, Brittany showed all the signs of a depressed region and 'internal colony', reinforced by decades of cultural discrimination and disdain by the French core. However, as more and more Bretons compared their plight with other French regions, Brittany in the 1960s began to witness a revival of Breton culture and a renewed Breton political movement, with some violent fringes, to redress the situation; and this in turn helped to change French policy towards redevelopment of the region (Reece 1979; A.D.Smith 1981a: chs. 1, 9).

But, if Hechter's model illuminates the situation in depressed regions like Brittany and Ireland, what of more divided and more affluent regions like Wales and especially Scotland? Do they possess all the features of 'internal colonies'? Hechter is conscious of the difficulty, both at the theoretical and the empirical levels. In a note, he weighs up the question of how many of these features internal colonies must exhibit (*ibid.*: 33, n. 1). As far as Scotland is concerned, he acknowledges that the region does not depend on a single primary product, nor suffer from a lack of services. This leads him to amend his thesis by distinguishing a special 'segmental' division of labour from the more usual 'cultural' division of labour. In a segmental division of labour, ethnic 'members interact wholly within the boundaries of their own group'; and as a result, 'group members monopolise certain niches in the occupational structure'. The point, of course, is that regions like Scotland retained 'considerable institutional autonomy' since the Union, and so cannot be regarded as proletarian nations or depressed internal colonies *tout court* (Hechter and Levi 1979:263–5).[11]

The introduction of an alternative type of division of labour marks a considerable advance, but it has serious implications for Hechter's original model. By separating the cultural division of labour from the spatial relationships of core and periphery, it makes it possible to analyse the consequences of cultural stratification *within* regions like Wales, with its progressive industrial south and

> If collective action is facilitated when the individual members of a group share common interests, then why does it occur so rarely? How can we explain why some people in the same structural position are free riders (Olson 1965), while others are not?
>
> (Hechter 1988:268)

This for Hechter is the chief merit of the rational choice approach: while giving due weight to structural constraints, it starts from a methodological individualism that seeks to explain collective outcomes in terms of individual behaviour. It thereby avoids the recourse to explanations of ethnicity and nationalism in terms of historical regression, and explains why individuals act as they do, often against our structural expectations.[13]

> Rational choice considers individual behaviour to be a function of the interaction of structural constraints and the sovereign preferences of individuals. The structure first determines, to a greater or lesser extent, the constraints under which individuals act. Within these constraints, individuals face various feasible courses of action. The course of action ultimately chosen is selected rationally: ... Where individual preferences are assumed to be known, transitive and temporally stable, behaviour can be predicted in the face of any combination of circumstances.
>
> (*ibid.*: 268)

For Hechter, ethnic groups are, in principle, no different from any other type of group, and therefore demand no special theory. People join ethnic groups or nationalist movements because they think they will receive a net individual benefit by doing so.

> In this regard, ethnic organisations are critical for two basic reasons. First, they are the major source of the private rewards and punishments that motivate the individual's decision to participate in collective action. Second, because the individual's benefit/cost calculation depends in part upon his estimate of the probability of success of any collective action, organisations can play a key role by controlling the information available to their members.
>
> (*ibid.*: 271)

Such organisations are solidarity groups, and ethnic organisations are particularly salient examples. They mould the preferences of their members by applying sanctions to deviant individuals (such as free-riders and criminals) and by controlling the information that comes to them from outside the group–as, for example, the Amish communities in Pennsylvania, or the Gypsies in many lands, have done for generations (*ibid.*: 275–6).

Hechter and his colleagues have applied this solidaristic theory of social order to a number of topics. Here I can only consider the two most immediately relevant

Nationalism, in turn, Giddens regards as primarily a psychological phenomenon:

> the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising communality among the members of a political order.
>
> (*ibid.:* 116)

But nationalism *per se* is not at the centre of Giddens' concerns. It functions only insofar as it reinforces the territorial cohesion and reflexive qualities of the nation-state. It is the nation-state in its unique administrative, military and territorial properties that commands his attention:

> The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.
>
> (*ibid.:* 121)

In other words, what distinguishes the nation-state from other polities, and nationalism from earlier kinds of group identity, is the rise of stable administration from fixed capital cities over well defined territories of territory. Before the modern epoch, genealogical myths and religious symbols contributed to the normal exclusionary forms of 'tribal' group identity. In the modern epoch, in contrast, nations were formed through processes of state centralisation and administrative expansion which, through the reflexive ordering of the state system, fixed the borders of a plurality of nations. This leads Giddens to characterise the 'nation-state' as 'a bordered power-container…the pre-eminent power-container of the modern era' (*ibid.:* 120).

For Anthony Giddens, as for Eric Hobsbawm and others, nationalism is intimately linked to the modern state. Indeed, it is only insofar as it is linked to the state that Giddens considers it to be sociologically significant. While he regards nationalism as primarily a political movement associated with the nation-state, he recognises its important psychological dimensions, and notes its definite symbolic content in which the 'homeland' is tied to

> a myth of origin, conferring cultural autonomy upon the community which is held to be the bearer of these ideals.
>
> (*ibid.:* 216)

This symbolic content is often grounded on 'historicist' arguments such as those advanced by Herder, and it can lead to more exclusive or to more egalitarian versions of the concept of the nation-state. Similarly, national symbols such as a common language can provide a sense of community and hence some measure of ontological security where traditional moral schemes have been disrupted by

for state power, even one with fixed borders: it refers also to a distinctive culture community, a 'people' in their 'homeland', a historic society and a moral community. The desire for political autonomy in a fixed territory is a vital component of nationalism, but it is very far from exhausting its ideals.

Nations and the inter-state order

The centrality of political institutions was also recognised by Charles Tilly in his work on the formation of national states in Europe. Tilly's focus is the state and its activities, rather than the nation, 'one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon' (Tilly 1975:6). Yet he also distinguished between those nations that were forged by the economic and military activities of modern states, mainly in Western Europe, and those later nations that were created, as it were, 'by design' by diplomats and statesmen through international treaties following long periods of protracted warfare, as after the Thirty Years' or Napoleonic Wars. Though such a distinction implicitly suggests a role for the idea of the nation advanced by statesmen, intellectuals and others, Tilly gives this idea no independent status. For Tilly, it is the modern state that is sociologically paramount and always historically prior; the nation is merely a construct, dependent upon the state for its force and meaning, and is treated adjectivally. Certainly, the deliberations of elites—military, political and intellectual—exerted a profound influence on the political map of Europe and overseas, but always within the context of an inter-state system whose members are in a continual state of competition and hence conflict (Tilly 1975: Conclusion).

This inter-state system emerged in a Europe perennially at war, a Europe unable to refashion the Roman empire. Its protected geographical position and multiple groupings, its urban wealth and conflicts between lords and peasants, as well as the military and economic effectiveness of the state form, prevented any one state emerging as hegemonic overlord of the continent. For Charles Tilly, it is, above all, war that 'makes the state', just as it is the state that 'makes war'. War is the engine of state-making, and hence at one remove of national formation. But, after warfare has left the parties exhausted, diplomacy is called in to fashion a new international order of 'national states' in accordance with the balance of power between the leading states, first in Europe and then globally (Tilly 1975: Introduction, Conclusion).[5]

A more recent exposition of the primacy of political institutions can be found in the work of Rogers Brubaker. He argues that the conventional 'substantialist' accounts of nationalism reify the nation and treat it as an enduring collectivity. Far from regarding nations as real communities, which are stable and enduring over time,

> we should focus on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalised cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening, and refrain from using the analytically dubious notion of 'nations' as substantial, enduring collectivities. A recent book by Julia

Breuilly includes middle-level bureaucrats, officers, professionals, traders and intellectuals. In other cases, disaffected and poorer aristocrats or members of the lower clergy provided the vanguard of the nationalist movement, notably in parts of Eastern Europe. At times even the peasants and workers have been drawn into the nationalist cause, though left to themselves manual workers tend to place class solidarity above the nation, as Marx and Engels claimed. However, nationalism has flourished among peasants in certain revolutionary situations in Asia and Africa, just as it has drawn in workers wherever their trade unions have formed the main parties of opposition against the colonial authorities. Workers have also tended to become nationalistic wherever labour competition between workers of different ethnic groups has become acute, as occurred in late nineteenth-century Bohemia. But perhaps the most striking example of working-class adherence to nationalism occurred in the two world wars, though we should remember that, despite the high rate of workers volunteering for battle, it was the leaders of the trade unions in France, Germany and Britain, much more than their rank and file, that acceded to the bourgeois summons to war in 1914 and again in 1939 (*ibid.*: 36–46).[11]

Professionals and intellectuals are often thought to have played a pivotal role in nationalist movements. Given their discursive skills, status interests and occupational needs, professionals have been particularly strong adherents of the nationalist cause. Yet, claims Breuilly, it would be a mistake to see nationalism as the politics of professionals, if only because their positions in the hierarchies of status and power have kept the majority of professionals neutral and apolitical. Similarly with the intellectuals, who are often held to be the central proponents and adherents of nationalism. John Breuilly readily concedes the importance of intellectuals to political movements in general, and is prepared to allow that nationalist ideologies with their claim to speak for the whole nation hold special attractions for those who value both intellectual abstraction and their autonomy from sectional interests. At the same time, such abstraction and autonomy are the hallmarks of all modern ideologies; and intellectuals like others are subject to all kinds of social constraints and must operate within pre-existing political networks. It would be wrong, therefore, to characterise nationalism as the politics of the intellectuals or any other social group. It is to the politics and political contexts of social groups rather than their ideas that we must look to grasp the nature and functions of nationalism (*ibid.*: 48–51).[12]

If nationalism cannot be seen as the politics of intellectuals, does this mean that ideology is unimportant? With certain qualifications, concludes Breuilly,

> ideology can still be regarded as a powerful force which was essential to the work of co-ordination, mobilisation and adding legitimacy to what was carried out by a nationalist movement.
>
> (*ibid.*: 70)

However, the claim to link cultural distinctiveness to the demand for political self-determination had to be related to specific interests, and it worked only in

particular sorts of political situations. The fundamental situation was that of modernity. The modern era of capitalism, bureaucracy and secularism saw a growing split between 'state' and 'society', the growth of an absolutist realm of politics on the one hand, and of a private realm of 'civil society' on the other. It was this yawning chasm which various ideologies sought to bridge and to which nationalism offered a pseudo-solution, by holding up a vision of the community defined simultaneously as the cultural and the political 'nation' of theoretically equal citizens. At this point, Breuilly takes Herder's arguments as representative of what he regards as the essentially historicist vision of nationalism. For Herder, language was thought and it only developed within the context of social groups. Thought, therefore, like language, was group-specific and unique; so was every other cultural code–dress, dance, architecture, music–in tandem with the society in which it developed. In its original state of nature, as created by God, each nation is both unique and 'authentic'. The task of the nationalist is clearly to restore his or her community to its natural, authentic state. But this can only be done by realising the cultural nation as a political nation, thereby reintegrating what modernity had sundered. Hence the call for national self-determination, which means reintegrating society with the state, by securing for each unique nation its own territorial state. Only in this way can authenticity be restored and the community, i.e. the nation, realise its distinctive self and its true inner values (*ibid.*: 55–64).

Breuilly regards the historicism of nationalism with deep suspicion insofar as it makes a specious leap from culture to politics by a sleight-of-hand redefinition of the unique cultural nation as the political nation of citizens. At the same time, he concedes that nationalism sets out to tackle a real problem: the split between state and society which modernity opens up. In an important and original passage, he seeks to show how that attempt, although flawed, exerted great power over the masses through the development of a uniquely concrete symbolism. The quality that sets nationalism apart from other ideologies is its unabashed celebration of the community itself.

> Nationalists celebrate themselves rather than some transcendent reality, whether this be located in another world or in a future society, although the celebration also involves a concern with transformation of present reality.
> (*ibid.*: 64)

Breuilly illustrates this self-referential quality through the powerful example of the Afrikaner myth of the Great Trek and the Day of the Covenant, recalling the 'deliverance' of the Boer farmers at the battle of Blood River in 1838. The symbolism of liberation and victory was successful in mobilising a sense of Afrikaner destiny (though not immediately of political unity) a century later, when the Ossawatrek was instituted through a re-enactment of the Great Trek. Here, according to Breuilly,

would-be gods inevitably wreak havoc on themselves and their peoples, and destroy all hope of peace and a stable international order (see also Dunn 1978: ch. 3; Viroli 1995).

Despite these claims, Kedourie succeeds in offering a general framework for the understanding of nationalism which, at certain points, even manages to evince a degree of sympathy with those who embrace nationalism. That overall framework is the diffusion of ideas under the impact of a discriminatory colonialism. Kedourie sees nationalism as a disease transmitted through travel and reading from its sources in the West; yet he acknowledges that intellectuals may all too easily succumb to the disease because of the unenviable position in which they find themselves. With many an incisive example, Kedourie illustrates their predicament: their fervent embrace of an apparently superior civilisation with its ideals of impersonal merit and impartial justice; their subsequent bitter disappointment on finding themselves excluded both in the metropolis and at home; their tendency to see in their individual rejection the impotence of their people to which racial discrimination in the imperial bureaucracy lends credence; their ensuing self-doubt and identity crisis; and their search for a political solution to their alienation. This tendency to exclude the meritorious Western-educated non-Europeans from the higher echelons of the colonial bureaucracy is well documented, as is the accompanying self-doubt and ambivalence of the intellectuals; indeed, these same intellectuals and professionals can experience similar frustrations in the West itself, for example, in Quebec, where they are in the forefront of Québécois nationalism (Pinard and Hamilton 1984; cf. Wallerstein 1965; Crowder 1968; Gouldner 1979; A.D.Smith 1981a: ch. 6).

But is this diffusionist framework helpful in accounting for the rise of nationalism in Africa and Asia? Diffusionism in itself is always theoretically inadequate; it can never account for the *reception* of ideas that are transmitted from one centre to another. We may accept the Western origins of nationalist ideas, but is that in itself sufficient to explain the emergence, let alone the content, of nationalism in a given colony or state outside Europe? Can we derive the rise of an Arab or Indian nationalist movement from the political self-assertion of a few intellectuals whose discontents have found a political outlet in the idea of an Arab or an Indian nation? Granted that intellectuals are necessary to such movements, at least in their inception, are the latter mere products of their ambivalence and discontent, and is their nationalist thought always merely derivative? (see Chatterjee 1986).

The general picture that Kedourie paints is one in which traditional societies are pulverised and regimented by colonial modernity, leaving the intellectuals as the only social group able to respond to the onslaught. On the other hand, Kedourie admits the persistence of traditional elements, when he analyses the ways in which these intellectuals seek to manipulate the atavistic emotions of the masses and to use or revive their traditional practices. In fact, as we know, colonialism's impact was highly variable. For one thing, it very much depended on the nature and policies of the colonial power. Where the French, for example, tended to assimilate an African or Indo-Chinese elite, leaving the rest of the

population uneducated and second-class citizens, the British colonial authorities preferred a policy of 'indirect rule', working with and through traditional but subordinated indigenous authorities. We also have to take into account the variable presence of missionaries and the impact of missionary education in uprooting indigenous beliefs and customs. These are only some of the reasons why many traditional elements–ways of life, customs, beliefs, symbols, myths–persisted in varying degrees in Asia and Africa, even after decades of colonial rule (Crowder 1968; Markovitz 1977; cf. Horowitz 1985).

Now, the important point about colonial rule is that it provided, *in relation to pre-colonial cultures and social structures,* the crucible in which nationalist movements emerged. In other words, the genesis and development of nationalism in, say, Nigeria, Kenya and India must be located, not simply in the diffusion of Western ideas through conspiratorial cells of restless indigenous intellectuals who have returned empty-handed from the West, but in the interests, sentiments and aspirations of a variety of social and cultural groups in colonial India, Kenya and Nigeria. These social and cultural groups are partly formed by the activities of colonial officials, traders and missionaries, but they are also derived from pre-colonial ethnic communities and polities, and from traditional social strata like chieftains and traders, tribal chiefs and Brahmins, which have taken on a new life in the colonial setting. We cannot understand the specific nature of Indian, Kenyan or Nigerian nationalisms without taking into account the cultures and traditions of these communities and strata. Kedourie indirectly admits this, but sees the process as one-sided, a manipulation of the inert masses by messianic elites; whereas, in fact, the cultural resources and ethnic outlooks of peasants and traders, tribesmen and lower castes, also helped to shape the particular versions of nationalism that emerged in these colonies.[6]

The failure to treat seriously the social and cultural conditions in which nationalism emerges in Africa and Asia stems not only from Kedourie's diffusionism, but also from his psychologism. In fact, his overestimation of the power of ideas is closely linked to his belief in the universal need of human beings to belong to a stable community. It follows that, if such communities are undermined, human beings must immediately look for alternative sources of collective stability. At this point, the nation appears, like some *deus ex machina,* to fill the gap and assuage the pain of their disorientation. A new idea gives birth to a new type of community at the very moment when the old ideas of religion and the traditional forms of community are undermined.

But all this assumes, first, that human beings must belong to stable communities, and second that the nation is indeed a wholly new kind of community and has no links with traditional communities. Now, it may be true that many human beings prefer to live their lives in stable communities, though, given the variety of such groups in the modern world, their collective identities are likely to be multiple and cross-cutting. But it should not be inferred from this that all human beings always prefer stability to change, and tradition to the ability to join or even form their own communities of choice. This is as much a generalisation open to challenge as the nationalist idea that all human beings

the social constituencies of millennialism and nationalism are quite different. Millennialism appealed to the least educated, the poorest, most peripheral and most downtrodden strata, whereas more ambitious, educated, urban classes formed the backbone of most nationalist movements, even when they sought to draw other strata, lower down the social scale, into the movement (A.D.Smith 1979: ch. 2).

It is noteworthy that the French Revolution figures only as a legend and an example in Kedourie's analysis, despite the fact that, already in 1789, let alone 1792, French nationalism was the first fully fledged example of secular nationalism in Europe, and that it directly evoked nationalist responses wherever the Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies penetrated. This means that, both ideologically and socially, the 'progressive' urban bourgeoisie is excluded from the picture, to be replaced by the authoritarian, organic and millennial nationalism of Central and East European intellectuals, as Hans Kohn had already proposed. But it is not only in France that the educated urban classes, including the bourgeoisie, took up the nationalist cause. We find them in the vanguard of the movement in places as far removed from each other as Greece and Tartary, Japan and India, Mexico and the Gold Coast. Nor is the movement they espouse in the least bit apocalyptic or millennialist, even if it often centres on a messianic leader. On the contrary, it is firmly grounded in the realities of the present situation, even when it seeks to change them for the better. In this respect, most nationalisms conform much more closely to what Kedourie calls the British 'Whig doctrine of nationality' of which he approves, than to the 'Continental' unitary doctrine of nationalism, which he so heartily detests (Shafer 1938; Kedourie 1960: ch. 7; Kohn 1967a: ch. 7; Gildea 1994: ch. 3).

So neither at the sociological nor at the ideological level, can nationalism be compared with, or derived from, millennialism, whether of the medieval or of more recent varieties. They belong to different worlds of thought and action, and are divided not just by 'modernity' but, more radically, by the particularism of ethnic history, culture and territory.

The religion of history

Millennialism seeks to abolish the past, and replace it wholly by the future. Nationalism, in contrast, seeks to fashion a future in the image of the past. Not any past, of course; only an authentic past, the genuine past of a people in its homeland. It is this past that must be rediscovered and resurrected to provide a blueprint of the community's destiny; for only through a real understanding of the ethnic past can national regeneration succeed.

Now, for Elie Kedourie, the past is mainly a cultural resource to be politicised so as to mobilise and manipulate the sentiments of the masses. The cult of the 'dark gods' likewise functions as an instrument of mobilisation and activation. In this respect, Kedourie differs from other modernists. They see religion and history as, at best, quarries from which various cultural elements can be appropriated to give legitimacy to, or emotional support for, radical social change.

colourful rhetoric and slogans of some intellectuals are at best decorative extras, 'icing on the cake'. In other words, nationalist intellectuals are important only to the extent that they articulate and help organise fundamental popular sentiments, perceptions and attitudes which derive as much from pre-existing symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions on which the intellectuals draw for their ideologies of the nation, as from the needs of the modern moment.[16]

Ideology is undoubtedly a key element in the widespread appeal and success of nationalism. It serves to unify and focus the many grievances and aspirations of different social groups within a particular community or state, and to explain to and activate 'the people', wherever circumstances and technologies permit. But these ideologies are not simply the product of intellectuals, nor are most intellectuals, even those who are caught between competing cultures, free-floating and disoriented, nor are most of them able to exercise the kind of influence that Kedourie attributes to them. The same is true of their ideas, which are effective in society to the extent that they mesh with pre-existing popular notions and collective memories. Only then can they mobilise large numbers of people to demonstrate and march, join movements and even fight for the liberation and unity of their nation. Only then will people put aside their daily cares and overcome their fears for a time to struggle for some improvement in their lot. Only the most extreme ones dismissed apocalyptic visions and only minorities are likely to be attracted to their exponents.

But nationalism is a majority movement, not in the purely numerical sense (after all, most people do not join political organisations, at least not for longer periods) but because in every continent the nation has become the norm of political organisation and nationalism has become the main legitimating belief system. It is unlikely that this state of affairs would have obtained if it were simply the product of deranged intellectuals operating in a social vacuum created by modernisation, or that the mass of the people who adhered to their traditional religions and cultures could have been seduced by such visionary fantasies to create a world of nations.

6 Invention and imagination

The year 1983 saw the publication of two seminal books for the study of nationalism. The first, entitled *The Invention of Tradition,* contained a series of essays on a variety of political rituals, and was edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, with an introductory chapter by Hobsbawm. The second, by Benedict Anderson, under the title *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* put forward some general hypotheses about the development of nationalism in various parts of the world, together with some case studies. Both books stemmed from a Marxist tradition, but sought to move beyond its usual concerns with political economy into the realm of culture by reworking and supplementing them with themes drawn from the analysis of narratives and discourse developed by 'postmodernist' deconstructionism. In both cases, this led to a reading of the nation and nationalism as a central text of modern times, which needed to be unmasked and deconstructed. For both, nations and nationalism are constructs and cultural artefacts; the task of the analyst is to uncover their forms and contents, in order to reveal the needs and interests of those elites and strata which benefit or use their narratives. Hence, in both books a modernist project is overlaid by 'postmodernist' themes and language. The implications of this for the modernist paradigm of nationalism will be explored later.[1]

Inventing nations

Nations as 'invented traditions'

In his introduction to *The Invention of Tradition,* Eric Hobsbawm put forward some general propositions about invented traditions, national traditions and the nation. His message was that we can best understand the nature and appeal of nations by analysing national traditions, and that national traditions are one kind of invented traditions. If we could understand the genesis and function of invented traditions, we would be in a position to explain national traditions and therefore nations. What is an 'invented tradition'? Hobsbawm defines it as follows:

rather than 'fabrication'; in this vein he speaks of the 'inventions of the imagination', to include both national communities and their modes of representation in plays, novels, scores and newspapers.

There are several problems here. The first is semantic. Terms like 'invention' and 'imagination' can mean different things and are commonly used in just those senses from which Anderson wishes to distance himself: it is so easy to slide from 'imagined' in the sense of 'created' to 'imaginary' in the sense of 'illusory' or 'fabricated', a tendency encouraged by his insistence on regarding the nation as a cultural artefact portrayed/narrated by other cultural artefacts (novels, etc.). The result is to suggest that, once deconstructed, the nation must appear to fragment and dissolve into its individual parts, and that the nation is no more than the sum of its cultural representations. As such, the nation possesses no reality independent of its images and representations. But, such a perspective undermines the sociological reality of the nation, the bonds of allegiance and belonging which so many people feel, and obscures both the institutional, political and territorial constitution of nations, and the powerful ties, popular cultural resources and traditions that underpin so many nations and endow them with a sense of tangible reality.[14]

Second, there is the problem of intellectualism in Anderson's account. Anderson admits that changed consciousness or social change alone cannot account for collective attachments. He recognises the specific 'love' that inheres in the nation (*ibid.:* 141–3). At the same time his emphasis upon a form of individual cognition–imagination–as the key to the rise and spread of nationalism, deflects attention away from collective attachment and sentiment. How can emphasis upon imagination and the imagined community enable us to grasp the power of the nation and nationalism? 'Imagination' certainly helps us to understand how easily the concept of the nation *can* be spread and transplanted; but why *should* it be spread, and why should *it* (the nation) be transplanted? What was it about the nation, and what was it about so many people's circumstances, that made them *feel* bound into 'nations' and assert their 'national' rights? For the nation, as we shall see, is not only known and imagined: it is also deeply felt and acted out.[15]

A third problem is that of voluntaristic individualism. Anderson admits that

> Seen as both an *historical fatality* and as a community imagined through language, the nation presents itself as simultaneously open and closed.
> (*ibid.:* 146)

But he claims:

> For it shows that from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be 'invited into' the imagined community.
> (*ibid.:* 145)

was often confined to small coteries of intellectuals and upper classes; many more Italians joined and fought in the Risorgimento wars than could read and write (let alone in [Tuscan] Italian). The portrayals of the nation that stirred people into action were oral, audial and visual rather than literary, a matter of symbols, songs, images, reports and rituals. It was the nationalists who, on coming to power, set about educating their populations and turning them into citizens of the nation. Anderson's account captures some of the rhythms of the genesis of nations in Europe; but language and literacy never assumed so central a role outside Europe, being often replaced in public consciousness by religion, about which Anderson has surprisingly little to say.[18]

Outside Europe, in fact, the community of the nation was imagined and portrayed by a variety of media which, with the rise of cheap technologies, percolated to the majority of the designated populations. There were, of course, the traditional media of song, dance, costume, ritual object, artwork; even in Europe Herder had stressed their importance in establishing the cultural authenticity and popular depth of the nation. Unlike print, which for long was confined to elites and some middle strata, these were genuinely popular media and the works they purveyed were shared by large numbers of people as part of their daily lives. To which we might add: landscapes, monuments, buildings, tomb-styles, the more durable elements of collective cultures, which provided their historical environment. More recently, as Anderson recognises, print has been supplemented, and then overtaken, by radio, cassette, film and television, which can reach vast audiences unknown to the purveyors of pamphlets and novels (*ibid.*: 135).[19]

In other words, while discursive networks provide a key to the role of elites in portraying the nation and disseminating nationalism, other cultural media from music and art to radio and television have penetrated and mobilised the majority of the people, provided always that they 'spoke' to them in a 'language' and culture that they understood, and conveyed messages of myth and symbol, memory and tradition, that resonated with them. By widening the role of cultural media far beyond the relatively limited purview of print and the press, we can also overcome the limitations of an explanation of nations and nationalism in terms of 'print-communities'. For, quite obviously, as Anderson himself recognises, a global map of 'print-communities' does not correspond with one of emergent nations. Too many other factors intervene for so neat a congruence. That is why Anderson supplements an explanation of the rise of nations in Latin America through the work of creole printmen with an analysis of the provincial administrative 'pilgrimages' of creole functionaries. That is why, too, in considering the emergence of such unlikely national states as Indonesia out of its mass of territorial and ethnic groupings, Anderson underscores the importance of colonial state education systems producing literate and bilingual intelligentsias (*ibid.*: 116, 121–30). Indeed, in the second edition of his book, Anderson points to the crucial role of the colonial state, and its census-takers, ethnographers and cartographers, in defining the nations of Southeast Asia from the end of the nineteenth century (*ibid.*: ch. 10).

> pre-existing population bound by preferential endogamy and a common historical experience. Ethnicity is *both* primordial *and* instrumental.
>
> (van den Berghe 1995:360, original emphasis)

Here, it seems, we have the heart of the matter. What van den Berghe has done is to bracket physical appearance with culture, and equate living together and having common myths and historical experiences with preferential endogamy. But some of the best known ethnic descent myths suggest a quite different and more ambiguous interpretation. The Roman myth of common ancestry emphasised their varied origins (Latins, Etruscans, Sabines, etc.) and Rome was a magnet for various cultural populations from a fairly early period. This did not prevent a powerful ancestry *myth* (or two, to be precise) from developing, alongside equally powerful shared historical experiences (the Samnite wars, the Gallic invasions, Pyrrhus, and above all, Hannibal…) to give rise to its first literary expressions (see Gruen 1993; Garman 1992). The English, too, developed strong origin myths with references to various descent lines—Britons, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, Norman—and the content of these myths changed considerably over time (MacDougall 1982; Mason 1985). The same is true of the medieval and modern French ancestry myths, with its celebrated contest between Franks and Gauls (not to mention the Romans during the Revolution) (Poliakov 1974: ch. 1; Weber 1991: ch. 1). If it were really a matter of *actual* biological descent and kin selection, why these mixed references and transformations? In the light of these examples, can we really assert the correspondence of imputed and actual ancestry? Van den Berghe concedes that group definitions were always partly fictive, but believes this to be unimportant. But, as Vernon Reynolds (1980:311) points out:

> Unless his primordial inter-group theory based on sociobiology can explain why the new non-genetic transmission of kinship and group affiliation has to follow the logic of the old genetic one, it breaks down.

Myths of ethnic descent generally contain a kernel of factual truth, but they typically elaborate, exaggerate and idealise that kernel in a one-sided fashion (see Tudor 1972; A.D.Smith 1984a).

Van den Berghe is surely right to remind us that there are limits to ethnic plasticity and malleability. He points out that:

> It is impossible to constitute an ethnie on a basis other than a *credible* concept of common descent, and the concept is only credible if it corresponds at least partly to reality.
>
> Ethnicity always involves the cultural *and* genetic boundaries of a *breeding population,* that is, a population bounded by the rule or practice of *endogamy*.
>
> (van den Berghe 1988:256, original emphasis)

main objection is to the idea that primordial attachments are exclusively affective, and affective ties are somehow just there, implicit in the ethnic or kin relationship itself, and not born in social interaction.

> This leads to a mystification of emotion, a desocialising of the phenomenon, and in extreme cases can lead to the positing of a biological imperative of bond-formation. In other words, if bonds simply *are,* and if they are to have any source at all, then they must have a genetic source. Sociobiological explanations thus become, curiously, the last bastion of any kind of analytic enterprise, albeit a dead-end one.
>
> (*ibid.*: 192, original emphasis)

But is all this not to seriously misunderstand the import and utility of the concept of the 'primordial' for the study of ethnicity and nationality? Certainly, for Steven Grosby, the concept of primordiality has to do more with *cognition* of certain objects which the emotions that Eller and Coughlan erroneously single out accompany. Grosby argues that we should return to the sociological tradition that distinguishes between fundamental patterns of human experience, and which recognises a plurality of orientations of human action, with specific beliefs peculiar to each type of orientation; examples would be Weber's types of social action, Parsons' and Smith's pattern variables and Shils' primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties. Against the current reductionist vogue, this tradition recognises the importance of different kinds of cognition, or belief, which attach to different kinds of object, in this case, beliefs about ancestry and territory (Grosby 1994:166–7).

For Steven Grosby, human beings perceive certain objects to be in the category of the primordial. This is an act of interpretative cognition. Human beings participate in historically evolving patterns of belief and action, and act in ways that are meaningful to one another. 'The patterns are the legacy of history; they are tradition'.

> Ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location.
>
> (*ibid.*: 168)

The reason for the significance human beings always attach to primordial objects is that

> the family, the locality, and one's own 'people' bear, transmit, and protect life. That is why human beings have always attributed and continue to attribute sacredness to primordial objects and the attachments they form to them. This is one of the reasons why human beings have sacrificed their

and thereby provided the necessary point of departure for more convincing explanations.

Perennialism I: ethnic continuity

The primordialist-instrumentalist debate, which I have only briefly outlined here, is largely concerned with ethnicity and ethnic identity rather than with nations and nationalism. It is, nevertheless, germane to our problem because the competing assumptions of instrumentalists and primordialists have overshadowed and influenced the two main grand narratives of nations and nationalism: modernism and perennialism.[9]

In the past, one could be sure that modernists were also instrumentalists (and vice-versa), while perennialists were always primordialists of one kind or another (and vice-versa). But this simple dualism has given way to more variegated and complex formulations. Not all modernists embrace a robust instrumentalism, and not all perennialists turn out to be primordialists. We can even find an instrumentalist who is a perennialist of sorts; though the converse, a thoroughgoing primordialist who could propound a modernist account of nations and nationalism, is rare. What we find instead are theorists who embrace a perennialist view of ethnicity (with some primordialist overtones), only to adopt a modernist approach to nations and nationalism. Here I shall explore some examples of these combinations.

What is meant here by the term *'perennialism'*? Broadly speaking, it refers to the historical antiquity of the type of social and political organisation known as the 'nation', its immemorial or perennial character. In this view, there is little difference between ethnicity and nationality: nations and ethnic communities are cognate, even identical, phenomena. The perennialist readily accepts the modernity of nationalism as a political movement and ideology, but regards nations either as updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities, or as collective cultural identities that have existed, alongside ethnic communities, in all epochs of human history. On the other hand, the perennialist refuses to see either nations or ethnic groups as 'givens' in nature; they are strictly historical and social, rather than natural, phenomena. *As* perennialists, they could not endorse the central idea of the Abbé Sieyes, for whom nations were *sui generis,* existing in the natural order as part of the substratum of human and social existence. For the perennialist, the ethnic community or nation is a human and social phenomenon like any other. At the same time it is a constant and fundamental feature of human society throughout *recorded* history; and for this reason nations and ethnic communities appear to be immemorial to their members.

This point of view is very clearly exemplified by Joshua Fishman's analysis of ethnicity and language in Eastern Europe. Fishman does not use the language of 'cultural primordialism', though many of his formulations share its spirit. Instead, he wants to reveal the perennial and highly subjective nature of ethnicity by viewing it 'from the inside'. Attacking externalist liberal, Marxist and sociological denigrations and misunderstandings of ethnicity, Fishman briefly

Grosby's argument is in line with his emphasis on cultural primordiality, which we discussed earlier, but here he combines this theoretical concern with a careful examination of the Old Testament and other ancient evidence. But is his use of the term 'nation' similar to that of the majority of scholars of modern nations? Does not the substitution of religion for citizenship as a necessary component of the idea of the 'nation' separate his concept entirely from that of the 'modern nation'? Can, and should, we then speak of a 'pre-modern' and a 'modern' kind of nation, and how would they be related? Certainly for modernists like Breuilly or Gellner, Grosby's conception of pre-modern nations has little connection with that of the modern nation defined by citizenship and mass culture and education. But Grosby might well reply that the modernist usage is too restrictive, that it quite arbitrarily excludes members of a single broad category which possesses a number of similar features (named group, defined territory, myths and memories of ancestral peoplehood, cultural (religious) unity), but differ in certain other respects like legal citizenship and mass education. Could we, in fact, be dealing with two kinds of 'nation', or, better, perhaps a continuum from the one polar type to the other, with particular cases being ranged along it? Such a view would have the merit of being able to avoid the rather arbitrary exclusions which plague the field.

Of course, this formulation is necessarily abstract. It misses out the vital element of historical context. Suppose we accept the idea of two kinds of nation, or of a continuum between them; is not the modern type quite different from its predecessors exactly because of the historical context in which it was formed, and from which it derived its quite separate meaning, unknown and indeed unknowable to the ancient or medieval worlds? To bracket together these radically different formations may be simply another case of retrospective nationalism. After all, do not the very meanings of the terms we employ, which are always inadequate to the nuances and complexities of historical development and social life, derive from the changed contexts in which these concepts are used and hence reflect those changes? And were not the changes that inaugurated the modern world massive beyond previous human belief and knowledge?

But this is to beg the question of whether radical changes in some spheres of society and history–technology, communications, economics and demography, for example–necessarily have their counterparts in other spheres like culture, community and collective identity; and whether, if they have, the changes wrought are such as to make it necessary to treat more recent forms of culture, community and identity as utterly different and quite incommensurable with older forms, or whether, *per contra,* certain elements like kinship, memory and symbol, while differing in their particular contents between cases, remain constants of the human condition and are found in every historical context. Certainly, the case of ancient Israel gives us cause to reflect both on the definitional quandary of nationalism, and on the relationship between human communities like the ethnic group or the nation and the historical contexts in which beliefs and attachments to them have been formed.

the well known distinction made by Hugh Seton-Watson between the 'old, continuous' nations and the deliberately created, new nations, those that Charles Tilly called 'nations by design'. For both historians, the distinction related mainly to the advent of political nationalise, the ideology and movement. 'Old, continuous nations' were those that existed before 1789, well before nationalist ideologies and movements demanded, and provided vehicles for, the creation of nation-states; 'new nations' were those that nationalists set out to create according to their ideological blueprints (Seton-Watson 1977:6–13; cf. Tilly 1975: Introduction and Conclusion).[3]

For Hugh Seton-Watson, the distinction is essentially European. He lists the nations that evolved gradually, and describes the process by which they were formed over several centuries:

> The old nations of Europe in 1789 were the English, Scots, French, Dutch, Castilians and Portuguese in the west; the Danes and Swedes in the north, and the Hungarians, Poles and Russians in the east.
>
> (Seton-Watson 1977:7)

> The process of formation of national identity and national consciousness among the old nations was slow and obscure. It was a spontaneous process, not willed by anyone, though there were great events which in certain cases clearly accelerated it.
>
> (*ibid.:* 8)

The new nations, on the other hand, were formed over much shorter periods, by well known leaders using the written word and modern communications. Language and linguistic politics were the main factors in creating national consciousness in modern European new nations. Economic and geographical causes were more important in the formation of overseas nations of European origin, while state boundaries imposed by imperial governments formed the matrix of ex-colonial nations in much of Asia and Africa (*ibid.:* 9).

Pre-modern nations?

Seton-Watson's narrative is impressive in its scope and the wealth of historical evidence he adduces, but it is not without its problems. Seton-Watson himself concedes the inevitability of some anachronism in singling out elements derived from the study of new nations in the formation of national consciousness of the old nations. And he admits to the impossibility of finding a 'scientific definition' of the nation, claiming that

> a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one.
>
> (*ibid.:* 5, 11)

Myth-symbol complexes

Reaching back into the past and moving forward from it to the present, implies a concern and a method based on a conception of long-term history. This is the starting-point of John Armstrong's monumental, path-breaking analysis of medieval Middle Eastern and European civilisations and ethnic identities, *Nations before Nationalism*. Its overall aim is to explore 'the emergence of the intense group identification that today we term a "nation"', and its basic assumption is that 'the key to the significance of the phenomena of ethnic identification is persistence rather than genesis of particular patterns'. For this reason,

> A time dimension of many centuries (similar to the *longue durée* emphasised by the *Annales* school of French historiography) is essential for disentangling independent ethnic experiences from the effects of diffusion and mimesis. An extended temporal perspective is especially important as a means of perceiving modern nationalism as part of a cycle of ethnic consciousness. Because the epoch of Absolutism that immediately preceded European nationalism involved, at least for elites, an exceptionally strong rejection of ethnic differentiation, nationalism is often seen as utterly unprecedented. A longer look suggests that widespread intense ethnic identification, although expressed in other forms, is recurrent.
>
> (Armstrong 1982:4)

Here it is quite clear that, as we saw earlier, the terms 'ethnic' and 'nation' form part of a continuum, and that what matters is not the form they take in different epochs, but the persisting group perceptions and sentiments themselves. Although pre-modern persistent group identities, whether labelled 'ethnic' or 'national', are distinguished from 'nations' after the late eighteenth century, 'where consciousness of ethnic identity became a predominant force for constituting independent political structures', the body of Armstrong's book suggests that he regards ethnicity and nationhood as continuous, even though it is ethnic identities that form the subject of his analysis.[11]

Armstrong's point of departure is ethnic exclusion, the boundary between 'us' and 'them', and the universal comparison with the 'stranger'.

> Terms like *'goyim', 'barbaroi'* and *'nemtsi'* all imply such perception of the human incompleteness of persons who could not communicate with the in-group, which constituted the only 'real men'.
>
> (*ibid.*: 5)

The universality of ethnic opposition is why John Armstrong finds Fredrik Earth's boundary approach so illuminating. Whereas previous approaches to ethnicity had started from the unique cultural traits of each group, Barth's anthropological model focused on the interactions and perceptions of members of a social group, which was no longer defined by some cultural 'essence', but rather by its self-

transformation can, in some cases, be traced even further back than the growth of vernacular printed literature stemming from Gutenberg and Luther's Bible. A recent study of elite Scottish identity found that the crucial moment came in the reflective aftermath of Bannockburn and the Wars with England, with the rise of a distinctive ethno-history in historical and literary writings of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The same is true of the early formation of Swiss national identity. Its foundations in the Rütli Oath and Tell exploits were first recorded in *The White Book of Sarnen* (c. 1470) and subsequent writings. In these and other cases, we can trace the beginnings of an elite nationalism, and of the coalescence and gradual transformation of ethnic communities into early nations (Webster 1997; Im Hof 1991).[22]

Origins and types of nation

How then is this transformation effected? Basically, there are two routes in the formation of nations, and they depend on the kind of ethnic community that served as their point of departure.

Of the two kinds of pre-modern *ethnie*

> The first is late and relatively extensive, the second is vertical and intensive. In the first, we find communities that rarely penetrate deep in the social scale, but extend in ragged and imprecise fashion in space. Typically, 'lateral' *ethnie* are aristocratic, though usually clerical and scribal strata are included, along with some of the wealthier urban merchants. Equally typically, 'vertical' *ethnie* are urban-based, priestly, trading and artisan in their composition, with their ruling strata often thrown up from the wealthy and powerful factions in the towns; alternatively, they are loose coalitions of tribesmen under their clan chiefs, united for battle and later amalgamating, or co-existing with a dominant if primitive state and its monarch. In either case, the bond that unites them is of a more intensive and exclusive kind than among the lateral, aristocratic *ethnie;* hence its often marked religious, even missionary, quality.
>
> (A.D.Smith 1986a:77–8)

The first route to nationhood, that of *bureaucratic incorporation,* involves the transformation of a loose, aristocratic *ethnie* into a territorial nation. The upper-class members of most lateral *ethnies* had no interest in imbuing their middle classes, let alone their subject lower classes, with their own ethnic culture. But, perhaps because of the failure to recreate the (Holy) Roman empire in Western Europe, the ensuing competition between the various monarchs and courts of France, England and Spain forced them to mobilise their urban middle classes, if only to extract their wealth, in order to wage war and display their pomp, as Henry VIII and Francis I did so conspicuously on the Field of the Cloth of Gold. Inadvertently at first, they drew their middle classes into an increasingly accented, territorialised and politicised 'national' culture, i.e. one that, from being

seen to form elements in that trend to re-establish polyethnic hierarchies portrayed by McNeill.

Here I can only touch on the most salient of these issues, and try to show that, while they ostensibly turn their backs, not only on modernism, but on all large-scale narratives and higher-level theorising, these discussions and debates, and the research they have spawned, constitute in reality one part (the last epoch) of that larger framework which McNeill's analysis exemplifies. Theirs is an analysis which attempts to go beyond the modernist paradigm of nations and nationalism, and reveal its necessary supersession alongside the decomposition of its objects of reference, that is, the nation and nationalism. Yet in going beyond modernism they do not mean to challenge its assumption of the modernity of nations and nationalism. The 'postmodernist turn' does not seek to overturn the modernist paradigm, as does perennialism; nor does it seek to revise the modernist analysis 'from within', by revealing the debts of the modern nation to pre-modern ethnic ties, in the manner of the ethno-symbolists. Rather it seeks to extend the range of modernism to what it sees as a 'postmodern' phase of social development. But in doing so it subtly undermines and problematises some of the basic assumptions of modernism, notably its belief in the sociological reality of nations, and the power of nationalist ideologies.

The underlying leitmotif of the most recent phase of theorising in the field of ethnicity and nationalism, which we may very loosely call 'postmodern', is that of cultural and political fragmentation coupled, in varying degrees, with economic globalisation. Let me try to sketch this leitmotif in each of the themes listed above.

Fragmentation and hybrid identities

Of course, Anderson's analysis of the literary tropes and devices which sustain the narratives of 'nation-ness' foreshadowed the uses of deconstructionist techniques in the analysis of ethnic and national phenomena. For many his example has served as the inspiration, and point of departure, for their own more radical application of these techniques. For Homi Bhabha, for example, the very idea of a 'national identity' has become problematic. That idea had first emerged in the totalising project of the Enlightenment which sought to incorporate all being, including the Other. Hence the nationalist narratives of the national self (which was, in fact, always constructed and defined by the Other, the significant outsider) always claimed to incorporate the Other and purported to create total cultural homogeneity. But such a claim is fictitious. Cultural difference is irreducible, and it reveals the hybrid quality and ambivalence of national identity in every state (Bhabha 1990).

For Bhabha, national identities are composed of narratives of 'the people', and they operate under a 'doubled' and 'split' signifier–split between past and present, the self and the other, and above all between pedagogical and performative narratives. This superimposed dualism fragments the nation. The received versions of national identity inculcated by the nationalists are always

challenged and decomposed into their component cultural parts by the alternative narratives based on the actions and performances of members of the designated community. In the manner of Simmel, Homi Bhabha directs our attention to the impact of the stranger and the outsider in defining the national identity of the host group. Only here the host is an imperialist national community, acting as magnet to the ex-colonised. The great influx of ex-colonials, immigrants, *Gastarbeiter* and asylum-seekers has eroded the bases of traditional narratives and images of a homogeneous national identity, revealing their fragmented and hybrid character. Today, every collective cultural identity has become plural. Housed in 'anxious states', national identities have become precarious and hybridised, as they face in different directions. Composed of cultural elements from the ex-colonial periphery, which are neither able nor willing to be incorporated and assimilated, national identities have fragmented and lost their erstwhile hold on people (*ibid.*: ch. 16).

A similar emphasis on the importance of the cultural fragment and the irreducibility of its experience and testimony, can be found in the work of Partha Chatterjee. In general, he is concerned with the relationship between the hegemonic nationalist discourses of the West, which for Benedict Anderson provide 'modular' forms for creating by nationalist elites in Asia and Africa, and the indigenous nationalisms created by those non-Western elites. In his earlier work Chatterjee had demonstrated how, typically, the nationalist discourses of Asia and Africa both derived from Western models and at the same time opposed a 'material' outer world dominated by the West and the colonial state, to an inner, 'spiritual' domain which was the preserve of the national culture being created by indigenous elites since the mid-nineteenth century (Chatterjee 1986). In *The Nation and Its Fragments* (1993) Chatterjee shows, through a richly detailed analysis of nationalism in Bengal, how in such institutions as language, drama and the novel, art, religion, schooling and the family, a new, creative 'inner domain of national culture' was fashioned by nationalist Indian elites which is simultaneously modern and non-Western, using both Western and indigenous (Sanskrit) models. At the same time, this dominant Indian nationalist discourse is influenced by those of the many marginalised groups outside the mainstream of politics, the 'fragments of the nation' which in this case include Bengalis, women, peasants and outcastes, even when their alternative images of the nation were bypassed or suppressed, and their aspirations 'normalised' by an incorporating Indian nationalism. The interesting point here is that such nationalist culture creation precedes the political challenge to the West, and the ensuing nationalist conflict, a point also made by John Peel in his analysis of the 'cultural work' of Yoruba ethnogenesis in the same period. The encounter with the Other is certainly crucial, but the forms and contents of the Indian, Middle Eastern or African nationalism which that encounter triggers are also derived from other, non-Western sources within the traditional cultures of the community (albeit greatly modified) (Chatterjee 1993: chs 1, 5; Peel 1989).

Such readings still leave intact the cultural differences which fragment the nation. But here too some radical postmodernist theorising has decentred and

decomposed ethnicity. For Stuart Hall, Etienne Balibar and others, ethnicity must be viewed as a plastic and malleable social construction, deriving its meanings from the particular situations of those who invoke it and the relations of power between individuals and groups. Not only is it one among many competing identities, it derives its meanings from its articulation with other kinds of identity, notably class and gender. Shifting, permeable and 'situational', ethnicity has no essence or centre, no underlying features or common denominator. For Etienne Balibar, there is only a discourse of 'fictive ethnicity'. Thus:

> No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalised, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them are ethnicised–that is, represented in the past or in the future *as if* they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcend individuals and social conditions.
>
> (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991:96, original emphasis)

Ethnicity itself is produced through two routes, those of the language community and the race, both of which create the idea of predestined autonomous communities.

In similar vein, Stuart Hall views a sense of ethnicity as the expression of a hegemonic national identity, as in the concept of 'Englishness'. But Hall also sees the new 'identity politics' of representation in the West as constructing a new 'positive conception of the ethnicity of the margins, of the periphery'. This kind of voluntary ethnicity involves a

> new cultural politics which engages rather than suppresses *difference* and which depends, in part, on the cultural construction of new ethnic identities.
>
> (S.Hall 1992:257)

Once again, the hegemony of a dominant discourse of national (and racial) identity is challenged by alternative discourses of peripheral ethnicity, newly constructed out of popular experiences, and predicated on the celebration of diversity. This is the premise, and justification, of the politics of multiculturalism, to which I shall return.

In sensitising us to the more complex and multifaceted nature of contemporary national identities in the West, and in revealing the differences between the older received traditions of the nation and the much more varied, and contested, understandings of national community among and within the many cultural groups that comprise most modern national states, this kind of postmodern analysis has done much to illuminate the latest phase of national formation, especially in the West. There is little doubt that modern Western nations have become 'frayed at the edges', and that their members have had to rethink former assumptions about national community and identity in the light of much larger movements of population. It is also true that different groups in both Western

> congruent with the 'true' identity of the collectivity and constitute no threat to it.
>
> (Kandiyoti 1989:143; cf. Kandiyoti 1991)

Female symbolism of the nation

Deniz Kandiyoti here touches on a second level of analysis, the ideological and symbolic uses of women. Symbolism and ideology are two of the main dimensions along which Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, in their pioneering volume, locate women within ethnic and national processes. They regard women as central to the creation and reproduction of ethnic and national projects, and list five major dimensions of their activity and presence. Women, they argue, should be seen as:

a) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;
b) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups;
c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture;
d) as significant ethnic/national differences as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories;
e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles.

(Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989:7)

In a later thought-provoking and systematic survey of the field, Nira Yuval-Davis goes on to apply a deconstructionist analysis to the relationships between gender and nation, and includes the ideological and symbolic modes of locating women (c and d above) as vital components of cultural reproduction. Culture or 'cultural stuff', she argues, rather than being fixed and homogeneous, should be seen as

> a rich resource, usually full of internal contradictions, which is used selectively by different social agents in various social projects within specific power relations and political discourse in and outside the collectivity.
>
> (Yuval-Davis 1997:43)

As a result, hegemonic symbols and cultures are generally strongest in the centre of the polity and always evoke resistance, particularly at the periphery. Hegemonic nationalist symbols and narratives proclaim the need for men to defend both the 'Motherland' and the nation's women who symbolise and express its 'purity'. They call on men to sacrifice themselves for their women and children, so that they may be eulogised by their women in the manner of Plutarch's Spartan women, whom Rousseau so admired.[5]

Yuval-Davis points out that women 'are often constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivity's identity and honour':

Europe, was conditioned by the Western bourgeois family morality with its concern for 'respectability', moral character and physical (Greek) beauty. This produced a sharp differentiation, not only in gender roles but also in gendered attributes and stereotypes, already evident in the anti-revolutionary German-speaking regions, which identified the French forces as 'loose-living', in opposition to the respectable, masculine German morality, which nationalists like Ernst Moritz Arndt embraced. As the nineteenth century progressed, the integral nationalist search for a specific masculine morality, 'Aryan' male beauty and a respectable and distinctive 'national character' merged with racist fascism's cult of male activism and aggressive virility (Mosse 1985, 1995; cf. Leoussi 1997).

More recently, Glenda Sluga, in a penetrating historical investigation, traced the gendered nature of both nations and nationalist ideologies further back to their origins in the French Revolution, where by 1793 'the legislators of the new French Republic had defined popular national sovereignty in terms of its masculine citizenry'. In the name of social order, women were returned to the private sphere as patriot wives and mothers of citizens, as Rousseau had recommended. Drawing on the work of Joan Landes, Sluga shows how the division between public and private spheres, stemming from the creation of boundaries initiated by the Enlightenment, not only excluded women from the Revolution's invocation of universal rights, but ensured the entirely masculine character of the nation-state. Like Rousseau, Fichte, Michelet and Mazzini all emphasised the different roles of the sexes in national education, the supportive, nurturing function of women and the heroic, military role of men:

> Mazzini, like Michelet and Fichte, drew on the image of the patriarchal family (with the father at its head) as a natural unit to shore up the legitimacy of the fraternal nation-state and determine its preference for the male citizen as the active and military patriot.
>
> (Sluga 1998:9, 24; see also Landes 1988)

Feminism and identity politics

Finally, there is the normative level of analysis: the ways in which feminists should address 'identity politics' and the politics of multiculturalism. For Nira Yuval-Davis the problem with 'identity politics' is that it tends to harden ethnic and gender boundaries, and homogenise and naturalise categories and group differences (Yuval-Davis 1997:119). Similarly with multiculturalism. Here too the dangers of reifying and essentialising cultures ignore power differences between and within minorities, overemphasise the differences between cultures and privilege as 'authentic' the voices of the most unwesternised 'community representatives'. This can have particularly detrimental effects for women in terms of encouraging minority male control over their behaviour. Even allowing for the 'counter-narratives' which emerge from the nation's margins and 'hybrids', there is always the danger that homogeneity and essentialism

it presents itself as universal, it bears the imprint of its origins and flows from a single source, the United States. Alternatively, global culture is presented as a playfully eclectic and 'depthless' pastiche, attuned to the 'pastiche personality' of the affectually attenuated, decentred ego inhabiting 'an electronic, global world'. Here global culture appears as an entirely new technical construction, what Lyotard called 'a self-sufficient electronic circuit', at once timeless, placeless and memory-less, contradicting all our ideas of cultures which embody the distinctive historical roots, myths and memories, and the specific lifestyles, of ethnic communities and nations (Billig 1995: ch. 6; cf. Tomlinson 1991: ch. 3; A.D.Smith 1995a: ch. 1).[13]

Besides, as Philip Schlesinger demonstrated, the electronic cultural media and information technology on which much of the cultural globalisation thesis rests, are more variable in their effects on different classes, regions and ethnic communities than this argument allows. Paradoxically, too, the electronic media serve to reinforce old ethnic identities or encourage the (re-)creation of new ones. This is also the burden of Anthony Richmond's analysis of the ways in which the latest technological revolution is replacing industrial by 'service' societies'. In these 'post-industrial' societies, new modes of electronic mass communications are encouraging the resurgence of ethnic communities using these dense networks of linguistic and cultural communications (Schlesinger 1987; 1991: Part I; Richmond 1984).

From a more interactionist standpoint, Alberto Melucci also suggests that, with the crisis and decline of the nation-state, the revival of ethnicity in modern societies is to be expected, although for quite different reasons to those proposed by McNeill. In an age of voluntary networks of social interaction based on individual needs and activities, ethno-national organisation provides an important channel for individual identification and solidarity 'because it responds to a collective need which assumes particular importance in complex societies'. Ethno-national movements are actively political, but they are also pre-eminently cultural:

> As other criteria of group membership (such as class) weaken or recede, ethnic identity also responds to a need for identity of an eminently symbolic nature. It gives roots, based on a language, a culture and an ancient history, to demands that transcend the specific condition of the ethnic group.
>
> (Melucci 1989:89–92)

This suggests, not the transcendence of ethnicity but the revitalisation of ethnic ties by the very processes of globalisation that are presumed to be rendering them obsolete, in much the same way, and perhaps for similar reasons, as the resurgence of strong religious identities among ethnic communities in multi-faith and multicultural societies like Britain and the United States, or in ethnically and religiously divided societies like Nigeria and India. As Giddens would argue, the global and the local feed each other (see Igwara 1995; Jacobsen 1997; Deol 1996).[14]

scrutiny, then the results of that research will be called into question along with its research programme. In these circumstances it is more helpful to relate the research directly to one or other version of the major paradigms, or fashion a new one that can justify the particular research programme.

In my view, most of the analyses I have all too briefly considered in this chapter assume one or other version of the modernist paradigm, which they then seek to 'go beyond' in time-period as well as in the 'phase' of development of the phenomena themselves. It is doubtful whether, in their theoretical understanding, deconstructionist analyses go much beyond the ways in which modernists like Gellner or Anderson or Hobsbawm characterised and understood the nation and nationalism. But whereas these modernists (including some 'gender-nation' theorists) provide us with full and rounded historical, political and sociological accounts of nations and nationalism, postmodernist and allied analyses, in their desire to demonstrate the fluid, fragmented and constructed qualities of these phenomena, repudiate the need for such overall accounts or simply assume them as given. In doing so, they illuminate a corner of the broader canvas only to leave the rest of it in untraversed darkness. From the standpoint of a theory of nations and nationalism, this development can only represent a retreat from the advances made by modernism.

This is not to say that analyses that focus on the post-modern character and phase of nationalism have not made important empirical contributions to our understanding, only that their empirical discoveries have not been matched by similar broad theoretical advances. Some of these findings, notably those of the 'gender-nation' perspectives, which have drawn on concepts from other fields, can be fruitfully integrated with, while modifying, one or other of the existing paradigms and thereby enrich our understanding of the wider phenomena of ethnicity, nations and nationalism. Whether it will be possible to create a new overarching paradigm, or whether it will be enough to integrate gender concepts with existing (but modified) paradigms in the field, remains to be seen. But, in general, until the analyses of 'fragmentation' and 'post-modernity' make their assumptions explicit within a broader sociological and historical framework, they will be unable to advance the theory of nations and nationalism and elucidate the many problems in this field.

is becoming a magnet for scholarship and research everywhere, so the need to explain and understand the many issues that it throws up becomes all the more urgent. This means that we cannot evade the task of theory-construction. If the former grand narratives of nations and nationalism no longer command respect, the imperatives of the times in which we live urge us to fashion new explanations more attuned to our perceptions and to the problems that we face.

and McAllister (1996). A range of views is presented in Glazer and Moynihan (1975), who adopt an intermediate position themselves. See also Epstein (1978) who focuses on the creative, subjective aspects of ethnicity. For attempts to synthesise the rival positions, see McKay (1982) and Scott (1990).

8 For Edwin Wilmsen (in Wilmsden and McAllister 1996:3) 'Primordialist ethnic claims are nothing more than claims to ownership of the past and rights to its use for present purposes'. This is very different, but perhaps not incompatible with, the understanding of a theorist like Grosby (1995), whose analysis of the significance of national territory as an object of primordial beliefs rests on its widely perceived life-enhancing qualities for those who reside on it and who are, in part, collectively constituted by those beliefs. See also Chapter 9.

9 For these terms, see Brass (1991), A.D.Smith (1984b, 1995b), as well as McKay (1982) and Scott (1990).

10 This is also the project of Manning Nash (1989), for whom the most common ethnic boundary markers are kinship, commensality and a common cult. These form 'a *single recursive metaphor*. This metaphor of blood, substance, deity symbolise the existence of the group while at the same time they constitute the group…. This trinity of boundary markers and mechanisms is the deep or basic structure of ethnic group differentiation' (*ibid.*: 1ll). Nash is wary of the concept of 'primordial ties' as applied to ethnicity: the building blocks of ethnicity (the body, language, shared history, religion, territory) may be relatively unchanging, but 'primordial ties' are 'like any other set of bonds, forged in the process of historical time, subject to shifts in meaning, ambiguities of reference, political manipulation, and vicissitudes of honour and obloquy'. This means that history, politics and other circumstances vary the kind of building blocks and the nature of the boundaries in each case (*ibid.*: 4–6).

11 E.Weber (1979) is a study of the incorporation of the great majority of the population into the French national state through the mass, compulsory education system, the conscript army after the defeat by Prussia, and the creation of a centralised communications network linking all the French provinces. Connor cites the slow stages of extension of the franchise in Britain, culminating only in 1918 with the enfranchisement of women and the remaining 20 per cent of men; at the same time, a highly elitist view of the French nation obtained in French politics until 1848.

12 On which see Doob (1964) and Billig (1995). For a very different view of the power and resilience of the inter-state order, see Mayall (1990); and see Chapter 9.

13 See Chapter 3 for Horowitz's analysis of the causes of secession and irredentism. On the differences between these types of ethnic movement, see Horowitz (1992).

14 It is not clear whether Horowitz regards nationalism as a mainly state-centred ideology and movement, or whether we can speak of 'ethno-nations' in the new states of Asia and Africa. For a different account, see D.Brown (1994).

15 The title of his book and an article (Armstrong 1992) may imply a leaning towards 'continuous' perennialism, but a later article (Armstrong 1997) supports the view that Armstrong is interested in the *recurrence* of the nation.

16 On national sentiment in the Middle Ages, see Tipton (1972), Guenée (1985) and Hastings (1997). For antiquity, see Levi (1965), Tcherikover (1970) and Alty (1982).

8 Ethno-symbolism

1 Another historian who dates the rise of nationalism to the sixteenth century is Marcu (1976). But most historians regard the late eighteenth century as the watershed which ushers in the ideology of 'nationalism'.

2 This might be construed as an argument for the precedence of England, but a similar evolution, in which the state used religious (Catholic) and linguistic homogenisation to forge an (upper- and middle-class) nation, took place in France from at least the

Mayall, James (1990) *Nationalism and International Society,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
––(1991) 'Non-intervention, self-determination and the "new world order"', *International Affairs,* 67, 3, 421–9.
––(1992) 'Nationalism and international security after the Cold War', *Survival,* 34, Spring, 19–35.
Mayo, Patricia (1974) *The Roots of Identity: Three National Movements in Contemporary European Politics,* London: Allen Lane.
Mazrui, Ali (1985) 'African archives and oral tradition', *The Courier,* February, 13–15, Paris: UNESCO.
Meadwell, Hudson (1989) 'Cultural and instrumental approaches to ethnic nationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 12, 3, 309–28.
Mehden, Fred von der (1963) *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia,* Madison WI, Milwaukee WI and London: University of Wisconsin Press.
Melucci, Alberto (1989) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society,* London: Hutchinson Radius.
Mendels, Doron (1992) *The Rise and Fall of Jewish Nationalism,* New York: Doubleday.
Michelet, Jules (1890) *Historical View of the French Revolution,* trans. C.Cocks, London: S. Bell and Sons.
Mill, John Stuart (1872) *Considerations on Representative Government,* London.
Miller, David (1993) 'In defence of nationality', *Journal of Applied Philosophy,* 10, 1, 3–16.
––(1995) *On Nationality,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milton, John (1959) *Areopagitica,* vol. II, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 552.
Minogue, Kenneth (1967) *Nationalism,* London: Batsford.
Mitchell, Marion (1931) 'Emile Durkheim and the philosophy of nationalism', *Political Science Quarterly,* 46, 87–106.
Mitchell, Mark and Russell, Dave (1996) 'Immigration, citizenship and the nation-state in the new Europe', in Brian Jenkins and Spyros Sofos (eds) *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe,* London and New York: Routledge.
Montagne, Robert (1952) 'The "modern state" in Africa and Asia', *The Cambridge Journal,* 5, 583–602.
Morgan, Prys (1983) 'From a death to a view: the hunt for the Welsh past in the Romantic period', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 43–100.
Mosse, George (1964) *The Crisis of German Ideology,* New York: Grosset and Dunlap.
––(1976) 'Mass politics and the political liturgy of nationalism', in Eugene Kamenka (ed.) *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea,* London: Edward Arnold, 39–54.
––(1985) *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle Class Norms and Sexual Morality in Modern Europe,* Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
––(1994) *Confronting the Nation: Jewish and Western Nationalism,* Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press.
––(1995) 'Racism and nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism,* I, 2, 163–73.
Nairn, Tom (1977) *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism,* London: New Left Books.
Nash, Manning (1989) *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World,* Chicago IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
Nettl, J.P. and Robertson, Roland (1968) *International Systems and the Modernisation of Societies,* London: Faber.

Neuberger, Benjamin (1986) *National Self-determination in Post-Colonial Africa,* Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.
Newland, Kathleen (1993) 'Ethnic conflict and refugees', *Survival,* 35, 1, 81–101.
Newman, Gerald (1987) *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740–1830,* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Nimni, Ephraim (1994) *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis,* 2nd edn, London: Pluto Press.
Nisbet, Robert (1965) *The Sociological Tradition,* London: Heinemann.
––(1969) *Social Change and History,* London and New York: Oxford University Press.
Nora, Pierre (ed.) (1984) *Les Lieux de Mémoire,* Vol. I: *La République,* Paris: Gallimard.
––(ed.) (1986) *Les Lieux de Mémoire,* Vol. II: *La Nation,* Paris: Gallimard.
O'Brien, Conor Cruse (1988a) *God-Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism,* Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
––(1988b) 'Nationalism and the French Revolution', in G.Best (ed.) *The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and Its Legacy, 1789–1989,* London: Fontana, 17–48.
Okamura, J. (1981) 'Situational ethnicity', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 4, 4, 452–65.
O'Leary, Brendan (ed.) (1996a) 'Symposium on David Miller's *On Nationality*', *Nations and Nationalism,* 2, 3, 409–51.
––(1996b) 'Insufficiently liberal and insufficiently nationalist', in Brendan O'Leary (ed.) 'Symposium on David Miller's *On Nationality*, *Nations and Nationalism* 2, 3, 444–51.
Olorunsola, Victor (ed.) (1972) *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa,* New York: Anchor Books.
Olson, Mancur (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action,* Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Orridge, Andrew (1981) 'Uneven development and nationalism, I and II', *Political Studies,* XXIX, 1 and 2, 10–15, 181–90.
––(1982) 'Separatist and autonomist nationalisms: the structure of regional loyalties in the modern state', in Colin Williams (ed.) *National Separatism,* Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 43–74.
Ozouf, Mona (1982) *L'Ecole, L'Eglise et la République, 1871–1914,* Paris: Editions Cana/ Jean Offredo.
Palmer, Alison (1998) *Colonial Genocide,* Bathurst NSW: Crawford House Publishing.
Palmer, R.R. (1940) 'The national idea in France before the Revolution', *Journal of the History of Ideas,* I, 95–111.
Paul, David (1985) 'Slovak nationalism and the Hungarian state', in Paul Brass (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and the State,* London: Croom Helm, 115–59.
Pearson, Raymond (1983) *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848–1945,* London: Macmillan.
––(1993) 'Fact, fantasy, fraud: perceptions and projections of national revival', *Ethnic Groups,* 10, 1–3, 43–64.
Peel, John (1989) 'The cultural work of Yoruba ethno-genesis', in Elisabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and Malcolm Chapman (eds) *History and Ethnicity,* London and New York: Routledge, 198–215.
Penrose, Jan (1995) 'Essential constructions? The "cultural bases" of nationalist movements', *Nations and Nationalism,* I, 3, 391–417.
Periwal, Sukumar (ed.) (1995) *Notions of Nationalism,* Budapest: Central European University Press.

Yuval-Davis, Nira (1993) 'Gender and nation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 16, 4, 621–32.
––(1997) *Gender and Nation,* London: Sage.
Yuval-Davis, Nira and Anthias, Floya (eds) (1989) *Woman-Nation-State,* London: Sage.
Zacek, Joseph (1969) 'Nationalism in Czechoslovakia', in Peter Sugar and Ivo Lederer (eds) *Nationalism in Eastern Europe,* Seattle WA and London: University of Washington Press, 166–206.
Zartmann, William (1964) *Government and Politics in Northern Africa,* New York: Praeger.
Zenner, Walter (1991) *Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis,* Albany NY: State University of New York Press .
Zernatto, Guido (1944) 'Nation: the history of a word', *Review of Politics,* 6, 351–66.
Zerubavel, Yael (1995) *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition,* Chicago IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
Zubaida, Sami (1978) 'Theories of nationalism', in G.Littlejohn, B.Smart, J.Wakeford and N.Yuval-Davis (eds) *Power and the State,* London: Croom Helm.