

Module 4 Paradigms and Theories in International Relations

Unit 1	Theories of International Relations
Unit 2	Realism
Unit 3	Idealism
Unit 4	Foreign Policy Analysis
Unit 5	Foreign Policy in Action: Two Case Studies

Module 5 Basic Concepts in International Relations

Unit 1	Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality
Unit 2	Balance of Power
Unit 3	National Interest
Unit 4	Non-Alignment
Unit 5	Responsibility to Protect

As noted earlier, each unit contains a number of self-assessment exercises (SAE). These self-assessment exercises are designed to test you on the materials you have just covered. They will help you to evaluate your progress as well as reinforce your understanding of the material. Together with tutor-marked assignments, these exercises will assist you in achieving the stated learning objectives of the individual units and of the course.

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

The following books are recommended for further reading:

Holsti, K. J. (1983). *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. (4th ed.). Prentice-Hall.

Walter, S. Jones & Steven J. Rosen (1982). *The Logic of International Relations*. (4th ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Christopher ,Thorne (1973). *The Limits of Foreign Policy*. New York: G. P. Putman's Sons.

Hans, J. Morgenthau (1966). *Politics among Nations*. (4th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Charles, F. Hermann, Charles, W. Kegley Jr., & James, N. Rosenau (1987). (Eds). *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Richard, Snyder, Henry, Bruck, & Burton, Sapin (1954). *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*.

James, Rosenau (1966). "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy."
In R. B. Farrell (Ed). *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*.

PRESENTATION SCHEDULE

Your course materials give you important dates for the timely completion and submission of your TMAs and attending tutorials. You should remember that you are required to submit all your assignments by the stipulated time and date. You should guard against lagging behind in your work.

ASSIGNMENT FILE

In your assignment file, you will find all the details of the works you must submit to your tutor for marking. The marks you obtain for these assignments will count towards the final mark you obtain for this course. There are many assignments for this course, with each unit having at least one assignment. These assignments are meant to assist you to understand the course.

ASSESSMENT

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First, are the tutor-marked assignments, second, is a written examination. In attempting these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course.

The assignments must be submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the assignment file. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will account for 30 per cent of your total course mark. At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination of three hours duration. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS

There are 21 tutor-marked assignments in this course. Four assignments will be submitted and the best three will each count 10 per cent towards your total course mark. This implies that the total marks for the best three (3) assignments, will constitute 30 per cent of your total course mark. The assignments for the units in this course are contained in the Assignment File. You will be able to complete your assignments from the information and materials contained in your references, reading and study units. However, it is always desirable that you research more and

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Meaning of International Relations

International Relations is the study of conflict and cooperation by international actors, as furthered by the development and testing of hypotheses about international outcomes. The field of international relations concerns the relationships among the various governments of the world. These relationships linked with other actors such as international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and notable individuals make them interdependent. Indeed, no nation can live in isolation independent of other nations. Whether big or small, rich or poor, powerful or weak, every nation depends on other nations. This explains why all states in the international system live in an atmosphere of interdependence.

Owing to the fact that IR is in transition following emerging realities in the international system, it has become difficult arriving at a universally acceptable definition of the subject. However, scholars have persisted in their attempt to define international relations. In the words of Karl Deutsch, “international relations is that area of human action where inescapable interdependence meets with inadequate control.” There is no escaping from world affairs, yet we cannot shape them totally to our will. There is always interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics, the two component parts of international relations. There are multiple contests and conflicts of interests, which ensure that both foreign policy and domestic politics that constantly pushed and pulled in contradictory directions for the safety and prosperity of each nation and indeed the survival of humanity hang on this sea-saw.

Trevor Taylor defines IR “as a discipline that tries to explain political activities across states boundaries.” Another scholar, Seymon Brown postulates that international relations is the investigating and study of patterns of actions and reactions among sovereign states as represented by their governing elites.”

Quite often, IR scholars view international relations as a mix of **conflict** and **cooperation** in relationships among nations. Power is germane to international politics. Indeed, power is the currency of the international system. This explains why some scholars define international relations in terms of power relations between states. For example, Stanley Hoffman posits that “the discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and the activities which affect the external policies and power of the basic units into which the world is divided.”

5.0 SUMMARY

International relations is a broader and wider term that encompasses international politics. In the past, some scholars used the terms, international relations and international politics interchangeably. However, modern students especially those who study political behaviour have come to question this usage. They postulate that a distinction ought to exist between the two terms.

Whereas international politics denotes official political relations between governments acting on behalf of their states, international relations embraces the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society. Indeed, IR embraces all kinds of relations traversing state boundaries, be they cultural, economic, legal, political, or any other character, whether they be private or official and all human behaviour originating on one side of a state boundary and affecting human behaviour on the other side of the boundary. Indeed, International politics is part of international relations that deals with the political aspects of the relationships.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the term, international politics.
2. Explain the differences between international politics and IR.
3. Assess the view that IR encompasses international politics.

7. REFERENCE FOR FURTHER READING

Bull, H. (1995). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. (3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave Books.

Holsti, K. J. (1967). *International Politics: A framework for Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Zawodny, J.K. (1967). *Guide to the Study of International Relations*. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.

princes and sovereigns. The “international society” approach to IR theory, often referred to as the “English school” or the Grotian School, exists outside the mainstream social science debates that dominate US international studies. Its own rich history characterises its attempts to avoid the polarisation seen in the debates between realists and liberals and by its commitment to the study of what Hedley Bull, one of the school’s chief contributors calls “the anarchical society.”

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain why the international society is described as the anarchical society.
2. Explain the Grotian school of international relations.
3. Explain the view that the international society is the arena where states interact.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

- Bull, H. (1995). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. (3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave Books.
- Deutsch, K. (1968). *The Analysis of International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Goldstein, J. S. (2008). *International Relations*. (6th ed.). Patpaganj, Nepal: Longman, Pearson Education.
- Goldstein, J.S. & Pevehouse, J. C. (2011). *International Relations*, (9th ed.). San Francisco: Longman, Pearson Education.
- Hoffmann, S. (1960). (Ed.). *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Kaplan, M. (1957). *System and Process in International Politics*. New York: John Wiley.
- Olson, W. C. & Fred, A. S. (1966). *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*. (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

into conflict with other strongly held ideologies, international crises are bound to occur and solutions are bound to be more elusive.

Understandably, ideologies may be good or bad depending on the situation. Ideologies give strength to worthy causes, unity to nations and a sense of common interest to peoples in different parts of the world. In examining ideology and IR, it is important to know that IR is a site of cultural practices imbued with conscious and unconscious ideologies. Today, there is a claim that ideological struggles are over. This is precisely what Francis Fukuyama claims in his famous 1989 essay “The End of History?” and later elaborates on in his book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy as a system of governance has won an “unabashed victory” over other ideas to the point that liberalism is the only legitimate ideology left in the world. Not only are there no coherent ideological challenges to liberalism; liberalism itself is free of irrational internal contradictions that lead to the collapse of ideologies. Having no internal contradictions means, that liberalism is a finished idea. For Fukuyama, all this marks “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” signifying that liberalism is “the final form of human government.” In his view, because the history of the conflict of ideas in the form of ideological struggle is now over, all that is remaining is to spread liberal ideology throughout the world as a material way of life, through social, political, and economic institutions.

Today, in many countries, it may be argued that ideologies have lost their old appeal. However, in international politics this seems to be less true. Indeed, it is premature to talk of the end of ideology in international relations.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

- i. What is the meaning of ideology?
- ii. List some examples of conscious ideologies in international relations.
- iii. Identify the components of ideologies of the status quo.
- iv. Mention the two ideologies that dominated the Cold War era.
- v. Did the collapse of the USSR mark the end of Communism?
- vi. What is the relationship between ideology and international relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Throughout the 20th century, most of international relations centred on ideological issues with complicate and obstruct efforts to emphasise long-range problems and needs. The primary issues that divide nations

- explain the rules of interaction
- describe the historical and contemporary structure of the international system
- demonstrate a basic understanding of how the interaction between these actors is regulated by international norms and institutions.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The International System: The Arena of Interaction

International relations occur through the regularised interactive processes among state and non-state actors. These interactions take place within an arena called the **international system**. Although interactions take numerous and diverse forms they can be classified either by **type** or **issue areas**. Issue areas include trade and commerce, security, tourism, finance, technology transfer, cultural exchange, sports, educational exchange, immigration, crime and criminality, etc. The classification by type shows that irrespective of the issue area, interactions are either **conflictual** or **cooperative**. Conflict and cooperation are the dualities of interaction and are therefore pervasive, permanent and inherent characteristics of international relations. The international system has the following identifiable characteristics.

3.1.1 The Boundaries of the System

All international systems have identifiable boundaries outside which the actions and interactions among the constituent political units do not affect the environment. Similarly, events or conditions outside the system's boundary do not affect the actions of the political units. Hence, the boundaries of the system refer to the line between interaction and the environment.

Historically, the Western Sudan, the environment that gave rise to the ancient empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai, constituted an international system. Interactions in this system had no effect, whatsoever on Medieval Europe or China or the Americas. In due course, however, this situation was reversed following the gradual extension of European power and influence overseas from the 15th century. The expansion, which followed a historical sequence—the voyages of discovery, the slave trade, and colonisation—ultimately incorporated the West African sub-region into the European international system.

A system, according to Waltz, is composed of a structure and interacting units (Waltz, 1979, p. 79). The structure of the international system is characterised both by anarchy and by the interaction among like units - the states (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). States have to be treated as like units because their goals are similar. Although states may vary in size, wealth, power and form, they are functionally similar (Waltz, 1979, pp. 96-97). As Waltz (1979, p. 88) contends, the parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralised and anarchic.

The only element of the international structure that varies is the distribution of capabilities across the system's units. The structure of the international system will therefore change only with changes in the distribution of power. As Waltz (1979, p. 99) puts it: "in defining international-political structures, we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have." We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities." In arguing for his choice of states as the units of the system, Waltz contends that the international structure has to be defined not by all actors within it but only by the major ones (Waltz, 1979, p. 99). According to Waltz, it is the units of greatest capability that will 'set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves' (Waltz, 1979, p. 72). This entails that the most powerful actors will define the structure of the international system. International politics, according to Waltz, is like economics where the structure of a market is defined by the number of firms that compete in it (Waltz, 1979, p. 93).

3.4.1 The Contemporary International System

In the 18th and 19th centuries, international relations was largely a European affair with not more than 20 countries fully engaged in the interaction process. The dominant states in this period were the so-called great powers namely, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia (later Germany). The extension of the European state system into the rest of the world in the last decades of the 19th century and the subsequent emergence of over 200 independent political units in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and in other corners of the world has created a truly global international system. In essence, the boundary of the contemporary international system is global in scope and dimension. The system has a multiplicity of actors grouped broadly into two categories, namely; states and non-state actors. Some non-state actors such as multinational corporations, international organisations and terrorist groups exercise significant and often disproportionate

UNIT 2 POWER

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Power
 - 3.2 Indices of Power
 - 3.3 Soft Power
 - 3.3.1 Sources of Soft Power
 - 3.3.2 The Limits of Soft Power
 - 3.4 Smart Power
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The unit discusses power as the currency of international politics. Power is to international relations just as money is to economics and commerce. Power is the central ingredient of international politics. Power determines the relative influence of state actors in the international system, just as it shapes the structure of the system itself. International relations is therefore in essence power relations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define power in its various forms
- explain why power is the currency of international politics
- explain the indices of power
- define and explain the differences between soft power, hard power and smart power.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Power

Hans Morgenthau, the archetypal realist, asserts in his book *Politics among Nations*: "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." Power is without doubt the most crucial of all concepts in the

study of International Politics. Power here, has been defined both in **relational** and **material** terms.

The **relational** definition formulated by Robert Dahl sees power as "An ability to get B to do something it would not otherwise do." The **relational** nature of power is hence, demonstrated with this example. Take for instance two states (the United States and the Soviet Union) which have balanced capabilities. As long as this condition existed, the power of either nation vis-a-vis the other was almost zero, even though with their capabilities, they could mutually annihilate each other. In a stalemate where capabilities are equal, power tends to disappear completely. However, a small increase in the capabilities of one of the two nations could translate into a major advantage in terms of its power. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the power balance between its successor state, Russia and the United States, is no longer zero. The United States is clearly now more powerful than Russia, and can in consequence exercise power over Russia.

The **material** definition sees power as capabilities or resources, mainly military with which states can influence one another. Power in material terms equates capabilities. Using the materialist paradigm, John Stoessinger defines power as "the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations." It is often suggested that a nation's power is the sum total of its capabilities. Yet power is not limited to capabilities; there are other dimensions to it. Whereas capabilities are measurable, there are certain qualities to power that are more psychological and relational.

The **psychological** aspect of power is crucial. Since a nation's power may depend in considerable measure on what other nations think it is or even on what it thinks other nations think it is. This relates to **perception**. State A might perceive state B as being more powerful although in reality this may not be so. However, as long as this perception persists, A dares not go to war with B, yet this is the only way its perception can be proved wrong. Similarly, state A might consider itself more powerful than state B and might wage war against B only, to suffer defeat and humiliation. This was the situation, which made Hitler suffered, when he launched Operation Babarossa against the Soviet Union in June 1941.

In *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Joseph Nye, one of the foremost authorities on power, defines power as follows:

Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast the weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe and predict

how the value of the cards may be changing. For example, the distribution of power resources in the contemporary information age varies greatly on different issues. As we are aware, the United States is the only superpower in a "unipolar" world. However, the context is far more complex than first meets the eye.

The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally. On the top board of classic interstate military issues, the United States is indeed the only superpower with global military reach, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multipolar. The United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the European Union, Japan, China, and others. It makes little sense to call this American hegemony. On the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically organised among state and non-state actors. It makes no sense at all to call this a unipolar world or an American empire-despite the claims of propagandists on the right and left. This is among several issues that are now intruding into the world of grand strategy. Yet many political leaders still focus almost entirely on military assets and classic military solutions on the top board. They mistake the necessary for the sufficient. They are one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional game. In the long term, that is the way to lose, since obtaining favourable outcomes on the bottom transnational board often requires the use of soft power assets.

3.2 Indices of Power

The following are the indices of power:

Geography: According to Morgenthau, the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends is geography. As an indication of the strategic importance of a state's geographic location to its aggregate power, he gives the example of the continental United States that is separated from other continents by 3000 miles of the Atlantic Ocean to the east and over 6000 miles of the Pacific to the west.

The decisive role that Morgenthau claims for geography, as a factor in a nation's power may have been right in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The contemporary reality is that nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles have reduced the importance of a nation's spatial location as a factor of its power. In any case, Russia's huge landmass did not prevent it from defeat by tiny Japan in a naval battle in 1904.

the more established G-8 nations, including the United States. Designing foreign policies cognizant of new technological capacities and new actors requires greater sophistication than in the past. A final reason for the hunt for smart power today is that target populations themselves have become "smarter." With the steady spread of secondary and higher education and the availability of more media outlets, populations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have grown much more affluent, more sophisticated and knowledgeable about their own and other societies, and less easily influenced by the exercise of soft or hard power. These newly educated populations demand different treatment than in the past, as their world becomes urban and more middle class, individuals are becoming more assertive. The spread of democratic practices has meant that foreign leaders also have less leeway than in the past to act as American surrogates, as stand-ins for American power from over the horizon. Democracy places distinct constraints on the design and conduct of U.S. foreign policy just as it provides opportunities. In brief, the world has become smarter, and America's foreign policy elites have not kept up. Until very recently, the Bush administration officials have demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to conceive of and deploy power creatively, in ways appropriate to our times, and synthesising the strengths of the different instruments of state power. Alas, this has proven a bipartisan problem, as the previous Democratic administration was not a paragon of smart power either, with serious missteps in its initial efforts to mix military power, trade and diplomatic influence.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

- i. What is power?
- ii. What are the indices of power?
- iii. What is soft power?
- iv. What is smart power?
- v. What is hard power?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Since power is the currency of international politics, it is the most important issue that dominates the interest of state actors. Actors pursue their interests to enhance their power while the extent of their influence in the international system is also determined by their aggregate power. However, with technological development, power can be segregated into three categories: hard power, soft power and smart power. The success of states in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals is contingent upon the use of a combination of any element of these three or in combination.

The term *ambassador* is derived from Medieval Latin, *ambactiare*, meaning, "to go on a mission." The word gained currency in Italy in the late 15th century and by the 16th century had become the common title for the envoys of secular rulers. The papacy continued to use the term *legates* and *nuncios* for its own diplomatic emissaries.

Modern diplomacy began in Renaissance Italy. Commercial success made it imperative for the Italian city-states to devote attention to establishing and maintaining diplomatic contact with other states in order to minimise risk and enhance prosperity. Venice pioneered the process of giving written instructions to envoys and maintaining an archive of diplomatic correspondence. Other Italian city-states copied the practice, and by the late 16th century, resident embassies had become the norm throughout Italy. From there the practice spread to France and Spain until it covered Europe. From Europe, the practice spread throughout the world.

Undoubtedly, the diplomacy of the courts entered its golden age in the 18th century. The game came to be played according to well understood rules, with a great deal of glitter on the surface but with much incompetence and intrigue beneath. Diplomats represented their sovereigns, and often were merely the willing tools in the great contests for empire and for European supremacy, which dominated that century. Strong rulers like Peter the Great of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia used diplomacy and force, as the occasion seemed to demand, to achieve their ends.

As diplomacy became less formal and restricted, its rules became more standardised and more generally accepted. The Congress of Vienna made particularly important contributions in this respect. To place diplomacy on a more systematic and formal basis, the Congress laid down certain rules of procedure that regulate diplomatic practices until date. These rules were embodied in the Reglement of March 19, 1815, and in regulations of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. The diplomatic hierarchy thus established consisted of four ranks or classes of representatives: (1) ambassadors, papal legates, and papal nuncios; (2) envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary; (3) ministers resident, later merged with the second rank; and (4) charges d'affaires.

The question of precedence in a particular country was resolved by providing that the order of priority within each rank should be based on the length of service in that country rather than on the more subjective basis of the relative importance of the sovereign or country, the diplomat represented. The ambassador who was senior in terms of length of service in a country should be **doyen** or dean of the diplomatic corps in that country. Since the papacy, as a general practice, changed its representatives less frequently than most states, many of the deans at

little risk to themselves, intimidate weaker opponents to give up their gains and objectives. If the opponent refuses to be threatened and, in effect calls the bluff of the coercing power, the latter must then decide whether to back off or to escalate the use of force. For instance, Lyndon Johnson, in his unsuccessful use of air power against Hanoi in 1965 decided to back off.

Essentially, it is pertinent to identify the conditions necessary for successful employment of this strategy, since in their absence even a superpower will flounder in attempt to intimidate a weak opponent and find itself drawn into a costly or prolonged conflict. Three principal conditions are important for the success of coercive diplomacy:

- The coercing power must create in the opponent's mind a sense of urgency for compliance with its demand.
- A belief that the coercing power is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demand than the opponent is to oppose it.
- The threat to escalate conflict if the opponent fails to meet the demand.

Generally, what one demands of the opponent can affect the balance of motivation. If one demands a great deal, the opponent's motivation not to comply will likely be very high. The essential and drawbacks of the strategy of coercive diplomacy have long been established. Although its use in the European balance-of-power era was evidently not systematically articulated, it was part of the conventional wisdom of statesmen in the business of statecraft and diplomacy.

Indeed, coercive diplomacy bears a close resemblance to the ultimatums that were often employed in the conduct of European diplomacy. A full-blown ultimatum has three components: a specific, clear demand on the opponent; time limit for compliance; and a threat of punishment for non-compliance. These conditions are both credible and sufficiently potent to impress upon the opponent that compliance, is preferable. There are several variants of coercive diplomacy. In addition to the full- ultimatum version of the strategy already mentioned, there is the "try-and-see" approach. In this variant of the strategy, only the first element of an ultimatum, a specific and clear demand, is conveyed and the coercing power does not announce a time limit or attempt to create a strong sense of urgency for compliance.

The successful use of coercive diplomacy by President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 enabled him to strike a deal with Nikita Khrushchev to remove his missiles from Cuba. It is on record that Kennedy and Khrushchev did negotiate and agree upon a *quid pro quo*, which ended the missile crisis, Khrushchev agreeing to remove the

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the origins of modern diplomacy.
2. “Nations go to war only when diplomacy fails.” Discuss.
3. Assess the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy.
4. Explain the term, gunboat diplomacy.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Cable James (1980). *Gunboat Diplomacy*. London: Macmillan.

Gordon Craig & Alexander George (1995). *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of our Times*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Morgenthau, H.J. (1985). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill Inc.

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persistence of regimes was demonstrated in the 1970s, when U.S. power declined following the decades of U.S. hegemony since 1945. The international economic regimes adjusted somewhat and survived.

In part, the survival of regimes rests on their embedding in permanent institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions become the tangible manifestation of shared expectations as well as the machinery for coordinating international actions based on those expectations. In international security affairs, the UN and other IGOs provide a stable framework for resolving disputes.

Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime. There may be many rules and decision-making procedures, which are consistent with the same principles and norms. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes if principles and norms are unaltered. For instance, Benjamin Cohen points out that there has been a substantial increase in private bank financing during the 1970s. Fundamental political arguments are more concerned with norms and principles than with rules and procedures. Changes in the latter may be interpreted in different ways. For instance, in the area of international trade, recent revisions in the Articles of Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provide for special and differential treatment for less developed countries (LDCs). All industrialised countries have instituted generalised systems of preferences for LDCs. Such rules violate one of the basic norms of the liberal post war order, the most-favoured-nation treatment of all parties.

Indeed, extant international regimes offer a number of examples of such behavior, particularly in the area of North-South relations. The Third World has used international regimes to enhance power and control over international transaction flows in a number of issue-areas. The Third World has advocated allocative systems based on authoritative state control rather than on the market.

Similarly, in the area of shipping, developing countries have supported the United Nations Convention on Liner Conferences, which establishes a norm of a 40-40-20 split of cargo between exporting, importing, and third-country liners. In the area of trade, developing countries have used the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and UNCTAD to press for special and differential treatment. Through international agreements on business practices and technology transfer, developing countries have sought to legitimate and thereby enhance the power of national government to regulate multinational corporations. The Law of the Seas negotiations have afforded developing states the opportunity to claim revenues from the exploitation of deep seabed nodules even though they lack the technology and capital to undertake development on their own.

focus on power relationships, the neoliberals who base their analyses on constellations of interests, and the cognitivists who emphasise knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities. The use of the term schools does not imply that there are no significant differences among the positions taken by members of the same school with respect to international regimes.

One major difference separating the three schools of thought is the degree of institutionalism that power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based theories of regimes tend to espouse.

6.0 TUTOR- MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain in detail what you understand by international regimes.
2. Explain the three approaches to the study of international regimes.
3. Explain the significance of international regimes to the international system.

7.0 REFERENCES/ FURTHER READING

- Bull, H. (1995). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. (3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave Books.
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In short, bureaucratic constraints limit the choices available to the policy maker. Organisational procedures and capabilities consequently shape in a profound way, the means from which the government could choose to realise its objectives.

Governmental Politics

This relates to the bureaucratic character of modern foreign policy making in complex societies. Participants in the discussions that lead to policy choices often define issues and favour policy alternatives that reflect organisational affiliations. Hence, the aphorism “where you stand depends on where you sit” which aptly reflects bureaucratic imperatives. For instance, officials of the Ministry of External Affairs would typically favour diplomatic approaches to policy problems, whereas Ministry of Defence officials would routinely favour military solutions. In the Bakassi crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon, the Justice and External Affairs ministries would clearly favour a policy bias directed at the International court of Justice, while Defence would naturally favour a military option. Because the players in the game of governmental politics are responsible for protecting the nation’s security, they are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right.

As a result of the conflicting preferences and the unequal power and influence within individuals involved in the process the result of the decision process differs from what any person or group intended. This makes the process intensely political.

According, the bureaucratic politics paradigm then, the explanation of why nations make the choices they do resides not in their interaction in the international arena but within the governments themselves. Instead of the unitary actor of the realist paradigm, the model identifies the games, the players, the coalitions, bargains and compromises which influence the decision making process. In the Bakassi example, the final policy choices made by the government reflect the varied influences and capabilities of the participants in the decision process. In accordance with the model policy choices are the result of a tug of war among competing agencies; a political game with high stakes in which differences are settled at the minimum common denominator instead of by rational, cost-benefit calculations.

3.6.3 The Hero-in-History Model

The model equates national action with the preferences and initiatives of the highest officials in national governments. It argues that the course of world history is determined by the decisions of political elites. Leaders

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Indeed, modern realist theory developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists call **idealism**. As an approach, idealism emphasises international law, morality, and international organisations, rather than power alone as key influences on international relations. Idealists think that human nature is good. They see the international system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems. Indeed, for idealists, the principles of IR must flow from **morality**.

However, from the realists' paradigm, states are rational actors whose decisions to maximise power derive from rational calculations of risks and gains, and of the shifts in the power balance in the international system. The nature of the international system reflects this emphasis on power. To be sure, a hand full of "great powers" and their military alliances define the world order. For instance, two superpowers with their allies defined the system during the Cold War, from 1945 to 1990.

Against this background, realists ground themselves in a long tradition. Indeed, realists believe that power politics is timeless and cross-cultural. For instance, the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who lived 2,000 years ago, advised the rulers of states on how to survive in a time when war has become a systematic instrument of power. According to Sun Tzu, moral reasoning is not very useful to these rulers who are surrounded with armed and dangerous neighbours. He showed rulers how to use power to advance their interests and protect their survival.

Similarly, the Greek historian, Thucydides captures the essence of relative power among the Greek-City-States. In his book, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, he describes the causes of the war in power terms, "What made the war inevitable was the growth in Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta." Today, statesmen like the leaders of Sparta, employ war as an instrument of state strategy and policy on calculations of power. Indeed, today's international relations operate on the famous dictum by Thucydides, "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. Indeed, his conception of the importance of power, together with the propensity of states to form competing alliances places Thucydides well within the **realist school**.

Niccolo Machiavelli, like Thucydides, who developed an understanding of state behaviour from his observation of relations between Athens and Sparta, Machiavelli, analysed interstate relations in the Italian system of the 16th century. His emphasis on the ruler's need to adopt moral standards different from those of the individual in order to ensure the state's survival, his concern with power, his assumption that politics is characterised by a clash of interests, and his pessimistic view of human

nature clearly puts him within the **realist paradigm or school** of international relations.

In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes discussed the free-for-all that exists when government is absent and people seek their own selfish interests. He called it the “state of nature” or “state of war”, what we would call in today’s parlance the law of the jungle in contrast to the rule of law. Like other modern realists, Hobbes concerned himself with the underlying forces of politics and with the nature of power in political relationships.

3.2 Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics

Since Hans Morgenthau is the chief priest of the realist school, it becomes pertinent to discuss in details his realist theory of international relations. After World War II, Hans Morgenthau argued that international politics is governed by objective, universal laws based on national interests defined in terms of power not psychological motives of decision makers. In his celebrated work, *Politics among Nations*, (1948), the chief realist sets forth six principles of realist theory.

3.2.1 Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism

Firstly, certain objective laws that have their roots in human nature govern politics. It maintains that human nature has not changed since classical times. Therefore, in order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operations of these laws being independent to our performances, men will change them only at the risk of failure. For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Therefore, in theorising about international politics, it is necessary to employ historical data for examining political acts and their consequences. In systematising these vast amounts of historical data, the student of politics should empathise with the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances. Therefore, we must ask, what are the rational alternatives from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.

Secondly, Morgenthau posits that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and that historical evidence proves this assumption. This concept, central to Morgenthau's realism, gives continuity and unity to the seemingly diverse foreign policies of the

Idealism is a metaphysical term; however, we are concerned here with moral and political idealism. In international relations theory, **idealists** are often contrasted with **realists**. Generally, Idealists see international relations in terms of moral precepts, justice, trust and obligation.

The approach of this theory of international relations was **law**, so it was both legalistic and historical. It merely describes international events at the time under review. It lacks the capacity to explain. For example, it describes a phenomenon thus, "England breached a treaty with France and then there was war."

Essentially, the idealists became very worried with the events that led to World War I. They preferred a more peaceful international system and a just system.

They perceived the post-world-War I, international system as unjust and turbulent; therefore, they sought a change in the system through a gradual approach. It regards the power politics as the passing phase of history and presents the picture of a future international society based on the notion reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. It aims at bringing about a better world with the help of **education** and **international organisation**.

To effect a change in the international system, this moralistic approach arrived at the following conclusions. "Wars are not good, so they are not wanted."

The aim is to achieve a just system:

- Spread democracy all over the world to get peace.
- States should observe international law.
- States should use their power for peaceful purposes. States should not use power (war) with weaker states – military, economic, diplomatic.
- People should be educated and reforms made.
- A world government was necessary - the idealist looked at international organisation as a nucleus for a world government.

One of the chief advocates of the idealist school was Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States during the First World War. An important development in realist thinking was the formation of the **League of Nations** at the end of World War I. The above stated Wilsonian ideals (famously called the fourteen points) were embodied in Article 18 of the League of Nations' Covenant and later in Article 102 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. They provided a means for registering international agreements and, in the case of the UN, an incentive to do

the politics, attitudes, or actions of another state or states. Such outputs include all actions that transcend national borders, such as sending a diplomatic note, enunciating a doctrine, making an alliance, or formulating long-range, but vague objectives like “making the world safe for democracy”, promoting NEPAD, or Pan-Africanism. Clearly, the scope of foreign policy outputs vary tremendously from specific actions like dispatching a diplomatic note to a friendly government to defining a state’s long term objective throughout the world.

From the foregoing, it is clear that foreign policy outputs range in scope from the very specific to the very general. Foreign policy outputs can be divided into two broad groups. The most general outputs deal with issues of **national orientations and roles of states**. The second group is more specific and concern the objectives, decisions and actions of states.

3.4 Orientation and Roles

The structure of the international system is a basic condition affecting the orientation of states. In a hierarchical system, submission and dependence are the main orientations. This means that other members of the system occupy a subordinate and submissive relationship with the dominant state. On the other hand, in a polar system, states usually orient themselves towards alliances, while those states which seek security through isolation or nonalignment, generally fail. They may be reduced to vassalage by bloc leaders or in some cases, simply destroyed and incorporated into the territory of bloc or alliance leaders.

For instance, in the polar structure of the Greek City States system, the smaller allies of Athens and Sparta had few alternatives in their foreign policy orientations. They had to be faithful allies and pay tributes of taxes and armed forces or face occupation by the bloc leaders. Similarly, the satellites of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe could not deviate from the pattern set by the bloc leader, i.e., the Soviet Union. Their foreign policies were orientated according to the designs of the Soviet Union.

In general, the orientations of most states in a bloc, multi-bloc, or hierarchical system are determined by the interest of the superior powers. The more cohesive a polar or hierarchical system, the less latitude of choice or freedom of action remains for the weaker members of the system. There are likewise limited opportunities for changing orientations and roles. These are determined by the general distribution of power in the system and by the needs and interests of the major actors.

3. **The System Level Variables:** Since states do not exist in a vacuum, any explanation of foreign policy would be largely incomplete without analysing the conditions abroad that give rise to specific foreign policy actions. With only a few exceptions such as Hitler, Napoleon, most governments do not launch diplomatic or military crusades to change a regional or world order. Rather, they respond to a variety of other countries' objectives and actions, or to the changing conditions and trends in the international system or its subsystem. For instance, Nigeria's initiation of ECOMOG was informed by the destabilising potential of the Liberian Civil War on the West African sub-region. NEPAD was initiated by Nigeria in response to the attitude of the developed world to Africa's development needs.

In general, the objectives and actions of others set an agenda of foreign policy problems between two or more governments. The type of response will largely be similar to the stimulus, hence the notion that foreign policy actions are often reciprocal.

There is also the trend towards economic diplomacy in the contemporary international system occasioned by the exponential growth in interdependence and dependent relationships in the international system. Typically, in a world of high economic interconnectedness, those who are most dependent will suffer the most and yet have the least capacity to change or manage the system. These trends create a problem, but how governments respond to them will be determined by the state and individual level analysis variables.

The structure of power and influence is another system level variable that impinges on the decision-making processes in foreign policy. They put limits on the type of actions or responses available to states, particularly the weaker or smaller states.

Yet, another variable is the effect of system values. Any international system possesses certain values or doctrines that transcend purely local or national values. For example, in the contemporary international system, the concept of governance, democracy and human rights, have assumed universal values. The result is the genocide tribunal on Rwanda at Arusha, Tanzania, the Hague tribunal on war crimes in Yugoslavia, and the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe and its suspension from the Commonwealth.

3.7 The Impact of Interdependence on Foreign Policy

The advent of an interdependent world has had a tremendous impact on the nature of foreign policy in two major ways:

1. **Isolationism:** In practical terms, isolationism meant non-entanglement in the complex web of European military alliances and intrigues. These have little consequences for Americans.
2. **The Monroe Doctrine:** The doctrine insisted on European non-intervention in the western hemisphere. It in effect declared Latin America as the United States sphere of influence.
3. **Commercial Expansion:** This entailed full participation in free international trade and access to world markets while avoiding foreign conflicts.

These principles asserted for the United States a major role as a world economic actor but a minor role in world political and military affairs. The First World War thoroughly upset the international order on which these principles were based. The United States enjoying the advantage of its geographical location stayed out of the war for three years while all the major European powers were involved. As the war progressed, early neutrality and isolationism gradually gave way to growing hostility toward Germany and increasing sympathy to the Allies, particularly Britain. America's linguistic, cultural and commercial ties with Britain made absolute neutrality impossible. When German submarines began sinking American, commercial vessels with civilian passengers aboard, President Woodrow Wilson took the United States into the war.

The break with historic isolation signified for the United States the beginning of an active role in the defence of Western democracy. As Wilson declared to the American people in his message of April 2, 1917, "the world must be made safe for democracy." The Versailles settlement was based on the Wilsonian design aimed at seeking systemic guarantees against potential future threats to stability. It was based on the concept of collective security, which formed the basis for the League of Nations. It modelled future international relations on the principle of an alliance of major powers permanently committed to oppose aggression. As it happened, the League was unsuccessful in fulfilling these goals when new threats to international peace developed.

Domestic political opposition and a resurgence of isolationism prevented the United States from actively supporting the League. In less than two decades after World War I, revisionist aggressive states – Nazi Germany, Militarist Japan, and Fascist Italy – determined to overturn the international order emerged on the world scene. The consequence was World War II. The United States was drawn fully into the war following the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941. The purpose of the attack was to immobilise American defences against Japanese seizure of American, British, and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

Following the war, the United States and its allies once again set about to secure the future international system. The German and Japanese political systems were redesigned by occupation authorities along modern democratic lines; the United Nations was founded to re-establish the machinery of collective security. The United States joined the UN immediately whereas it had stayed out of the League. This was clear evidence that there had been a dramatic shift in American policy – a strategic reorientation from isolationism to a permanent commitment to world responsibilities. America would henceforth be fully engaged in international politics. Its foreign policy and its military capabilities reflected this strategic engagement. Whereas it implemented complete disarmament after World War I, demobilisation after World War II left a standing army of more than a million and a global network of active military bases.

The post war settlement of 1945 planted the seed for the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union ceased to be allies in the common struggle against fascism; instead, they entered a prolonged and intense ideological competition for the political mastery of Europe, Asia and the world. On March 5th 1946, Winston Churchill declared at Fulton, Missouri: “Across Europe...an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent.” Far more alarming was the perception that the Soviet Union was seeking to push the Iron Curtain forward towards Western Europe and bring new lands under Communist control. Communist insurgents were active not only in Eastern Europe, but in China, Malaya, the Korean peninsula, Vietnam, Indochina, France, Italy, Turkey and Greece. It was however the Greek case that produced a crisis atmosphere in Washington.

The retreating Germans had destroyed railways, ports, bridges, communication facilities, and civil administration. The country was engulfed in civil war in which communists and monarchists contested for power. The Soviet Union, it was believed, was providing arms and logistic support to the communists in violation of the understanding that Greece was within the Western sphere of influence. In the ensuing debate in Washington about Soviet motives, the dominant school of thought was that the Soviet Union was involved in a global struggle and opposition to capitalism. This school was based on the analysis of the United States’ diplomat and scholar, George Kennan who provided a philosophical formulation for the policy of containment elaborated in the Truman Doctrine on March 12th, 1947.

Kennan’s analysis was that the United States should assume responsibility of containing Soviet power within its existing boundaries until internal changes within the Soviet leadership produced an abandonment of aggressive intentions. The Truman Doctrine offered to

Security Council calling for the restoration of peace and security and authorising assistance to South Korea in repelling the invasion. On the 29th, Truman authorised the use of air power above the 38th parallel dividing North from South Korea. He also approved the first deployment of US ground forces to hold airfields and port facilities. The head of the US committed substantial ground forces.

From the onset of the war, it was clear that the Truman administration would do what was necessary to thwart a North Korean victory. In fact, at the very first meeting on June 25th, Truman drew a line against Communist expansion. Although the president did not want a general war with the Soviet Union, he and his advisers believed that if South Korea was lost, the Soviet Union “will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another...If we let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.” Clearly, the administration would not waver in its commitment to the defence of South Korea.

With the benefit of hindsight, scholars are now certain that the Soviet Union was not in fact behind the Korean invasion. As Nikita Khrushchev wrote, “I must stress that the war wasn’t Stalin’s idea, but Kim Il-song’s. Kim was the initiator.” At the time however, the idea that North Korea might be acting on its own volition to bring about unification of the Korean people would have been too far-fetched to Washington. The administration had in fact intervened in a civil war- a clear case of misperception in the conduct of international politics. The conflict was not created by the Soviet Union.

Instead, the policymakers in Washington believed that Stalin was testing their resolve. As Secretary of State, Dean Acheson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July “It was an open, clear, direct challenge, and it was a challenge at about the only point in the world at which we were capable of picking it up in any way at all.” This refers to the fact that the US had a large military base in Japan. Why the Soviet Union would pick the one spot where the US could react swiftly was left unanswered by the Secretary of State. In his view, the Soviets were calculating that after the loss of China, they could win another easy victory in South Korea and undermine the US position in Japan. He was now determined to show them that they had underestimated American resolve. Since the Soviets did not want global war, if the US demonstrated toughness, Moscow would back off.

By mid-July, MacArthur’s troops were fully involved in the conflict. From bases in Japan, US airpower inflicted a heavy toll on the enemy. With the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution by the General Assembly of the UN and designation of North Korea as the aggressor,

and this had informed its decision to intervene in both the Korean War and in the first Gulf War in 1950 and 1991 respectively.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the cornerstones of American foreign policy.
2. Explain the reasons for American intervention in Korea.
3. Explain Iraq's reasons and objectives for invading Kuwait.
4. Explain why the United States decided to intervene to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.
5. Describe the road to Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

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MODULE 5 BASIC CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Unit 1	Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality
Unit 2	Balance of Power
Unit 3	National Interest
Unit 4	Non-Alignment
Unit 5	Responsibility to Protect

UNIT 1 SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIALITY

CONTENTS

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
3.1	Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Sovereignty is one of the **cornerstones** of the modern state system. Indeed, certain features of the state system are inseparable from it and sovereignty is one of such. The others are the doctrine of nationalism and the principle of national power. Sovereignty is the legal theory that gives the state unrestrained and unlimited authority in domestic matters and in its relations with other states. Like nationalism, the concept of sovereignty is strongly associated with the nation state system. Therefore, some understanding of this concept is essential to the purposeful study of international relations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain sovereignty and trace its historical development as a fundamental concept in international relations
- explain the meaning of independence
- explain the relevance of territoriality to the study of IR.

this is the reason why scholars accepted the definition given by Morgenthau. According to Morgenthau (1948), balance of power is “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality”.

However, balance of power as a theory has the problem of maintaining equilibrium among countries in the international system as one of its greatest challenges. Nevertheless, the theory has developed its own techniques and devices of maintaining the balance used in the past. Some of these are; the international compensation arms racing, the alliance formation, creation of buffer states and divide and rule.

Territorial compensation theorists of balance of power have argued that states within a region or system can redistribute territories and re-adjust boundaries to ensure that a measure of equilibrium is achieved within the system. States would also require territories from elsewhere to share up their power and compete favourably with their neighbours. This re-distribution of territories and reorganisation of boundaries at the end of the Napoleonic wars in the post French revolution of 1789 was a prominent example of attaining balance of power through territorial compensation. In a related development, during the last quarter of the 18th century, this strategy was employed to maintain the classical balance of power system in Europe.

At the end of World War II in 1945, balance of power quickly returned as a way of checking aggression among states. Although not consciously designed, the arms racing, alliance seeking and assertive interventionism of the rival camps during the Cold War that emergence after World War II between the U.S.A and the defunct U.S.S.R, coupled with their allies ensured that balance of power became prominent from the late 1940s and 1989.

Indeed, during this period, balance of power became balance of terror in an international atmosphere of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The development of Thermo nuclear weapons and the intercontinental Ballistic missile in the late 1940s and during the 1950s with capacity to annihilate humanity, ensure that balance of power occupy the centre stage of global politics from the end of the Cold War to the 21st century.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

- i. What is Balance of Power?
- ii. List the eight meanings of BOP by Ernst Haas.
- iii. Under what conditions does balance of power appear as balance of terror?
- iv. Why is balance of power relevant to the international system?

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Indeed, the policy of non-alignment remains Indian's contribution to international relations. Soon after taking office in 1947 as interim Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru announced a policy that eventually metamorphosed into non-alignment. As a policy, non-alignment is a direct response to the Cold War that commenced as soon as the World War II ended in 1945. Cold War describes the acute tension that developed between two erstwhile allies, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

During the World War II, 1939-1945, the allies-United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and others won a decisive war against Germany, Italy and Japan. Despite this victory, the victors could not permanently forget their ideological differences; this led to the Cold War. It was a strange war, a war fought without weapons and armed forces, a war of nerves, diplomatically fought between two hostile camps. The two blocs that emerged: (i) The Capitalist or Western or Democratic bloc, led by the United States; and (ii) The Socialist or Eastern or Soviet bloc, led by the Soviet Union.

Against this background, the policy of non-alignment emerged to keep states away from bloc politics, maintain friendship with both, but military alliance with none and evolve an independent foreign policy. Undoubtedly, non-alignment as an international group emerged at the Belgrade Conference of September 1961. India was largely responsible for launching the Non-Align Movement (NAM) in 1961. In this Conference, 26 Afro-Asian nations and a European nation participated. Besides, three Latin American countries participated with observer status. Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Broz Tito (Yugoslavia) and Abdul Nasser (Egypt) initiated the Conference. Tito presided over the Conference. These triumvirate leaders sent out invitations to prospective participants after carefully scrutinising their foreign policy orientation.

The five criteria for joining NAM were:

- A country following independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence
- A country opposed to imperialism and colonialism
- A country that has no Cold War military pact with any bloc
- A country that has no bilateral treaty with any of the power bloc
- A country that has no foreign military base on its territory

The Conference adopted a 27-point Declaration. Some of the crucial features of this declaration were that it made an appeal to the world powers to preserve and protect international peace and condemned all manifestations of colonialism and imperialism. It demanded freedom for all colonial people and condemned the policy of racialism in any part of

UNIT 5 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is a new phenomenon in the vocabulary of international relations. Since the emergence of the modern state in 1648, the basic principles guiding inter-state relations have been sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as equal and independent members of the international system.

Over the years, these basic principles have ensured that states do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In recognition of these principles, the United Nations Article 2 declares that, “the UN is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all its members.”

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the concept responsibility to protect
- explain the basic assumptions and principles of responsibility to protect
- explain the historical instances of the application of responsibility to protect.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In the Westphalian tradition, sovereignty signifies the legal identity of a state in international law. It is a concept that provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth. This explains why the principle of sovereign sovereignty signifies the capacity to make