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Should Australia remain in the ANZUS alliance?
ART 1: New Zealand and Australia in Pacific Regionalism, Baker

"But it had no geographic centre and was subject to the shifting interests of its allies and
partners, on whom New Zealand then relied for an ultimate security guarantee and trade
...
I have the feeling
that we [are] getting into a curious colonial status (cited in McGibbon 1999, pp
...
”” p139

"Corner went public with his proposed solution ten years later, giving a passionate speech arguing that the
South Pacific should become New Zealand’s primary area of foreign policy interest and activity
...
He went on to call for a return to a focus on the South
Pacific, arguing that, ‘if we do not accept the implications of our geographic and historical situation and of
the dual racial origin of our people, our foreign policy can not be fully realistic, consistent or
effective’
...
The Pacific Ocean is ours
...
Our environment is the ‘surrounding Pacific’
...
391)
...
Australia did not take any sustained interest in the affairs of the [South Pacific] forum in
these years, rousing itself only to oppose New Zealand’s push for a regional nuclear-free zone when the
United States made its concerns known to Gough Whitlam
...
Few in the region would have noticed that efforts to restore
relations between New Zealand and the United States had begun almost immediately on both sides of the
Pacific or will have appreciated the extent to which New Zealand has since sought to engage the Americans
in regional affairs
...
Even this
proved only a temporary irritant, with New Zealand keen enough to secure a free trade agreement that it
was willing to demonstrate a strong commitment to the War on Terror in other areas, namely Afghanistan
and the South Pacific, albeit in the name of liberal internationalism
...
New Zealand’s efforts to sell itself as having a unique understanding of, and role in, the island
Pacific met with such success in Washington that President Bush spoke of relying on ‘New Zealand’s
leadership, with US help, to help solve the problems — and Australian help as well’
...
” p145

"China’s increasing presence in the island Pacific and Fiji’s establishment of the Pacific Islands
Development Forum as a region-wide but island-only organisation have both been of concern to New
Zealand — as they have to Australia
...
When Fiji then insisted that the price of its return to the Pacific Islands Forum was
the relegation of Australia and New Zealand to the status of development partners, New Zealand was quick
to send ministers and officials to remind their island counterparts of Australia and New Zealand’s
contributions to their economies
...
” p146

"Small powers with limited resources such as New Zealand have an added incentive to think creatively
about the pursuit of their national interests
...
Australia has been fortunate in that its allies have
been not only powers with whom it has excellent economic relationships, but also societies with which
Australia shares core values, culture and traditions
...
China is Australia’s most important two-way trading partner, yet the USA
is its principal security guarantor
...
Rather than being ‘torn’ between China’s money and the USA’s might, Australia has
doubled down on its alliance
...
After 1945, Australia turned to Washington because it was fearful of a rearmed Japan
and of communism on the march as Europe’s empires broke apart
...
”p405


Four benefits of Treaty:

1
...


2
...


3
...


4
...


"During the negotiations over the treaty, Australia sought a more explicit guarantee (Spender 1969), such as
that found in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which all members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization are committed to treat an attack on one as an attack on all (NATO 1949)
...
Thus, the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) maintains a
deliberate ambiguity in its text, which has periodically caused fears of abandonment within Australia
...
” p405

"Intelligence experts argue that access to US intelligence technology is ‘critical to the maintenance by
Australia of ‘‘the knowledge edge’’’ (Ball 2001, 50), and many in and around government think this is the
alliance’s most important benefit (see, for example, Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2006, 35︎39)
...
None- theless, the alliance provides a not inconsiderable foot in the policy door in
Washington, without which Australia would be distinctly worse off
...
” p406


Three costs of alliance:

1
...


2
...


3
...
The pursuit of alliance arrangements in each of those
regions is designed to make the global posture of US strategy more effective
...
Of
course, Australian troops have not made the strategic difference to any specific conflict
...
” p407

"In return for a range of concrete benefits, Australia pays a regular premium through hosting US equipment
and technology, participation in military action, and broad-ranging diplomatic and political support
...
” p407


3 complaints levelled at alliance:

1
...


2
...
the alliance impinges on Australia’s regional relations
...
Australia is small and a long way from the USA
...
Writing in 1980, Camilleri’s (1980, 145) concerns are illustrative: the alliance ‘severely
curtails the autonomy of Australian diplomacy and will sooner or later involve Australia in conflict situations
which are neither of its making nor of its choosing’
...
” p408

"Whether it is the perception of Australia as a reluctant participant in Asia, preferring relations with AngloSaxon powers, or the tag that Australia was the USA’s ‘deputy sheriff’, critics have argued that the security
relationship with the USA makes Australia’s ability to advance its regional interests considerably more
difficult
...
” p409

"Alongside the continuing salience of cost︎benefit considera- tions, the reason Australia has opted to bind
itself tightly to the alliance and the US vision for regional order derives from a distinct set of political factors:
the domestic circumstances of the alliance, specifically the deeply rooted and broadly based support for
the alliance at elite and public levels; Australia’s international context and, in particular, the assertive policies
of China towards Australia in 2009 and the region in 2010; and a recognition that the nature of Australia’s
economic relationship with China means that it can be kept on a separate track from its strategic policy
...
” p409-10

"The Lowy Institute’s annual poll has focused on Australia’s relations with the USA since it was first
undertaken in 2005 (Cook 2005)
...
This has been between 72 and
83 percent in all polls bar one (2007 with 63 percent)
...
In an analysis of
public opinion about the alliance prior to the Lowy polling, Goot (2007, 286, 288) shows that, although the
Bush period generated some concern about US policy, a substantial majority of Australians remained
strongly committed to the alliance, with six surveys between 1993 and 2004 showing between 77 and 88
percent of respondents rating the alliance as very or fairly important to Australia
...
” p412-3

"In 2009, a series of incidents damaged Australia︎China relations
...
These not only hurt the bilateral relationship, but have also been
interpreted as an effort by China to put pressure on Australia
...
This assertive
tendency became more pronounced in China’s broader regional dealings through 2010
...
 While China stepped back to some degree from this more
assertive posture in 2011 and 2012, China’s behaviour demonstrated several things of importance to
Australia: first, that China’s behaviour is likely to make the regional order more unstable as it becomes more
powerful, notwithstanding China’s best efforts to mitigate these effects; second, that disputes in Asia are
increasingly taking on a military hue; and third, that China is increasingly willing to test elements of the
dominant order, most obviously US military pre-eminence, in areas it deems to be of strategic importance
and where it perceives the USA to be weak
...
Regional instability was not a hypothetical
scenario, it was real
...
Australia’s interests in this dynamic landscape would thus be best served by
facilitating the signalling of US resolve in the region
...
“ p413


"China is Australia’s number-one trade partner with 26
...
2
percent of imports (DFAT 2012), that this has been growing rapidly and that it has
generated a remarkable improvement in Australia’s terms of trade
...
With the exception of education, the overwhelming

bulk of exports to China is commodities and the vast majority of imports remains cheaply
manufactured consumer goods, for which China adds very little to the value chain
...



In short, the market nature of the relationship means that China cannot actively inflict damage on Australian
economic interests without damaging itself
...
While China
accounts for over a quarter of Australian exports, this is less than the combined exports to Japan and
South Korea, which are substantially smaller but richer markets
...
” p414

"This article has argued that the alliance not only retains its centrality in Australian foreign and strategic
policy, but has been strengthened and tightened in recent years because of the interplay between
cost︎benefit calculations and political considerations
...
if Australia and China began to become much more significant investors in one
another and if the constitution of their trade moved away from easily substitutable
products
...
If this
occurred, the ability of Australia to manage the strategic and the economic would
become much more difficult as China’s potential leverage over Australia would
increase
...


if the international setting changes and, in particular, if Australia’s perception of where its interests
lie changes, then its strategic policy will shift… Here, Australia’s policy reflects its circumstances as
a middle-sized power in an anarchic international system; it is as a ‘price-taker’ of the international
order


3
...
Whether this derives from shifts in public opinion leading to a change in
electoral pay-offs or a transformation in elite attitudes, or some interaction of the
two, once one element begins to shift, attitudes may, as they did in the 1940s, turn
fairly quickly
...
The USA is clearly committed to remaining militarily dominant in Asia at present
and can easily afford to do this, given that its defence spending is around 4 percent of gross domestic
product
...
Equally, while
China is likely to continue to grow, it is unlikely to become the kind of sophisticated economy that would
cause Australia political challenges in the medium-term future
...
The
one wrinkle in Australia’s strategic future is whether it is right to think that US military primacy will generate
the levels of stability that it fostered in the past, and it is here that Australian judgement is probably most
questionable
...
Such a choice comes with distinct
benefits*protection in times of risk, access to technology and informational advantage*but it is not costfree
...
” p416


ART 3: An Independent Australian Foreign Policy, Butler


VERY LEFT WING, STRONG ARGUMENT, PERSUASIVE
...
” p69

"On the Middle East, Australia’s participation in virtually all of the United States’ ill judged, contrived and
unproductive ventures into that region, particularly since the terrorist attack upon the United States on 11
September 2001, have lacked reason or substance in terms of Australia’s direct interest or stated
attachment to principles governing the conduct of international affairs
...
” p71

"A sound Australian foreign policy would give expression to our nationally determined, intrinsic, interests
and values
...
This is deeply harmful to us
...
” p72

"On our Alliance relationship with the United States, we need to consider for how much longer we will be
prepared to be formally identified with a country that: has some 800 military bases in the world; is the only
state that has killed others through the use of nuclear weapons; has invaded or bombed some forty
countries since the Second World War; maintains a defence expenditure larger than the next nine states put
together; is a massive arms exporter to all sides in the Middle East; jeopardises peace and nuclear nonproliferation through its protection of Israel and its nuclear weapons; proclaims itself to be the ‘exceptional
country’, meaning that it is not obliged to conform to international law; and, holds a view of its right to use
military force, including deadly force anywhere in the world where it identifies the existence of an enemy, in
ways that are contrary to international law and the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war; is now
developing new nuclear weapons, in violation of its Treaty obligations
...
This has cost us, to
an unacceptable degree: in financial and human terms, in our relations with others, in the exercise of our
independence, and in a heightened threat to us and our people from anti-western, non- state groups
...
” p73

"The alternatives are not between being a completely compliant member of the United States Alliance or an
enemy
...
It is worth remembering that the
United Kingdom refused to take part in the Vietnam War
...
” p74

"We must focus our policy attention more deeply on our own region and area, that is Asia and the Pacific,
South East Asia
...
That would be a useful ANZAC legacy
...
Most crucially, in October 1949 the Communists triumphed in the
Chinese Civil War
...
In June 1950 the Commu- nist regime in North Korea launched a massive invasion of
South Korea
...
As a result of
these developments, U
...
policy in East Asia was transformed and policymakers in Washington decided
they should construct an alliance com- parable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the
purpose of containing the spread of Communism in the region
...
The ANZUS Treaty marked the first time that Australia had entered
into a treaty arrangement to which Britain was not a signatory
...
Article IV of the document committed each party only to “act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes
...
S
...
Thus, far from adhering uncritically to the demands of Washington, Australia used the alliance as a
vehicle to further its own national interests and to safeguard its security, especially from threats of
Communist expansion
...
S
...
” p72

"This was the very bait that Allen Fraser, chairman of Labor’s foreign affairs committee, could not resist:
“Then if I understand you correctly, Mr President, you are saying that if Australia were to withdraw her
troops from Vietnam, we could not expect full support in the future from the United States under ANZUS?”
Although Fraser’s question might be reason- ably perceived as yet another example of Australian anxiety
about the extent to which the ANZUS Treaty provided Australia with a security guarantee, any nuance was
lost on the visiting president
...
As the president and his advisers got up to leave,
Fraser shot back in anger, “Thanks for the lecture, Mr President
...
As Menzies stated: ‘if in spite of all
efforts to live at peace, a war comes, the business of foreign policy is to see that we enter it with great and
powerful friends’ (Menzies 1970, 44)
...
” p63

"We should also not get involved in peripheral issues which may serve American interests but have nothing
to do with Australia
...
The invasion of Iraq, the current imbroglio
in the Middle East and Afghanistan are not serving Australian interests
...
We are not part of Europe or North America
...
” p64

"Our concern over Ukraine and Russia is a typical example of what not to do
...
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created to contain the Soviet Union and seems
to put Russia in the same boat
...
We mindlessly join the United States
which wants to maintain its position as the Number 1 world power
...

Neither country can claim the international moral high ground
...
” p65

"For a country that faces no identifiable external threat we give far too much attention to military
matters
...
The only foreseeable way in which we could get involved in military activity in our
region is as part of a US operation
...
” p66

"The world is in a state of flux with old certainties no longer certain
...
It
is too early to get worked up about the decline of the West but while the fall may be a long way off I think a
future Gibbon will write that the American Empire has begun its decline
...
Flexibility must be our
watchword
...
” p66


ART 7: A Tilt Toward China? Australia Reconsiders Its American Ties, Lee

"China has emerged as the largest or second-largest trading partner of every major country in Asia,
including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Australia
...
” p63

"White's arguments for a regional concert of powers have also generated strong support from the
mainstream press, and from business groups - especially in the mining sector - who believe that backing
America's "strategic competition" is an unnecessary distraction from the wiser policy of seeking closer
economic relations with China
...
Instead he urges Canberra to do
all it can to persuade America that maintaining primacy is all but impossible and that forming a stable
concert of great powers is the region's best prospect for peace and stability
...
As the argument goes, a stable concert of powers - à la the hundred-year peace that steered
Europe until the outbreak of the First World War - can only be achieved if Washington is prepared to step
back and accept Beijing as its strategic (and moral) equal in Asia, and this, so far anyhow, the Obama
administration seems unwilling to do
...
” p65

"Australia's decision to welcome an enhanced American strategic role in Asia, it is worth noting, comes on
the back of significandy increased Chinese assertiveness in the region, from 2009 onward, over territorial
claims in the East and South China Seas and American and South Korean naval activities in the Yellow Sea
...
” p67

"More broadly, there is little guarantee that elevating China as an American equal in Asia would lead to
greater Chinese contentment
...
Over time, rising powers always tend to want just a little more
...
” p85-6

"While a number of reasons have been cited for our involvement in the Gulf war, Afghanistan and now twice
in Iraq, the main one is that the United States have been involved in these hostilities- NOT that Australian
security has been directly threatened, at least in such a way that our military involvement would act as a
serious counterforce or as a deterrent to any actual potential threats to us emerging from developments in
those areas
...
While to this
day, the merits of our involvement in Vietnam are debatable, we were engaged in our own region where in
the view of the government of the day, we had a direct security interest in the defeat of North Vietnam
...
” p87

"To cite historian Peter Edwards, Australia’s security focus has shifted from defence of Australia to defence
of Australia’s interests and values—although the question of where our main interests lie is moot
...
Our foreign policy
apparatus is talented and thorough–albeit that it receives scant acknowledgment
...
” p90


ART 9: Unbreakable Alliance? ANZUS in the Asian Century, Taylor

"The institutionalization of the alliance continues to intensify—as evidenced by the broadening of the
relationship into such areas as cyber security, ballistic missile defense, space cooperation, and
counterterrorism—just as military cooperation between the United States and  Australia both broadens and
deepens
...
S
...
this is set to grow substantially in the next few years” (Green, Dean, Taylor, & Cooper, 2015,
p
...
” p76

"Periods of structural change generate both new opportunities and challenges for alliances
...
Equally, alliances can also experience new challenges that may even prove terminal
...
As the Australian strategic intellectual Paul Dibb
(1995) has observed “multipolarity by definition involves more players and therefore a greater number of
combinations or permutations of state actors, which can compound uncertainty
...
7)
...
S
...
” p76

"most informed observers agree that China still remains some way behind the United States when it comes
to hard military power (see, e
...
, Dibb & Lee, 2014)
...
Other more recent
entrants into this debate, such as former Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr and former Prime Minister
Malcolm Fraser have advocated that Australia should adopt a completely neutral posture between Beijing
and Washington and, in Fraser’s case, that Canberra should abandon the alliance altogether (see, e
...
, Carr,
2014; Fraser & Roberts, 2014)
...
8)
...
And the impact of those choices—indeed
their very nature—will be determined by the effectiveness of our foreign policy making” (p
...
” p78

"Immedi- ately following the launch of White’s book The China Choice in August 2012, for instance,
America’s senior Asia diplomat at the time, Kurt Campbell, inter- vened directly by condemning the “false
assessments” that were being made in an “inaccurate and overwrought” Australian debate
...
” p78

"Yet with the exception of Japan—whose defense budget has been increasing for three straight years,
including a record increase in 2015 (Panda, 2015)—other American allies and partners have seemed to
interpret the renewed U
...
commitment to Asia signaled in its rebalancing strategy as an excuse to do less
rather than more
...
the perception that Canberra
is essentially “free-riding” upon the alliance continues to generate some disquiet in Washington
...
”” p79


"As Carr (2014, p
...
S
...
Both our ally the U
...
and our friend Japan should be quietly coached that
Australia’s inter- ests on this question may be at odds with their own, although they can count on us
exerting every bit of influence we have in China to urge caution and restraint
...
”” p80

"During the 1960s, for instance, Washington refused to support Canberra’s opposition to Indonesia’s
annexation of West Papua for fear of driving Jakarta into the arms of Beijing
...
Washington’s response
was that such support would only be forthcoming in the event of “overt attack,” and that it would be limited
to air, sea, and logistical assistance
...
S
...
In fairness to Clinton,
this American support was ultimately still wel- come and arguably even decisive in determining the outcome

of the East Timor crisis
...
” p81-2

"Finally, while much of the Australian foreign policy debate over recent years has centered around how
Australia should respond to China’s rise, history sug- gests that Indonesia’s rise could present a largely
unanticipated Achilles heel for ANZUS
...
As that country’s economic and strategic weight continues
to grow over the medium-to-longer term, those tensions could potentially become even more acute in the
decades ahead
...
Because of Indonesia’s aversion to formal
alliances, such a trilateral arrangement may need to begin at the second track or track 1
...

Having experienced severe trilateral troubles of a different kind during the mid- 1980s—on that occasion
involving New Zealand—the investment of time, energy, and resources into such a dialogue today would
seem timely
...
” p1

"Of course, the Australia–US relationship is more than the security alliance and includes, among other
things, trade, commerce and immigration
...
” p2

"The AUSFTA was signed on May 18, 2004, approved by Congress in July, and came into effect on January
1, 2005
...
Keeping in mind that John
Howard had been in Washington on September 11, 2001 to make representations about trade, many in
Washington valued the Howard govern- ment’s response to 9/11, as well as its support for the Iraq
War…
...
” p9

"The Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty signals an important step in strengthening the bilateral relationship
between Australia and the USA
...
” p11


ART 11: China’s Pragmatic Security Policy: The Middle-Power Factor, Tow and Rigby

“The Chinese leadership's apparent adoption of a more aggressive security posture has recently surfaced in
relations with two of the Asia-Pacific's "middle powers" with whom China has cultivated spectacular
increases in economic ties and notable advances in political relations: Australia and the Republic of Korea
...
Accordingly, he
concludes that China can gain full access to and benefit greatly from joining such an order instead of
contesting it
...
” p167


Lecture Notes


Australia and the United States: the networked alliance

The political economy context

- Chinese investment in agriculture

    - Dimesnyion to ANZUS alliance not spoken of - trade

    - Selective outrage - Chinese investment barely ranks

- Australia in ‘a global trading order'

- Austalia and the Anglophone economic hegemony

    - US, UK, Aus as leading edge of free market liberal capitalism

    - c
...
Euro ‘social capitalism’ (Germany, Sweden) and East Ais mercantilist and state
capitalism (Japan, South Korea, China)

            - different to foreign market in Eur,

            - Non liberal, state has large role

            - Odd one out with biggest country in the world

- Foreign investment in Aus

ANZUS

- “the alliance for all the years to come"

- US the hub, Aus NZ Canda, Jap, South Korea

- Aus didn’t want revival of Jap militarism, reassurance US would defend us

- Few alliances have lasted so long

- Object of alliance has shifted so remarkably:

    - Us controlling Jap,

    - control communist China,

    - from Vietnamese communists

    - Indonesia

    - Latter part of Cold War - our contribution to US global balance

    - War on terror

    - Against China again

    - Reborn to fight different concerns/fears

Security Treaty

- Will talk if:

    - territorial integrity is threatened

    - Political independence is theratened

    - security is threatened

Benefits and costs of ANZUS alliance


- Alliance if about joint facilities

- Benefits:

    - US will come to our aid if we’re attacked in pacific (talk about it)

    - Access to US intelligence about friends and foes

        - Higher access to US secret military hardware

    - Because of our loyalty, seat at table at councils in Washington

        - Can be heard if we want

        - Do we have a voice? Use it?

- Costs:

    - Countries may think military bases are aimed at them

        - Openly regarded as high priority SU targets

        - Possibel central Aus base is high priority to China

    - Burden sharing

        - Pay for things

            - New US facility in Darwin - who will pay?

            - Military budget is expanding, other things to spend on

    - Loss of foreign policy autonomy

        - Committed to ally - ability to discern difference between whose interests

Aus’s discovery of the sharp limits of US extended conventional deterrence obligation
62-65

- US can enact treaty however it like

- Provider of security - worried about being dragged into wars they have no interest in

    - Drawn in

    - Entanglement

- Recipient wary of abandonment

- Kennedy admin on 2 occasion made clear Aus foreign policy concerns weren’t shared
by US

    - Indonesia nationalist, Dutch takeover

        - US worried about communist takeover of South East Asia

    - Confrontation against Malaysia

        - Grew out of 3 British colonies

        - Imperialist plot - trying to take control

        - Low level military conflict

            - Aus special forces and Indonesian forces

        - US more concerned about communism than Malaysia formation

        - Couldn’t look to US for support

- Aus participation in alliance wars

    - Korean War

    - Vietnam

    - Gulf war

    - Afghanisatn War

    - Iraq War I

    - Iraq II

    - Syria

The Pacific Pivot - The Obama Admin’s response to “the rapid and dramatic shifts playing
out across Asia"

- B Clinton hopefull for China partnership - now adversaries

- Pivot: not purely military


- Strengthen bilateral alliances

- Deepen working alliances with emerging partners, including China

- Engaging with regional multilateral institutions

- Explanding trade and investment

- forging a broad-based military presence

- Advancing democracy and human rights

- Trans Pacific Trade Agreement

Chinese view of US encirclment

- “containment"

Today’s networked ANZUS alliance:

- Greatly increased role for the joint facilities in

    - US global military operations

    - US nuclear and conventional global conventional military operations

    - drone assassinations

    - missile defence

    - planning for space warfare

- Technologucal and organisational integration of

Desmond Ball

- Joint facilities as core utility

    - Makes Aus useful

- Every gov since 94 - any nuclear threat, we look to US to defend us even with their
nuclear weapons

    - Approve of WMD, “Nuclear deterrents"

    - Reliance is absurd, obscene, reckless

    - Inherently non discriminatory

        - Genocidal in nature

    - Reckless

        - Non proliferation regime - don’t want others to have them

Nuclear Protection

- Global order

- Kim Beazley

- Accepted risk of US bases as targets, benefits of global stability

    - Never discussion of risks in parliamet

    - Questions of democracy

Pine Gap - three distinct functions today

- 1km x 1km

- Original and most important system: ground station for space based signs
intelliengence

    - gathering electronic communications

- Ground based interception of foreign satellite/communications satellite transmissions

- Relay Ground Station for Overhead Persistent Infrared satellites




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