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Habermas and New Social Movements
Article in Telos · September 1990
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156-64 (here
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Habermas and New Social Movements
Piet Strydom
In his introduction to Jürgen Habermas’s work, Stephen White (1988) gives an account of
the latter’s position on the new social movements which, despite plausibly linking this
theme to the idea of a newly founded critical theoretical research programme, leaves
something to be desired
...
Not only does
Habermas’s concept of the new social movements remain undeveloped, but his
articulation of the critical theoretical approach actually precludes an adequate treatment
of this phenomenon
...
According to these and other critics to Habermas’s left, as he perceives them
(1990: 204), his general theory of society makes the problem of social movements into a
secondary one, casts it in a historically insensitive linear mould and, finally, links it too
tightly to normative concerns
...
Ignoring these serious theoretical questions, White is
far too optimistic when he submits that Habermas provides ‘the best available
framework’ (1988: 124) for the study of the new social movements
...
I propose to do this by contrasting White’s presentation of Habermas’s position
with the criticisms and innovative departures of younger generation critical theorists
...
In terms of their behaviour, the communicative model is the only one
complex enough to provide some comprehension of the peculiar mix of strategic,
norm-guided (especially its universalistic quality) and expressive or dramaturgical
action such groups engage in
...


1

Strydom, ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos No 85 (23/3), Fall 1990, pp
...
What is more provocative and
important in the present context, is the further claim made with regard to the quality of
Habermas’s theoretical framework relative to the explanation of the genesis of the new
social movements and the interpretation of their societal significance
...
My argument will not be that what White does is entirely wrong, but
rather that what he leaves out of his account is so central to understanding particularly the
weakness of Habermas’s position on social movements that he is of necessity bound, by
contrast with the subtleties of his exposition in other departments, to give a superficial,
undifferentiated and politically naive interpretation of the German writer’s treatment of
the theme of the new social movements
...
The problem is that he, despite his recognition of the overall frameworkfunction fulfilled by Habermas’s ‘general theory of society’ (White 1988: 23), neglects to
take account of the way in which the theory of modernity is integrated into the more
general theory
...
It is not the
Lakatosian concept as such that is to blame, to be sure, but rather White’s ones-sided
application of it
...
It takes the form of a theory of rationality which constitutes a minimal
intersubjectivist model of the subject
...
This core component in turn informs the ‘social-scientific’ or
‘Hegelian-Marxian dimension’ (White 1988: 9, 128) of Habermas’s research programme
which is executed in the form of an analysis of modernity, particularly advanced
capitalism
...
White (1988: 12930) is aware of the fact that the core or philosophical level of Habermas’s work is made
up of what the latter conceives of as the ‘reconstructive’ theoretical component
...
And that this reductionism could not possibly remain without
serious consequences for his overview of Habermas’s work, particularly with reference to
the new social movements, is obvious
...
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Before exploring these consequences, it should be pointed out that it is
remarkable that White, despite projections to the contrary (1988: 86), nowhere attempts
to go into Habermas’s theory of social evolution and thus to develop an understanding of
what he refers to as the latter’s general theory of society
...
Two reasons are given for this strategy, the first of
which is as curious as the second is unconvincing
...
The second line of defence to the effect that the debate about the theory of social
evolution ‘yields more heat than light at this most broad and abstract level of analysis’
(White 1988: 170), apart from revealing a lack of familiarity with the relevant literature,
only confirms the earlier expressed suspicion that White does not bring a sufficiently
penetrating theoretical vision to his analysis of Habermas’s work
...

Since Thomas McCarthy’s The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (1978) and
the remarks of the editors of Telos (39, 1979: 3) on the publication of Habermas’s essay
on ‘History and Evolution’ in that journal in the late 1970s, for instance, a critique of
Habermas’s ontogenetically based developmental-logical theory of social evolution has
been developed by younger generation critical theorists such as Johann Arnason (1979),
Axel Honneth and Hans Joas (1980, 1988), Günter Frankenberg and Ulrich Rödel (1981),
and Klaus Eder (1985)
...
g
...
It is significant that the major thrust of
this critique and reformulation consists precisely of a demonstration that Habermas’s
theory of society does not allow an adequate treatment of social movements and thus,
quite expectedly, of a determined effort to correct this defect by placing social
movements at the very centre of the social theoretical stage
...

2 The Immanent Critique of Habermas’s Theory of Social Movements
Having provided analyses of the immanent critique of Habermas’s ontogenetically based
developmental-logical theory of social evolution elsewhere (Strydom 1992, 1993), I
propose to present a sample of arguments to illustrate the conclusions reached in the
debate
...


3

Strydom, ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos No 85 (23/3), Fall 1990, pp
...
The crucial point here is that this shift in emphasis is attributable
to Habermas’s concern with the development not only of a synchronic communicative
model, but in particular also of the theory of sociocultural evolution
...
The consequences, as seen by McCarthy, were far-reaching
...
The practical meaning guiding the interpretation of
history as well as the present was thus located not in a historically and socially situated
practical reason but, in a Neo-Kantian turn, rather in pure practical reason
...
At the outset, he pinpointed the specific character of
Habermas’s theory of sociocultural evolution as a developmental-logical theory which
takes evolution to mean ‘the realization of an ordered sequence of structural
possibilities’(Arnason 1979: 215)
...
Arnason
discovered Habermas’s position to have at least two serious theoretical implications
...
The second is that the introduction of the
concept of development logic implies ‘a double closure’ (1979: 217) in that it, through an
instrumentalist reduction of the relation between humans and nature and a normativistic
subsumption of the relations between people in society, allows neither interference from
the material context nor alternative historical projects
...
In a brief yet penetrating analysis
they clarified the role of this model in Habermas’s conceptualisation of the theory of
social evolution, revealed the developmental-logical bias of the theory, and demonstrated
the problematic nature of its implications
...
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on the attempt to ‘project the structure of ontogenetic learning processes onto the process
of evolutionary learning’ (Honneth and Joas 1988: 165) through which society as a whole
advances from the primitive through the civilisational to the modern level
...
For Honneth and Joas, this position implies that ‘systemthreatening problems’ are adduced ‘in order to identify the moral learning process
which
...
In drawing
out the implications of this developmental-logical ontogenetic type of evolutionary
explanation, Honneth and Joas emphasised specifically the question of social movements
...
In so far as such an explanation takes
the historical context into account, it does so only to ascertain formal levels of
consciousness and hence ignores processes of communication guided by collective
processes of interpretation and experience gained through collective learning
...
The theory of social evolution is
solely concerned with the development of structures and hence reads the historical
material exclusively from the point of view of the logic of such development
...

Second, the ontogenetically based developmental-logical approach to social
evolution operates with an ambiguous concept of ‘social learning’ (Honneth and Joas
1988: 165-66)
...
The crucial
point here is that social movements, typically representing a consciousness of action
orientations which are socially superior and constitute a normative advance, learn not in
reaction to unresolved system problems and dangers, but rather through the collective
experiencing of and cooperative opposition to repression and social justice prevailing in a
society
...
It is indeed so that Habermas (1987:
316) envisages as a ‘major task’ the description of ‘the evolutionary learning process in
terms of social movements and political upheavals’, but, to be sure, only after the
historical material had been ordered according to the developmental-logical explanatory
scheme
...
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concept of social learning must of necessity be ambiguous to encompass within a single
framework not only the process of systemic learning, but also the social or collective
learning processes represented by social movements
...

In their research, they proceeded on the basis of a theoretical construct which combined a
normative theory with a historical-sociological approach
...

Hypotheses deriving from a historical-sociological theory were then related to this strong
theoretical component on the assumption that historical developments correspond to the
developmental logic
...

Frankenberg and Rödel’s attempt to apply this construct to the relevant historical material
proved to be an empirical failure, however, in that the material simply did not admit of
being ordered according to the chosen viewpoint
...
First, development is not reconstructed from the internal perspective of historical
subjects and their normative evaluations, but rather ex post from the perspective of the
external observer according to a normative standard he commands by virtue of his
disposal over a stage model
...
Second,
the developmental model, due to its emphasis on the coordination of evolutionary
mechanisms from the viewpoint of the observer, leads to a reductive treatment of the
complex of relations among normatively oriented historical actors and their internal
perspective, institutionalised norms and system problems
...

In the context of his construction of a sociological learning theory, Max Miller
(1986) put forward the argument that Habermas’s appropriation of the early Piaget’s
theory of the social constitution of universalistic morality via the middle and later
Piaget’s concern with the developmental logic of cognitive competences at the
ontogenetic level led him to ‘displace the genuine sociological concept of a collective
learning process by the concept of “developmental logic”’ (1986: 216)
...
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problem of accounting for the precise relation between individual and societal
evolutionary learning, specifying the learning mechanism making possible the translation
from the individual to the social level, and finally of explaining the genesis of collective
systems of interpretation or worldviews
...
He demonstrated that the development of moral consciousness in the
modern period depended crucially on ‘the logic of associative communalisation’ (Eder
1985: 87) or a collective learning process which began at the everyday level of the
practice of life and was borne by social movements
...
This learning process started at the level of the everyday practice of life in those
associations which in time came to form the Enlightenment-bourgeois emancipation
movement or the early modern social movement
...

Drawing insights from the work of Miller and Eder, I (Strydom 1987: 268-9)
argued that one should not allow oneself to be misled by Habermas’s frequent references
to social movements in the context of his theory of social evolution since he by the very
choice of theoretical strategy assigns them only a secondary or derivative role
...
At best, social movements are conceived in terms of institutional
innovation rather than being appreciated as also playing a crucial part in the generation of
new learning abilities and knowledge and in the constitution of collective interpretative
systems
...
It is undoubtedly the case that Habermas’s failure to deal in a
theoretically adequate manner with the phenomenon of social movements can be led back
to his mistaken twofold projection of the developmental logical structure of the
ontogenetic learning process onto society
...
On the other, the
ontogenetic fallacy is committed when one transfers the ontogenetic model to the level of

7

Strydom, ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos No 85 (23/3), Fall 1990, pp
...

Considering the immanent critique of Habermas, it becomes apparent that White’s
emphasis on Habermas’s communicative model without regard for its systematic
extension by the theory of social evolution amounts to an attempt to present Habermas’s
theory of action in a neutral manner
...
Whereas Habermas chooses
the abstract dualistic model of lifeworld and system which loses touch with social
movements, his critics demonstrate in different ways that an alternative hermeneutically
sensitive model which is capable of dealing with the historical and institutional
dimensions is necessary were one to make progress on a theoretically informed study of
social movements (see Saretzki 1988)
...
There is of course no doubt
about the fact that Cohen (1982, 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992), as a critical theorist,
sympathetically seeks to secure the strengths of Habermas’s position, but what White
does not appreciate is the more specific context into which her work fits
...
2
3 Pointers toward a New Critical Theoretical Approach to Social Movements
In the present context, it is not possible to go in any detail into the respective strategies
developed by the above-mentioned authors with a view to overcoming the impediments
Habermas’s version of critical theory places in the way of the study of social movements
...

In order to circumvent the pernicious implications of Habermas’s reconstructed
version of historical materialism, Arnason early on suggested the introduction of an
alternative praxis theoretical position which operates with the conception of a ‘pluridimensional and open-textured’ (1979: 217) social process involving both a more than
merely instrumental or purposive-rational notion of the appropriation of nature and a
notion of association admitting of alternative practical projects
...
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collective identity and revolution – all of which nevertheless share an interpretative
horizon
...
This requires that Habermas’s interpretation of the modern
structures of consciousness and hence practical reason be detranscendentalised or deapriorised to a degree he does not seem willing to countenance
...
In the latter
case, where practical struggles over the institutionalisation of a legitimate form of
organization for society shift to the foreground, it is no longer a matter of general
knowledge about abstract conditions that counts, but rather concrete knowledge of
suffered domination and felt injustice which calls forth insight into the limits of a societal
communicative relation
...

In a recent work, Rödel and Frankenberg joined by Helmut Dubiel (1989) start
from a positive identification with Habermas’s theory of modernity as a post-traditional
theory of politics, but then criticise the democratic theoretical implications of his work
...
Their critique is thus of a
twofold nature
...
In so far as Habermas’s
theory of politics assumes that the state administration is under present conditions no
longer subject to the necessity of the symbolic reproduction of institutions, Rödel,
Frankenberg and Dubiel regard his functionalism as unacceptable
...

This could be done by recognising that in their social perception human beings regard
themselves as nodal points in a network of meaningful relations which make possible the
imagination of relevant topics, themes, forms of discourse and even of the societal
totality
...
Included

9

Strydom, ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos No 85 (23/3), Fall 1990, pp
...
Of all the authors discussed
thus far, he in fact goes furthest in formulating and realising such a programme
...

As regards breaking with Habermas, Eder first replaced the psychologically
inspired distinction between developmental logic and developmental dynamics by the
theory of the self-production of society, borrowed from Touraine, which represents the
application of the constructivist perspective at the macro-level and is referred to as ‘the
theory of praxis’ (Eder 1988: 256-7, 291-3, 300, 301)
...
The
theoretical significance of this is that society is conceived from the viewpoint not of
social order but rather of the contradictory and ambivalent process of the creation of
social order – which means to say, from the perspective of social movements
...
This strategy represents a
theoretical gain in that it allows an appreciation of the contribution of social movements
not only to the constitution of collective systems of interpretation and to changes in the
constitutive structures of society, but at the same time also supports a critical awareness
of the discrepancy between the potential made available by collective learning and the
selective use made of it in the actual organization of society
...

The various criticisms and positive pointers put forward by the younger
generation of critical theorists do not merely correct Habermas’s treatment of social
movements as being of secondary importance as a result of his developmental-logical
theory of social evolution and the related structuralistically backed idealistic view of
institutionalisation
...
It is
against the background of this outline that White’s interpretation of Habermas’s position
on the new social movements appears as inadequate in many respects
...
156-64 (here
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of the new social movements
...
To the
extent that these new developments, however critical of Habermas, remain within the
framework of critical theory, they therefore represent an immanent critique of his
theoretical position
...
Like
Habermas, White sees these criticisms as devolving on assumptions which ultimately
derive from an indefensible subjectivist philosophy
...
The current immanent critique of
Habermas, at least, does not entail recourse without more ado to the philosophy of
consciousness or of the subject, but in fact involves an elaboration of the critical theory of
society which gets distorted in certain respects and covered over in others by Habermas’s
overly philosophical approach
...

The most convenient starting point for a critical consideration of White’s (1988:
124) presentation is offered by his assertion that Habermas’s theory provides the best
available framework for explaining why the new social movements have arisen
...
Since such colonisation
represents a threat to and erosion of the social integration of society, Cohen (1985: 710)
is justified in interpreting this explanation as a revival of the classical Durkheimian
‘breakdown thesis’
...
If one inquires a bit more deeply
into its form, it becomes apparent that this rather crude explanation is moreover of the
linear type in so far as it presupposes a developmental perspective according to which a
historically new situation and concurrent structural problems give rise to a qualitatively
new phenomenon such as the new social movements (Brand 1982: 50)
...
4

11

Strydom, ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos No 85 (23/3), Fall 1990, pp
...
It is
rather the highly involved history of the dialectical interrelations of such major social
movements and the social counter-movements which ran concurrently with and opposed
them, such as the early Romantic, the Socialist Utopian, Anarchist and avant-garde art
movements
...
They drew their cultural resources from a counter-model which was
directed against the dominant modern trend represented by modernising elite and major
social movement alike
...
To that extent they were thus
involved in endeavours to realise a different or an alternative modernity
...
Rather, the social countermovements were concerned with the aesthetic-expressive foundations of society, the
basic but taken-for-granted relation that social human beings establish with their world
which has an elementary structuring effect on their rational, be it cognitive-instrumental
or normative, commitments
...
It is interesting to note that
while Habermas’s linear approach leads him to lose sight of social counter-movements in
favour of concentrating exclusively on the major movements, he is at times compelled to
reintroduce the dialectical vision, such as for instance in the form of the somewhat too
abstract reflexive figure of ‘the self-critique of the Enlightenment which is as old as the
Enlightenment itself’ (Habermas 1988: 63)
...
6
The important point is now that the same stereoscopic view that is presented here
of the old social movements and their respective social counter-movements must be
applied also to the new social movements (Eder 1988: 229, 251-2, 260, 265-6, 268-82)
...
This is borne out by White’s presentation
...
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hand, Habermas’s position remains essentially confined to a linear theoretical framework,
notwithstanding a positive move in the direction of identifying the inherent ambiguity of
modern institutions,7 and, on the other, it remains single-mindedly focused on normative,
particularly moral-political, orientations
...
Locating the
new social movements strictly within the modern context, Habermas (1981; 1987: 393-6)
bases his typology on the distinction between offensive or emancipation and defensive or
resistance movements, the former being exemplified by the feminist movement in
continuation of the classical bourgeois and socialist emancipation movements and the
latter by the new social movements
...
While these latter movements,
focusing on green problems, complexity problems and more generally the overburdening
of communicative infrastructures, are of interest to Habermas in so far as they form the
core of what he calls the ‘new conflict potential’ (1987: 394) and, in particular, facilitate
a change in orientation from the old to the new politics, he adopts an ambivalent and
indeed quite pessimistic attitude towards them
...

It is not without reason, then, that Cohen (1985: 710-11) regards Habermas as
considering it as not very likely that they would be able to transcend their particularism
so as to become carriers of a progressive rationalisation process
...
the utopian
...
as grounded in some of the practices
and ideas of the new social movements’ (1988: 126-7, 138, 139)
...
In any case, not only for theoretical but also for political
reasons he would be unwilling to accept the claim that he entertains a utopia of a
balanced society which is grounded in the practices of the new social movements
...
This becomes
clear in view of Eder’s (1989) assessment that the new social movements represent a
petit-embourgeoisment (Verkleinbürgerlichung)
...
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an attempt to replace bourgeois with petit-bourgeois culture
...

This explains why Habermas (1987: 393) locates feminism in the tradition of the classical
emancipation movements, and further shows the inadequacy of his typology
...

This brings us to the second critical point, namely Habermas’s single-minded
focus on normative, particularly moral-political, orientations
...
In his interpretation, White tends to further exaggerate
this emphasis
...
The continued urgency of this longstanding issue does not take away from the fact, however, that recent developments
concern a different issue, namely, the aesthetic-expressive one
...
It is for this reason that they cannot come to
terms with the problem of the aesthetic-expressive foundations of society (Eder 1988:
275; Münch 1984: 119-26; Frank 1988: 63-4, 1989: 590-607)
...
As a result, alternative
projects are automatically screened out
...
As long
as this is ignored, it remains impossible to deal with today’s most challenging problem
and with the most radical of the new social movements
...

Considering this one-sided emphasis, it is pretentious to claim, as do White and
many of Habermas’s followers, that Habermas’s position is ‘a significant advance over
the views of Foucault…[in so far as]…Habermas’s model identifies common elements in
new social movements which at least offer the promise of grounds for dialogue and
collective action between them…beyond…particularistic and local resistance to
normalization’ (White 1988: 142)
...
It is not a matter of Foucault ineptly fumbling towards the
normative foundations of society
...
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in social theory which is so important to Habermas (see e
...
1984: xxxvii), Foucault
confronts the new problem of the creative activity of social groups as collective actors –
what he calls the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (1980: 81)9 to which the
aesthetic-expressive moment is crucial
...
The broader perspective beyond Habermas
implied here can be clarified by briefly considering the innovations that social
movements introduced in the course of the history of modernity
...
It
regards social movements in terms of what is variously called their ‘practical rationality’
(Eder 1988) or ‘cognitive praxis’ (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 45), including their social
practices, systems of interpretation and goals
...
This means that those practices, interpretations and goals are new
which constitute a counter-society or an alternative modernity and, hence, could be
incorporated in modern society only at the price of a more or less drastic evolutionary
change
...
Alternative practices and ideas
repeat themselves in the course of history, emerging at one point and then disappearing as
though being dead, only to reappear unexpectedly at a later date
...
The truly new question now is that of nature and our
relation to it
...
Counter-movements have focused on the question of nature for the
last three centuries, but only with the emergence of the new social movements has this
question finally become a major concern
...

This new problem confronts contemporary society with the alternatives of either
continuing the mastery of nature, while perhaps building into it awareness of its negative
consequences and a willingness to take corrective action, or of a radical evolutionary
change on the basis of a non-exploitative relation to nature
...
Habermas’s normative
emphasis does not allow the specificity of the new social movements to be seriously
addressed
...
Generally speaking, the cognitive-symbolic foundations of a

15

Strydom, ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos No 85 (23/3), Fall 1990, pp
...
The ‘moral-political’ or normative
orientation that Habermas and, with him, White have in mind also belongs here but
represents a different subset than the currently relevant aesthetic or conative one
...

According to a widely used threefold classification of culture (e
...
Parsons 1964;
Worsley 1984; Habermas 1984, 1987; Bourdieu 1986), the aesthetic-expressive or
conative domain of experience, emotion and truthfulness contrasts with the cognitive (in
the narrow sense) and the normative domains
...
The classical emancipation movement in struggling with the political
problem succeeded in the realisation of rights which allowed the legitimate efflorescence
of the capitalist economy and the mobilisation of science and technology for that purpose
...
The new social movements grapple with the problem
of nature and are concomitantly posing questions about the conative underpinnings of
modern society, thus problematising what motivates people, what meanings are being
pursued and ultimately what human needs are being fulfilled
...

The endeetic field can be socially located and elucidated by aligning the threefold
classification of culture with the societal dimensions of production, distribution and
consumption
...
In the same sense that the new social movements
are concerned with the conative rather than with the cognitive or the normative, they
focus on consumption rather than on production or distribution
...
This is basically what the new social
movements are concerned with: bringing about a change in the elementary cultural
structures underpinning modern society, thus redefining the boundary between society
and non-society, between culture and nature, and transforming our human social
relationship to and appropriation of nature
...

Expressed in Habermas’s (1979: 2-3, 1984: 36-42) terms, for them it is a matter neither
of truth nor of correctness, but rather of truthfulness
...
It is neither a critique of ideology nor a
critique of instrumental reason and even less a critique of functionalist reason, as in the
case of Marx, Horkheimer and Habermas respectively, but rather an aesthetic social
critique14 or what I propose to call endeetic critique
...
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needs
...
It is in this sense that the continuation of the
rationalisation of modern culture and society today depends crucially on our ability to
draw out the practical implications of the thrust towards the institutionalisation of an
expressive form of life and to develop what amounts to an endeetic critique
...
According to him, the most characteristic
feature of the new social movements is their defensive and self-limiting radicalism in the
sense that they ‘do not support totalistic revolutionary programs, either for generating a
traditional revolutionary ideology or for smashing the institutions of capitalism’ (125)
...
15 To
the extent that they are concerned with the question of nature, the new social movements
are more offensive and totalising than Habermas and many of his interpreters seem to
think
...
Given
the inherent ambivalence of the new social movements, however, their rational potential
on the aesthetic-expressive level makes it all the more imperative that we be aware of
their potential for irrationality on the normative or moral-political level
...


NOTES
1
...

2
...

3
...

4
...
156-64 (here
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‘development turns in circles’ (256)
...

5
...

6
...

7
...

8
...
See, for example, Rüsen et al
...

9
...

10
...
Since I regard all the dimensions of culture
to be underpinned by cognitive-symbolic structures, I isolate one of the three subsets
rather that play the symbolic out against the cognitive and the normative, as he does
...
Here I presuppose the following classification of culture and its institutional and
biological-psychological underpinnings:
_________________________________________________________
Cognitive
Normative
Aesthetic/Conative
_________________________________________________________
truth
legitimacy
truthfulness
facts
norms
experiences
science/technology morality/law/politics feeling/emotion
intelligence
conscience
motivation/expression
_________________________________________________________
12
...

13
...

14
...

15
...
Münch (1984: 119-26) offers a voluntaristic interpretation of the expressive
revolution
...
See Strydom (1991) for a more comprehensive
overview
...
Habermas (1987: 395) himself speaks of the ‘new conflicts arising along the seams
between system and lifeworld’
...
156-64 (here
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References
Arnason, Johann P
...

Arnason, Johann P
...
Honneth and U
...
II
...

Berger, Peter L
...
(1974) The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness
...

Bourdieu, P
...
London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul
...
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag
...
Suhrkamp: Frankfurt
...

Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press
...

Cohen, Jean and Arato, Andrew (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory
...

Eder, Klaus (1985) Gesellschaft as Lernprozess? Zur Pathogenese politischer Modernität
in Deutschland
...

Eder, K
...
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp
...
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